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THE PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AFTER THE 
END OF THE COLD WAR: EMERGING NORM OR JUST PRACTICE? 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This thesis examines the practice of humanitarian intervention after the end of the 
Cold War. In the 90s there was an evident willingness of the world community to 
promote and protect human rights. The Security Council got involved in matters 
traditionally regarded internal affairs of states and imposed economic and 
diplomatic sanctions. What is more, the UN authorised military interventions in 
cases where massive abuses of human rights have taken place and this is the most 
significant normative change regarding humanitarian intervention. Thus, from 
"unilateral" humanitarian intervention we move to "collective" humanitarian 
intervention. Accordingly, the UN Security Council authorised military action in 
Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. Yet, although the Council granted authorisation of the 
use of force, states had been reluctant to recognise a "unilateral" right of 
humanitarian intervention. 
Kosovo is the most challenging case that caused a wide debate regarding 
the legality of humanitarian intervention. Yet, Kosovo has set a very bad precedent 
for humanitarian intervention. NATO's violations of humanitarian laws, the 
bombing against civilian infrastructures, as well as the significant loss of civilian 
lives proved that the means used were against the proclaimed humanitarian ends. 
Furthermore, NATO intervention did not bring peace to Kosovo, but the situation 
remains tense. Thus, it could be argued that the 1999 intervention did not bring a 
positive and long-term outcome. This is a good case that can illustrate how 
political and moral omissions can create bad precedents for the emergence of a 
new norm. 
Finally, this thesis concludes that after the attacks of 9/11, the prospects of 
humanitarian intervention in the future are questionable. War against terrorism 
became the new form of interventionism in the new millennium. Thus, omissions 
and failures of the past, along with the new challenges of the world community 
have curtailed the future of humanitarian intervention. 
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Humanitarian intervention is a highly controversial issue. There is a 
great chasm among lawyers and political analysts regarding the legality and 
morality of such interventions. During the Cold-War, states met severe 
criticism when decided to intervene for humanitarian purposes. At the end of 
the Cold-War and the emergence of the New World Order, however, there was 
a remarkable shift of the world community towards a more effective protection 
of human right worldwide. A long lasting debate over humanitarian 
intervention dominated during the 90's. At the peak of this debate stands the 
1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. In this case, an international organisation 
of 16 democratic states decided to intervene in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) without obtaining a Security Council 
authorisation. Scholars of international law, as well as scholars of international 
relations offered various interpretations regarding the legality and legitimacy of 
this intervention. This debate with its various and divergent aspects challenged 
me to explore what the legal status of humanitarian intervention is and the 
possible development of normative changes in this specific area of intervention. 
But, what is humanitarian intervention? According to this thesis, 
humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of armed force against a state in 
order to prevent, or halt mass violations of human rights. Yet, this is a broad 
definition that needs clarification and some restrictions. Accordingly, for this 
thesis, the protection of nationals abroad cannot be regarded as an instance of 
humanitarian intervention. Oscar Schachter noted that "such action has 
sometimes been called a type of humanitarian intervention, although it is much 
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more circumscribed". ' Donnelly, Holzgrefe, Murphy and Malanczuk also 
preclude the protection of nationals abroad from the broader sphere of 
humanitarian intervention. 2 In my thesis, the concept of humanitarian 
intervention has to do with situations that there is a humanitarian emergency in 
a state and the people of this state expect some kind of help from another state, 
that it, in turn, will not only care for its own citizens in the troubled region, but 
for all the oppressed people. In other words, humanitarian interventions should 
be altruistic. Intervening in a place with situations of humanitarian necessity in 
order to protect your own citizens cannot be a pure humanitarian intervention. 
Further, this thesis will not consider cases of alleged humanitarian 
interventions that the official government of the state invited or welcomed the 
use of force in its territory to restore order, prevent anarchy, protect threatened 
populations, or halt massive human rights abuses. This is because there is no 
question of intervention, when a state is invited to intervene by the authorities 
of the target state. Hence, the alleged humanitarian intervention of Australia in 
East Timor (1999) will not be considered in the post Cold-War case studies of 
humanitarian intervention. Farer, for instance, precludes the Australian-led and 
Security Council authorised intervention in East Timor because Indonesia 
consented to the occupation. 3 Similarly, most authors do not include this case 
'. Oscar Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", Michigan Law Review, vol. 82, 
1984, p. 1029. 
2 Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: 
Law, Morality and Politics", Journal of International Affairs, 1983/83, vol. 3, p. 313. Peter 
Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, Amsterdam, 
Het Spinhuis, 1993, pp. 3-5. J. L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in J. L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 18. Sean D. Murphy, 
Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 16. 
3 Tom J. Farer, Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy, in J. 
L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 58. 
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in their works because of the consent of the Indonesian government. Likewise, 
the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina welcomed resolution 770 authorising 
the use of all necessary measures for the delivery of humanitarian intervention. 
Hence, Wheeler argued that with this fact "the Security Council was not setting 
a radically new precedent for humanitarian intervention ". 4 
Furthermore, this thesis includes pro-democratic intervention in the 
wider sphere of humanitarian intervention. As democracy is a polity that 
derives from the people and serves the rights and well being of its people, it 
could be argued that protection of democracy in a state might further safeguard 
fundamental freedoms and human rights. In other wars, disruption of a 
democracy by an unconstitutional regime (for instance, military coup) might 
lead to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of people. 
Thomas Franck noted that there is an emerging right to democratic 
governance. 5 In addition, Lois Fielding argued that "evidence of an emerging 
right of humanitarian assistance to restore democracy is supported by recent 
pronouncements in documents, declarations and resolutions of the UN and of 
regional organisations, statements of government officials and international 
law theorists, and statements in (US) national policy documents 1). 6 From the 
above, the connection of human rights and democracy is obvious. Yet, for a 
pro-democratic intervention to qualify as a humanitarian one there needs to be 
mass violations of human rights, or, at least, an imminent threat to fundamental 
human rights. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis the disruption of democracy 
4 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 252. 
S Thomas Franck, "Emerging Right to Democratic Governance", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 86, Nol, 1992, p. 52. 
6 Lois E. Fielding, " Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: the 
Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Promote Democracy", Duke Journal of 
International Law, vol. 5, Spring 1995, p. 329. 
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by unconstitutional regimes when followed by violations of human rights will 
count for humanitarian intervention. 
Another very important element for humanitarian intervention is the 
primacy of humanitarian motives. Some scholars believe that the primacy of 
humanitarian motives is not necessary, others that it is requisite and others that 
a humanitarian intervention should be purely motivated by humanitarian 
concerns. However, state practice certifies that each and every intervention is 
motivated by interests. The fact that a humanitarian intervention coincides with 
selfish interests of the intervening state does not preclude its humanitarian 
character, if these interests are not the primary goal. If humanitarian motives lie 
there in order to veil the selfish motives of an intervening state, then this is an 
act of aggression and not a humanitarian intervention. For this thesis, 
humanitarian intervention applies in cases that a large population of a state is 
threatened by an "imminent peril", "humanitarian catastrophe", "humanitarian 
disaster", "humanitarian emergency", egregious-mass-enormous violations of 
human rights, genocidal practices, ethnic cleansing, mass torture and killings. 
Hence, humanitarian intervention should be a reasonable response to the above 
situations, but concern for human rights should be the primary goal of 
intervening states, not a supplementary one. 
Let us now explore what other scholars think of humanitarian 
intervention. Ian Brownlie calls humanitarian intervention "the threat or use of 
armed force by a state, a belligerent community, or an international 
organisation, with the object of protecting human rights ". 7 Femando Teson 
thinks that humanitarian intervention is "the proportionate transboundary help, 
7 Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in John N. Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the 
Modern World, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 217. 
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including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in another state 
who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be 
rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government"! Jack 
Donnelly speaks of humanitarian intervention as an "intervention (in the 
narrow sense of coercive interference in the internal affairs of another state) in 
order to remedy mass and flagrant violations of the basic human rights of 
foreign nationals by their government ". 9 Murphy thinks that ((humanitarian 
intervention is the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or 
international organisation primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals 
of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognised 
human rights ". 10 A very good definition of humanitarian intervention had been 
offered by J. L. Holzgrefe: "the threat or use of force across state borders by a 
state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave 
violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own 
citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is 
applied". " This definition, also adopted by Farer12 and Buchanan 13, covers 
what is humanitarian intervention for this thesis. 
To this extent, it is essential to explore what prevents such a "noble" 
kind of intervention from becoming a legal norm. It could be argued that there 
are four basic objections to humanitarian intervention. Firstly, there are 
divergent views regarding what principles should govern humanitarian 
8 Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd 
edition, New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 5 
9 Jack Donnelly, op. cit., p. 313. 
10 Murphy, op. cit., p. 12. 
" Holzgrefe, op. cit., p. 18. 
12 Farer, op. cit., p. 55. 
13 Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in J. L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 130. 
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intervention. 14 Secondly, there are fears that states may attain their selfish 
interests, which usually motivate this kind of intervention. 15 The third objection 
is strongly compound with the second one and it is the problem of selectivity. 16 
In other words, the historical records reveal that states do not intervene in 
places where they have no interests. This fact makes states suspicious of the 
real motives of intervening states and renders humanitarian intervention 
unreliable. The question of double standards in the world community has to do 
with this issue. The fourth objection to humanitarian intervention is the 
problem of abuses and distortion of the principle of non-intervention. '7 Finally, 
the last objection has to do with the prudence of such a kind of intervention, as 
the terms "humanitarian" and "intervention" is highly contradictory, especially 
when intervention is armed intervention. This is why Adam Roberts has called 
"humanitarian war" an "oxymoron". 18 
After having examined what is humanitarian intervention and having set 
its parameters for this thesis, we come to the central question of this thesis. The 
topic of humanitarian intervention comprises various and specific perspectives. 
14 Ian Brownlie, The Principle of Non-Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, in 
William E. Butler, The Non-Use of Force in International Law, Dordrecht, Kluer Academic 
Publishers, 1989, p. 25. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin C. Morris, Humanitarian Intervention 
and State Practice at the End of the Cold War, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds. ), 
International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, Basingstoke- 
England, Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 136. 
15 Dino Kritsiotis, "Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention", Michigan 
Journal of International Law, vol. 19,1998, pp. 1007 and 1034. Vaughan Lowe, The Principle 
of Non-Intervention: Use of Force, in Vaughan Lowe and Colin Warbrick (eds. ), The United 
Nations and the Principles of International Law: Essays in the Memory of Michael Akehurst, 
London, Routledge, 1994, p. 66. Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: 
The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force", American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 67,1973, p. 290. Also Brownlie, op. cit., p. 26, and Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 138 
and Schachter, op. cit., p. 1629. 
16 Franck and Rodley, op. cit., p. 290, Brownlie, op. cit., p. 26, Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 137 
and Kritsiotis, op. cit., p. 1007 and 1026-8. 
17 W. Michael Reisman, "Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive 
Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention", European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 11, No. 1,2000, p. 6. Also Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 137, Schachter, 
o8p. cit., p. 1629, Franck and Rodley, op. cit., p. 305 and Kritsiotis, op. cit., p. 1007 and 1020-5. 1 Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military intervention and Human Rights, International 
Affairs, vol. 69, No3,1993, p. 429. 
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I Yet, the pivotal question for this thesis is whether the boom of humanitarian 
intervention during the 90's leads to an emerging norm, or if it reflects the 
contemporary practice of states that is just an exception to the norm of non 
intervention. Since the fall of the Cold War, there is a remarkable shift in the 
world community towards a more effective protection of human rights. An 
enhanced involvement of the UN Security Council in matters previously 
considered strictly domestic illustrates evolving trends in the UN and 
international law in general. The goal of this thesis is to detect these trends, to 
explore the possible iterance of these precedents and, finally, examine whether 
or not these specific changes signify the emergence of a new legal norm in 
favour of humanitarian intervention. 
Let us now consider what an emerging norm is. In order to have a norm, 
a relative practice is necessary. A norm has usually two meanings. 
Accordingly, norm is "a typical pattern or practice " or "a prescription with a 
justification attached to it"! 9 However, a legal norm has a somewhat different 
meaning. This pattern of practice should be accompanied with evidence that it 
is accepted as a legal one. In other words, evidence of opinio juris is a 
prerequisite. The fact that states intervene in order to protect human rights does 
not necessarily mean that their intervention is legal. On the other hand, many 
times intervening states had received stem criticism for their actions and had 
been accused of blatant violations of international law. According to Article 38, 
19 Neta C. Crawford, Decolonisation as an International Norm: The Evolution of Practices, 
Arguments, and beliefs, in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, (eds. ), Emerging Norms of 
Justified Intervention, Cambridge-Massachusetts, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
1993, p. 39. Similarly, the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics gives two interpretations of 
norm: "a standard which I statistically determined or derived from a number of cases. The 
statistically normal means simply that which occurs most frequently" or "a standard 
embodying a judgement about what should be the case". Ian McLean, Oxford Concise 
Dictionary of Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 344. 
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paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Court is 
directed to apply the following: 
1. international Treaties; 
2. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
3. the general principles of law recognised by recognised nations; 
4. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various countries as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 20 
Currently, there is no legal norm permitting humanitarian intervention. As 
regards international treaties, it could be argued that non-intervention remains 
the rule in international law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter clearly notes that 
"all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations ". Simma argued that the prohibition of the use of force enunciated in 
Article 2(4) of the Charter is part ofjus cogens, which means that it is accepted 
and recognised by the international community of states as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same peremptory 
character. 21 
Nevertheless, there are two exceptions to Article 2(4). Article 51 declares that 
"nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
20 International Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court of Justice, for more details 
see: http: //www. icj-cij. org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute. htm#Article_1 
21 Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects", European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 3. 
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maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security". The other exception to the ban of the use of 
force lies in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. According to Article 42 "should 
the Security Council consider that measures provided in Article 41 would be 
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action 
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or 
land forces of Members of the United Nations ". 
It is clear from the above that the UN Charter does not provide any exception 
in favour of humanitarian intervention. The only permissible humanitarian 
intervention under the UN Charter would be after a determination of 
international peace and security under article 39, the authorisation for the use of 
force to restore international peace and security under Article 42. Yet, this 
would be a response to a threat to international peace and security and without 
such a determination the use of force would not be appropriate. Thus, the UN 
Charter does not include any provisions for humanitarian intervention. What is 
more, for many years Article 2(7) remained a constraint for enforcement action: 
"nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
11 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII". However, it is unmistakable that 
this article does not apply to UN enforcement action and it is questionable why 
states refrained to adopt such measures for internal matters when there was a 
determination of a threat to peace and security. 
In addition, the basic instruments on human rights, (the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
and other conventions) do not provide for neither unilateral, nor collective 
military enforcement for the protection of human rights 22 Thus, it could be 
argued that humanitarian intervention is impermissible by the UN and, 
subsequently, by current international law. 
In order to complete the legal regime, it would be very essential to mention 
some interpretations of article 2(4), according to which humanitarian 
intervention is not impermissible by the provisions of this article. Some 
scholars argue that a genuinely humanitarian intervention would not be a use of 
force against the territorial integrity and political independence of the target 
state, or that it would not be inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations. 23 Teson believes that recent research has revealed that the meaning of 
u Franck and Rodley, op. cit., p. 299. 
23 Anthony D'Amato, "The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny", 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 84, No. 2, April 1990, p. 520. Francis Kofi Abiew, 
The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, The Hague, The 
Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 91-102. Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian 
Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in J. N. Moore 
(ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 
1974, pp. 235-244. W. Michael Reisman and Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention 
to Protect the Ibos, in R. B. Lillich (ed. ), Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, 
Charlottesville, Virginia University Press, 1973, pp. 167-177. Martha Brenfors and Malene 
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"force against territorial integrity and political independence", as was known to 
the 1945 drafters, is quite technical and does not encompass all uses of force 24 
Accordingly, he supported that "a genuine humanitarian intervention does not 
result in territorial conquest or political subjugation". 5 He comes to this 
argument to support that humanitarian intervention is not against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of states. Actually, alleged humanitarian 
interventions should not result in territorial political subjugation. However, his 
argument is misleading, because humanitarian interventions affect the political 
independence and the territorial integrity of states, even temporarily. In the case 
of Bangladesh, although there was no political subjugation or territorial 
conquest, India's intervention led to the break up of Pakistan and the creation 
of a new state, Bangladesh. This was a clear breach of the Pakistani sovereignty 
and affected permanently the territorial integrity and political independence of 
the Pakistani state. 
Another element of Article 2(4) that has provided the basis for arguments that 
humanitarian intervention may be lawful under the UN Charter is that 
humanitarian intervention is not "inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations" 26 Teson thinks that this clause provides a rather strong literal 
argument in favour of accepting a right of humanitarian intervention in 
appropriate cases. 27 He supports this argument on the basis that the promotion 
of human rights is a main purpose of the United Nations. 28 He further believes 
Maxe Petersen, "The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention -A Defence", Nordic 
Journal of International Law, vol. 69,2004, p. 467. 
24 Teson, op. cit., pp. 150-151. 
25 Ibid., p. 151. 
26 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001,52. 
27 Teson, op. cit., p. 151. 
28 id 
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that humanitarian intervention is in accordance with one of the fundamental 
purposes of the UN Charter and that it is a distortion to argue that humanitarian 
intervention is prohibited by Article 2(4). 29 However, it could be said that 
Teson's argument is invalid, because the UN Charter prohibits intervention in 
general, apart from the two exception that have to do with self-defence and UN 
enforcement action, in order to eliminate any distortion of the principle of non 
intervention in the international affairs of states. 
It is clear from the above that treaty provisions do not support a right of 
humanitarian intervention. In theory, it is still possible to have a treaty reform 
that would introduce a right of humanitarian intervention. The Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo recommended the establishment of a 
right of humanitarian intervention with criteria that would evaluate its 
legality. 30 In practice, however, it is very difficult to attain treaty reforms in this 
specific area of law, because it is doubtful that the majority of the UN members 
would vote for such a new treaty law. 31 This is because UN members would not 
vote for such a reform due to fears of abuse by powerful states. Furthermore, 
identifying possible criteria and codifying them are very difficult matters. 32 
Discrepancies and opposition will doom the new treaty to failure. 
The other alternative for the emergence of a new legal norm in favour of 
humanitarian intervention would be the creation of new customary law. Franck 
argued that "law is rarely static and that its evolutionary response to changing 
circumstances may deliberately be to purchase a degree of contextual 
29 Id 
3o Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000, pp. 187-198. 
31 Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert 
Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 255-260. Also Buchanan, op. cit., pp. 134-139. 32 Stromseth, op. cit., p. 258. 
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reasonableness at some cost to its absolute, one-size-fits-all, certainty, '. 33 How 
can this evolution become a legal norm? There are two criteria for the creation 
of a rule of customary international law: (1) general practice of States and (2) 
the acceptance by States of the general practice as law. 34 Article 38(b) of the 
International Court of Justice defines international custom "as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law "35 In contrast to treaty reform, Buchanan 
believes that "the process by which international customary law is formed is 
perhaps somewhat more promising, but still very difficult and uncertain ". 36 
Stromseth wonders "whether an emerging norm of customary 
international law can be identified under which humanitarian intervention 
should be understood not simply as ethically and politically justified but also as 
legal under the normative framework governing the use of force" 37 She 
believes this approach has three advantages: first, it appreciates the nuances of 
responses and the evolution of thinking reflected in recent practice; second, this 
approach takes seriously the legal justifications offered by states and the 
responses of the international community; and thirdly, this approach keeps the 
Charter's non intervention presumption front and centre, but it is open to a 
customary law evolution and acceptance of humanitarian intervention as 
lawful, based on concrete cases and precedents. 8 She believes that "the 
normative status of humanitarian intervention is arguably in a state of 
33 Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in 
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 204-205. 34 H. W. A. Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification, A. W. Sijthhoff-Leiden, 
1972, p. 46. 
35 International Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court of Justice, for further details 
see: http: //www. icj-cij. org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute. htm#Article 1. 
36 Buchanan, op. cit., p. 134. 
37 Stromseth, op. cit., p. 244. 
39 Ibid., pp. 246-247. 
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evolution somewhere between the second and third approaches ". 39 Finally, she 
compares elements in the cases of Iraq and Kosovo and concludes that common 
elements suggest the contours of a possible emerging norm. 40 
On the other hand, Byers and Chesterman are very cautious for the 
possibility of the creation of a new customary law in favour of humanitarian 
intervention. They believe that "only if most states support, and none or only 
few oppose, it can the desired new or changed rule become a binding rule of 
customary international law" 41 This is the hard reality regarding the 
emergence of a new customary law. The world community has to accept a 
specific practice as legal. Some states, or even a majority of states, are not for 
the establishment of customary law. Byers and Chesterman further illustrate the 
difficulties in creating a new customary law In favour of humanitarian 
intervention. They argue that "since clear treaty provisions prevail over 
customary international law, an ordinary customary rule allowing intervention 
would not have been sufficient to override Article 2(4) ". 42 Therefore, the only 
way to establishing a customary law, is when this rule achieves the status ofjus 
cogens and thus override conflicting treaty provisions 43 
Yet, the emergence of a new customary law is not impossible, as law is 
not static and evolves rapidly. A new customary law in favour of humanitarian 
intervention can become an exception to Article 2(4) if the world community 
accepts a legal right of humanitarian intervention. No scholar can claim with 
39 Ibid., p. 247. 
40 Ibid., pp. 248-253. 
41 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, , 
in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert 
Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p179. 
42 Ibid., p. 182. 
43 Ibid., p. 183. 
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certainty the emergence or not of a customary law and, respectively, if we 
consider that humanitarian intervention will become customary law, no one can 
predict the exact time that the world community will accept this right. But one 
thing is sure, rules change. In the past colonialism had been the norm. 
Nevertheless, decolonisation became the new norm because the interests and 
capabilities of colonial actors changed, or changing norms led to the extinction 
of colonialism. The UN was founded on the principle of non-intervention. 
Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter verify the above argument. Yet, recent 
trends in the world community indicate that sovereignty is not sacrosanct and 
that states intervene with the purpose of protecting innocent people from mass 
human rights violations. 
Trachtenberg thinks that "it is increasingly taken for granted that the 
world community has a right, and maybe even an obligation, to intervene when 
certain limits are transgressed-when ethnic minorities are being massacred, for 
example, or when states allows its territory to be used as a base for terrorist 
activity, or even perhaps if countries are ruled by dictators. Clearly, something 
important is going on. New norms seem to be emerging. The international 
system may be changing in fundamental ways" as Haas includes democracy in 
this evolution in international norms. 46 Damrosch discerns a shift in the concept 
of "threats to peace" towards intrastate conflicts. 47 Anne Marie Slaughter and 
Carl Kaysen argued that "an intervention in the traditional language of 
44 Crawford, op. cit., pp. 37-38 and 46. 
45 Marc Trachtenberg, Intervention in Historical Perspective, in Laura W. Reed and Carl 
Kayser, (eds. ), Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, Cambridge-Massachusetts, American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993, p. 15. 
46 Ernst B. Haas, Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes towards the Definition of Justifiable 
Intervention, in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kayser, (eds. ), Emerging Norms of Justified 
Intervention, Cambridge-Massachusetts, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993, p. 64. 47 Lori Fisler Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law, , 
in Laura 
W. Reed and Carl Kayser, (eds. ), Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, Cambridge- 
Massachusetts, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993, p. 100. 
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international law is an illegal action. In our exploration of changing legal 
concepts and evolving norms, this connotation is no longer universally 
appropriate ". 48 All the above assertions are factual and no one can ignore the 
remarkable changes in the world community since the end of the Cold War. 
The discrepancies, however, have to do with the extent of this state practice. 
Some argue that these are exceptions and illegalities that will not be repeated in 
the future, while others believe that this series of changes are signs of evolving 
norms. 
I Yet, how can one detect the emergence of a new norm? How can we be 
sure that the signs of normative changes will finally lead up to the creation of 
customary law in favour of humanitarian intervention? Or, in what cases should 
this law apply and what would the criteria be? According to Wheeler, an 
intervention has to satisfy certain tests to count as humanitarian. Accordingly, 
he set four requirements that an intervention must meet to qualify as 
humanitarian: there must be a supreme humanitarian emergency; the use of 
force must be a last resort; it must meet the requirement of proportionality; 
there must be a high probability that the use of force will achieve a positive 
humanitarian outcome. 49 For Wheeler, the primacy of humanitarian motives is 
not a threshold condition. 50 He believes that "even if an intervention is 
motivated by non-humanitarian reasons, it can still count as humanitarian 
provided that the motives, and the means employed do not undermine a 
positive humanitarian outcome ". 51 
48 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley and Carl Kaysen, Introductory Note: Emerging Norms of 
Justified Interventions, in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, (eds. ), Emerging Norms of Justified 
Intervention, Cambridge-Massachusetts, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993, p. 7. 49 Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 33-37. 
50 Ibid., p. 38. 
51 Id 
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The above criteria for an intervention in order to count as a 
humanitarian one are very satisfactory. For this thesis the supreme 
humanitarian emergency is a prerequisite for intervention. Proportionality and 
the use of force as a last resort are also two necessary criteria. The last 
criterion, although very important, lacks a basic requirement. The probability 
that the use of force will achieve a positive humanitarian outcome is not a 
sufficient prerequisite. The positive humanitarian outcome is a requisite itself. 
Once states decide to militarily intervene in another state to prevent mass 
murder, they have to ensure that they will attain a positive humanitarian 
outcome. Because if we cannot have a positive humanitarian outcome, how 
could the intervention be called a humanitarian one? Last but not least, the 
primacy of humanitarian motives is indispensable. This condition reduces the 
probability of abuses by powerful states that wish to attain their interventionist 
goals under the flag of human rights. It is questionable, however, why Wheeler 
excludes this condition. 
Ramsbotham and Lewer adopted from the International Law 
Association and from Lillich the following criteria for military humanitarian 
intervention (under international Law): 
1. an immediate and extensive threat to fundamental human rights, particularly a 
threat of widespread loss of human life; 
2. a proportional use of force which does not threaten greater destruction of 
values than the human rights at stake; 
3. a minimal effect on authority structures in the affected states; 
4. a prompt disengagement, consistent with the purpose of the action; 
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5. immediate full reporting to the Security Council and appropriate regional 
organisations; 
6. if possible an invitation from the de jure government to intervene; 
7. the relative disinterestedness of the intervening state or states; 
8. if possible authorised by the collective decision of a supranational body. 52 
Criteria 3 and 4 are very essential and are not included in Wheeler's list. This is 
probably because Wheeler did not offer criteria for humanitarian intervention 
under international law, but for a framework of humanitarian intervention in 
general. It is very important for the legal theory of humanitarian intervention 
that these two criteria should be fulfilled once intervention has taken place. 
This is because it fits with the scholars of international law that claim that 
humanitarian intervention is not against Article 2(4) because it is not against 
"the territorial integrity and political independence of any state". As regards 
criterion 6, it is essential for this thesis that an invitation by the official 
government of the target state disqualifies an intervention from humanitarian. 
Last but not least, criteria 7 and 8 are very crucial safeguards against abuses of 
a right of humanitarian intervention. 
Professor Cassese has set a number of conditions for a legally justified 
humanitarian intervention: 
1. gross and egregious human rights involving the loss of lives of hundreds or 
thousands of innocent people; 
2. the Security Council is unable to take any coercive action to stop the 
massacres because of disagreement among the Permanent Members or because 
one or more of them exercises its veto power; 
52 Nick Lewer and Oliver Ramsbotham, "Something Must Be Done", Towards an Ethical 
Framework for Humanitarian Intervention in International Social Conflict, Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 1993, pp. 89-90. 
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3. all peaceful avenues have been exhausted; 
4. a group of states decides to try to halt the atrocities, with the support or at least 
the non-opposition of the majority of Members States of the UN; 
5. armed force is exclusively used for the limited purpose of stopping the 
atrocities and restoring respect for human right, not for any goal beyond this 
limited purpose. Consequently, the use of force must be discontinued as soon as 
this purpose is attained. 53 
From this exploration, conditions 2 and 4 are very interesting because a prior 
Security Council consultation and acceptance by UN Member States is a 
requisite. 
Very significant are the criteria worded in two recent reports. The ICISS 
"Responsibility to Protect" advances six criteria for military intervention: right 
authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and 
reasonable prospects. 54 As regards the right authority, it means who can 
authorise military intervention (according to this report the UN is the 
competent organisation to authorise military intervention). Another report, the 
December 2004 High-Level Panel Report, suggested six criteria of legitimacy 
that the Security Council should always address in considering whether to 
authorise or apply military force: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last 
resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences. 55 
Stromseth argued that a careful examination and comparison of the Kosovo 
intervention and earlier intervention to protect the Kurds following the Gulf 
53 Antonio Cassese, "Ex Iniuria his Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation 
of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? ", European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 27. 
sa The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Responsibility 
to protect, IDRC Publishers, Ottawa, 2002, p. 32. 
53 A/59/565,2 December 2004. 
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War suggest the contours of a possible emerging norm. 56 This is a very 
interesting approach that results to undisputable signs of evolution in the world 
community's normative framework. The contours of a possible norm that she 
detects from these two cases are: same threshold conditions (mass violation of 
human rights involving loss of life); the UN Security Council was unable to act 
because of a veto threat; the Security Council did not criticise or condemn the 
action undertaken; diplomatic means had been exhausted; proportionality; 
common humanitarian purpose and effect; both interventions were collective; 
the intervening states offered legal justifications (previous Security Council 
resolutions adopted under Chapter VII that characterised the situation as a 
threat to peace and security); both interventions were welcomed by the 
population that was bearing the brunt of atrocities; and, finally, both 
interventions had a reasonable prospect of success in achieving their 
humanitarian objectives. 57 
The outcomes of this comparison are valuable and are founded on state 
practice; they are not simply a theory. Yet, she thinks that this approach for an 
incremental change under international customary law has some drawbacks: 
there are relatively few cases to provide data points making it hard to say 
definitively that a new norm is emerging or what its contours are; states may 
not explain clearly the legal justification for their action; abuses by powerful 
states. 58 Moreover, she did not examine other cases that lead to entirely 
different contours. For instance, ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone have not many things in common with Kosovo and Iraq. The lack of a 
previous Security Council resolution characterising the situation as a threat to 
56 Stromseth, op. cit., p. 248. 
57 Ibid., pp. 246-252. 
59 Ibid., p. 253. 
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peace and security is obvious. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that these are 
two of the most important cases in support of humanitarian intervention. On the 
whole, however, it could be said that her method of research is very interesting 
and brings light in the presumable signs of evolution in the world order. 
Various aspects had been examined so far regarding the contours of an 
emerging norm. For this thesis, those criteria result from state practice and the 
behaviour of state in a parallel examination of what the world community 
considers legal or what the world community is ready to accept as legal. World 
politics are a very significant factor for the creation of a new norm, as the 
practice of states does not reflect international law, but choices in the 
international political stage. If, in turn, the world community embraces these 
political choices and starts to consider them as legal responses of states, then 
the creation of international customary law is undisputable. Thus, political 
choices of states should not be underestimated when considering the evolution 
of a new norm. On the other hand, the matter of legality is likewise valuable in 
order to establish new customary law. For this purpose, the criteria for 
humanitarian intervention will derive from an exploration of state practice. This 
thesis will include some of the criteria listed above, as well as some that had 
been detected through the exploration of this thesis. These criteria are: 
1. humanitarian emergency with thousands of lives threatened by egregious 
abuses of fundamental human rights and mass murder; 
2. peaceful remedies have to be tried and exhausted; 
3. proportionality is a basic prerequisite. Those in need of humanitarian aid 
should not be harmed by the ones that are supposed to save them. The means 
used should not be against the humanitarian ends. 
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4. primacy of the humanitarian motives and not of any other goal of intervening 
states; 
5. relative disinterestedness of intervening states; 
6. prior Security Council consultation of the matter; 
7. Security Council ineffectiveness because of a veto threat; 
8. prior Security Council resolution deploring the situation in a state or 
characterising it a threat to international peace and security; 
9. lack of condemnation in the Security Council; 
10. the action should be collective; 
11. there must be a minimal effect on authority structures in the affected states; 
12. immediate withdrawal of troops as soon as the humanitarian objective has 
been attained; 
13. intervention should be welcomed by the threatened population; 
14. a reasonable prospect of success that will lead to a positive humanitarian 
outcome and not to failure. 
15. this outcome should have the prospects for a long-term resolution of the 
conflict. 
Drawbacks for the crystallisation of a new customary law are: selectivity, 
abuses of such a right, failures of alleged humanitarian interventions, and the 




The first two chapters represent an introduction to humanitarian 
intervention, definitions, specifications, research questions methodology, 
analysis of basic concepts for this thesis, parameters of an emerging norm and 
non-intervention. This thesis further includes a brief consideration of 
humanitarian intervention during the Cold War. It carefully examines the 
justifications of intervening states at this specific time and the reactions of the 
world community. This is essential for this thesis, in order to illustrate the 
changes in the world community through a confrontation of the past and the 
recent trends. Therefore, Chapter 3 will have to do with the Cold War instances 
of humanitarian intervention. There will be a brief analysis of the pivotal 
interventions, which include the Belgian intervention in the Congo (1960), the 
Belgian and US intervention in the Congo (1964), the US intervention in the 
Dominican Republic (1965), the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea 
(1978), the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda (1979), the French intervention 
in the Central African Empire (1979), the US intervention in Grenada (1983) 
and the US intervention in Panama (1989). India will be examined in a 
subchapter, as it is, according to this thesis, the leading case of humanitarian 
intervention during the Cold War. This is because of the incontestable 
magnitude of the human tragedy, the slaughter and genocide of several millions 
of Bengalis, the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, the 
justifications offered and the doubtless positive humanitarian impacts in the 
region. 
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On the other hand, Chapter 4 will consist of the examination of the 
following post-Cold War cases: French, US and UK intervention in northern 
Iraq (1991), NATO intervention in Yugoslavia (1992), ECOWAS intervention 
in Liberia (1991), US-led intervention in Somalia (1992), French intervention 
in Rwanda (1994), US intervention in Haiti (1994), and ECOWAS intervention 
in Sierra Leone (1997). Through the exploration of these cases I will try to 
trace the reactions of the world community towards humanitarian intervention, 
the nascent trends in this specific area, and the possible precedents they have 
set. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will focus on the top-ranking humanitarian 
intervention, NATO's intervention in Kosovo (1999). This is the leading 
humanitarian intervention after the end of the Cold War and, in turn, this is the 
main case study of this thesis. Hence, this chapter is divided in 5 subchapters, 
including the background of the conflict, the legal questions, political motives 
and selfish interests, moral and ethical aspects and, finally, the future status of 
this Serbian province and its compatibility with the theory of humanitarian 
intervention. 
This structure illustrates another important element of this thesis. 
According to this thesis, the establishment of a legal norm requires both 
legal/moral and political considerations. For the creation of a customary rule 
state practice is a requisite. Buchanan notably argued that "in fact it appears 
that significant change through the development of new customary law will 
usually, if not always, require illegality ". 59 Therefore, the research and analysis 
of each case will be divided in three stages: legal, moral and political, except 
for the Cold War cases (only the Indian intervention in East Pakistan will be 
59 Buchanan, op. cit., p. 135. 
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examined from the three several aspects separately). Moral and political 
imperatives, as well as legal considerations can lead to the creation of a stark 
new norm. The same factors can also suppress the emergence of a new norm. 
From this contradistinction valuable connotations can be made. Very useful 
lessons can be taken by the emergence of decolonisation in an era that imperial 
states used to get millions of goods from their colonies. The abolition of slavery 
that was a factor in favour of decolonisation was a result of moral and political 
considerations, that later became legal imperative. The same happened with 
decolonisation. One of the reasons that led up to the emergence of the new 
norm is the fact that the interests and the capabilities of the relevant actors 
changed. 60 In addition, moral voices led to the abolition of slavery. 61 
As regards to the used materials, I used books regarding the use of 
force, humanitarian intervention, international law and the use of force. The 
articles from various journals of international law and international relations 
were also quite useful. As regards to the primary sources, most of them come 
from the United Nations (Security Council and General Assembly documents 
mostly). I also used material from the International Court of Justice, the OAS, 
EU, COE, OSCE, AU, NATO and other sources. Further, in the case of Kosovo 
the analysis of primary documents and bibliography is not the sole source of 
my research. I have travelled twice to Yugoslavia, where I met some 
distinguished people and I got some information for the history of Kosovo, the 
pre-war and the post-war Yugoslavia. My visit there helped me explore various 
issues that I did not know from the existing bibliography. Thus, this 
information has helped me to explore and develop some further points in my 
60 Crawford, op. cit., p. 38. 
61 Ibid., p. 51. 
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thesis. In Yugoslavia I got some interviews and I discussed with intellectual 
people on various subjects. In addition I got some books from Yugoslavia, 
primarily special editions of the Serb Orthodox Patriarchate. These editions 
have to do with the historical, cultural and religious life of Kosovo before and 
after the bombings. Nevertheless, I used these books and the interviews in only 
few instances. Most of my work depends on the exploration of primary sources, 
documents and the current bibliography regarding the Kosovo intervention. 
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CHAPTER 2 
This chapter will have to deal with three different issues. First of all, 
there will be a brief reference to non-intervention. After some definitions and 
clarifications of matters relating to non-intervention, there will be a brief 
reference to early theories of non-intervention. Examination of both natural and 
positive law on this issue will be included. In the last stage, there will be an 
examination of the status of non-intervention after the creation of the UN 
Charter and whether or not this principle has survived after 1945. The second 
topic has to do with pro-democratic intervention, as a specific part of 
humanitarian intervention. Basic goal of this part is to clarify whether pro- 
democratic intervention can count as a humanitarian one, which its parameters 
should be and what are the evolving trends in this specific area of law. The last 
part will consist of the arguments and interpretations of various scholars 
regarding normative changes in the area of humanitarian intervention. Is 
humanitarian intervention becoming a norm, or the boom of humanitarian 
intervention in the 90s was a significant exception to the norm of non- 
intervention? All the above issues will be explored right away. 
NON-INTERVENTION 
An approximate definition of intervention and no-intervention is given 
by R. J. Vincent: "that activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a 
group of states or an international organisation which interferes coercively in 
the domestic affairs of another state. It is a discreet event having a beginning 
29 
and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state. It is not 
necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of 
international relations... Intervention having been defined, nonintervention 
might be said to be the circumstance in which intervention does not occur". 1 
There are three types of intervention: military, economic and political 
intervention. 2 The purposes of intervention are: the balance of power, the 
interests of humanity, and the maintenance of ideological solidarity. 3 Vincent 
believes that "the rule of nonintervention can be said to derive from and 
require respect for the principle of state sovereignty... If a state has a right to 
sovereignty, this implies that other states have a duty to respect that right by, 
among other things, refraining from intervention in its domestic affairs. The 
principle of non intervention identifies the right of states to sovereignty as a 
standard in international society and makes explicit the respect required for it 
in abstention from intervention. The function of the principle of nonintervention 
in international relations might be said, then, to be one of protecting the 
principle of state sovereignty". 
The early views on non-intervention are very important for the 
principle of non-intervention. Among the naturalist's international lawyers, 
Grotius can be taken as a precursor of the notion, because he conceived of 
international law as a law which existed between sovereign states. 5 However, 
the principle of non-intervention fords its first explicit manifestation in the 
writings of Wolff and Vattel, although neither of them used the word 
1 R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and international world order, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1974, p. 13. 
2 Ibid., p. 9 
3 Ibid., p. 11 
° Ibid., p. 14. 
5 Ibid., p. 22. 
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intervention. 6 In particular, Wolff argued that "by nature no nation has the 
right to any act which belongs to the exercise of the sovereignty of another 
nation, for sovereignty, as it exists in a people or originally in a nation, is 
absolute ". 7 Yet, he does allow a limited right of intercession on behalf of 
subjects "too heavily burdened or too harshly treated" by their sovereign, but 
draws line at the use of force. 8 Similarly, Vattel noted "Of all the rights 
possessed by a nation, that of sovereignty is doubtless the most important and 
the one which others should most carefully respect if they are desirous not to 
give cause for offence ". 9 He further argued that "no foreign power has any 
right to interfere otherwise by its good offices, unless it be requested to do so or 
be led to do so by special reasons. To intermeddle in the domestic affairs of 
another Nation or to undertake to constrain its councils is to do it an injury". 10 
For him, there were only two notable exceptions to the rule of non-intervention: 
intervention on the just side in a civil war and intervention in the interests of 
the balance of power. " 
On the other hand, the positivist school of international law was 
adherent to the principle of non-intervention. Martens, for instance, argued that 
`foreign nations having not the least right to interfere in arrangements which 
are purely domestic ". 12 James Kent noted that "no state is entitled to take 
cognizance or notice of the domestic administration of another state, or of what 
passes within it as between the government and its own citizens". 13 Likewise, 
6 Ibid., p. 26. 
7 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 17. Also Vincent, op. cit., p. 28. 
9 Vincent, op. cit., p. 30. 
10 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 18. 
" Vincent, op. cit., p. 30. 
12 Ibid., p. 32. 
13 Ibid., p. 32. 
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Henry Wheaton noted that "non-interference is the general rule ,,. 14 W. E. Hall 
took the nest step by regarding the absence of interference from other states as 
a defining characteristic of the right of independence. 15 T. W. Lawrence argued 
that states should intervene very sparingly, and on the clearest grounds of 
justice and necessity. 16 Finally, Mountague Bernard echoed Wolff 's absolute 
principle of non-intervention. 17 
It is clear from the above, that both schools advanced the principle of 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states. It would be necessary, 
however, to make notion of some doctrinal theories on non-intervention. 
Richard Cobden wished to see the principle of non-intervention win general 
acceptance as a rule of international conduct. 18 John Stuart Mill tempted to 
clarify the grounds upon which it was justifiable to intervene in the affairs of 
other countries. He made a distinction between rules applicable in the relations 
of civilised nations and those which were relevant to conduct towards 
"barbarians". 19 For Immanuel Kant, "no state shall forcibly interfere in the 
constitution and government of another state ,. 20 Last but not least, Joseph 
Mazzini saw the origin of the principle of non-intervention as an offspring of 
the theory of human rights which was the legacy of the eighteenth century 
thought in Europe 21 Mazzini strongly criticised the doctrines on non- 
intervention. He believed that the non-intervention principle after 1815 meant 
"intervention on the wrong side; intervention by all who choose, and are 
'4 Ibid., p. 34. 
13 Ibid., p. 36- 
16 Ibid., p. 37. 
17 Ibid., p. 38. 
'g Ibid., p. 45. 
19 Ibid., pp. 53-55. 
20 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 20 and Vincent, op. cit., p. 56. 
21 Vincent, op. cit., p. 59. 
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strong enough, to put down free movements of peoples against corrupt 
governments. It means cooperation with despots against peoples, but no 
cooperation ofpeoples against despots" 22 
Having examined theories on non-intervention, it would be very 
essential to explore what happened after the creation of the UN Charter. It 
seems that the UN members were devoted to state sovereignty and the principle 
of non-intervention. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter clearly states that "all 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations ". In 
addition, Article 2(7) declares that "nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII". Vaughan Lowe argued that both articles are framed in a general manner. 23 
Vincent also detected that "nowhere in the Charter is the principle of 
nonintervention explicitly laid down as a rule governing the relations between 
the members of the United Nations". 24 He thinks that Article 2(7) supports the 
principle of non-intervention, but it was to apply to relations between the UN as 
an organisation and its several members, and not to relations between the 
members themselves. 25 
22 Ibid., p. 60. 
23 Vaughan Lowe, The Principle of Non-Intervention: Use of Force, in Vaughan Lowe and 
Colin Warbrick (eds. ), The United Nations and the Principles of International Law: Essays in 
the Memory of Michael Akehurst, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 68. 24 Vincent, op. cit., p. 234. 
23 Ibid., p. 235. 
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Yet, it could be argued that there is a clear support from the Charter to 
the principle of non-intervention. Although the Charter fails to explicitly 
support this principle, it is clearly evident in Articles 2(4) and 2(7), as well as 
in 2(1) that declares that "the organisation is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its members ". Further, Article 2(4) bans any form of 
military intervention. But if there are any ambiguities on the Charter's purposes 
and principles, there is a series of General Assembly resolutions regarding the 
principle of non-intervention. First, in 1949, the Essentials of Peace Resolution 
called upon every nation to "refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, 
aimed at impairing the freedom, independence, or integrity of any State, or at 
fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State ". 26 In 
addition, the Peace Through Deeds Resolution condemned the "intervention of 
any State in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of changing its 
legally established government by the threat or use of force ". 27 Vincent argued 
that with these resolutions the implicit noninterventionism of the Charter began 
to be made explicit in the practice of the United Nations. 28 
In 1957, the Declaration Concerning the Peaceful Coexistence of 
States demanded "respect for each other's sovereignty, equality and territorial 
integrity and non-intervention in one another's internal affairs" 29 Moreover, 
in 1965, the Assembly adopted resolution 2131, which declared that "No State 
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed 
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
26 General Assembly Resolution 290,1 December 1949. 
27 General Assembly Resolution 380,17 November 1950. 
28 Vincent, op. cit., p. 237. 
29 General Assembly Resolution 1236,14 December 1957. 
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personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements 
are condemned ". 30 In 1966, the Assembly adopted the Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Independence and Sovereignty, where it considered its duty to 
"urge the immediate cessation of intervention, whatever its form, to condemn it 
as a basic source of danger to the cause of world peace ". 31 
In 1970, another important resolution had been adopted by the UN 
General Assembly. The Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations declared that "No State has the right to 
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all 
other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the 
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation 
of international law . 32 Last but not least, the General Assembly adopted the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the 
Internal Affairs of States, which includes everything the previous resolutions 
declared, but, apart from armed intervention, it also added other kinds of 
intervention, such as economic sanctions. 33 
It is clear from the above that the principle of non-intervention remains 
pivotal in the international relations of states after the foundation of the UN. 
The UN Charter, as well as the General Assembly resolutions can certify its 
importance. But this is only the theory. In practice, things are quite different. 
30 General Assembly Resolution 2131,21 December 1965 
31 General Assembly Resolution 2225,19 December 1966. 
32 General Assembly Resolution 2625,24 October 1970. 
33 General Assembly Resolution 36/103,9December 1981. 
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Vaughan Lowe wonders why anyone should suppose that it exists, as "the very 
terrain of history is mapped out on the grid of intervention ,,. 34 Thus, he 
concludes that, "on the one hand, we have a continuous tradition of legal 
formulations of the principle of non-intervention. On the other hand, there is an 
equal continuous tradition of intervention in the affairs of foreign states. There 
is plainly a long standing contrast between the word and the deed. Non 
intervention is preached, but not practiced". 35 This is a quite acute argument of 
Lowe. Although non-intervention is the rule, the practice proves the contrary. 
From the creation of the UN until recently we have a plethora of interventions 
in various states. This is an evident contradiction of theory and practice. Yet, it 
is obvious that the principle of non-intervention is pivotal in the international 
relations of states. 
34 Lowe, op. cit., p. 67. 
35 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
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PRO-DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTIONS 
After the end of the Cold War self-determination became a very 
important principle in international relations. Self-determination should not 
only be regarded as the main purpose for decolonisation, but as an historical 
root from which grew the democratic entitlement 36 Thomas Franck supports 
that there is an emerging right to democratic governance. 37 He thinks that 
democracy is becoming these days a normative rule of the international 
system. 38 After the end of the Cold War the right to democratic governance 
grew sharply and at the beginnings of the 90's it could be seen that almost two 
thirds of the world were governed by democratic regimes. 39 This was the result 
of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a significant 
number of states, which founded their states with the democratic entitlement. 
Many factors led up to this outcome, but one of the most significant is the 
contribution of regional organisations that promote democracy. Among these 
organisations are: the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU), the 
Council of Europe (COE) and the African Union (AU). 
Further, the recent developments in the UN Security Council and its 
involvement in cases where democracy is disrupted by illegal regimes illustrate 
that there is an interest in the world community of protecting democracy. Lois 
36 Thomas Franck, "Emerging Right to Democratic Governance", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 86, No!, 1992, p. 52 
37 Ibid., p. 46 
3s id 
39 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, "You, the People": Pro-Democratic Intervention in 
International Law, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth (eds. ), Democratic Governance and 
International Law, Cambridge, University Press, 2000, p. 260. Also Tom J. Farer, "Collectively 
Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States: The Western Hemisphere's Prospect", 
Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 15,1993, p. 716 
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Fielding noted that "the overthrow of a democratic government can constitute 
a threat to peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter, and that 
evidence of an emerging right of humanitarian assistance to restore democracy 
is supported by recent pronouncements in documents, declarations and 
resolutions of the UN and of regional organisations, statements of government 
officials and international law theorists, and statements in (US) national policy 
documents" 40 UN Security Council resolution 940 that authorised the use of 
force to restore democratic rule in Haiti represents a development in favour of 
the democratic entitlement. Haiti was not the one and only UN Security 
Council involvement in the internal affairs of a state. The precedence of Iraq, 
Liberia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda for humanitarian purposes 
is a good illustration. 
The difference here is that the overthrown of the democratically elected 
Haitian government had led to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation 
and the refugee flows, which, in turn, led up to the imposition of sanctions and 
to the authorisation of the use of force. But Haiti is not the only incident of pro- 
democratic intervention. In 1997 ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone to 
remove the military coup and restore the unconstitutionally overthrown 
government. The Security Council had condemned the coup and demanded the 
restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone. 41 ECOWAS intervened military in 
Sierra Leone and restored democracy without a prior authorisation by the 
Security Council. The Council's response was not condemnation of this 
intervention, but it welcomed the fact that the military junta had been 
40 Lois E. Fielding, " Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: the 
Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Promote Democracy", Duke Journal of 
International Law, vol. 5, Spring 1995, p. 329 
41 S/PRST/1997/29 (27 May 1997) and S/RES/1132 (1997), 8 October 1997. 
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defeated. 42 This practice of the Council in the 90s reflected the world 
community's will to protect democracy, as a polity deriving from the people 
and serving for the rights of the people. Nevertheless, in order to count as 
humanitarian ones, pro-democratic interventions should be responses to places 
where human rights are massively being deprived or violated. In absence of 
egregious violations of human rights, or of an imminent threat to fundamental 
human rights, pro-democratic intervention cannot qualify as a humanitarian 
intervention. 
THE DEBATE ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TODAY 
During the 90's the debate over humanitarian intervention dominated 
the political and legal agendas. Issues regarding the legality and legitimacy of 
such a kind of intervention had been raised quite often and various arguments 
had been offered. If one examines the positions taken by scholars of 
international relations and international law, it would be quite easy to determine 
the chasm among various arguments, interpretations and assumptions. At the 
peak of this debate stand the questions below: to intervene, or not; legal or 
illegal; legitimate, or illegitimate; collective, or unauthorised humanitarian 
interventions; mere state practice, or an emerging norm; precedent, or not. As 
the question of this thesis has to do with the possible emergence of a new norm 
in favour of humanitarian intervention, it would be quite useful to examine the 
views expressed by prominent scholars of international relations on this 
specific question. Thus, the positions offered by various scholars will reflect 
42 S/PRST/1997/52, (14 November 1997). 
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their arguments on whether the world community is moving towards 
fundamental changes in the area of intervention or not. 
First of all, some scholars argue that the recent trends in the world community 
reflect the emergence of a right of humanitarian intervention. Fernando Teson, 
one of the most fervent supporters of humanitarian intervention, thinks that 
`forcible action to stop serious human rights deprivations is permitted by 
international law, properly construed" 43 Commenting on the adoption of 
resolution 794 of the Security Council on Somalia, he noted that "human 
suffering has taken precedence over state sovereignty, which is precisely the 
policy that undergirds humanitarian intervention "44 As regards the adoption of 
resolution 940 on Haiti, he called it "the most important precedent supporting 
the legitimacy both of an international principle of democratic rule and of 
collective humanitarian intervention "45 Teson's views, however, are 
overenthusiastic and do not reflect the reality. Of course, resolutions 794 and 
940 reflect normative changes in the world community, since the Council 
adopted forcible measures to protect human rights under Chapter VII, but this 
does not mean that human suffering has taken precedence over sovereignty. 
The Councils enforcement measures to restore international peace and security 
are not enough to support that humanitarian intervention outside the Council's 
realm is also permissible. Thus, it seems that his argument is misleading. 
43 Fernando K Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2°d 
edition, New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 5. °4 Ibid., p. 247. 
45 Ibid., p. 249. 
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Other authors have supported quite similar arguments, but in a modest way. 
Franck, for instance, argued that law is rarely static46 and that after the 1999 
NATO intervention in Kosovo "egregious repression of minorities is not a risk 
free venture, particularly for smallish states "4' Indeed, law is not static and 
evolves quite rapidly sometimes. Many rules have been replaced by new 
emerging norms and possibly humanitarian intervention may become an 
exception to or even abolish the principle of non-intervention. Henkin thinks 
that "the NATO action in Kosovo, and the proceedings in the Security Council, 
may reflect a step toward a change in the law, part of the quest for developing 
"a form of collective intervention" beyond a veto-bound Security Council "49 
Henkin wisely supports that recent developments may reflect a step toward a 
change in international law, as in this transitional stage it would be quite 
premature to say that law has changed because of nascent trends. Similarly, 
Chamey estimates that "perhaps the Kosovo intervention sets a precedent for 
the development of new international law to protect human rights " 49 
Michael Reisman had expressed the view that "when human rights 
enforcement by military means is required, it should, indeed, be the 
responsibility of the Security Council acting under the Charter. But when the 
Council cannot act, the legal requirement continues to be to save lives, 
however one can and as quickly as one can, for each passing day, each passing 
hour means more murders, rapes, mutilations, and dismemberments-violations 
46 Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in 
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 204-205. 
47 Thomas M. Franck, "Lessons of Kosovo", American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, 
No4, October 1999, p. 859. 
48 Luis Henkin, "Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 828. 
49 Jonathan I. Chamey, "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo", American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 836. 
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of human beings that no prosecution will expunge nor remedy repair ". 50 Abiew 
noted that "developments in the post-Cold War era regarding intervention to 
protect human rights suggest a gradual change in attitudes and challenges to 
state sovereignty and its corollary principle of non-intervention ". 51 He thinks 
that state sovereignty "will not bar action to protect and sustain the lives of 
large numbers of civilians trapped in situations of internal conflict '"52 It could 
be said that his arguments are quite close to Teson's beliefs, but again it is quite 
untimely to support that human rights have taken precedence over state 
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. 
Murphy also believes that "recent interventions in Liberia, Iraq, 
Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, and to a certain extent in Bosnia, reveal evolving 
attitudes about the use of military force to protect human rights ". 53 No doubt, 
similar interventions in the past would be unlikely to happen. The above 
interventions in the internal affairs of these states do reflect gradual changes in 
the area of intervention. But these changes do not reflect the law, but evolving 
attitudes in the realm of international law. Greenwood said that "the end of the 
Cold War has brought about a transformation in the political situation of the 
Security Council, so that the possibility of humanitarian intervention by that 
body can no longer be discounted". 54 He also thinks that "international 
attitudes towards humanitarian intervention have undergone a considerable 
so W. Michael Reisman, "Kosovo's Antinomies", American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 862. 
si Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian 
Intervention, The Hague, The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 223. 
52 Ibid., p. 229. 
53 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
Order, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, pä91. 
54 Christopher Greenwood, Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?, The World Today, 
vol. 49, February 1993, p. 35. 
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change in the last few years ". 55 It could be said that his arguments are very 
substantial. Professor Cassese had supported an extreme argument: "based on 
the nascent trends of the world community, I submit that under certain strict 
conditions resort to armed force may gradually become justified, even absent 
any authorisation by the Security Council ". 56 Nevertheless, in a later article of 
his he contented that "it is premature to maintain that a customary rule has 
emerged". 57 
Nicholas Wheeler stressed that "the key normative change in the 1990s 
was that the Security Council, under pressure from Western governments 
increasingly interpreted its responsibilities under Chapter VII as including the 
enforcement of global humanitarian norms. However, this norm of 
humanitarian intervention is critically limited to cases where the Security 
Council authorises action ". 58 Wheeler masterly distinguished between Security 
Council authorised intervention for humanitarian purposes and unilateral 
humanitarian intervention out of the Charter's realm. The significant changes in 
the 90s had to do with the Council's intense occupation with internal matters of 
states, namely the protection of human rights. Jane Stromseth thinks that "over 
time, as the cases of the Kurds and Kosovo suggest, the elements of a normative 
consensus regarding intervention for humanitarian purposes may emerge ". 59 
Tom Farer becomes more direful by remarking that "one could fairly see 
55 Ibid., p. 39. 
56 Antonio Cassese, "Ex Iniuria Jus Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation 
of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? ", European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 27. 
5' Antonio Cassese, "A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
Necessitatis", European Journal of International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 796. 
58 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford, oxford University Press, 2000, p. 289. 
59 Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert 
Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 271. 
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humanitarian intervention as very much more than a minor exception or 
adjustment to the received organisation of the human race ". 60 
All the above authors have tried to detect signs of normative changes in 
the world community and each of them interpreted these changes with various 
arguments. Yet, some scholars are more cautious and critical for these 
emerging values. Glennon, for instance, believes that "current international 
law dogma is out of sync with emerging values "61 and Roberts called 
"humanitarian war" an "oxymoron" which may yet become a reality. 62 Jack 
Donnelly pointed out that "a review of the major arguments in the literature 
clearly shows that humanitarian intervention is not a recognise principle of 
international law" 63 One of the starkest opponents of humanitarian 
intervention, however, is Oscar Schachter. He thinks that "international law 
does not, and should not, legitimise use of force across national lines except for 
self-defence (including collective defence) and enforcement measures ordered 
by the Security Council. Neither human rights, democracy nor self- 
determination are acceptable legal grounds for waging war, nor for that 
matter, are traditional just war causes of righting of wrongs ". 64 Further, he 
believes that "the idea that wars waged in a good cause such as democracy 
60 Tom J. Farer, Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy, in 
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 55. 
61 Michael J. Glennon Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After Kosovo, 
New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 6- 
62 62 Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military intervention and Human Rights, International 
Affairs, vol. 69, No3,1993, p. 429- 
63 Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: 
Law, Morality and Politics", Journal ofInternational Affairs, v. 3,1983/84, p. 314. 
64 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, London, Nijhoff Publishers, 
1991, pp. 128-129. 
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and human rights would not involve violation of territorial integrity or political 
independence demands an Orwellian construction of those terms ". 65 
Chesterman is also quite sceptical on the matter. He contested the 
survival of a customary right of humanitarian intervention after the passage of 
the UN Charter and Article 2(4). 66 He further asserted that "as a legal concept 
it will be argued that humanitarian intervention in incoherent- any `right' of 
humanitarian intervention amounts not to an asserted exception to the 
prohibition of the use of force, but to a lacuna in the enforceable content of 
international law', 67 In a joint article with Michael Byers, they argue that "it is 
extremely unlikely that workable criteria for a right of humanitarian 
intervention will ever be developed to the satisfaction of more than a handful of 
states". 68 Yet, this is a very absolute premise, as one cannot predict the position 
of states in the future. The nascent trends of the post-Cold War era indicate that 
some important changes are evolving in the international system. Time will 
show if these changes will lead up to the crystallisation of a new customary 
law, or not. 
Professor Simma maintained that "humanitarian interventions involving 
the threat or use of force and undertaken without the mandate of the Security 
Council will, as a matter of principle, remain in breach of international law ". 69 
Nevertheless, he noted that "the lesson which can be drawn from this is that 
unfortunately there do occur `hard cases' in which terrible dilemmas must be 
65 Oscar Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", Michigan Law Review, vol. 82, 
1984, p. 645. 
66 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 235. 
67 Ibid., p. 2. 
68 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, , 
in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert 
Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 202. 
69 Bruno Summa, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects", European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 6. 
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faced and imperative political and moral considerations may appear to leave 
no choice but to act outside the law . 
70 In a parallel way, Peter Malanczuk 
argued that "in current international law collective humanitarian measures, 
based on the decision of a competent international organisation, are the only 
lawful instruments available to use armed force to protect fundamental human 
rights ,. 7 1 Last but not least, Richard Falk thinks that the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo was "a badly flawed precedent for evaluating future claims to 
undertake humanitarian intervention without proper UN authorisation ". 72 
To sum up, it could be said that most scholars accept the fact that the 
end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes in the world community. 
From a veto-bound Security Council we move to a time of cooperation and the 
adoption collective measures under Chapter VII. The threats to international 
peace and security now derive from internal conflicts, not solely from external 
aggression. The world community becomes quite often involved in the internal 
affairs of other states. It is difficult to disconfum the above changes. The main 
reason for confrontation, however, has to do with the various interpretations of 
these changes. There are many discrepancies because of the different 
understanding of these normative trends. Accordingly, some scholars regard 
these changes as precedents for unauthorised humanitarian intervention; on the 
other hand, others estimate that these were some exceptions to the rule that 
must not be repeated. 
Let us now consider three recent reports relating to the issue of 
intervention and peacekeeping and their arguments might be quite useful for 
70 [bid, p. 22. 
" Peter Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, 
Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis, 1993, p. 30. 
n Richard A. Fallt, "Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law", American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 856. 
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this thesis. First of all, the ICISS Report (report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) was created with a specific 
mandate: to build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling 
intervention for human protection purposes (humanitarian intervention) and 
sovereignty. 73 This Commission believes that while there is not yet a 
sufficiently strong basis to claim the emergence of a new principle of 
customary international law, growing state and regional organisation practice, 
as well as Security Council precedent suggest an emerging guiding principle 
which in the Commission's view could properly be termed "the responsibility 
to protect ". 74 Accordingly, the emerging principle in question is that 
intervention for human protection purposes, including military intervention in 
extreme cases, is supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring or 
imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end 
the harm, or itself is the perpetrator. 75 In addition, the Commission found that 
"the Charter's strong bias against military intervention is not to be regarded 
as absolute when decisive action is required on human protection grounds ". 76 
In the Commission's view, "the Security Council should be the first 
port of call on any matter relating to military intervention for human protection 
purposes ". 77 Yet, a possible alternative, according to the ICISS, "would be to 
seek support for military action from the General Assembly meeting in an 
Emergency Special Session under the established `Uniting for Peace' 
n The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Responsibility 
to Protect, IDRC Publishers, Ottawa, 2002, p. 2. 
74 Ibid., p. 15. 
75 Ibid., p. 16. 
76 Id 
77 Ibid., p. 53. 
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procedures ". 78 A further possibility would be for collective intervention to be 
pursued by regional or sub-regional organisation acting within its defining 
boundaries. 79 It is easy to detect that the Commission does not provide any 
support for unilateral humanitarian intervention, but prefers to rely upon the 
UN. Finally, the Commission has found "less tension between these principles 
[state sovereignty and intervention] than we expected We found broad 
willingness to accept the idea that the responsibility to protect its people from 
killing and other grave harm was the most basic and fundamental of all the 
responsibilities that sovereignty imposes - and that if a state cannot or will not 
protect its people from such harm, then coercive intervention for human 
protection purposes, including ultimately military intervention, by others in the 
international community may be warranted in extreme cases ". 80 
The second document to be examined is the Brahimi Report. This report 
deals with peacekeeping. In this report the Panel concurred that "consent of the 
local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should 
remain the principles of peacekeeping ". 
81 In contrast to the above assertion, the 
report supported that "the United Nations military units must be capable of 
defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate. 
Rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-for-stroke responses 
but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is 
directed at United Nations troops or at people they are charged to protect and, 
in particularly dangerous situations, should not force the United Nations 
's Id 
79 Id 
so Ibid., p. 69. 
81 The Brahimi Report, A/55/305 or S/2000/809,21 August 2000. 
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contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers". 
82 This position contradicts 
the earlier one that supported the use of force only in self-defence. Probably, 
this has to do with changes in the traditional notions of self-defence. In the past 
the use of force in self defence of the peacekeepers meant that they could use 
their weapons to defend themselves. Now, according to this report, they can do 
so to defend themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate. 
Last but not least, there is the December 2004 High-Level Panel Report. 
This report asserted the new threats that the world community faces today: 
economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases(such as 
HIV), and environmental degradation; war and violence within States, 
including civil war, genocide, and other large scale atrocities; the spread and 
possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; 
terrorism; and Transnational organised crime. 83 These threats are from non- 
State actors as well as states. Thus, the Panel argued that there are new 
challenges for collective security as well as changing notions. Accordingly, the 
Panel supported that "the central challenge for the 21 s" century is to fashion a 
new and broader understanding of what collective security means - and of all 
the responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come with it if 
a collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable ". 84 As 
regards the use of force, however, the Panel believes that "Chapter VII fully 
empowers the Security Council to deal with every kind of threat that states may 
confront". 85 It is remarkable that both the KISS and the December 2004 High- 
82 Id 




Level Panel reports support that the Security Council is the competent organ to 
apply coercive measures, including military intervention. 
Commenting on these developments, it could be said that all reports 
detect the changing attitudes in the world community and the new challenges 
for the United Nations. It is quite interesting that all of them suggest UN 
involvement for the resolution of these new challenges in the world 
community. Yet, although these reports and their findings are quite significant, 
as they detect signs of normative changes, it could be argued that they are not 
of a legal significance, as they do not reflect law, but they explore the new 
trends in the world community and recommend specific proposals. However, it 
could be said that none of them supports an emerging right of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, outside the Council's realm. On the contrary, all of 
the explicitly point out that all new threats to our system of collective security 






HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING THE COLD WAR 
This Chapter will include cases from the Cold War era. These cases are 
very crucial for this thesis, as the emerging trends in the 90s can become 
evident through a mere confrontation with attitudes of states during the Cold 
War towards humanitarian intervention. Some of the most essential cases will 
be explored and the leading case study will be India's intervention in East 
Pakistan (1971). 
3.1 BELGIAN INTERVENTION IN THE CONGO (1960) 
No doubt, this is one of the weakest cases regarding humanitarian 
intervention. The Congo gained its independence in 1960 and thereafter the 
Republic of the Congo was the object of the largest military assistance 
operation directed by the Organisation itself. ' Belgium ignored this 
international effort undertaken by the UN and intervened militarily on 5 July in 
the Congo. Belgium officially claimed that it went to the Congo in order to 
protect the lives of Belgian and other nationals. 
2 On 13 July the S ecurity 
Council adopted resolution 143 authorised the Secretary-General to provide the 
Congo with military assistance and called upon Belgium to withdraw its 
troops. 3 The fact that the Belgian troops remained in the Congo until September 
1 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 65. 
2 Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World 
Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 99. Also Chesterman, op. cit., p. 66. 
3 S/RES/143 (1960), 17 July 1960 
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certifies the Belgian interests in this area. 4 The overlapping of the UN military 
assistance operation also leaves the Belgian intervention vulnerable to 
suspicions. As Chesterman noted, this is not a very convincing instance of 
humanitarian intervention. 5 
3.2 BELGIAN AND US INTERVENTION IN THE CONGO (1964) 
In September 1964, rebel forces in the Congo took over two thousand 
hostages in Stanleyville and Paulis. They had threatened to kill them, unless the 
central government agreed to certain concessions. When the government 
rejected their demands, the rebels killed forty-five of the hostages. As a result, 
Belgian forces with the aid of US aeroplanes intervened in Congo on 24 
November 1964. Both the US and Belgium claimed that they intervened in the 
Congo to protect their and foreigner nationals, as well as humanitarian 
concerns. 6 There were various reactions in the UN Security Council. The 
Security Council, finally, adopted a resolution deploring the events in the 
Congo, requesting all states to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of 
the Congo, but did not condemn the intervention! 
It is difficult to claim that this intervention is strong enough to create a 
precedent for humanitarian intervention in customary law. First of all, Belgium 
4 Akehurst, op. cit., p. 99 and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 66. 
i Chesterman, op. cit., p. 65. 
6 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 67. Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of 
the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, Dordrecht-the Netherlands, 1999, 
p. 105. Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
Order, Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol21, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 93. 
7 S/PV. 1170 (1964), 9 December 1964. 
8 S/RES/199 (1964), 30 December 1964. 
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and the US did not intent to primarily protect the human rights of the 
Congolese nationals. 9 Further, various states criticised and reacted to this 
action. Resolution 199, although it did not condemn the US and Belgian 
intervention, it clearly manifested its discontent by requesting states to refrain 
from intervening in the internal affairs of the Congo. In addition, political and 
economic interests were at stake. 
1° Finally, the 1964 intervention in the Congo 
cannot qualify as a humanitarian intervention, since the legitimate government 
of the Congo consented to this intervention. 
" Thus, it could be argued that this 
case as state practice does not add much to the theory and law surrounding 
humanitarian intervention. 
3.3 US INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1965) 
In 1963, a military coup removed from power the democratically 
elected Juan Bosch. In April 1965, revolt broke up in the Dominican Republic, 
as the public was disappointed by its unpopular leader. On April 28, a large 
number of US troops landed in Santo Dominico. The US officially claimed that 
its intervention aimed at rescuing its nationals. 12 First of all, the protection of 
9 Murphy, op. cit., p. 93. 
10 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 69. 
" Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in John N. Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the 
Modern World, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 221. Michael Akehurst, 
Humanitarian Intervention, in Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World Politics, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 100. Also Abiew, op. cit., p. 105, Chesterman, op. cit., p67 and 
Murphy, op. cit., p. 93. 
12 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 70. Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of 
the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, Dordrecht-the Netherlands, 1999, 
p. 109. Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
Order, Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol21, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 94. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian 
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nationals abroad cannot be regarded as a legitimate instance of humanitarian 
intervention. This is because the motives of humanitarian interventions have to 
be altruistic and aim to rescue the people in danger, not only the nationals of 
one or two states. As Schachter argued "such action has sometimes been called 
a type of humanitarian intervention, although it is much more 
circumscribed". 13 Donnelly and Malanczuk also distinguish between 
humanitarian intervention and intervention for the protection of nationals 
abroad. 14 
Apart from this fact, the real concern of the US was not the protection 
of its nationals, but its interests of national security. Indeed, the US declared 
that its aim was to prevent a communist take-over. 15 Brownlie commended that 
"the United States had no more title to intervene than did the U. S. S. R. in the 
similar political circumstances in Czechoslovakia in 1968". 16 He believes that 
this action was an action of national self-interest and was "simply illegal 11.17 It 
could be argued that this was not the best example of intervention for the 
protection of national abroad. The maintenance of the US troops for over a year 
in the island manifested its desire to control the region. 18 In the debates of the 
Security Council, some states seem to have embraced the US justification for 
Intervention in Contemporary Conflict. - A Reconceptualisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, 
p. 56. Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World 
Politics, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 100. Oscar Schachter, "The Right of States to Use 
Armed Force", Michigan Law Review, vol. 82,1984, p. 1629. Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian 
Intervention, in John N. Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 221. 
13 Schachter, op. cit., p. 1029. 
14 Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: 
Law, Morality and Politics", Journal of International Affairs, 1983/83, vol. 3, p. 313. Peter 
Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, Amsterdam, 
Het Spinhuis, 1993, pp. 3-5. 
15 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 56, Abiew, op. cit., p. 110, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 70 
and Murphy, op. cit., p. 97. 
16 Brownlie, op. cit., p. 221. 
"Id 
11 Abiew, op. cit., p. 110 
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the protection of its nationals, but most states condemned the action. 19 Overall, 
it could be said that the 1964 US intervention in the Dominican Republic has 
not to offer much on the debate of humanitarian intervention. 
3.4 VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN KAMPUCHEA (1978) 
Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea represents another alleged 
instance of humanitarian intervention. On December 1978, Vietnam invaded 
Kampuchea, following sporadic fighting along the borders of the two countries. 
This intervention resulted to the overthrow of Pol Pot, an unpopular and 
undesirable regime. The Khmer Rouge forces of Pol Pot took over power from 
the Republican government in 1975 and began a campaign of remaking the 
Kampuchean society. However, this regime had committed a series of atrocities 
that horrified the world community: torture, mass killings, deportations, 
starvation and forced evacuation of cities. It is estimated that more than a 
million Kampucheans perished in a three year period. 20 Undoubtedly, the 
Vietnamese intervention had halted these horrifying atrocities and there was a 
positive humanitarian outcome. 
21 Yet, does the Vietnamese intervention fit into 
the framework of humanitarian intervention? And further, did this intervention 
set any precedent for future humanitarian interventions? 
19 S/PV. 1176 (1965), 1 May 1965; S/PV. 1198 (1965), 4 May 1965; S/PV. 1200 (1965), 5 May 
1965. 
20 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
Order, Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol21, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 103. Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and 
Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, Dordrecht-the Netherlands, 1999, p. 127. 
21 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 79. 
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Abiew thinks that the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea is another 
illustration of the use of force for the protection of human rights. 22 Yet, this 
argument is not very persuasive, as intervention in Vietnam seems to be one of 
the most inappropriate cases in support of humanitarian intervention. This is 
because, although the situation in Vietnam favoured intervention in support of 
human rights, the world community denied responding to such a crisis and 
Vietnam justified its use of force on self-defence. This fact explains why Teson 
did not include in his case studies the intervention of Kampuchea in Vietnam. 
Abiew himself acknowledges that despite the world community's expression of 
outrage at the human rights atrocities, no effective measures were taken to stop 
what was happening in Kampuchea. 
23 No resolution was adopted in the 
Security Council due to a Soviet veto. The cold war rivalries were present at 
this time and the discussions in the Security Council meetings clearly illustrate 
this fact. Thus, his argument is insubstantial. 
What is more, the Vietnamese representative in the UN argued before 
the Security Council that it had acted in self-defence and that Pol Pot had been 
overthrown by the Kampuchean people. 
24 The above argument had been also 
supported by the Soviet block. No doubt, Vietnam got involved in the conflict 
only after prior Kampuchean aggression. 
25 As a result, Vietnam claimed its 
right to self defence. As regards the overthrow of Pol Pot, Vietnam argued that 
the Kampuchean people were the actors that led to this outcome. Accordingly, 
the argument of two wars been fought at the same time is also present to this 
22 Abiew, op. cit., p. 127. 
23 Ibid., p. 128. 
24 S/PV. 2109 (1979), 12 January 1979; and S/PV. 2110 (1979), 13 January 1979. 
23 Frederik Harhoff, "Unauthorised Humanitarian Interventions-Armed Violence in the Name 
of Humanity? ", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 70,2001, p. 86. Also Murphy, op. cit., 
p. 104 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 128. 
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case. 26 This argument of two wars fought in a parallel way was also advanced 
by Tanzania after its invasion in Uganda. The fact here, however, is that 
Kampuchea advanced claims to self-defence and denied any humanitarian 
purposes. 27 
Despite Kampuchea's claims to self-defence, Abiew believes that self- 
defence cannot justify the instalment of a new regime and the presence of 
Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea for over a decade. 28 Hence, he argued that a 
possible basis for justifying intervention on humanitarian grounds was the 
existence of large scale atrocities 29 Ronzitti thinks that this case is probably the 
one that throws most light on the relation between the use of force and the 
protection of human rights. 0 Yet, Vietnam met stem criticism for its 
intervention in Kampuchea and its claims on self defence could not convince 
the world community. 31 In the Council's meetings most states said that 
Vietnam had acted illegally by intervening in Kampuchea's internal affairs. 32 
Had Vietnam claimed a right of humanitarian intervention, the reaction of the 
world community would have been much more condemnatory. Thus, Ronzitti 
and Abiew miscalculated these reactions when they try to link the use of force 
and human rights. It is also questionable why Ronzitti linked this intervention 
with the protection of human rights, while he rejected such a premise in 
26 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary 
Conflict. - A Reconceptualisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 55. Also Chesterman, 
op. cit., p. 80, Abiew, op. cit., p. 128. 
2 Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World 
Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 97. Also Chesterman, op. cit., p. 80, Murphy, op. cit., 
104-105and Abiew, op. cit., p. 128. 21Abiew, 
op. cit., p. 130 and Harhoff, op. cit., p. 86. 
29 Id 
30 Natalino Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention 
on Grounds of Humanity, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1985, p. 98. 
31 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 80, Murphy, op. cit., p. 104 and Abiew, op. cit. 129. 
32 S/PV. 2109 (1979), 12 January 1979; and S/PV. 2110 (1979), 13 January 1979. 
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Tanzania's intervention in Uganda, 33 where the world community at least did 
not condemn the Tanzanian aggression. 
Furthermore, the UN General Assembly censured the Kampuchean 
intervention. 34 It is also quite interesting that the Assembly did not recognise 
the instalment of the new regime in Kampuchea and voted to accept the 
credentials of Pol Pot's delegate. The newly installed Peoples Republic of 
Kampuchea was not recognised by the world community until 1991.35 Thus, 
there is an evident lack of opiniojuris in the Vietnamese intervention. 36 What is 
more, the interests of Vietnam and its selfish motives are the ones that can 
explain its intervention, while its humanitarian impulse was at least very 
weak. 37 Most scholars support that the three leading cases of humanitarian 
intervention during the Cold War (India's intervention in East Pakistan, 
Tanzania's intervention in Uganda and Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea) 
revealed little support for the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention. 
Although there were mass abuses of human rights, including mass killings and 
genocidal practices, none of the above states tried to justify its actions on 
humanitarian grounds, but relied on self-defence. 38 Thus, it is obvious that this 
practice is not accompanied by opiniojuris, which is very vital for the creation 
of customary law. 
33 Ronzitti, op. cit., p. 110. 
34 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 34/22 (1979), 14 November 1979; and UN 
General Assembly Resolution 34/46 (1979), 23 November 1979. 
35 Danesh Sarooshi, Humanitarian Intervention and International Humanitarian Assistance: 
Law and Practice, London, HMSO Publications Centre, 1994, p. 23. Also Chesterman, op. cit., 
8 land Murphy, op. cit., p. 104. 
36 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 81. 
37 Murphy, op. cit., p. 104 and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 81. 
38 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin C. Morris, Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at 
the End of the Cold War, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds. ), International Society after 
the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, Basingstoke-England, Macmillan Press, 1996, 
pp. 142-143. Christopher Greenwood, "Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention? ", The 
World Today, vol. 49, February 1993, p. 35. Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military 
Intervention and Human Rights", International Affairs, vol. 69, No3,1993, p. 434. Also 
Akehurst, op. cit., pp. 96-98, Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 71-81 
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3.5 TANZANIA'S INTERVENTION IN UGANDA (1979) 
Dictator Idi Amin came to power in Uganda in 1971 after his 
successful coup. The brutality and savagery during his reign had been horrific. 
Under his rule there were egregious violations of human rights in Uganda, 
including killings of a large number of people, pogroms, expulsions and gross 
ethnic discrimination. 39 Donnelly thinks that "the heinous nature of Amin 's 
rule is beyond dispute. The human rights records of a handful of post-war 
regimes have been worse, but Amin 's barbarism, his penchant for international 
notoriety, and the absence of major countervailing ideological, strategic or 
economic concerns, made Uganda an ideal situation for humanitarian 
intervention, and thus a useful test" 40 In April 1979, the Tanzanian Army, 
along with Ugandan exiles and refugees toppled Amin from power and a new 
provisional government was formed. As Donnelly argued, this had been an 
ideal situation for humanitarian intervention. Yet, does the Tanzanian 
intervention in Uganda qualify for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention? 
This is a very special case because Tanzania decided to intervene in Uganda, 
after Amin's occupation of the Kagera salient, which was attached to the 
Tanzanian borders. 41 Amin declared annexation of Kagera and the creation of a 
39 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary 
Conflict: A Reconceptualisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 4. Francis Kofi Abiew, The 
Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, Dordrecht-the 
Netherlands, 1999, pp. 121-125. 
40 Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: 
Law, Morality and Politics". Journal of International Affairs, 1983/83, vol. 3, p. 316 
41 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
Order, Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol21, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 105. Also Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 6, Abiew, 
op. cit., p. 121. 
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new boundary between the two countries. 2 No doubt, this announcement of 
annexation leaded up to the immediate Tanzanian response. As a result, the 
Tanzanian intervention could be justified on its legal right to self-defence. 
Indeed, the Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, declared the annexation an act 
of war and grounded its intervention as a reaction to the Ugandan aggression. 43 
Self-defence in response to the Ugandan aggression is a sufficient legal 
justification. Thus, the Tanzanian President neglected the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention and relied upon the traditional grounds of self- 
defence. 
Nevertheless, there are two factors that cannot justify Tanzania's 
intervention as exercising its right to self defence. First of all, Amin offered to 
withdraw from the Tanzanian territory, but Nyerere rejected this offer because 
Tanzania could not forget the "pillage, massacre, destruction and rape and had 
created a state of war between the two countries. 44 Thus, it is questionable why 
Nyerere intervened in Uganda when Amin began to withdraw his troops from 
the Kagera salient. 45 Secondly, Tanzania penetrated into Uganda, alongside 
with Ugandan exiles and refugees and toppled the Ugandan dictator. 46 The fact 
that the Tanzanian army stayed for four months in Kampala makes the 
42 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 77. Fernando R Teson, Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd edition, New York, Transnational 
Publishers, 1997, p. 179. Also Abiew, op. cit., p. 121, Murphy, op. cit., p. 105 and Donnelly, 
op. cit., p. 316. 
4 Martha Brenfors and Malene Maxe Petersen, "The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention-A Defence", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 69,2004, p490. Also 
Teson, op. cit., pp. 179-180, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 77, Murphy, op. cit., p. 105 and Abiew, op. cit., 
pp. 122-124. 
Teson, op. cit., p. 180 and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 77 
45 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 77, Murphy, op. cit., p. 105, Abiew, op. cit., p. 12land Teson, op. cit., 
p. 180 
46 Teson, op. cit., p. 182, Abiew, op. cit., p. 122, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 77 and Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 
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argument about self-defence doubtful. 47 Chesterman, however, thinks that 
"Tanzania's military action was clearly precipitated by Uganda's armed attack 
on Tanzania, though was variously characterised as defensive and punitive in 
character". 48 
Teson argued that "article 51 of the UN Charter cannot possibly justify 
overthrowing the Ugandan government, because self-defence is not a punitive 
action ". 49 On the contrary, Murphy argued that "Tanzania's claim that it was 
acting in self-defence is not clearly erroneous, unless it is shown that 
Tanzania's security would not have been further threatened if Idi Amin 
remained in power ". 50 He explained this argument by traditional theories of 
"pre-emptive" or "preventive" self-defence that became familiar after the 
attacks of September 11 in New York. Yet, it is not the purpose of this chapter 
to explore whether or not the Tanzanian intervention can be explained as its 
right to self-defence. What matters here is that the legal justification offered by 
Tanzania's leader was self-defence, not humanitarian intervention. It could be 
argued that this fact weakens the claims for humanitarian intervention. 
As regards to Nyerere's humanitarianism, it seems that the Nigerian 
President was genuinely concerned about Amin's human rights violations. 51 
Many authors believe that this is an ideal case for humanitarian intervention. 52 
The egregious violations of human rights, including mass killings, approve the 
above assertion. Teson supported that "the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda 
is a precedent supporting the legality of humanitarian intervention in 
47 Abiew, op. cit., p. 125. 
48 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 77. 
49 Teson, op. cit., p. 185. 
50 Murphy, op. cit., pp. 106-107. 
51 Teson, op. cit., p. 182, Abiew, op. cit., p. 123, Donnelly, op. cit., p. 316 and Murphy, op. cit., 
107 
3z Donnelly, op. cit., p. 316, Teson, op. cit., p. 184 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 125. 
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appropriate cases... The Ugandan case is perhaps the clearest in a series of 
cases that have carved out an important exception to the prohibition of Article 
2(4) ". 53 He concludes to the above argument because he believes that the 
Tanzanian action was legitimised by the international community, 54 which did 
not react against the use of force by Tanzania. 55 
No doubt, the intervention was tolerated by the world community. 56 
Surprisingly, the matter was never brought up in the UN Security Council or 
the General Assembly. 57 But as Chesterman argued the above argument of 
Teson is an exaggeration, because "most states acknowledged Tanzania's right 
to defend itself and were subsequently content to see Amin's regime replaced, 
but this is not the same as saying that they regarded the intervention as a 
lawful use of force ". 58 Even Teson, for instance, acknowledges that the US 
government supported Tanzania from the outset, although on self-defence 
grounds. 59 Thus, Tanzania's claim to self-defence weakens the claims to 
humanitarian intervention. Further, it is uncertain that Tanzania would have 
intervened in Uganda, had Amin not occupied the Kagera salient. Self-interest 
was also a leading motive for intervention, given the long-standing animosity 
between the two countries. 60 The fact that there were humanitarian concerns is 
indisputable, but the primary motive for Tanzania's action had been the 
Ugandan aggression. 
53 Teson, op. cit., p. 188. 
1 Ibid., p. 187. 
55 Ibid., p. 191 and 195. 
56 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 52, Brenfors and Petersen, op. cit., p. 491, 
Chesterman, op. cit., p. 78, Murphy, op. cit., p. 106, Abiew, op. cit., p. 123 and Teson, op. cit., 
191 and195. 
' Frederik Harhoflj "Unauthorised Humanitarian Interventions-Armed Violence in the Name 
of Humanity? ", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 70,2001, p. 88. Also Chesterman, 
op. cit., p. 78, Murphy, op. cit., p. 106, Brenfors and Petersen, op. cit., p. 490. 
S Chesterman, op. cit., p. 78. 
59 Teson, op. cit., p. 185 
60 Donnelly, op. cit., p. 316. 
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It seems that Reisman considered the Tanzanian intervention legitimate 
instance of humanitarian intervention: "there is neither need nor justification 
for treating in a mechanically equal fashion Tanzania's intervention in Uganda 
to overthrow Amin 's despotism, on the one hand, and Soviet intervention in 
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1966 to overthrow popular 
governments and to impose undesired regime on a coerced population, on the 
other". " Teson and Abiew seem to share this view. 62 On the other hand, 
Ronzitti claimed that there were two wars fought in Uganda: one would be a 
war of self-defence between Tanzania and Uganda and the second war would 
be a war of liberation fought by the Ugandans against Amin. 63 Thus, he 
concludes that Tanzania's intervention in Uganda is not an authoritative 
precedent for the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention. 64 Donnelly 
believes that the Tanzanian action clearly failed to meet the doctrine's legal 
standards, as "the decision to leave several thousands troops in Uganda well 
after the final elimination of Amin 's forces clearly violates the standards 
proposed by the defenders of humanitarian intervention ". 65 
In conclusion, it could be argued that although Tanzania's intervention 
in Uganda could have been a good example of humanitarian intervention, 
Tanzania's selfish motives and its justification on the grounds of self-defence 
weaken the validity for a precedent of armed humanitarian interventions. As 
Chesterman argued, "there is little evidence of opinio juris beyond an 
61 Reisman, W. Michael, "Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Article 2(4)", 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 78, NO, July 1984, p. 644. 
62 Teson, op. cit., p. 184 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 125. 
63 Natalino Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention 
on Grounds of Humanity, Dordrecht, Nijhoii 1985, pp. 102-104. 
64 Ibid., p. 110. 
65 Donnelly, op. cit., p. 317. 
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affirmation of the right of self-defence ". 
66 If Nyerere would have claimed 
Tanzania's right of humanitarian intervention, he would definitely have created 
a very strong precedent for humanitarian intervention. But his statements on 
Tanzania's right to defend itself against the Ugandan aggression eliminate the 
significance of this intervention in setting a precedent for future armed 
humanitarian interventions. Moreover, his interventions in another two African 
States (the Comoros 1975 and the Seychelles in 1997) to oust regimes that he 
disliked weaken further his humanitarian motives. 67 In addition, his friendship 
with the ousted Ugandan President Milton Obote68 further complexes the cause 
of intervention. Thus, it could be said that Tanzania managed to serve its selfish 
motives under its challenged right to defend itself against the Ugandan 
aggression. 
3.6 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE 
(1979) 
In January 1966 Jean-Bedel Bokassa removed President David Dacko 
from power in a military coup. In the first decade, this regime had been 
supported by France, both economically and politically. 69 However, during the 
last years of his power, political opposition grew and he became brutal in 
66 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 79. 
67 Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After Kosovo, 
New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 72. 
6$ Teson, op. cit., p. 185 and Glennon, op. cit., p. 72. 
69 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
Order, Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol21, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 107. Also Fernando R Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An 
Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd edition, New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 198. 
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responding to this opposition. The torture and murder of about a hundred 
schoolchildren following unrest in January 1979 triggered international 
outrage. 70 As a result, in May 1979, the sixth Franco-African Congress 
convened in Kigali and established an African judicial commission to 
investigate the massacre. 71 On 16 August, this commission confirmed that the 
atrocities had taken place and that Bokassa had personally participated in the 
massacre. 72 A month later, while Bokassa was in Libya, French troops 
intervened and restored Dacko to power in a bloodless coup. 
Murphy noted that "this incident is probably the best example of 
humanitarian intervention during the Cold War that was accepted as lawful by 
the international community ". 73 Teson believes that "the null cost in human 
lives makes the Central African case an instance of humanitarian intervention 
par excellence ". 74 Yet, does the French intervention qualify as a legitimate 
instance of humanitarian intervention? It seems that the arguments above are 
isolated and have not been expressed elsewhere. First of all, France pretended 
that its troops intervened in the Central African Empire in response to the 
request of the new regime. 
75 On the other hand, France did have humanitarian 
concerns. 76 As a result, France had off financial aid after publication of the 
report of the judicial commission. 
77 But France never articulated claims on 
humanitarian intervention, or the protection of human rights. Teson noted that 
70 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 82. Also Teson, op. cit., p. 196 and Murphy, 
op. cit., p. 107. 
7 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 82, Murphy, op. cit., pp. 107-108 and Teson, op. cit., p. 196. 
72 Id 
73 Murphy, op. cit., p. 108. 
74 Teson, op. cit., p. 199. 
75 Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World 
Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 98. Also Chesterman, op. cit., p. 82, Murphy, op. cit., 
108 and Teson, op. cit., p. 197. 
Murphy, op. cit., p. 108 and Teson, op. cit., p. 198. 
Chesterman, op. cit., p. 82. 
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statements of French officials confirm that humanitarian concerns were crucial 
to the French decision to intervene. 78 Yet, he does not cite these statements, as 
he did in other cases. What is more, France never justified its intervention on 
humanitarian grounds. 
The fact that the world community did not condemn this intervention, 
or even tolerated it79 does not imply that this case was a clear instance of 
humanitarian intervention that states regarded it as lawful. The absence of the 
UN and OAU80 also does not explain the world community's support to the 
French intervention. Chesterman believes that "as in the case of Tanzania's 
statements concerning its ouster of Amin, it appears that the action against 
Bokassa was more in the nature of punishment, than prevention ". 81 This is a 
good explanation, but what matters here is that this case does not present a 
clear instance of humanitarian intervention. First of all, there were not human 
rights violations in a large scale. Unlike East Pakistan, Uganda and 
Kampuchea, the Central African Empire lacked the genocidal practices of the 
three other cases. The torture and murder of 100 schoolchildren is hideous, but 
cannot alone justify humanitarian intervention. Glennon argues that the 
magnitude of human rights violations was questionable. 82 He also pointed that 
the French economic interests remained strong in the Central African Republic, 
following its independence from France in 1960.83 
78 Teson, op. cit., p. 198 
79 Murphy, op. cit., p. 108 and Teson, op. cit., p. 198. 
80 Teson, op. cit., p. 197. 
Chesterman, op. cit., p. 82 
82 Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After Kosovo, 
New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 73. 
83 Id 
67 
3.7 US INTERVENTION IN GRENADA (1983) 
In October 1983, Bernard Coard deposed Maurice Bishop in a coup. 
Bishop came to power after replacing the elected government in 1974. The fact 
that the first coup followed the later is very important for this subchapter and 
the following analysis. On 19 October 1983, following public unrest, up to 200 
people had been killed, including Maurice Bishop and three of his cabinet 
ministers. There were reports of the army firing on women and children. 84 On 
25 October, following requests by the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States, 1900 US troops accompanied by 300 Caribbean soldiers landed in 
Grenada and deposed after three days of fighting the coup of Bernard Coard. 
This was a low-casualties operation (less than a hundred). An interim 
government was established, which led to multi-party elections in late 1984.85 
Troops withdrew by 15 December, leaving only a small number of US and 
Caribbean support personnel on the island. 86 
Nigel Rodley thinks that this intervention is one out of the four 
interventions during the Cold War that could be best justified by the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention (the other three include: India's intervention in 
Bangladesh, Tanzanian intervention in Uganda and Vietnam's intervention in 
Kampuchea). 87 Teson also believes that "the operation in Grenada was aimed 
at rescuing the Grenadian from an immediate threat to their lives and from 
84 Fernando R Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd 
edition, New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 212 
85 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
Order, Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol21, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 109. 
86 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 99. Also Murphy, op. cit., p. 109. 
87 Nigel S. Rodley, Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: 
The Legal Framework, in Nigel S. Rodley (ed. ), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: 
International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights, London, Brassey's (UK), 1992, p. 21. 
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deprivation of their democratic rights stemming from the imminent imposition 
on them of an unwanted authoritarian regime ". 
88 Finally, D'Amato argued that 
the US intervention in Grenada "was a lawful and temporary humanitarian 
intervention to free the people of Grenada from the tyranny of the thugs who 
had machine-gunned their way to power... now the episode can safely be cited 
as an instance of limited humanitarian intervention on behalf of the citizens of 
Grenada". 89 But was this the official justification of the US for its 1983 
intervention in Grenada? Or, can an immediate threat of abuses of human rights 
justify humanitarian intervention? And can Grenada be an authoritative 
instance of pro-democratic intervention to ensure respect for human rights? All 
these three questions will be addressed further down. 
As regards to the first question, it could be said that the Reagan 
administration advance three official justifications for its use of force in 
Grenada. None of them, however, included humanitarian intervention, 
protection of human rights or whatsoever. Accordingly, the first justification 
had to do with an invitation from the Governor of Grenada to restore order to 
the island. 90 The second justification refers to a request from the OECS for 
collective security action in Grenada. 
91 Finally, the US invoked the protection 
of nationals abroad as a legal justification. 
92 Yet, Schachter argued that "the 
Americans on the island were not hostages and treats had not been made 
88 Teson, op. cit., p211. 
89 Anthony D'Amato, "The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny", 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 84, No. 2, April 1990, p. 523. 
90 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary 
Conflict: A Reconceptualisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 56. Also Murphy, op. cit., 
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against them ". 93 It is clear from the above that the US did not advance any 
claims for a right of humanitarian intervention. 
94 The legal advisor to the US 
Department of State noted that the United States "did not assert a broad 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention "95 What is more, none of the Caribbean 
states advanced humanitarian justifications, but referred to the stabilisation of 
the country and the prevention of the Marxist revolution "spreading to all the 
islands" 96 
As regards to the second question, Teson argued that "the conditions in 
Grenada were such that a very serious deprivation of human rights was 
imminent. Intervention to prevent imminent, certain, and extensive human 
rights violations must be considered encompassed in the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention". 97 Nevertheless, humanitarian intervention is 
considered to be the use of force by states to remedy flagrant violations of 
fundamental human rights and policies of mass murder, ethnic cleansing, 
genocide and other atrocities. Most authors support this view, rather than an 
imminent threat-98 Teson also noted that humanitarian intervention is "the 
proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by 
governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human 
rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their 
93 Oscar Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", Michigan Law Review, vol. 82, 
1984, p. 1631. 
94 Murphy, op. cit., p. 109. 
93 Teson, op. cit., p. 216. 
96 Will D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, in Antonio Cassese (ed. ), The Current Legal 
Regulation of the Use of Force, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1986, pp. 56-65. 
97 Teson, op. cit., pp. 219-220. 
98 Michael Laban Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations, 2nd edition, New York, Basic Books, 1992, p. 107. Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, Morality and Politics", Journal 
of International Affairs, v. 3,1983/84, p. 313. Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in John 
N. Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1974, p. 217. 
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oppressive government ". 99 Thus, he omitted to add the imminent threat in his 
own definition of humanitarian intervention. Further, there were not atrocities 
of a large scale in Grenada at the time of intervention, nor was there any 
possibility of widespread atrocities and violence. 
'00 
It could be argued that this intervention does not fit into the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. Although Teson tried to collect statements from 
politicians and organisations to prove the implied humanitarian concerns, 
101 the 
official position of the US and the Caribbean states disconfirm his arguments. 
Actually, there were no mass violations of human rights, or an imminent threat. 
The real motive of intervening states had been their goal to curtail the Soviet 
influence over Grenada. As Murphy noted, the dominant feature is less "pro- 
human rights" and more "anti-communism". 
102 Teson cannot find supporters to 
his views, as most scholars point out this anti-communist campaign of the US 
intervention. 103 Not surprisingly, Teson ignores the above fact and remains 
silent to the anti-communist syndrome of intervening states. Yet, he refers that 
the pro-Western New National Party won 14 of the 15 seats. 104 This fact also 
verifies the fact that the goal of intervening states had been the fighting of 
communism. 
The third question had to do with the significance of the US 
intervention in Grenada in setting a precedent for pro-democratic intervention. 
Murphy, for instance argued that the intervention would be characterised as a 
99 Teson, op. cit., p. 5 
100 Murphy, op. cit., p. 110, Glennon, op. cit., p. 75 
101 Ibid., pp214-215. 
102 Murphy, op. cit., p. 110. Schachter also believes that this was the real motive for the US 
intervention in Grenada. Schachter, op. cit., p. 1632. 
101 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 56, Murphy, op. cit., p. 110, Glennon, op. cit., p. 75, 
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new breed of humanitarian intervention, such as "intervention to restore 
democracy" or "pro-democratic intervention". 105 Teson also advances this 
argument. ' 06 But the United States did not advance such a claim. Although the 
broader sphere of pro-democratic intervention will be explored in a later 
chapter, some points will be stressed here for this specific intervention. It could 
be argued that this is a totally inappropriate case for the pro-democratic 
interventions. This is because pro-democratic interventions involve the 
restoration to power of a democratic government, which was illegally disrupted 
by unconstitutional regimes. 107 However, there was no democratic government 
to restore in Haiti. Maurice Bishop came to power after a coup and was 
replaced by Coard's coup. 
Furthermore, the new regime did not commit a large scale of atrocities. 
Thus, pro-democratic intervention would be inappropriate. The world 
community and the UN strongly criticised the US intervention in Grenada. A 
Security Council resolution condemning the intervention as a breach of 
international law was vetoed by the US and a General Assembly resolution 
"deeply deplored the US-led intervention as a flagrant violation of 
international law"! 08 Teson thinks that "the reaction of the United Nations 
majority and of his first group of critic does not do justice to the human 
cause ". 109 Thus, he acknowledges that this intervention cannot be a strong 
precedence for pro-democratic or humanitarian intervention. The lack of opinio 
juris is more than evident. ' 10 
los Murphy, op. cit., p. 110. 
106 Teson , op. cit., pp. 
215-216. 
107 For further details see the chapter on Haiti and pro-democratic intervention. 
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3.8 US INTERVENTION IN PANAMA (1989) 
On 20 December 1989, about 12,000 US military forces along with 
other US forces already stationed in Panama intervened in Panama to remove 
Manuel Noriega and to install Guillermo Endara as President of Panama. 
Earlier in the same year, Endara won the election over Noriega's candidate, but 
Noriega annulled the election. President Bush justified the use of force on four 
grounds: the protection of US citizens in Panama, the restoration of democracy, 
protection of the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties and fighting drug 
trafficking off. " It is important to mention that Noriega was indicted on US 
courts for drug trafficking. Noriega was taken into custody and Endara became 
the President of Panama. Once again, the world community had to deal with 
new challenges regarding the sphere of the use of force in international law. 
After Grenada, Panama became the second case where democracy had been 
advanced by the US as a justification for the use of force. And although in 
Grenada there was no disruption of democracy, but only installation of 
democracy through free and fair elections, in Panama there was an actual 
disruption of democracy. Yet, did the world community accept the US 
intervention? And did it set any precedence for the use of force to restore 
democracy? 
". Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
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Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, Philadelphia, Procedural 
Aspects of International Law Series, vo121, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 114. Ved 
P. Nanda, "7%e Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under International Law", 
American Journal ojlnternational Law, vol. 84, No. 2, April 1990, p. 494. 
73 
It could be argued that the US intervention in Panama cannot set a 
strong precedent for pro-democratic intervention in international law. It is clear 
from the discussions in the UN Security Council that states condemned the US 
intervention as an "act of aggression" and "flagrant violation of international 
law". 112 The US vetoed a draft resolution condemning the intervention (ten 
members in favour, four members against the adoption of this resolution and 
one abstention). ' 13 The UN General Assembly, however, adopted a resolution 
that strongly condemned the US unilateral armed invasion in Panama. ' 14 The 
condemnation of the world community was evident on other levels as well. The 
Permanent Council of the OAS initially refused to accept the credentials of the 
ambassador dispatched by Endara to present Panama, while the Noriega 
regime's ambassador continued to participate and joined the vote deploring the 
invasion. 115 What is more, the new regime lacked recognition by Latin 
American states. 116 The lack of opiniojuris in the case of Panama is obvious. 
Let us now consider the position of several scholars relating the US 
intervention in Panama. Farer noted that "if sovereignty means anything, it 
means that one state cannot compromise another states territorial integrity, or 
dictate the character or the occupants of its governing institutions"! 17 
Professor Nanda argued that there was "no legal basis on replacing Noriega 
with democracy. No international legal instrument permits intervention to 
maintain or impose a democratic form of government in another state... The 
US stands alone in making such a claim and the community response at the UN 
112 S/PV. 2899 (1989), 20 December 1989; and S/PV. 2900 (1989), 21 December 1989. 
13 S/PV. 2902 (1989), 23 December 1989. 
114 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/240 (1989), 29 December 1989. 
115 Tom J. Farer, "Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm", American Journal of International. 
Law, vol. 84, No. 2, April 1990, p. 510. Also Chesterman, op. cit., p. 106. 
116 Farer, op. cit., p. 520 and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 106 
117 Farer, op. cit., p. 507. 
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and the OAS has appropriately been to reject this claim ". 
118 On the other hand, 
Professor D'Amato thinks that "their views are conditioned by a static 
conception of international law"! 
19 He believes that the US interventions in 
Grenada and Panama "are milestones along the path to a new nonstatist 
conception of international law that changes previous formulas". 
120 What is 
more, he argued that the US forcible intervention in Panama did not violate 
Article 2(4), because the US did not act against the "territorial integrity" of 
Panama, nor was the use of force directed against the "political independence" 
of Panama. 121 
As regards the above discrepancies, it could be argued that the Teson's 
mentor, Professor D'Amato, if far optimistic for regulations of the use of force 
regarding human rights and democracy. The world community had never 
accepted such values at this time and the strong condemnation of the US 
intervention in Grenada confirms the above assertion. He strongly supported a 
new era for human rights and democracy in a case that met severe opposition 
by the society of states. Hence, it is questionable why he makes his case under 
such unfavourable circumstances. Further, as Murphy observed, human rights 
and democracy was not the primary goal of the intervention, but national US 
interests: to beat drug trafficking and to eliminate a severe irritant in US foreign 
relations with Latin America (Noriega). 
122 Accordingly, he argued that "even if 
pro-democratic intervention is considered within the scope of humanitarian 
"a Nanda, op. cit., pp. 498-500. 
Anthony D'Amato, "The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny", 
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intervention, the intervention in Panama is not a strong precedent in support of 
its acceptance by the international community". 
123 
123 Ibid., P. 115. 
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3.9 INDIA'S INTERVENTION IN EAST PAKISTAN (1971) 
INTRODUCTION-THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT 
After the end of World War II and the decolonisation period, India and 
Pakistan became two independent states. The separation of these two states did 
not settle all of their disputes and continuous conflicts continued to occur 
between those states. Good illustrations are the two wars between India and 
Pakistan in 1947-48 and 1965.1 The 1971 war, however, had nothing to do with 
the ordinary problems and territorial claims of India and Pakistan, but it had to 
deal with the crisis resulting from the revolt in East Bengal. The Pakistani State 
was divided into East and West Pakistan. East Bengal was a province of 
Pakistan and it constituted its eastern province (East Pakistan). The only link 
between these two parts of Pakistan was religion. Most of the people in East 
Bengal were Muslims. 2 The Hindu minority in East Pakistan reached the figure 
of ten to twelve million people. 3 
Nevertheless, there were important cultural, linguistic and economic 
disparities between the two parts of Pakistan. 4 In the west wing of Pakistan 
people spoke Urdu, the official language, while in the east the majority of the 
population spoke Bengali. 
5 Further, East Bengal is a land of monsoon rains and 
Chopra Pran, "East Bengal: A Crisis for India°, The World Today, vol. 27, Sept. 1971, p. 372- 
2 Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian 
Intervention, The Hague, The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 113. Also 
Chopra Pran, op. cit., p. 372- 
3 Leo Kuper, The Prevention of Genocide, New Heaven, Yale University Press, 1985, p. 45. 
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rise in contrast with the dry land of West Pakistan. 6 Culturally, Pakistan was 
strongly linked with the Middle East, while East Bengal had strong cultural and 
economic affinities with India. 7 However, political motives led to the outbreak 
of war in 1971. The East Bengalis felt like they were a colony of West 
Pakistan. 8 West Pakistan became increasingly more industrialised and 
prosperous, while the conditions in the East deteriorated. 9 The realisation of the 
political and economic domination of East Pakistan by the West Pakistan 
Government led the Bengali people to demands of a greater autonomy for their 
region. '° 
To avoid this discrimination in their area and to achieve their autonomy 
the Bengalis nurtured a movement for greater regional autonomy in East 
Pakistan, the Awami League. " After many years of dictatorship in Pakistan, in 
the November-December 1970 general election the Awami League won 167 
seats out of the 169 in East Pakistan. 12 The success of the Awami League was 
an expression of Bengali separatism. 13 East Pakistan wanted a generous 
measure of autonomy in a loose federation in which the central government's 
authority would be confined to defence, foreign affairs and some currency 
matters. 14 After the elections, the Awami League and the Pakistan People's 
Party commenced negotiations and tried to proceed to a resolution of the 
6 Chopra Pran, op. cit., p. 372. 
7 Fernando R Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2°d 
edition, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p200 and Chopra Pran, op. cit., p. 373. 
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" Kuper, op. cit., p. 46. 
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conflict 15 The Pakistani Government desired to maintain the territorial integrity 
of the state and it had serious fears that the Awami League was planning the 
secession of East Pakistan. 16 Therefore, President Yahya Khan postponed the 
National Assembly indefinitely. 17 
The Pakistani Government decided that the only options to eliminate 
disaccord in East Pakistan were massacres and massive terror. 18 The 
international Commission of Jurists in its review describes the situation as very 
brutal. It acknowledged that there was indiscriminate killing of civilians, 
attempts to exterminate or drive out of the country a large part of the Hindu 
population, arrests and torture of students and Awami League activists, raping, 
destruction of villages and towns. 19 The Pakistani Army carried death lists on 
which appeared names of political, cultural, and intellectual leaders of 
Bengal. 20 Leo Kuper describes that the brutality of the Pakistani army increased 
sharply with massive collective reprisals in the annihilation of Bengali villages 
as the resistance of the Bengalis mounted 21 The cruelty in East Bengal caused 
a large influx of refugees to India. Leo Kuper states that seven million refugees 
had fled to India and that the daily flows of refugees to India were at the rate of 
40 to 50 thousand a day-22 Other scholars have stated that the number of 
refugees had reached ten million. 
23 This fact constituted a refugee aggression to 
the Indian state that created an unbearable economic strain to India. 24 
's Kuper, op. cit., p. 47. 
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Relations between Pakistan and India had been deteriorated as a result 
of the crisis. 25 On 3 December, for reasons that are unclear, the Pakistani air 
force had launched an air strike against India. 26 The crisis began when India 
decided to intervene militarily in Pakistan to stop the atrocities. On 16 
December 1971 the war ended after the intervention of the Indian Army, which 
sealed the successful secession of the independent state of Bangladesh. 27 India 
had justified its intervention in the Pakistani territory not only on the aggression 
committed by Pakistan, but also on the inhumane conditions in which the 
Bengali people had been kept 28 Subsequently, India's justifications for its 
intervention were based on mixed motives. 9 
One of the main concerns of this chapter is to consider whether or not 
the Indian intervention in Pakistan was motivated by pure humanitarian reasons 
or by other factors. The examination of this case will be divided into three 
stages. India's legal justifications and the legitimacy or not of its intervention, 
especially the claims on humanitarian intervention, will be the first part. In the 
second stage, political and other motives will be put forward with the purpose 
of detecting whether or not humanitarian intervention constitutes a political 
rather than a legal principle. To this extent, it is very important to balance the 
arguments for and against humanitarian intervention and to observe which of 
them applies to the Indian case. The last part will have to do with the moral 
ground of the intervention and it will be explored whether or not the 
3° intervention was morally justified. It should be noted that the Indian 
is Chesterman, op. cit., p. 72. 
26 Id 
27 Kuper, op. cit., p. 48. 
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intervention is one of the few instances that many writers have called an 
intervention morally justified. Finally, there will be a comprehensive evaluation 
of the Indian intervention in East Pakistan. 
LEGAL ASPECTS FOR THE USE OF FORCE 
In 1971 neither India nor Pakistan was a member of the UN, but under 
Article 31 of the UN Charter they were entitled to participate in the discussions 
of the Counci131 India's ambassador Sen had denied that his government had 
breached the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) since Pakistan had 
struck first. 32 The Indian Government had supported that its intervention had 
been justified by the aggression committed by Pakistan. 33 As already stated 
above, India had justified its intervention on humanitarian grounds and on UN 
Article 51 on self-defence34. However, India's justifications on self-defence 
had been insufficient 35 Article 51 states that nothing in the Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. In 
addition, customary international law places further restrictions on the right to 
self-defence. 36 Nicholas Wheeler plausibly states that the fact that Ambassador 
Sen did not refer Article 51 explicitly before the UN Security Council suggests 
that the Indian Government had recognised that it was dubious in invoking this 
31 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 60. 
32 S/PV. 1606 (1971), 4 December 1971. 
33 Id 
34 Martha Brenfors and Malene Maxe Petersen, "The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian 
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rule. 37 This is because the bombing of Indian villages along the India-Pakistan 
border could not justify India's claims on self-defence, since minor bombing 
incidents along the border had been a feature of Indian-Pakistani relations ever 
since their independence. 38 
Another Indian justification is the refugee aggression on India. 39 
Ambassador Sen had argued that the meaning of aggression should also 
encompass the aggression that resulted from ten million people coming to India 
as refugees. 40 The Indian delegation had tried to persuade the Security Council 
that its intervention was a legitimate response to Pakistan's refugee and 
military aggression. 41 India had claimed that the refugee aggression caused by 
the refugee influx jeopardised India's social system and its economy and this is 
a further act of aggression. 42 All India's justifications seem rational and 
legitimate. However, international law does not provide any articles and 
resolutions on the matter of refugee aggression. Murphy adds: "whether the 
massive flow of refugees can also be considered an act of aggression is 
likewise doubtful; a better case is made that they were a threat to international 
peace and security in the region " 43 Indeed, this argument of refugee 
aggression is an invention of the Indian delegation. The UN Charter, treaties, 
juridical decisions and laws do not refer to such a kind of aggression. 
Let us now consider India's claims on humanitarian intervention and 
examine the validity of such claims. Keeping in mind that India's primary 
36 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 60. Wheeler illustrates this argument with the Caroline Case of 1837. 
37 Ibid., p. 61. 
36 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
Order, Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol21, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996, pp. 98-99. 





justification for its use of force was Pakistan's aggression on India (including 
the refugee aggression), it could be said that India relied primarily on the 
traditional ground of self-defence, rather than the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. Yet, the Indian delegation decided that the humanitarian reasons 
would give it another justification for the use of force and it would mitigate the 
criticism against India. The Indian Ambassador Sen had argued before the 
Security Council that the military repression in East Pakistan was enough to 
shock the conscience of mankind and he had asked what had happened to the 
conventions on genocide, human rights and self-determination. 45 Ambassador 
Sen was well aware of the answer of this question. All the conventions on 
genocide, human rights and self-determination do not recognise a right to 
humanitarian intervention. What is more, he did not claim a right to 
humanitarian intervention, but he primarily relied upon traditional and new 
imaginative grounds of self-defence. Thus, it is doubtful why he invoked these 
conventions. He probably wanted to mitigate the reactions of the world 
community to India's intervention by speaking in moral terms. Yet, this 
question of his does not add any credits to India's legal justifications. 
The international Commission of Jurists concluded by stating that 
India's armed intervention would have been justified if she had acted under the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 46 Nevertheless, India had never 
explicitly invoked the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, but it had only 
advanced humanitarian claims. Hence, the world community had lost this 
unique opportunity to test whether a right to humanitarian intervention would 
43 Murphy, op. cit., p. 99. 
44 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 74, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 62, Kuper, op. cit., p. 54, Ronzitti, op. cit., p. 96. 
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be welcomed or not. Further, the discussions before the Council and the 
General Assembly had nothing to do with discussions on the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention. Akehurst argued that India had realised that 
humanitarian intervention was an insufficient justification for the use of force 
and this is why it had relied upon the ground of self-defence. 47 Teson disagreed 
with Akehurst's view and he stressed that the important point is that the whole 
picture of the situation was one that warranted foreign intervention on the 
grounds of humanity. 48 Michael Walzer supported that morality is not a bar to 
unilateral action when there is no immediate alternative available, like in the 
Bengali case. 49 He thinks that humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a 
response to acts that shock the moral conscience of mankind. 50 Yet, this 
justification can only be moral, not legal. This is because there is no provision 
in international law for humanitarian intervention. Undoubtedly, the atrocities 
committed by Pakistan had shocked the international community. Therefore, 
according to his beliefs, India's intervention was a classical instance 
humanitarian intervention. In the same sense, Nicholas Wheeler believes that it 
is the failure of the Security Council to stop the massive violations of human 
rights in East Pakistan, and the appalling situation of the refugees on the Indian 
border, that gave India a legal right to act unilaterally. 51 
It seems that most of the writers had rushed to justify India's 
intervention on the atrocities and the genocide committed by Pakistan. 
Therefore, they try to justify India's intervention as a humanitarian one. 
46 East Pakistan Staff Study by the Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, 
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However, India had never justified its intervention in the terms of the legal 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 52 Nicholas Wheeler had clearly observed 
that India had attempted to persuade members of the Security Council that its 
intervention was justifiable in terms of the UN principles relating to the 
protection of human rights. 53 Nevertheless, India's references to human rights, 
apart from the fact that they were not India's primary justification, did not 
constitute claims to a right of humanitarian intervention. It could be argued that 
this had happened because India had been well aware of the trends in the 
international community, which had been stressing upon the matters of 
territorial integrity and state sovereignty, rather than the protection of universal 
human rights. 
The fact that the international community did not seem willing to favour 
human rights instead of state sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of a state can be clearly illustrated by a 
quick examination of the position of states during the crisis. First of all, it 
should be stressed that during the days of the crisis the UN Security Council 
had remained inactive due to the Cold War rivalries. 54 The matter was raised 
only nine months after the first massacre. 55 Nine members of the Security 
Council were calling for a meeting. The subject was on the deteriorating 
situation, which had led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan. 56 This 
had happened on 4 December, when India had already invaded Pakistan. 57 The 
Indian Government had insisted that the cause of the conflict was the refusal of 
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the Pakistan Government to accept the results of the General election and to 
grand autonomy to the Bengalis. 58 On the other hand, the Pakistan Government 
had claimed that the cause of the internal conflict and its military intervention 
in East Pakistan was the secessionist movement in East Bengal. Further, 
Pakistan claimed that India's real motive was the breaking up of Pakistan. 59 
It could be said that the international community was not willing to 
accept India's justifications. There was, however, a variation in the states' 
opinions. The US and China had been aligned with Pakistan and the Soviet 
Union had supported India. There had been two states that named India an 
aggressor. The Chinese Ambassador had rejected India's justifications and had 
called the Council to name India as an aggressor and to demand that it 
withdraw its forces from East Pakistan. 
60 Albania was the second state to 
condemn India as being an aggressor. 61 The United States had acknowledged 
that the cause of the human suffering of the Bengali people lay in the failure of 
both India and Pakistan to arrive at a political solution. Thus, the immediate 
cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of forces were essential conditions 
for progress. Therefore, the US proposed a resolution calling upon the 
governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps necessary for an immediate 
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of armed forces to their own sides of the 
Indian-Pakistan borders. 62 
A Soviet veto, however, had prevented adoption of the US proposed 
resolution. 63 The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact ally Poland were the only 
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states to condone India's action in the Security Council. 64 The USSR 
representative had argued that the inhumane acts of repression and terrorism by 
the Pakistan government had been the main cause of a most serious problem 
and of human suffering. The USSR had, therefore, called for a political 
settlement in East Pakistan and for a cessation of all acts of violence by 
Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Furthermore, the USSR had called for a 
political settlement in East Pakistan that would put an end to the hostilities. 65 
Although the Soviet Union supported the fact that India's recourse to force had 
to be located in the context of the massive human suffering caused by Pakistan, 
it did not explicitly defend India's use of force as a humanitarian intervention. 66 
The Security Council had been paralysed due to the opposition of the 
superpowers and the Soviet veto. After a third meeting that the Council had 
failed to attain a resolution, the non-aligned group of states had managed to 
persuade the major powers to refer the issue to the General Assembly under the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950.67 The General Assembly had considered 
the question at two plenary meetings held on 7 December 1971.68 Most 
delegates in the General Assembly had said that the situation in East Pakistan 
was an internal one, to be settled by the Pakistan Government, with no external 
interference and expressed support for the principles of integrity and non- 
interference. 69 Resolution 2793 carried by 104 votes to 11 with 10 abstentions 
had called for an immediate ceasefire with a reference to an early political 
solution and to intensified efforts to bring about the conditions necessary for 
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the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes. 70 The resolution had called 
upon India and Pakistan to conclude a ceasefire and withdraw their forces. 71 
The states that had opposed the resolution and that did emphasise the atrocities 
committed by Pakistan were the Soviet Union and the other members of the 
Warsaw Pact. 72 India, however, had stated that it did not feel bound by the 
General Assembly Resolution because it is recommendatory, not mandatory. 73 
This official statement of India is unacceptable. No doubt, the General 
Assembly resolutions have a recommendatory character and are not binding, 
like the Security Council resolutions. Yet, India should not ignore this 
resolution because it is not mandatory, but she could have stressed other 
justifications. For instance, India could advance claims of internal security, 
along with humanitarian ones, in support of its decision not to implement the 
call of the General Assembly resolution. 
India's decision to disregard Resolution 2793 had led to the final 
meeting of the Security Council from 12 to 21 December 1971.74 Once again 
the superpowers were irreconcilable and there was a great difficulty in 
obtaining a resolution. On 16 December the Indian ambassador had announced 
to the Security Council that the Pakistani forces had surrendered in Bangladesh 
and that the Indian government had also ordered a cease-fire in the West. 75 The 
participating states in the Security Council had concluded in a resolution after 
the Pakistani forces had surrendered to the Indian army. Security Council 
Resolution 307 had called, between others, for a durable cease-fire and 
cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict, for all Member States to avoid 
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any action, which might aggravate the situation in the subcontinent and for a 
safe return of refugees in their homes. 76 Leo Kuper characterised this resolution 
as meaningless, even as a face-saving device. 77 Indeed this Security Council 
Resolution had been meaningless, given that the Indian arms had defeated the 
Pakistani army and created the new state of Bangladesh. 78 
All this debate in the Security Council and the General Assembly and 
the reactions of states had proved that states were unwilling to recognise a right 
to humanitarian intervention. 79 None of the states had justified India's use of 
force in terms of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 80 Yet, the debate in 
the General Assembly illustrated that India had to respect Pakistan's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity-81 As Nicholas Wheeler argued, in the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, India's cries for justice fell on 
deaf ears. 82 On the other hand, the international community had stressed upon 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the maintenance of the principle of non- 
intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Territorial integrity and 
sovereignty had proved their predominance over humanitarian issues in the 
world community. Thus, the states had chosen to solidify the principle of non- 
intervention and sovereignty, instead of preventing crimes against humanity. 
For instance, China and Albania had shown their oppositions to India's 
humanitarian claims by naming India an aggressor. The other states did not use 
such an accurate word, but they had shown that they considered the Indian 
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intervention illegal. Therefore, it could be said that the Indian intervention in 
East Pakistan could not set a precedent for humanitarian intervention in 
international law for reasons that will be analysed further. 
Oscar Schachter thinks that despite considerable sympathy for the 
oppressed Bengalis, a large number of the UN General Assembly had called on 
India to withdraw its forces. 83 Simon Chesterman notably proves that the 
General Assembly resolution had been directed at both India and Pakistan. 84 
However, Schachter's point of view seems to be very rational because, 
although the resolution had been directed against both of the conflicting states, 
it could be said that it had mostly implied India because India had used force 
against Pakistan and Pakistan had had every right to keep its military forces in 
its territory according to international law. 85 This is why Nicholas Wheeler 
thinks that India had suffered a major defeat in the General Assembly. 86 
Similarly, Leo Kuper argued that the General Assembly Resolution had been a 
rejection of humanitarian intervention and a commitment to two general 
principles of international relations between states, which is respect for state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs 
of member states. 87 No doubt, General Assembly resolution 2793 had been a 
rejection to humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, in the case of Bangladesh 
humanitarian intervention had been rejected much earlier by India, when it had 
the opportunity to invoke humanitarian intervention, but it denied it. In other 
words, the same intervening state did not recognise a right to humanitarian 
intervention. Hence, it relied on the grounds of self-defence. Thus, the rejection 
83 Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, Michigan Law Review, 1984, 
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of humanitarian intervention is not simply a result of the response of states, as 
illustrated before the Security Council and the General Assembly, but it is the 
same India's rejection of humanitarian intervention, as it had denied claiming 
such a right in favouring circumstances. 
Teson had argued that the statements and the wording of General 
Assembly Resolution 2793 show that nations were concerned with the 
restoration of conditions necessary for the voluntary return of refugees, an 
ultra-euphemism to urge Pakistan to renounce its genocidal policies. 88 He had 
implied that the General Assembly had been turned against Pakistan. This 
argument, though, seems totally insubstantial, because the Soviet Union and its 
Warsaw Pact allies, the most fervent supporters of India, were the minority of 
states that did not vote for Resolution 2793. Concern had been expressed about 
the fate of the people, but as Chesterman argues, the fact remains that the issue 
only came onto the agenda, when Indian troops crossed the border and the main 
step taken was to call upon the two states to respect each other's territory. 89 
In addition, Teson argued that the characterisation of the Indian action 
as humanitarian intervention can be made at two levels: foreign assistance for 
people engaged in a struggle for their right to self-determination and as foreign 
intervention aimed at stopping acts of genocide. 90 It could be said that those 
justifications are of a more moral and political, rather than legal nature. Self- 
determination and the prevention of genocide are not enough themselves to 
justify the unilateral use of force. What is more, India did not intervene in East 
Pakistan in order to assist people engaged in a struggle of self-determination, 
86 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 68. 
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nor to halt genocide. On the contrary, India claimed a right to self-defence, as a 
justification for its actions. Richard Lillich had been more temperate on this 
topic by stating that the human rights violations in East Pakistan and the UN 
inactivity calls for a fundamental re-evaluation of the protection of human- 
rights by general international Law. 91 However, he did not support that there is 
a legal right of humanitarian intervention in the international relations of states. 
He had just supported that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention deserves a 
reassessment due to the failure of the UN to prevent genocide. 92 An answer, 
however, to this argument could be that humanitarian intervention encloses the 
high risk for abuses by states of the principle of non-intervention in their 
international relations. 
On the other hand, Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley noted that the UN 
instruments on human rights (the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the 
ICCPR, the ICESCR, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide and many others) provide neither collective, nor unilateral military 
enforcement. 93 Moreover, they stressed that the UN had repeatedly tried to 
prevent unilateral intervention. 94 Therefore, it is clear from their arguments that 
they consider the Indian intervention illegal according to international law. 
They had evidently supported immediately after the Indian intervention that the 
use of unilateral force remains and should remain illegal except in instances of 
self-defence against an actual attack. 95 Further, they stated that the Bangladesh 
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case although containing important mitigating factors in India's favour, does 
not constitute a definable and workable new rule of law, which would make 
certain kinds of unilateral military interventions permissible in the future. 96 In 
other words they had noted that India's intervention could not set a precedent 
for a new rule of customary international law. 
Let us now consider how India's action might have established a new 
rule of customary international law. The International Court of Justice had 
defined the criteria for the creation of a rule of customary international law: (1) 
a general practice of States and (2) the acceptance by States of the general 
practice as law. 97 It could be said that India did not fulfil both of the criteria. 
Humanitarian intervention is evidenced in state practice, but it had been proved 
that states claim humanitarian intervention because they cannot justify their 
intervention in the name of their interests and power politics. The heads of 
states know that they will be condemned as aggressors in the international 
community. Even if we accept that humanitarian intervention is evidenced in 
state practice, in the case of India humanitarian intervention had not been the 
justification for the use of force because India had primarily relied on the 
traditional ground of self-defence. 98 India had tried to justify its intervention on 
humanitarian grounds, but it had never explicitly justified its use of force in 
terms of the legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 99 Even the Soviet 
Union that had supported that India's recourse to force had to be located in the 
context of the massive human suffering caused by Pakistan, it did not explicitly 
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defend India's use of force as a humanitarian intervention. '00 Therefore, it 
could be said that in this case India's most significant supporter had not even 
claimed the right to humanitarian intervention. In that sense, how is it possible 
to claim that the Indian intervention had been accepted as a precedent for 
humanitarian intervention? 
Nevertheless, even if one accepts that India's action constitutes state 
practice for the purposes of establishing customary international law, there is 
little evidence of opinio juris. 101 The acceptance by states of general practice as 
law is very significant for the formulation of a customary rule of international 
law. In the case of India, however, humanitarian concerns appear to have 
tempered criticism of India but were not accepted as a justification for its 
intervention. 102 It had been clearly illustrated by the UN Security Council and 
the General Assembly that States had been unwilling to accept such an 
intervention. On the contrary, states had proved their allegiance in the rules of 
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. Even 
the argument of the International Commission of Jurists that India's 
intervention would have been justified if she had acted under the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention cannot be valid at the time that the international 
community was not ready to accept such an intervention and states were not 
willing to accept humanitarian intervention as a legal justification for the use of 
force. What is more, the International Commission of Jurists is not an 
authoritative body, but they are merely commentators. 
POLITICAL MOTIVES 
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An exhaustive examination of humanitarian interventions in the past 
can prove that along with humanitarian purposes states intervene for their 
national interest and for matters of power politics. More specifically, states veil 
their cruel interests behind the flag of human rights and humanitarian 
intervention. A critical analysis of India's intervention can easily prove that 
India's primary motives were political and that the claims for the cessation of 
massive human suffering in East Pakistan were simply a reason to achieve its 
purposes. Undoubtedly, in the case of India there had been many human rights 
violations and acts of genocide and India had contributed to their cessation. 
What is important, however, is that India did not intervene with the pure 
objective of protecting the human rights of the Bengali people and stopping the 
Pakistani brutality and cruelty. Yet, this is one of the few cases that there had 
really existed humanitarian necessity and the grounds for a pure humanitarian 
intervention. 
Teson based upon this fact had called India's intervention "an almost 
perfect example of humanitarian intervention". 103 He had further suggested that 
it is not important whether Indian leaders had selfish purposes along with 
"humanitarian ones", but that the whole picture of the situation was one that 
favoured foreign intervention on the grounds of humanity. 104 It could be said 
that this argument is superficial and does not correspond to a scholar of 
international law. Abuses of the principle of non-intervention under the 
fallacious shield of human rights veil pure national interest of states. In a 
similar argument to Teson's, Michael Walzer, although he had recognised that 
India had strategic interest in its intervention, he had supported that the Indian 
102 Ibid., p. 73. 
103Teson, op. cit., p. 207. 
95 
intervention qualifies as humanitarian because it was a rescue, strictly and 
narrowly defined. 105 Others had recognised that self-interest was an important 
motive for the Indian intervention, but they still insisted that India's motives 
had been "apparently genuine humanitarian motives". ' 06 
The fact that many authors had viewed the Indian intervention as one of 
the most illustrative examples of humanitarian intervention does not mean that 
this intervention was perfect and constitutes a model that justifies humanitarian 
intervention. Neither could this model be characterised as an ideal model of 
humanitarian intervention. Even in this "almost perfect example of 
humanitarian intervention" there had been mixed motives on the part of 
India. 107 The flow of refugees that threatened the country's life had led the 
Indian Prime Minister Mrs Ghandi to tell the Congress Party workers in New 
Delhi that she would do what is best in India's national interest. 108 This is 
enough to prove that there is no humanitarian intervention based upon pure 
humanitarian purposes, but on national interest. Humanitarian objectives had 
been put forward just in order to mitigate the reactions of the other states of the 
international community. This is why humanitarian intervention constitutes a 
political rather than a legal or a moral concept. And this is why there is no 
genuine humanitarian intervention in the past. 
Let us now consider the interests that the Indian government had veiled 
behind the protective shield of human rights. First of all, the breaking up of 
Pakistan would favour India's position in world politics, because India would 
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weaken the power of its archenemy. 109 As already stated above, India had two 
wars with Pakistan regarding territorial claims after the separation of the two 
states. 110 This enmity existed at the time of the Bengali crisis and it exists even 
today. Therefore, India had achieved a major goal against Pakistan with its 
"humanitarian intervention". East Pakistan had become an independent state, 
Bangladesh, and Pakistan had lost the most vital and the richest region of its 
territory. Further, Mrs Ghandi's party was doing badly in the polls as a 
consequence of the refugee crisis and the appropriate handling of the situation 
would lead up to desirable electoral outcome. 111 Yet, as Nicholas Wheeler had 
argued, it was impossible for an Indian Government to argue that it would go to 
war and justify it on the basis of weakening an enemy and improving its 
electoral fortunes. 112 It would be irreconcilable with UN principles and with 
international law. Therefore, the Indian Government had claimed the right to 
self-defence and had implied humanitarian motives. 
Apart from the above named Indian interests, there is another piece of 
evidence that leaves no space for any doubts that the Indian intervention was 
not motivated by humanitarian reasons, but mostly, if not only, by its vital 
national interests. India had claimed that it had acted for humanitarian reasons, 
self-defence and refugee aggression. However, India did not intervene 
militarily in East Pakistan to halt the massacre and to protect human rights to 
rescue the Bengali people, but it had only intervened nine months after the 
atrocities began. 113 The Indian intervention had come too late to save hundreds 
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of thousands of Bengalis. 114 The only reason for the use of military force was 
not India's humanitarian claims, but the exodus of ten million refugees that 
caused a vital threat to the security of the Indian state and the survival of Mrs 
Ghandi's "Congress Party". ' 15 This explains clearly why the Indian 
Government had decided to intervene in East Pakistan after a long delay. If the 
motives were purely and primarily humanitarian, then, India would have 
intervened months earlier in Pakistan. This "almost perfect example of 
humanitarian intervention" proves that there is no pure humanitarian 
intervention. It is only another justification for the use of force that mitigates 
the feelings of the public opinion and that of the world community. 
The struggle for national interest and power politics could be 
understood by the positions taken by states at the time of the crisis. The only 
states that condoned India's action in the Security Council and the General 
Assembly were the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. ' 16 This is because 
the Soviet Union and India had signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and 
Cooperation in August 1971.117 The Soviet Union had been a fervent supporter 
of India and had favoured India's interventionism at that time, although it had 
traditionally insisted in the past on its doctrinal position on the inviolability of 
territorial borders and non-use of force because this suited its interest. 118 By 
supporting India, the Soviet Union had ensured its alliance with India and its 
future control over the new state of Bangladesh, which had given India an 
important advantage in its power seeking policies against China and the 
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USA. 119 The position taken by the Soviet Union reveals the hypocrisy in the 
international relations of states. This is why unilateral humanitarian 
intervention should not be legitimate and accepted by the world community: 
because it will give states hypocritical willingness to protect human rights and 
thus abuse the principle of non-intervention. 
MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
After the examination of the legal and political aspects of India's 
"humanitarian intervention" it is useful for the overall understanding of the 
intervention to examine the intervention from a moral point of view. The Indian 
intervention has created many dilemmas on the matter of morality. The first 
dilemma is that some writers had condemned the intervention as illegal, while 
they had also observed that it have been morally justified. 120 Some writers had 
accepted that it could be possible to consider an act as illegal and yet moral, 
while some others had rejected it as inherently contradictory, thinking that if an 
act is moral, the law should recognise it as legal. 121 On this divergence of 
arguments, it could be said that it is difficult to regard an act as illegal and yet 
moral. It is amply known that law and the rules derive from moral principles. 
The Ancient Romans had expressed this view in the Latin dictum "ex injuria 
(or delicto) jus oritur". This means that law derives from injustice and 
presupposes that it comes out from injustice in order to protect justice. 
Therefore, it would seem odd to claim that justice does not embrace ethical 
principles. 
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On the other hand, the dilemma above could be characterised as a 
pseudo-dilemma. Before scholars proceed to this dilemma they should clarify 
whether this intervention had been morally justified or not. The majority of 
writers had viewed the Indian intervention as morally justified. Nicholas 
Wheeler had supported that the level of human rights abuses had clearly met 
the criteria of a supreme humanitarian 122 He had further argued that 
although India's intervention was not motivated by primarily humanitarian 
reasons, it counts as a humanitarian one, because the matters of the 
demographic aggression committed by the refugee influx did not undermine the 
humanitarian benefits of the intervention. 123 Michael Walzer had argued that 
morality is not a bar to unilateral action, so long as there is no immediate 
alternative available and he thinks that there was no alternative in the Bengali 
case. 124 As it has been already stated above, most of the writers seem to 
consider the Indian intervention as moral. As a consequence comes the 
argument of how an intervention can be considered illegal and yet moral. 
Nevertheless, it could be said, in contrast to the majority of the writers on this 
topic that in the Indian intervention morality was not the pragmatic motive. The 
potential moral incentives had been clearly subrogated and sacrificed by the 
political ones. If India wanted to rescue the Bengalis from the Pakistani 
atrocities it would intervene nine months earlier, when the first massacres 
occurred in East Pakistan. 125 But India had only intervened when the refugee 
crisis became a threat to its national security and it humanitarian motives did 
not undermine a positive humanitarian outcome and that the intervention had 
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been humanitarian because the security reasons that had led India to intervene 
did not undermine the humanitarian benefits of the intervention. 126 But the fact 
that political motives coincided with a positive humanitarian outcome does not 
mean that India's primary aim had been the part of morality and the protection 
of human rights. Human rights and morality had simply been a justification to 
mitigate the clamours of the world community. Some scholars would support 
that moral incentives can coexist with selfish motives. However, it is very 
dubious that India would intervene without the calculation of those selfish 
motives. Thus, if such coexistence is feasible, then selfish motives are 
overestimated and they are the most determinative criterion for intervention. had 
imposed economic strains to its society. Therefore, India's intervention had 
been based upon selfish motives rather than moral ones. Nicholas Wheeler 
believes that the non- 
Morality is one of the most attractive appeals of humanitarian 
intervention. Michael Walzer had argued that humanitarian intervention is 
justified to acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind". 127 In the Indian 
case, the world community had been horrified by the atrocities committed by 
Pakistan. The inactivity of the United Nations and the unwillingness of states to 
cooperate with the purpose of ending up to a political solution had been clearly 
illustrated. The fact that India did intervene in East Pakistan does not mean that 
India had been the moral actor in this problem and the other states indifferent or 
immoral. It could be said that India had acted for its own political motives. No 
doubt, India had claimed morality and humanitarian necessity, while its 
primary goals were the political ones. Subsequently, states never intervene for 
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moral objectives, even if they claim humanitarian intervention, but they pursue 
their interests. The moral concepts of humanitarian intervention are sacrificed 
by the political ones. What is more, the moral concept probably exists for the 
theoretical foundation of the doctrine. Therefore, it could be said that India's 
intervention had not been pure and morally justified on the fact that it had 
stopped the massacre and it had rescued the Bengali people, at the time that 
political motives had been the fulcrum. It seems that humanitarian intervention 
and its moral premises are simply a form of state hypocrisy in international 
relations. Thus, the Indian intervention had arguably been legally condemned in 
the sense that even morality could not justify it. 
CONCLUSION 
The Indian intervention in East Pakistan is one of great importance 
because it constitutes the one and only paradigm of secession and the creation 
of a new state in the Cold War era. 128 Further, it was the first time in the UN era 
that humanitarian claims had been used to justify the use of force. 129 This is one 
out of many claimed "humanitarian interventions" that had gained the support 
of many authors and mitigated the clamours against the intervening state. This 
is because the situation in East Bengal and the atrocities committed by Pakistan 
had favoured the existence of such an intervention. As Nicholas Wheeler had 
noted, the level of human rights abuses had clearly met the criteria of a 
supreme humanitarian intervention. Undoubtedly, if genocide would not meet 
the criteria of a supreme humanitarian intervention, then no other reason would 
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be sufficient to justify this kind of intervention. However, the Indian army had 
used force against Pakistan not with the purpose of rescuing the Bengali people 
but in order to protect the Indian society from the refugee influx. If India would 
intervene in East-Bengal before the refugees start fleeing to its own borders, 
then the intervention would be purely humanitarian. Nevertheless, selfish 
motives had been the pivotal factor for intervention. 
Some writers think that the mixed interventions (humanitarian and 
other motives) cannot undermine the positive humanitarian outcome. No doubt, 
India had succeeded in stopping the Pakistani atrocities and it was the only 
nation that led to the rescue of the Bengalis from genocide. Nevertheless, it 
would be more prudent if India's incentives and the outcome coincided. If 
India's objectives were purely humanitarian then its intervention would be 
justified and it would reply to the realist argument against humanitarian 
intervention, which refers to the matter of self-interest. But even this "almost 
perfect example of humanitarian intervention" is vulnerable because national 
interest had been at stake. Compared to other humanitarian interventions where 
it turned out that there had been no grounds for such an action, it could be said 
that the Indian intervention is the most justifiable because genocide in East 
Pakistan had actually occurred. Thus, many commentators have considered this 
intervention to be a leading case of humanitarian intervention. 130 In addition, 
the positive outcome for the Bengali people had given India mitigation for its 
breach of international law, but it did not justify the intervention. Although 
most states had been devoted to sovereignty and non-interference in the internal 
129 Wheeler, op. cit., p71. 
130 Abiew, op. cit., p. 118. 
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affairs of a state, India's intervention, no matter what the motives had been, had 
halted the genocide of the Bengalis. 
It is very essential, however, to state that the international community 
did not seem willing to establish a new customary rule favouring intervention 
on the grounds of humanity. Abiew thinks that "the fact that the UN did not 
condemn the intervention could also be interpreted as an implied recognition of 
the doctrine. 131 However, such an argument is very insubstantial, since the 
Soviet Union had prevented adoption of a US proposed resolution regarding a 
ceasefire. 132 Further, the majority of the states had demonstrated its opposition 
to India's intervention in the UN Security Council and in the General 
Assembly. States had supported the principles of non-intervention and non- 
interference in the international affairs. Apart from this, India had never 
referred to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention but it had put forward 
humanitarian reasons. Even the Soviet Union that supported India did not claim 
a right of humanitarian intervention. Finally, even if India's intervention had 
been accepted as a state practice, there was not enough evidence of opiniojuris, 
because the international community did not regard India's intervention as legal 
and India's use of force had been condemned within the UN instruments. The 
acceptance by states of the general practice as law is very significant for the 
formulation of a customary rule of international law. The 1971 India's 
intervention in East Pakistan, however, does not set any precedent for future 
unauthorised humanitarian intervention. The fact that India did not advance any 
explicit claims on a right to humanitarian intervention, as well as the reluctance 
of states to accept India's use of force reflects the reluctance of states to 
131 Ibid., p. 120. 
132 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 74. 
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embrace such a right. This reluctance of states had been evident in most pre- 
Cold War alleged humanitarian interventions. 
This chapter on India's intervention in East Pakistan is very significant 
for this thesis, because it illustrates the practice of humanitarian intervention in 
the Cold War era. From this chapter it is not difficult to discern the reluctance 
of the world community to accept a right to humanitarian intervention. What is 
more, states had been devoted to the principle of non-intervention and non 
interference in the internal affairs of other states. The following chapters will 
deal with the same issues and the main aim of this thesis is to examine the 
practice of humanitarian intervention after the end of the Cold War and to 
detect whether or not normative changes have been formed in the realm of the 
use of force. 
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3.10 ASSESSMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING 
THE COLD WAR 
Several cases from the Cold War period had been examined so far. 
From these cases one can conclude in some substantial arguments. Firstly, it 
could be argued that some of these cases had not to do with actual instances of 
humanitarian intervention, but with the protection of nationals abroad. 
Secondly, the main characteristic of this period is that all instances were 
alleged "unilateral" humanitarian interventions. This means that in each case 
only a state decided to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state with 
alleged humanitarian purposes and outside the Council's realm. Thirdly, the 
Security Council was inactive due to Cold War rivalries and veto threats. 
Moreover, the majority of intervening states primarily relied upon self-defence 
and various other justifications, while the advancement of humanitarian claims 
was at least weak. States were unwilling to put forward a right of humanitarian 
intervention, even in the most critical cases: India's intervention in East 
Pakistan, Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea and Tanzania's intervention in 
Uganda. 
What is more, the world community reacted to such a kind of 
intervention and supported in the debates of the Security Council as well as the 
General Assembly the principle of non-intervention and respect to state 
sovereignty. As a result, there is an evident lack of opinio juris, as regards to 
the formulation of customary law in favour of humanitarian intervention. 
Further, it could be said that the first examples of pro-democratic intervention 
appeared in this era. Thus, Grenada and Panama are the first alleged instances 
of this kind of intervention. However, in Grenada this was a premature 
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expression of this kind of interventions, as the overthrown government was not 
democratically elected. As regards to Panama, it could be argued that it was the 
first time that the right to democratic governance was officially advanced by 
the intervening state, but the world community approved by its vote in the UN 
General Assembly that it was not ready to accept this kind of intervention. 
Last but not least, there is a decision by the ICJ that rejects the existence 
of a right of humanitarian intervention as a customary law during the Cold- 
War. In 1985, when the US alleged violations of human rights in support of its 
actions in Nicaragua, the ICJ rejected this justification and stated that "while 
the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for 
human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate 
method to monitor or ensure such respect. With regard to the steps actually 
taken, the protection of human rights, a strictly humanitarian objective, cannot 
be compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil installations, or 
again with the training, arming and equipping of the contras. The Court 
concludes that the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in 
Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United 
States, and cannot in any event be reconciled with the legal strategy of the 
respondent state, which is based on the right of collective self-defence ", 133 
133 Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, ICJ Rep (1986), 14, at 134-135, para 268. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT THE END OF 
THE COLD WAR 
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4.1 US, UK, FRENCH INTERVENTION IN IRAQ (1991) 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter there had been made an examination of 
humanitarian intervention during the Cold War era. The paralysis of the Security 
Council because of veto-threats during this era plays an important role in 
understanding the system of states at that time. What is more, the world 
community had witnessed "unilateral" humanitarian interventions during the Cold 
War. The world community had been reluctant to accept a right to humanitarian 
intervention and strongly opposed any relevant effort. However, this chapter has to 
deal with a shift in world politics and with a new era for international relations. 
The end of the Cold War led up to a new world order, where states are more eager 
to cooperate between them and get effective ends. As regards to humanitarian 
issues, the Security Council has played a central role in legitimising the threat or 
use of force in defence of humanitarian values. ' The multiple Security Council 
authorisations under Chapter VII reveal an era where the UN will have a more 
drastic role. The Security Council got involved in essentially domestic crises 
deriving from massive abuses of human rights. Thus, many times the Council had 
interfered in the internal affairs of states. 3 
1 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 139. 
2 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 126. 
3 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
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What is more, from unilateral humanitarian intervention during the Cold 
War, we move to collective humanitarian intervention, many times under the 
authority of the Security Council. The first case to examine will be Iraq in 1991 
and the protection of Kurds. In Iraq, the US, UK and France had intervened for 
humanitarian purposes without obtaining a Security Council authorisation, but with 
a resolution with a wording very close to Chapter VII and recognition that the 
transboundary implications of a humanitarian crisis can constitute a threat to 
international peace and security. 4 Intervening states had offered various 
justifications for their actions in Iraq. This incident is very essential and illustrative 
for the understanding of this shift in the World Community after the end of the 
Cold War. Thus, the first case study of collective humanitarian intervention in the 
90's will be Iraq. 
INTERVENTION IN IRAQ: THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT 
The Kurdish problem had existed before the end of the two World Wars. 
The Kurds claim their existence in the area from the 7th century BC. 5 They had 
wanted to establish their own state since the nineteenth century. At the end of 
World War I, when the Ottoman Empire had been dissolved and its territories had 
been divided into separate spheres of influence, the Treaty of Sevres (1920) 
" S/RES/688 (1991), 5 April 1991. 
S Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf 
War, European Journal of International Law, 1991, vol. 2, p. 115. 
6 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 139 and Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 116. 
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provided the Kurds with the prospect of an independent Kurdish state. 7 However, 
the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) ignored completely the claims of the Kurds. 8 The 
reason for not creating an independent Kurdistan could be traced in the Anglo- 
French collusion and rivalry in redrawing the map of the Middle East and in the 
British interest in controlling the oil in the area. 9 Although the Kurds are about 20 
million people and they represent the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle 
East, they lack a state of their own. 10 After the Treaty of Lausanne they had been 
divided in the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. " Since then, the Kurdish 
struggle for independence and the creation of a sovereign Kurdish state had never 
been accomplished due to geopolitical considerations on the part of the European 
powers. 12 
In Iraq, the Kurds secured an important autonomy under a 1974 decree. 13 
Nevertheless, the Iraqi government continued with its efforts to suppress the 
Kurdish language and culture and persecute its political leaders. 14 Further, the Iraqi 
government marginalized and excluded the Kurds and began a colonial 
7 Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, 
The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 145. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, 
Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualisation, Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1996, p. 73. Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics 1945-2000,8th edition, London, Longman, 
2001, p. 488. Also Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 116. 
8 Abiew, op. cit., p. 145, Calvocoressi, op. cit., 488, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 73 and 
Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 116. 
9 Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 116. 
10 Lawrence Freedman and David Boren, "Safe Heavens "for Kurds in Post-War Iraq, in Nigel S. 
Rodley(ed. ), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of Human 
Rights, London, Brassey's (UK), 1992, p. 44. Malanczuk argues according to his information that 
the Kurdish population is between 8 and 30 million people (op. cit., p. 1 15). 
11 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 139, Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 44, Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 115, and Abiew, 
op. cit., p. 145 although he does not cite Syria and more specifically Turkey, which has the largest 
population of Kurds, more than 10 million people (Calvocoressi cites that half of the total 25 
millions of the Kurdish population lives in Turkey). 
12 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 73 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 146. 
13 Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 459, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 139 and Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 117. 
14 Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 45. 
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"Arabisation " program consisting of large scale Kurdish deportations and forced 
Arab settlement in the region-15 During the Iran-Iraq War, Kurdish rebels had 
seized the opportunity to challenge the Baath party's control of northern Iraq. 16 At 
the end of the war in 1988, however, Saddam Hussein turned his fire on the 
Kurds. 17 He undertook a brutal campaign against the Iraqi Kurds, destroying 
villages, using chemical weapons and munitions and killing about 100,000 
people. 18 There were protests and the world community condemned these attacks, 
but no sanctions were imposed, and yet, the Soviet Union and France continued to 
supply arms to the Iraqi regime. 19 This is an important point, because later France 
was one of the intervening states that offered its "protection" to the Iraqi Kurds 
that had been oppressed by its own arms. 
In 1991, Iraq's defeat in the Kuwait conflict incited the Kurdish rebels to 
strengthen their position in the region 20 The Kurds knew that Saddam's regime 
was very weak at that time and they also counted on western support, given the 
fact that the coalition countries made clear their distaste for the Iraqi regime and 
their desire to see Saddam replaced. 21 Further, Iraqi military presence in the 
Kurdish populated areas was reduced because of Saddam's desire to stamp out the 
rebellion in the south. 22 As a consequence, Kurdish guerrillas made rapid military 
'5 Abiew, op. cit., p. 146. 
16 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 139. 
17 Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 45, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 73, and Wheeler, 
op. cit., p. 139. 
1 Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 45, Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 139-140, and Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 73. 
19 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 140 and Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 73. 
20 Christopher Greenwood, Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?, The World Today, 
vol. 49, February 1993, p. 35. Also Abiew, op. cit., p. 147, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 141, and Freedman and 
Boren, op. cit., p. 45. 
21 Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 45. 
22 Abiew, op. cit., p. 147. 
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advances in removing the Iraqi Army 23 The accomplishment of the Kurdish dream 
of independence did not last for long. Immediately, the Iraqi Army responded by 
attacking Kurdish cities, guerrillas and unarmed civilians. 4 The massacres and the 
plight of the Kurds led to the devastation of the Kurdish populated areas and to a 
mass exodus of refugees into Turkey and Iran. 25 The number of the refugees 
reached 1.5 million people and the situation was appalling, due to the bad weather 
conditions and starvation. 26 Turkey was reluctant to accept a substantial number of 
refugees because of its fears of PKK and its separatist movements. 27 Unlike 
Turkey, Iran did not prevent the refugees entering the country, although Iran 
already had more refugees than any other country in the world at that time. 28 
The situation was horrifying. The deaths totalled as many as 1,000 per day, 
mainly children and old people. 29 But what was the reaction of the US and the 
European allies? What did they do to halt the plight of the Kurds and a human 
tragedy? Initially, the allies stood idly by and they did not show any interest of 
intervening in Iraq to prevent it from committing the massacres and causing human 
suffering. 30 Nevertheless, it had been the allies that played a major role in this 
insurgence of the Iraqi Kurdish and they bore a large part of responsibility for the 
23 Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 45 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 147, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 141 and 
Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 118. 
24 Abiew, op. cit., p. 147 and Wheeler, op. cit., p141. 
25 James Mayall, "Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the "New World Order", International 
Affairs, vol. 67, No3,1991, p. 426. Also Greenwood, op. cit., p. 35, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 141, Abiew, 
o. cit., p. 148, Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 46. 
Martha Brenfors and Malene Maxe Petersen, "The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 69,2004, p. 493. Also Abiew, op. cit., 
p 148 and Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 48. 
27 Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 49. 
28 Ibid., p. 51. It is argued that apart from the I million Kurds who arrived in 1991, there were 
600,000 Kurds following past expulsions and 2.2 million Afghans that fled their country after the 
1979 USSR invasion. 
29 Ibid., P. 49 and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 141 and 151. 
3° Mayall, op. cit., p. 426. 
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situation. This is because the allies encouraged them to revolt during the conflict, 
but when the conflict was over and the Government of Iraq remained in power, the 
Kurds and the Shiites were left at the Government's mercy. 31 Thus, the rebels had 
been expecting support from the ones that encouraged them. On 15 February, 
President George Bush superficially stated that "there's another way for the 
bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take 
matters into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside 
and to comply with the United Nations resolutions and then rejoin the family of 
peace-loving nations ". 32 
However, when Saddam commenced the massacre against the Kurds, 
President Bush preferred to follow a non-interventionist policy, having in mind 
that he could face another Vietnam. 33 The truth is that the Bush administration was 
under the pressure of Saudi Arabia and Turkey not to allow Iraq break up, because 
Turkey had the fear of an independent Kurdistan and Saudi Arabia worried that the 
disintegration of Iraq could lead to the emergence of an Iranian controlled Shiite 
state hostile to its interests. 4 President Bush held the idea that the situation in Iraq 
was an internal struggle, a civil war that the Iraqi people had to resolve for 
themselves. 35 Likewise, the British Prime Minister, John Major, was initially 
unfavourable in the idea of protecting the Kurds and his government justified its 
31 Christine Gray, After the Ceasefire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use of Force, 1994, 
British Year Book of International Law, No. 65,1994, p. 160. 
32 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 196. Also Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 46 and Mayall, op. cit., p. 428 
(note 14). 
33 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 150 and Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 47. 
34 Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 147-148 and Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p47. 
35 Wheeler, p. 147 and 150. 
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policy of non-intervention on the grounds that there was no legal mandate to 
intervene inside the Iraqi borders. 36 
Although the policy of the US and European states was initially non- 
intervention, it was not the reassessment of international obligations towards those 
who have had their fundamental rights systematically abused but the media that led 
Western states to intervene in order to protect the Kurds. 37 The media had led to a 
shift in the US policy. Suddenly, President Bush became pro-interventionist and 
expressed his humanitarian concerns. He did not only decide to send US soldiers 
into northern Iraq to protect the Kurds, but he also stated that "all we are doing is 
motivated by humanitarian concerns". 38 Simultaneously, the British Prime 
minister was obliged to change his policy of non-intervention by the television 
coverage of the conflict and the severe criticism of his predecessor, Margaret 
Thatcher. 39 Security Council Resolution 688 came as a response to the plight of the 
Kurds and it triggered a debate on whether it would set a precedent supporting 
humanitarian intervention in the future. Security Council Resolution 688 and the 
intervention based upon it, as well as the ends of that intervention will be discussed 
below. 
36 Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
37 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 140, Mayall, op. cit., p426, and Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 50. 
38 Freedman and Boren, op. cit., p. 54. 
39 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 149. 
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SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688 
Following the massacre in northern Iraq in 1991, France and Turkey 
brought the issue before the Security Counci140 More specifically, France had 
advanced claims in a previous resolution for a "duty of intervention" to protect the 
Kurds, but it could not gain support from other members of the Security Council 41 
Further, Turkey and Iran in their letters to the Security Council had asked for 
international action to prevent the exodus of Kurdish refugees into their borders on 
a scale that posed threat to the security of the region. 2 On 5 April 1991 Security 
Council adopted resolution 688, based on a draft resolution submitted by France 
and Belgium and co-sponsored by the UK and USA43 The Council condemned the 
repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, the consequences 
of which threaten international peace and security. It further demanded Iraq to 
immediately end this repression and expressed the hope that an open dialogue will 
take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are 
respected. 45 It also insisted that Iraq allow immediate access by international 
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and make 
available all necessary facilities for their operations 46 
40 S/PV. 2982,5 April 1991. 
" Wheeler, op. cit., p. 141-142. 
42 Id 
43 Nigel S. Rodley, Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: The 
Legal Framework, in Nigel Rodley (ed. ), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International 
Intervention in Defence of Human Rights, London, Brassey's (UK), 1992, p. 29. Also Wheeler, 
op. cit., p. 143 and Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 127. 




Resolution 688 had been the least widely supported of all the resolutions 
until then adopted by the Security Council resolution in response to the Kuwait 
crisis. 47 Out of the 15 members, ten voted in favour, three voted against (Cuba, 
Yemen, Zimbabwe), and two abstained (China and India). 48 As Wheeler argued, 
this reflected the fact that it was not only an immediate response to the suffering of 
the Kurds, but also the result of a process of argumentation within the Security 
Council as to the meaning to be given Article 2(7) of the UN Charter in the Post- 
Cold-War period. 49 Not surprisingly, Security Council Resolution 688 was the first 
resolution expressly to recall Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 50 The legitimacy of 
this resolution by the Security Council was vigorously debated, since the 
participants understood that the resolution would establish a precedent for future 
Security Council involvement in situations arising out of internal conflict. 51 Iraq 
and those voting against the revolution argued vigorously that the human rights 
and humanitarian concerns addressed by the draft resolution were beyond the 
purview of the Security Council and their very discussion was incompatible with 
Article 2(7). 52 
It would be very essential to observe the position of the states voting 
against Security Council Resolution 688 in order to understand the how this 
resolution had been adopted and under which circumstances. Yemen argued that 
`7 Peter Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, 
Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis, 1993, p. 17, Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention 
and Human Rights, International Affairs, vol. 69, NO, 1993, p. 438. Also Greenwood, op. cit., p. 36, 
Chesterman, op. cit., p. 133 and Gray, op. cit., p. 161. 
`g Wheeler, op. cit., p. 143, Rodley, op. cit., p. 29, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 133, Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 77, Roberts, op. cit., p. 438, Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 17, Greenwood, op. cit., 
g. 36, and Gray, op. cit., p.. 161. 
Wheeler, op. cit., p. 143. 
50 S/RES/688 (1991), 5 April 1991. Also Chesterman, op. cit., p. 132. 
51 Abiew, op. cit., p. 149 and Rodley, op. cit., p. 29. 
52 S/PV. 2982,5 April 1991. 
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the humanitarian crisis inside Iraq did not pose a threat to international peace and 
security, and that therefore the whole issue is not within the competence of the 
Council. In addition, the Yemeni Ambassador expressed his worries about the draft 
resolution on the dangerous precedent it might set 53 The Zimbabwe 
Representative argued that the humanitarian crisis in Iraq did not justify Security 
Council action and that other organs of the UN are competent to deal with the 
humanitarian situation and the refugee problem. 54 Respectively, the Cuban 
Ambassador stated that the Security Council had no right to violate the principle of 
non-intervention and questions of a humanitarian nature raised by some members 
constituted a clear breach of the domestic jurisdiction rule in Article 2(7). 55 
As regards to the abstaining states, China stressed that according to Article 
2(7) the Security Council should not consider or take action on questions regarding 
the internal affairs of any state and if there are international aspects involved in the 
question, they should be settled through the appropriate channels. 56 India argued 
that the Security Council was competent to deal with the matter, only if it could be 
shown that Iraq's use of force resulted in a clear threat to international peace and 
security. 57 It could be said that the crisis in northern Iraq posed a threat to 
international peace and security, not only because of the refugee flows, but because 
there are about 20 million Kurds in the Middle East and an expansion of the crisis 
could generate much more serious consequences. This is why Turkey and the 







Iraq's point of view, however, it was paradoxical that the Security Council should 
interest itself in letters from Iran and Turkey concerning the Kurds when those 
states did not have a good record of treatment of the Kurds in their own 
jurisdictions 58 It could be argued that all of the countries opposing resolution 688 
pointed out on a possible precedent that might allow future intervention in the 
internal affairs of any state and violation of the UN Article 2(7). Yet, Article 2(7) 
does not preclude the Security Council, since it clearly declares that "this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII". 
59 
But it is obvious that many states did not wish any kind of intervention in the 
internal affairs of states, including the Council. It could be argued, though, that the 
Security Council does not need any precedent in order to intervene in the internal 
affairs of states. If it finds a threat to peace and security it is competent to respond 
to such a threat, irrespectively of its internal nature. Thus, it could be said that 
states had expressed fears of not setting a precedent for future Security Council 
practice on matters considered essentially domestic. 
On the other hand, states voting for resolution 688 argued that the situation 
was a threat or potential threat to international peace and security, triggered by the 
transboundary impact of the refugee problem. 60 Most of the states voting for the 
resolution, apart from France and the UK, were very anxious not to set a precedent 
that might legitimise Security Council intervention on humanitarian grounds 
alone 61 For instance, Rumania was anxious not to create a precedent susceptible to 
later political abuse and believed that this was a special case in the aftermath of the 
ss Id 
59 UN Charter. 
60 S/PV. 2982,5 April 1991 and S/Res/688 (1991), 5 April 1991. 
61 Malanczuk, op. cit, p. 128, and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 144. 
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Gulf War. 62 Ecuador had stressed that it would not have supported the resolution 
had it been dealing solely with a case of violation of human rights by a country 
within its frontiers. 63 Overall, it could be argued that apart from Britain and France, 
all the other states voting for the resolution emphasized that their support did not 
present a weakening of their commitment to the non-intervention rule in the 
society of states. 
Nevertheless, France and Britain had a different understanding of the 
situation and they advanced humanitarian claims. France made explicit reference 
to a "crime against humanity"64 Further, the French Ambassador noted that having 
passed fourteen resolutions designed to restore peace and security in the region, the 
Security Council would have been remiss in its task had it stood idly by, without 
reacting to the massacre of entire populations, the extermination of civilians, 
including women and children. 5 This argument, although it seems supporting 
humanitarian values, it still makes reference to international peace and security. It 
clearly points the humanitarian nature of the situation, but it explicitly connects it 
with international peace and security of the region. Britain also raised humanitarian 
claims arguing that Article 2(7) did not apply to human rights because they were 
not essentially domestic66 However, these humanitarian claims were raised only 
after the vote had been taken and they did not play any part in persuading members 
of the Security Council to adopt Resolution 688.67 





67 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 145. 
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As illustrated above, states were reluctant to create a precedent for 
intervention on humanitarian grounds. Simon Chesterman argues that resolution 
688 is a dubious precedent for two reasons. The first is that it was the fourteenth 
Security Council Resolution following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but the first 
that failed to state explicitly or implicitly that the Council was acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. 68 Secondly, the Council referred to the threat to 
international peace and security as a result of the transboundary implications of the 
conflict 69 Furthermore, as Rodley said, the situation had been considered a threat 
to international peace and Security, which is the pre-condition for action under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. 70 Yet, the wording of the resolution did not mention 
any collective enforcement measures, and it did not expressly authorize or endorse 
the allied military intervention. 71 What is odd in this case is that Resolution 688 
uses the verb "demands" and the verb "insists", which are peremptory and bring 
the Council closer to an interventionist role. 72 However, the resolution was not 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. Malanczuk notably argued that 
"Resolution 688 by itself did not provide the legal basis [for the allied intervention 
in Iraq] and as such is not a precedent for Security Council practice of forcible 
humanitarian measures under Article 42 73 
Another factor that makes this precedent dubious, according to 
Chesterman, is that the Council did refer to the threat to international peace and 
bs Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 131-132 and Gray, op. cit., p. 161. 
69 Id 
70 Rodley, op. cit., p31. 
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security only in connection with the transboundary effects of the situation. 74 Peter 
Malanczuk argued that the resolution cannot be cited as a precedent for the 
proposition that the Security Council views massive, but purely internal human 
rights violations as such, without transboundary effects, as a direct threat to 
international peace and security. 75 Further, he said that Resolution 688 amounted 
to little more than a formal censure of Iraq. 76 Adam Roberts goes further by noting 
that the Council asserted that the refugees and their transboundary effects posed 
the threat to international peace and security and that the resolution was perhaps 
not at all humanitarian. 77 He believes that the action reflected the responsibility of 
the coalition after the Gulf War as a customary law variant on the rights of 
victors. 78 What is more, no right of intervention on humanitarian grounds, without 
Security Council authorization, was recognized. 79 
On the other hand, there are some scholars arguing that Security Council 
Resolution 688 sets a very significant precedent for the creation of new rules in 
international law. Christopher Greenwood thinks that the law on humanitarian 
intervention has changed both for the United Nations and for individual states. 80 
Moreover, he believes that international law does not forbid military intervention 
altogether when a government massacres its own people. 81 According to Rodley, 
the resolution represents what could be a first step towards a possible doctrine of 
74 Chesterman, op. cit, p. 132. 
75 Malanczuk, op. cit., pp. 17-18. 
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collective military intervention to protect human rights. 82 Calvocoressi thinks that 
the resolution, although it did not invoke Chapter VII, is felt to have sanctioned 
international intervention within Iraq and led to the injection of armed forces into 
Iraq without its consent. 83 Some observers believe that Resolution 688 and the 
following action as a global turning-point in forcible humanitarian intervention, in 
which statist non intervention norms were giving way before a new international 
consensus that minimum humanitarian standards within states would be enforced 
by the international community. 84 
However, all of these views refer to intervention, while Resolution 688 did 
not even imply it. Apart from its wording that seems to be under Chapter VII, it did 
not mention it and it did not authorize all necessary means for the restoration of the 
peace and security in the region. Therefore, it could be argued that Resolution 688 
cannot set a precedent for humanitarian intervention in international law, in the 
sense that humanitarian intervention involves the use of force. It could be argued 
that Nicholas Wheeler is very close to the exact meaning of this resolution. He 
clearly stated that the significance of resolution 688 in setting a precedent for UN 
humanitarian intervention is that the Security Council recognized for the first time 
that a state's internal repression could have transboundary consequences that 
threaten international peace and security. 85 In other words, the Security Council 
will be responsible in the future to address human rights violations with 
transboundary effects that threaten international peace and security. Malanczuk 
u Rodley, op. cit., p. 33. 
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argued that this precedent for a more active role of the Security Council in cases of 
gross violations of human rights threatening international peace should not be 
overestimated, but it will definitely be an important reference for future cases. 86 He 
further noted that the right of humanitarian intervention asserted was a limited one, 
in that it required a supporting Security Council resolution and it was restricted to 
bringing relief and redress in human rights emergencies. 87 
Moreover, apart from the fact that the resolution did not authorize the use 
of all necessary means, there is a little evidence of opinion juris to claim that a new 
custom of humanitarian intervention has been created. 88 As already stated above 
Resolution 688 is the only resolution to recall Article 2(7). States stressed upon the 
importance of this article and their reluctance to change the norms of international 
community. The debate in the Security Council proved that states reaffirmed their 
commitment to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Even the 
supporting states relied crucially on the transboundary implications of Iraq's 
repression that posed a threat to international peace and security. 89 Last but not 
least, Resolution 688 was the least widely supported resolution regarding Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait90 and it reflects the will of states to reaffirm their commitment 
to state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. 
Thus, it could be argued that resolution 688 did not create any precedent for 
intervention in the internal affairs of states. The only potential precedent is that the 
transboundary implications of a humanitarian crisis can threaten international 
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peace and security. Then, the Council, as the competent UN organ to maintain 
international peace and security, can get involved to remove this threat. As regards 
collective humanitarian intervention under the auspices of the UN Security 
Council, it could be argued resolution 688 did not set such a precedent. This is 
because resolution 688 does not even mention the use of force, nor does it 
authorise all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the 
region. Nevertheless, it would be essential to explore the practice of intervening 
states and their justifications for the no-fly zones in Iraq. 
THE SAFE HAVENS AND THEIR LEGAL RATIONALES 
After the adoption of Resolution 688, the US got greatly involved in the 
provision of humanitarian relief. 91 On 10 April 1991, Washington had instructed 
the Iraqi government not to send military forces north of the 36th parallel. 92 
President Bush declared that the operation would have a temporary nature, because 
the administration and security for the sites would be handed over as soon as 
possible to the United Nations. 93 Immediately, the US prepared the plan of 
"Operation Provide Comfort", which called for six zones of protection, each 
capable of handling 60,000 refugees. 94 The rescue plan involved 5,000 American 
troops with more available in the event of conflict, another 2,000 British men, 
1,000 French and Dutch forces. 95 According to Freedman and Boren, the logic of 
91 Ibid., p. 150. 
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the Safe Havens "was to establish Western military authority over a substantial 
area of Iraq". 96 The Iraqi ground forces had been recommended to pull back of this 
area by the US commander in charge, and the threat of military clashes convinced 
them to comply with this demand 97 Iraq had been also recommended to withdraw 
its police from the area as well, so that the refugees feel safe to return. 98 
The idea of safe-havens was originally Turkish and it came out in a speech 
of Turkey's President on 7 April, when he declared that "We have to get better 
land under UN control and to put those people in the Iraqi territory and take care 
of them ". 99 Western Countries, although indifferent in the beginning, changed their 
position after the media coverage of the plight of the Kurds. 100 In the European 
arena, the French initiated calls for a bolder response to the Kurdish crisis. 101 
However, the British Prime Minister was the first that proposed a drastic and solid 
possible solution of the problem in an EC Summit in Luxembourg, where he 
suggested the creation of UN-protected Kurdish enclaves of northern Iraq-102 The 
Community leaders endorsed the plan, as an initiative in an area where the US was 
weak in taking a drastic position. 103 The US was initially not enthusiastic to the 
idea of safe enclaves because of the fear that the creation of enclaves for the Kurds 
could lead up to the break-up of Iraq, which would cause problems to Turkey, a 
US and a NATO ally. 104 Therefore, Britain's Ambassador in the UN suggested that 
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the term enclave be substituted by that of "safe haven", which did not imply the 
redrawing of national borders. '°5 
RESOLUTION 688 AS A LEGAL BASIS FOR INTERVENTION 
No doubt, "Operation Provide Comfort" was a very crucial response to the 
plight of the Kurds and it was also the main factor that helped the Kurds return to 
their homes. 106 However, it could be argued that the "Safe Havens" represented a 
breach of international law. The intervention was not legally justified on any 
ground. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France proposed 
contradictory justifications. 107 It could be said that the main justification for the use 
of force in Iraq was that the measures taken were consistent with resolution 688.108 
The US Senate called President Bush to "adopt effective measures to assist Iraqi 
refugees as set forth in Resolution 688 and to enforce, pursuant to Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter, the demand in Resolution 688 that Iraq end its 
repression of the Iraqi civilian population ". 109 Further, when Bush declared the 
US decision to send military forces on behalf of the Kurds, he stated that this was 
consistent with Resolution 688.110 The British Prime Minister claimed that the 
intervention was legally justified according to Resolution 688.111 
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Yet, Resolution 688 could not provide such a justification. It simply did not 
approve the use of force against the sovereign state of Iraq and, therefore, it did not 
endorse the military protective measures taken by the allied forces in creating the 
security zone in the north of Iraq. ' 12 As already discussed above, the wording of 
Resolution 688 comes very close to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and to an 
interventionist end, but it never recalls Chapter VII, nor calls for the use of all 
necessary means to restore peace and security in the region. ' 13 Therefore, the US 
and British claims fall out of the reach of Resolution 688. If the allied powers 
needed such an authorization, they should seek for another resolution, authorizing 
the use of force in order to implement the humanitarian relief efforts, as declared in 
Resolution 688. Yet, the intervening states knew that such an attempt would be 
vetoed by China and the USSR. This is why the western allies did not seek to 
propose a Chapter VII resolution, enforcing the use of all necessary means, 
because of the fear of veto. ' 14 As a result, Resolution 688 has not the language of 
Resolution 678, which authorized the use of all necessary means to repel the Iraqi 
aggression in Kuwait. ' is 
Apart from the fear of a veto, however, there is another very substantial 
explanation for the omission of enforcement provisions. When the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 688 on 5 April, the idea of military intervention to 
create such safety zones had not yet found the support of the US. ' 16 Only five days 
later, on 10 April, the US made it clear that it would use force against Iraq if it will 
12 Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 129. 
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not cease all military activity on its territory north of the 36th parallel and block 
international relief efforts for the Kurds. 117 Then, Washington found itself strongly 
committed to the matter and knowing that a future Security Council would not 
authorize the use of force decided to base upon Resolution 688. Nigel Rodley 
believed that "no Security Council member who voted for resolution 688 is known 
to have challenged the allied view that the operation was consistent with resolution 
688". 118 Nevertheless, this fact cannot justify the allied intervention in Iraq. 
The UN Secretary General, Perez de Cueller, raised the question whether 
safe havens for the Kurds could be imposed upon Iraq in disrespect of its 
sovereignty. 119 What is more, he stated that any deployment of foreign troops in 
Iraq would require permission by Iraq. 120 He further declared that if the safe 
havens cannot get Iraq's consent the allied powers would have to create the safe 
havens under the aegis of the UN, after they obtain a Security Council 
authorisation. 121 Even for the deployment of a UN supported police force the 
consent of the Security Council would be necessary according to him. 122 However, 
the views expressed by the Secretary General were dubious. On the one hand, he 
insisted for Iraqi consent and he seemed to be very sensitive to the legal questions 
involved, and on the other hand, he acknowledged the importance of acting from a 
moral and humanitarian point of view. 123 Hence, he stated that "if the countries 
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involved do not require the United Nations flag, then that is quite different", 
because he knew that the UN was not getting involved in something illegal, but it 
was the US, Britain and France that breached international law. 124 What is more, in 
the September final report to the General Assembly, he noted a change in the 
traditional understanding of state sovereignty in light of the international 
community's interest in taking action where massive human rights violations are 
involved. 125 
Rodley argued that the declared intention to hand over the relief effort to 
the United Nations meant that the Safe Havens action could be understood as a 
contribution to the humanitarian relief efforts that resolution 688 called for. 126 
Calvocoressi stressed that Resolution 688 is felt to have sanctioned international 
intervention within Iraq and led to the injection of armed forces into Iraq without 
its consent. 127 Yet, most of the scholars arguably consider the intervention illegal 
and inconsistent with resolution 688.128 As already clearly argued, resolution 688 
was not adopter under Chapter VII and it did not authorise the no-fly zones. The 
UN Charter provides only two exceptions to the principle of non-intervention: 
Article 51 on self-defence and Article 42 on Security Council enforcement action 
under its authority. Operation Provide Comfort and the no-fly zones did not fulfil 
any of the above criteria. The fact that a resolution deplored the situation in Iraq, 
found a threat to peace and demanded Iraq to stop the repression does not provide 
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a legal justification, because it is not an exception to Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A JUSTIFICATION 
Another justification put forward was that the use of force could be better 
explained by the paradigm of humanitarian intervention. France had been the first 
state to officially call for intervention with the purpose of protecting the human 
rights of the Kurds in northern Iraq. The French Foreign Minister argued that the 
fate of the Kurds should lead the society of states to recognise a "duty of 
intervention" in cases where human rights are being massively violated. 129 The 
French Ambassador in the UN argued that "violations of human rights such as 
those being observed become a matter of international interest when they take on 
such proportions that they assume the dimension of a crime against humanity" . 
130 
Britain's Ambassador put forward humanitarian claims as well, claiming that 
Article 2(7) did not apply to human rights because they were not essentially 
domestic. 131 However, the claims of France for a duty of intervention to protect the 
Kurds failed to secure support from other members of the Security Council, 
because they did not wish to erode the rule of non-intervention. 132 Three days 
before the adoption of Resolution 688 France failed to persuade the Security 
Council to adopt a resolution to provide protection for the Kurds. 133 In addition, as 
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regards the adoption of Resolution 688, Britain and France had advanced these 
solidarist claims after the vote had been taken and these claims played no part in 
the formulation of the resolution. 134 And as regards to the possibility for 
humanitarian intervention under the UN auspices, Resolution 688 did not authorise 
forcible humanitarian intervention. 135 
Humanitarian voices had been raised during the intervention as well. More 
specifically, the British Foreign Secretary Douglas stated that "not every action 
that a British government or an American government or a French government 
takes has to be underwritten by a specific provision in a UN resolution provided 
we comply with international law. International law recognises extreme 
humanitarian need... we are on strong legal as well as humanitarian ground in 
setting up this "no-fly " zones ", 136 The same view had been presented by the 
Common Wealth Legal Counsel Anthony Aust at a hearing of the House of 
Commons Foreign Affair Committee, where he repeated the argument that 
intervention should be justified in cases of extreme humanitarian need. 137 Yet, both 
Douglas Hurd and Anthony Aust continued to rely on the Security Council's 
authority, linking the no-fly zones with Resolution 688.138 Moreover, an FCO 
acknowledged that this intervention was not covered by Resolution 688, "but the 
states taking action in northern Iraq did so in exercise of the customary 
international law principle of humanitarian intervention ". 139 
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Malanczuk wonders whether the intervention in Iraq could be justified on 
the principle self-determination of Kurds, although he recognises that this principle 
is to a large extent unclear in its precise scope and content in contemporary 
international law. 140 He acknowledges that self-determination can be implemented 
by a sufficient degree of autonomy and not with state secession. 14' Nevertheless, 
he notes that the principle of self-determination cannot justify the allied armed 
intervention because it does not justify third-party intervention on behalf of 
secessionist movements. 142 Further, the intervention in north Iraq was not purely 
humanitarian, nor did it aim to support the self-determination of Iraq. '43 It could be 
said that his remark is accurate, since Resolution 688 stressed upon the 
transboundary implications of the crisis and not human rights as such. In addition, 
the "safe havens" did not seek for political commitment for future status of the 
Kurds. 144 This instance of humanitarian intervention cannot be the ideal one, once 
the incentives for intervention had been too many, apart from the humanitarian 
ones. 
On the other hand, Abiew believes that the humanitarian crisis in Iraq 
constituted a threat to international peace and security of the region and hence, the 
Security Council would be justified in demanding intervention for humanitarian 
purposes, and in fact, did just that. 145 Further, although he recognises that 
Resolution 688 did not approve the use of force for humanitarian purposes, he 
thinks that the Secretary-General did not request such an authorisation and that in 
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the end he acquiesced in the intervention. 146 First of all, the Secretary General does 
not have any legal authority and he is not competent to determine what is legal or 
not. Further, it could be said that Abiew follows the traditional misinterpretation of 
the pro-interventionists, which tend to distort the truth in favour of their arguments. 
In fact, the Secretary General declared that if the safe havens cannot get Iraq's 
consent the allied powers would have to create the safe havens under the aegis of 
the UN, after they obtain a Security Council authorisation. 147 Thus, it is clear from 
the above that Abiew's allegation is false. This is a very good illustration of how 
the interventionists formulate their arguments in order to prove that their doctrine 
has a legal basis. They usually put forward false arguments or misleading and 
distorted truths. Teson uses this tactic quite many times. For instance, he notes that 
resolution 940 on Haiti did not determine that the situation in Haiti constituted a 
threat to international peace and security. 148 Yet, despite the fact that previous 
resolutions made such a reference, resolution 940 clearly determined that "the 
situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security 
in the region". 149 This is the desperate and undocumented tactic of some fervent 
interventionists. 
It could be said that humanitarian intervention could not justify this 
intervention in legal terms. In current international law, the prevailing view rejects 
the legality of humanitarian intervention because of the danger of abuse by the 
powerful states. 150 The Charter of the United Nations and all the basic UN 
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instruments on human rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights etc. ) do not provide military enforcement for 
the protection of human rights. 151 Scholars claiming such a right in international 
law found their arguments on international customary law. However, in all the 
alleged instances of humanitarian intervention in the past, apart that most of the 
intervention the motives are mostly, if not at all, not humanitarian, there is lack of 
opinion juris. There is not evidence that states have accepted a right to 
humanitarian intervention. The ICJ confirmed the above assertion in the 1985 
Nicaragua case. 
This is why Britain and France did not try to justify their intervention 
exclusively on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and they sought for other 
legal rationales in support of their action's legitimacy. 152 This is because they 
knew that their claims would simply fall in deaf ears. 153 Exactly the same 
happened with the paradigm of India's intervention in East Pakistan, where India 
raised many justifications for the use of force (refugee aggression, self-defence, 
humanitarian intervention). 154 On any case, however, the non-fly zones had been 
an unorthodox example of humanitarian intervention, as Simon Chesterman 
notes. 155 It could be argued that although many humanitarian claims had been 
raised for this intervention, the main concern of the intervening powers was that 
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the crisis would destabilise the peace in the region. Turkey had pushed its western 
allies to respond to the refugee problem, afraid that the refugees would raise the 
Kurdish secessionist movement in Turkey. The fear of an independent Kurdistan 
troubled not only the Turks, but its US ally as well, because of their interests of oil 
in the area. This is why they did not pressure Saddam for a solid political solution 
on the Kurdish matter. 
SELF-DEFENCE AS A LEGITIMATE BASIS 
Along with other justifications for the no-fly zones and the safe havens, 
the allies grasped the chance to legitimise their intervention making reference to a 
right of self-defence. The United Kingdom was the one that referred to self- 
defence. The Secretary of State for Defence expressed in the House of Commons 
that the no-fly zones were established to meet situations of severe humanitarian 
need and that the air strikes were an exercise of self-defence in response to threats 
to allied aircraft enforcing the zones. '56 Further, the UK considered that attacks 
against Iraqi missile systems and associated command and control centres were 
necessary and proportionate response in self defence to such threats. 157 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that this argument of self-defence is misleading, 
because the coalition aircraft did not have the authority to fly over Iraq in the first 
place. 158 Thus, the allies could not claim such a right in the sovereign state of Iraq 
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without a UN authorisation, but, on the other hand, Iraq would be legitimate in 
exercising a right to self-defence against the intervening states. 
Among these claims for a right to self-defence Chesterman places the 
American attacks against Iraq in 1993, launched with twenty three cruise missiles 
in response to alleged assassination on former President George Bush. 159 The US 
tried to justify this attack on the right to self-defence; yet, the UN Security Council 
has consistently rejected such responses as illegal reprisals, which have also been 
declared illegal by the ICJ and the General Assembly. 160 Therefore, it is clear from 
the above that states misinterpret the traditional ground of self-defence in order to 
legitimise their actions. As Simma argued, Article 51 of the UN Charter has 
become the subject of gross misinterpretations. 161 Indeed, both of the arguments 
above fall in this category. In this respect, the third justification of the intervening 
states cannot legitimise the action taken for the no-fly zones. The right to self- 
defence had been just put forward as another legal rationale, although these states 
had been well aware they had no justification in invoking Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. 
RESOLUTION 678 AS A LEGAL BASIS 
The last rationale for an air attack in the no-fly zones came out by the UN 
Secretary General, which claimed that the action taken by the allies was authorised 
by the United Nations as a response to Iraq's violation of the Kuwait ceasefire 
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resolution 687.162 More specifically he stated that "the raid yesterday and the 
forces that carried out the raid have received a mandate from the Security Council 
according to Resolution 678, and the cause of the raid was the violation by Iraq of 
Resolution 687 concerning the ceasefire ". 163 This view of the Secretary General 
had been contradictory to a large extent, once the allies had proposed three 
different justifications, but never resorted to Resolution 687.1 In addition, his 
view points out a marked change from the Secretary-General's earlier criticism of 
unilateral action. 165 It could be argued that the role of the UN Secretary General 
had been a little bit ambiguous in this matter. It seems difficult to understand why 
he tried to find legitimate aspects for the allied action and more specifically why he 
used a justification never put forward before by the intervening parties. His 
statement could be read as an implicit approval of the no-fly zones, since he 
implicitly acknowledges that the allied forces were acting on behalf of the UN. 166 
Nevertheless, this view cannot justify the no-fly zones because it is oxymoron to 
argue that the allies acted under Resolution 678, once its validity ends with the 
ceasefire resolution 687.167 
MORAL OR IMMORAL? 
The premise of genuine humanitarian intervention claims that when a 
government oppresses its own people the world community has a legal and moral 
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obligation to intervene on behalf of the people deprived of their fundamental 
rights. Yet, the 1991 intervention in Iraq had revealed the falsehood of this 
premise. There is no genuine humanitarian intervention in state practice. Vital 
interests of powerful states use to motivate such a kind of intervention. The fact 
that the world community had been eager to defend human rights of some people, 
while it ignored others proves the unfaithfulness of humanitarian intervention. 
Powerful states intervene selectively to protect human rights from abuses by 
totalitarian and oppressive governments. The criterion for intervention is 
unchallengeable: interests. This immoral game had been easy to understand in Iraq. 
Western powers decided to intervene in Iraq to protect its Kurdish population 
(about 2 million people), while it had turned a blind eye on Turkey's brutal 
repression on the Kurdish population of south-eastern Turkey that counts millions 
of people more than Iraq. Turkey's stance had also been hypocritical because 
Turkey brought the issue before the UN Security Council, along with France. 
However, at the same time, Turkey had been involved in its own campaign of 
ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish populated south-eastern part of the country. 168 Let 
no one be mistaken: this hypocrisy of humanitarian intervention as witnessed in 
international relations should never be embodied into international law. An extent 
analysis to the issue of selectivity and the Kurds will be undertaken in a later 
chapter (Kosovo: political motives vs. human rights and morality). 
168 Doug Bandow, NATO's Hypocritical Humanitarianism, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's 
Empty Victory, A Postmortem on the Balkan War, Washington D. C., CATO Institute, 2001, pp. 32 
and 36. Eric Herring, From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords: NATO's War against Serbia and 
Its Aftermath, in Ken Booth (eds. ), The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, London, 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 238. Marjorie Cohn, "NATO Bombing of Kosovo: Humanitarian 
Intervention or Crime against Humanity? ", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, vol. 15, 
2002, p. 103, Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, Lessons from Kosovo, Monroe ME, 
Common Courage Press, 1999, p. 52. 
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Further, the fact that France continued to supply arms to the Iraqi regime 
during the crisis169 and later raised claims of a "duty to intervene" highlights 
another evident contradiction. A state that supplies arms to an ambiguous regime 
that evidently uses these arms to halt revolution and commit ethnic cleansing 
supports in a way these brutal acts. The later reference to a "duty to intervene" is 
totally contrary to the supply of arms to this repressive regime. However, this 
apparent contradiction illustrates one fact: states want to curry out their selfish 
motives. France had interest in selling arms to Iraq. Hence, it did not bother how 
these arms were used in this country. However, when the 1991 crisis challenged 
the anger of the western publics, France raised its humanitarian claims for a duty to 
intervene. This fact proves the hypocrisy in the international relations of states. In 
the international relations of states any action moves around the axis of selfish 
interests. States never act purely for humanitarian concerns, but only with 
calculation of their selfish motives. 
CONCLUSION 
The "Safe Havens" and the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq in 
1991 imposed by the western coalition illustrate the vulnerable points of 
humanitarian intervention. Once again, the intervening states fell into the 
hallucination of offering various interpretations and legal rationales for the 
legitimacy of their action. The records of alleged humanitarian interventions in the 
past prove that states rely upon other justifications, along with the humanitarian 
i6 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 140 and Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 73. 
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ones. This is because they realise that humanitarian intervention is not a legal norm 
and they refer to other grounds of legitimate use of force. This practice of 
"insecurity" is strongly connected to the alleged doctrine and it is verified by each 
and every intervention. The 1991 "Safe Havens" in Iraq had not been an exception 
to the rule, but a confirmation of this practice. Thus, it could be argued that there is 
something common in the practice of alleged humanitarian intervention prior and 
after the end of the Cold War: states offer a wide range of justifications, degrading 
the humanitarian character of the intervention. Thus, the continuation of this tactic 
shows that immediately after the end of the Cold War the world community was 
not ready to accept such a right. Nevertheless, there is a major difference in the 
1991 intervention in Iraq: from unilateral interventions in the past we move to 
collective interventions in the 90's. It had not been a single state, but a coalition of 
three Western states that intervened in Iraq: US, UK and France. 
As regards to the meaning of Security Council resolution 688, it could be 
argued that it does not set any precedent for future intervention sanctioned by the 
UN Security Council on behalf of human rights. Although the wording of this 
resolution is close to the wording Chapter VII, it does not make any reference to 
Chapter VII. What is more, it does not contain any authorisation for the use of 
force. Yet, humanitarian interventions involve the use of force against a state that 
systematically violates human rights. Thus, it could be said that the only precedent 
of resolution 688 had been the fact that the Security Council got committed to an 
issue that concerned the internal affairs of a state (human rights). This resolution 
made it clear that refugee flows caused by massive abuses of human rights can 
threaten international peace and security. The idea that human rights do not 
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anymore belong to the internal affairs of states is not recent. 170 Yet, the fact that 
the Council deals with a humanitarian issue due to its transboundary consequences 
that threaten international peace and security is new. Thus, under this 
interpretation, the Security Council might get involved and take action in similar 
cases in the future. This internationalisation of domestic crises that had been 
reflected much earlier in the world community, however, had led to the next step, 
the Security Council authorisation for the use of force in situations where 
humanitarian crises had been considered to threaten international peace and 
security. Yet, as already said above, the 1991 intervention in Iraq, as well as 
resolution 688, do not set any precedent for future humanitarian interventions. 
What is more, the recall of Article 2(7) in resolution 688 shows that the principle 
of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states still matters. 
170 Rosalyn Higgins, Intervention and International Law, in Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in 
World Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 34.35. 
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4.2 NATO INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA (1992) 
Bosnia represents another alleged instance of humanitarian intervention 
after the end of the cold war. Most scholars include this case in the sphere of 
humanitarian intervention and some conclude that it supports the view that human 
rights prevail over state sovereignty. Nevertheless, it could be argued that 
intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a clear instance of humanitarian 
intervention. This is not to say that massive abuses of human rights were not 
present in Bosnia, or that the world community did not intervene to halt ethnic 
cleansing and mass human tragedy. The point here is that two external factors 
render humanitarian intervention inapplicable in this case. First, the conflict in 
Bosnia was not just an internal conflict, but a conflict with international 
interference. Secondly, humanitarian intervention is an intervention in a state 
without the consent of the legitimate government of that state. However, the 
legitimate government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the one that called the 
international community to intervene and the one that welcomed international 
intervention to halt the massacres. But again, it would be unjust to say that Bosnia 
did not add any precedents in the context of humanitarian intervention and the 
protection of human rights in general. A detail analysis of the arguments above will 
be explored further down. 
Let us now consider what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
beginnings of the 90's and what the reaction of the world community was. First of 
all, the conflict in Bosnia broke out after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 
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beginnings of the 90's and followed the secessionist trends of two other Yugoslav 
republics, Slovenia and Croatia. Bosnia was ethnically and religiously mixed 
(around 44%, Muslims, 30% Serbs and 17% Croats). The rights of Bosnia's ethnic 
and religious groups had been protected under Tito's rule. ' Yet, the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia and the secession of Slovenia and Croatia created new challenges for 
the province. The Bosnian Government held a referendum on 29 February 1991 and 
a large majority voted for independence. Most of the Bosnian Serb population 
boycotted and rejected the results of this referendum. However, the Bosnian 
Government declared independence on 3 March 1992. In the following days the EU 
and the US awarded formal recognition to Bosnia. The immediate Serb response 
had been attacks against Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia. The war that broke out 
immediately was brutal, involving widespread and massive violations of human 
rights that included torture of civilians, rape, illegal detentions, indiscriminate 
shelling of civilians, forced evacuation, inhumane treatment of prisoners and tactics 
of ethnic cleansing. Wheeler argued that this was a war fought against civilians. 3 It 
should be noted though that all groups committed crimes and atrocities against the 
civilian population, but most atrocities had been committed by the Serbs. 4 
1 Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, 
Dordrecht-the Netherlands, 1999, p. 177. 
2 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, 
Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol2l, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1996, p200. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in 
Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 170. Also Abiew, 
op. cit., p. 177. 
3 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 250. 
4 Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: US Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo, 
Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 112. Also Murphy, op. cit., p. 200. 
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What was the response of the international community? What measures 
had been taken to protect civilians from suffering? On 7 April 1992 the Security 
Council decided to authorise the full deployment of the United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR). 5 Further, the Council demanded the immediate cessation of 
the fighting in Bosnia, the immediate stop of forcible expulsions of persons from 
the areas that they live and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the 
population; the Council also demanded that all forms of interference out of Bosnia 
cease immediately. 6 After the non-compliance of all parties with the above 
demands, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, imposed economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. ' In August 
1992, the Security Council, recognising that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security and acting under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, celled upon States "to take nationally or through regional 
agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with 
the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian 
organisations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and whatever 
needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina ". 
8 
What was the significance of the above resolution? Did it authorise 
Member States to use all necessary means to halt the atrocities? No doubt, the 
resolution does not grant any authorisation for the use of force for such reasoning. 
The Council is clear in its premise: "take ... all measures necessary to facilitate... the 
s S/RESl749 (1992), 7 April 1992. 
6 S/RES/752 (1992), 15 May 1992. 
S/RES/757 (1992), 30 May 1992. 
8 S/RES/770 (1992), 13 August 1992. 
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delivery... of humanitarian assistance ". Nevertheless, some scholars rushed to 
discern an authorisation for the use of force to halt the atrocities. Abiew, for 
instance noted that the Council "was also concerned by the reports of abuses 
against civilians imprisoned in camps, prisons and detention centres which had so 
shocked the international community that it referred to the use of all necessary 
means to have them closed ". 9 Yet, it is clear from the wording of resolution 770 
that such an authorisation had not been granted. Even Teson recognises that the 
purposes of resolution 770 were limited to securing the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. 10 Malanczuk also argued that "the text limits the purpose of action by 
Member States to the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance ". " 
Indeed, this was the meaning of resolution 770. 
Yet, did resolution 770 set any precedent for the legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention? No doubt, this is the first time that the Council authorised force for 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, however limited 12. In the past, resolution 
688 on northern Iraq demanded Iraq to immediately end repression and insisted that 
Iraq allow immediate access by international organizations to all those in need of 
assistance in all parts of Iraq and make available all necessary facilities for their 
operations. 13 But this resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, nor did it include an authorisation for the use of force. On the other hand, 
resolution 770 was adopted under Chapter VII and authorised "all measures 
9 Abiew, op. cit., p. 180. 
10 Fernando R Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2"a edition, 
New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 265. 
11 Peter Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, 
Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis, 1993, p. 21. 
12 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 252. 
13 S/RES/688 (1991), 5 April 1991. 
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necessary" for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This was a decisive step 
towards the adoption of resolution 794 on Somalia that authorised "the Secretary- 
General and member states cooperating to implement the offer to use all necessary 
means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian 
relief operations in Somalia ". 14 Thus, it could be argued that resolution 770 plays a 
significant role in post-Cold War humanitarian intervention. 
Yet, there are many setbacks that render this precedent very weak. As 
Wheeler argued, "since this resolution was warmly welcomed by the internationally 
recognised government of Bosnia, the Security Council was not setting a radically 
new precedent for humanitarian intervention ". 
15 Indeed, throughout the conflict the 
Bosnian Government insisted for a more drastic intervention by the world 
community to halt the massacres. Resolution 770 was a step towards these demands 
and was expectedly welcomed. The fact that the Government of Bosnia endorsed 
this resolution makes the doctrine of humanitarian intervention inapplicable in this 
case, because humanitarian interventions apply only in cases that lack the consent 
of the legitimate government of the country that commits mass violations of human 
rights. Accordingly, this is not a clear instance of humanitarian intervention. 
Let us now consider other actions of the UN Security Council, concerning 
the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In October 1992, the Council decided to 
"establish a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this 
ban not to apply to United Nations Protection Force flights or to other flights in 
14 S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
15 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 252. 
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support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance ". 16 
Further, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorised 
Member States "seven days after the adoption of this resolution, acting nationally 
or through regional organisations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of 
the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General 
and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, to ensure compliance with the 
ban of flights and proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of 
flights ". 17 This was the second time that the Security Council authorised Member 
States to use all necessary measures. The significance of this resolution, as a 
precedent for humanitarian intervention, is the same as resolution 770. 
Last but not least, the Council declared "safe havens" in Bosnia. Resolution 
819 demanded that "all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its 
surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any 
other hostile act". 18 A following resolution added Sarajevo and the towns of Tuzla, 
Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and their surroundings in the safe areas. '9 Like in northern 
Iraq, the Council did not authorise the use of all necessary measures to ensure that 
any of the parties would not violate these safe areas 2° Nevertheless, the fact that 
the Council adopted the policy of "safe havens" for another time illustrates the link 
between the two humanitarian crises and certifies the precedence of this practice in 
Iraq. But the safe havens in Iraq had been imposed without the consent of the Iraqi 
16 S/RES/78I (1992), 9 October 1992. 
17 S/RES/816 (1993), 31 Mars 1993. 
18 S/RES/8I9 (1993), 16 April 1993. 
19 S/RES1824 (1993), 6 May 1993. 
20 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 254. 
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government, while in Bosnia the legitimate government welcomed any kind of 
international intervention. 
This was the response of the UN in the 1992 crisis in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The response of western states and NATO were bombings against 
Bosnian Serbs and political pressure. 21 These bombings in accordance with the 
efforts of the "Contact Group" resulted to the Dayton Agreement and the settlement 
of disputes. 22 Teson believes that intervention in Bosnia "is another instance of 
collective humanitarian intervention, notwithstanding the fact that the operations 
were motivated also by the aim of forcing the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate peace". 23 
Yet, the instance of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not fit into the sphere of 
humanitarian intervention because of the consent of the Bosnian Government to 
this intervention. No doubt, there were massive violations of human rights and the 
use of force was to stop massacres and those violations. The consent of the Bosnian 
Government, however, does not allow any limits for the application of 
humanitarian intervention. 
What is more, the conflict in Bosnia was not simply an internal one. It was 
both a civil war and an international conflict 24 In April 1992, both the EU and the 
US recognised the Bosnian independence. u Shortly after, in May 1992, the 
Security Council recommended to the General Assembly that the Republic of 
21 Murphy, op. cit., pp207-208, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 255. 
22 Murphy, op. cit., pp. 212-213. 
23 Teson, op. cit., p. 262. 
24 Stanley Hoffmann, Humanitarian intervention in the Former Yugoslavia, in Stanley Hoffmann 
(ed. ), The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, Indiana, Notre Dame Press, 1996, 
42-43. 
DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 117. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina be admitted to membership in the United Nations26 and 
the Assembly admitted Bosnia on 22 May 1992.27 Chesterman noted that `from this 
point there is little question that the conflict was international " 28 Greenwood 
argued that "once the former Yugoslav republic became independent states in their 
own right, the situation ceased to be one of civil war within a single Yugoslavia and 
became instead complicated mixture of international and internal conflicts". 29 
Thus, he believes that the legal basis for outside intervention "no longer needed to 
rest on any theory of humanitarian intervention ". 30 Murphy also thinks that the 
conflict in Bosnia was not simply an internal conflict. 31 Accordingly, Murphy 
argued that the actions taken in Bosnia "do not fit easily within the concept of 
humanitarian intervention ". 32 
It could be argued that the instance of Bosnia does not fit into the traditional 
framework of humanitarian intervention. However, this does not mean that 
intervention in Bosnia has nothing to offer in the trends of the 90's towards a more 
effective protection of human rights in the world community. The adoption of 
resolution 770, the imposition of safe areas and the aerial bombings support the 
above argument. Further there is a continuum from Iraq to Bosnia and from Bosnia 
to Somalia. NATO imposed the safe areas in Bosnia, as France, the UK and the US 
imposed the safe havens in northern Iraq. Further, resolution 770 was a decisive 
26 S/RESl155 (1992), 20 May 1992. 
27 AIRES/46/237 (1992), 22 May 1992. 
28 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 134. 
'9 Christopher Greenwood, "Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention? ", The World Today, 
vol. 49, February 1993, p. 38. 
30 Id 
31 Murphy, op. cit., p. 214. 
32 1d 
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step towards the adoption of resolution 794 in Somalia that authorised the "use all 
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia ". 33 Thus, from an authorisation with a 
limited mandate of delivering humanitarian assistance in Bosnia we go to a broader 
authorisation for the use of force in Somalia. 
Teson believes that this is another instance of collective humanitarian 
intervention. 4 Yet, NATO intervention in Bosnia is not a clear instance of 
humanitarian intervention. The consent of the legitimate Government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as well as the international character of the conflict precludes this 
definition. Yet, despite the consent of the Bosnian Government and the 
international character of this conflict, the humanitarian impulse was present 
throughout the crisis. The world community reacted and responded to the 
massacres in Bosnia. However, the humanitarian impulse was very week this 
time35 and the response to mass human rights violations was belated. There was an 
evident reluctance by western states to intervene. 36 Although there was a limited 
mandate by the Security Council under resolution 770, western states were 
unwilling to intervene to halt the massacre. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse comment 
on this resolution "Here was a remarkable moment in which the international 
community was responding to a major international-social conflict as a largely 
humanitarian crisis in its contemplation of the use of force. But the momentum 
33 S/Res/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
34 Teson, op. cit., p. 190. 
33 Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", International 
Affairs, vol. 69, No3,1993, p. 443 
36 Abiew, op. cit., p. 178 and 184, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 171, DiPrizio, op. cit., 
p. 116. 
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passed". 37 The crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina were of a large scale. The 
response came late and solution had been achieved four years after the termination 
of the conflict. As a result, many scholars have sharply criticized this intervention 
and called intervention in Bosnia a "failure" of western states. 38 
37 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 178. 
3g Tom J. Farer, "Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons from the First 
Phase", Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 18,1996, p. 18. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris, 
Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the end of the Cold War, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy 
Larkins (eds. ), International Society After the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, 
Basingstoke-England, McMillan, 1996, p. 137. Also DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 103 and Wheeler, op. cit., 
pp. 255-256. 
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4.3 ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA (1992) 
Liberia represents another inter-ethnic conflict of an African state. In 1980 
Samuel Doe emerged to power after a violent coup by the armed forces. This 
resulted to the assassination of President William Tolbert. In 1989, Charles Taylor 
organised a rebel force (National Patriotic Front of Liberia, or NPFL) in the 
neighbouring Ivory Coast and invaded Liberia in an attempt to oust the unpopular 
President Doe. Civil war broke out between the NPFL, Doe's Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL) and another rebel group, the Independent National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (INPFL). Doe's campaign to suppress the rebellion through indiscriminate 
attacks on villages and people' resulted to a disturbing number of atrocities and a 
refugee crisis 2 Soon the NPFL managed to control the largest part of the country 
and AFL was confined to a small part of Monrovia, while the INPFL controlled the 
rest of Monrovia. 
3 In July 1990, President Doe requested that the ECOWAS 
introduce a peacekeeping force into Liberia "to forestall increasing terror and 
tension and to assure a peaceful transitional environment" 4 To this extent, the UN 
did not do anything to prevent the crisis in Liberia or to protect human rights. I 
could be argued that UN's occupation with the crises in Iraq, Bosnia and Somalia 
' Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, 
Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol21, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1996, p. 147. 
2 Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, 
Dordrecht-the Netherlands, 1999, pp. 200-202. Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 135. 
Also Murphy, op. cit., pp. 147-148. 
3 Murphy, op. cit., p. 147. 
4 Ibid., pp. 147-148. 
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did not leave any space for intervention in Liberia. Actually, the UN was absent 
and indifferent from this African inter-ethnic conflict. 
In absence of the UN and the OAU (the recently renamed Africa Union, or 
AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) called on the 
warring parties in Liberia to observe an immediate ceasefire and established an 
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), with the purpose of 
"keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the ceasefire is 
respected ". 5 Another task of ECOMOG was the establishment of an interim 
government to prepare for elections 6 ECOMOG was deployed in Liberia by late 
August. At the time of ECOMOG's intervention, Doe, as well as Taylor, opposed 
it. 7 Only the INPFL leader did not oppose the intervention. 8 From the first days of 
its deployment ECOMOG clashed with Taylor's NPFL and ECOMOG forces were 
successful in keeping the NFPL out of Monrovia and in establishing a zone for 
humanitarian assistance to be channelled to many of the victims of the civil war. 9 
As Chesterman argued, "although nominally a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG was 
responsible for the first use of aerial bombing in the war ". 10 However, ECOMOG 
with its interventionist role managed to persuade the factions agree to a ceasefire. 11 
The Security Council responded with a presidential statement, where "the 
members of the Security Council commend the efforts made by the ECOWAS 
S Christopher Greenwood, "Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention? ", The World Today, 
vol. 49, February 1993, p. 37. Also Chesterman, op. cit., p. 135 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 150. 
6 Greenwood, op. cit., p. 37 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 150. 
7 Murphy, op. cit., pp. 151-152, Abiew, op. cit., p. 202 and Greenwood, op. cit., p. 37. 
'Murphy, op. cit., p. 152. 
9Id 
10 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 135 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 152. 
1 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 135 and Murphy, op. cit., pp. 152-153. 
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Heads of State and Government to promote peace and normalcy in Liberia ". 12 In 
addition, this statement called upon the parties to the conflict to respect the 
ceasefire agreement. 13 It seems that the Council provided the ECOWAS with an 
ex post facto approval of its intervention. This ceasefire proved to be very fragile 
and after a series of four meetings in Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast), agreement was 
reached in October 1991. This agreement provided for the disarmament of the 
warring factions and the organisation of elections under the supervision of foreign 
observers by April 1992.14 Another statement of the President of the Security 
Council supported this agreement as the best possible solution of the conflict in 
Liberia. 15 This agreement also failed due to Taylor's non-compliance and fighting 
resumed in earnest August 1992.16 
On 19 November 1992 the Council unanimously adopted resolution 788. 
In this resolution, the Council reaffirmed "its belief that the Yamoussoukro IV 
Accord of 30 October 1991 (S/24815) offers the best possible framework for a 
peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict by creating the necessary conditions 
for free and fair elections in Liberia". 17 The Council further determined that "the 
deterioration of the situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security, particularly in West Africa as a whole ". 18 Interestingly enough, the 
Council welcomed "the continued commitment of the Economic Community of 
West African States (EGO WAS) to and the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of 
12 S/22133 (1991) 
13 Id 
14 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 136, Murphy, op. cit., pp. 153-154 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 203. 
1S S/23886 (1992). 
16 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 136 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 154 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 203. 
17 S/RESl788 (1992), 19 November 1992. 
13 Id 
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the Liberian conflict ". 19 Finally, this resolution requested the UN Secretary- 
General to dispatch urgently a Special Representative to Liberia and under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter imposed an arms embargo to Liberia, but decided that this 
embargo shall not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for the sole 
use of the peacekeeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia. 20 
No doubt, it seems that the Council fully endorsed ECOWAS activities in 
Liberia. It supported its Yamoussoukro Accords, it welcomed the commitment of 
ECOWAS towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and under its Chapter VII 
powers imposed an arms embargo that did not apply to ECOMOG. Thus, it could 
be said that there is an ex post facto support of the Council to ECOMOG's 
legitimacy. 21 Nevertheless, it could be said that ECOWAS intervened in Liberia 
without prior consultation of the UN Security Council 22 Accordingly ECOWAS 
was not granted with the Council's authorisation. And although some argue that 
the Councils statements and resolution 788 were "short of authorising the use of 
force by ECOMOG ", 23 it could be said that the Council's lack of condemnation24 
does not legitimise an armed intervention. 
The basis for ECOMOG's intervention is unclear25, because there was no 
authorisation of the Security Council and regional arrangements can be sought 
only in accordance with Article 53 of the UN Charter. What is more, ECOMOG 
19 Id 
20 Id 
21 Murphy, op. cit., p. 164, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 137 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 207. 
22 Martha Brenfors and Malene Maxe Petersen, "The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention-A Defence", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 69,2004, p. 492. 
23 Frederik Harho$ "Unauthorised Humanitarian Interventions - Armed Violence in the Name of 
Humanity? ", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 70,2001, p. 90. 
24 Brenfors and Petersen, op. cit., p. 493. 
25 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 136. 
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was a peacekeeping force with the powers of peace-enforcement. Accordingly, 
ECOMOG did not use force only for self-defence, but for the enforcement of 
peace. Thus, in order to be legitimate, the Security Council should approve the 
intervention. Nevertheless, ECOWAS did not require an authorisation for the use 
of force before intervening in Liberia. There is little doubt that ECOWAS 
intervention did not fit the UN Charter. 
Yet, this ex post facto approval of the Security Council to conflicts that 
human rights violations have taken place will be the question in ECOWAS 
intervention in Sierra Leone (1997) and NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999). In a 
similar manner, The Security Council with a presidential statement welcomed the 
fact that the military junta in Sierra Leone had been defeated, without referring 
how this had been achieved26. In Liberia also the Council did not endorse or 
condemn ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia, but the lack of condemnation, or the 
support to ECOMOG's actions implies an ex post approval of this intervention. In 
addition, a similar situation exists in the case of NATO intervention in Kosovo, 
where resolution 1244 brought an end to hostilities in Kosovo and decided for the 
future of the Serbian province. Some lawyers claimed that this resolution could be 
taken to imply post facto approval of the military action. 7 However, such tactics 
xs S/PRST/1997/52,14 November 1997. 
27 Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in J. L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and Political 
Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 225. Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN 
and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects", European Journal of International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 22. 
Luis Henkin, "Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, pp. 824-826. Ruth Wedgwood, "NATO's Campaign 
in Yugoslavia", American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 828. 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International 
Response, Lessons Learned Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 163 and 172-173. Thomas 
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cannot legitimise or justify the use of force by states or organisations of states. 
There is a more extensive analysis of such cases in the Kosovo chapter. 
The fact is that ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was not accordant with 
international law, but the world community failed to condemn this action. 
However, it seems that the international community favoured ECOWAS 
intervention in Liberia. 28 First of all, there was no reaction of the Security Council 
to the dispatch of ECOMOG's units in Liberia without obtaining the Council's 
authorisation. Secondly, the Council failed to condemn the use of force by 
ECOWAS in Liberia. At the same time, it provided ECOWAS with an ex post 
facto approval of its actions in Liberia. And although there is not a direct debate on 
the use of force, the lack of condemnation, as well as the Council's support for 
ECOWAS efforts in Liberia seem to approve its actions. This practice of the 
Council illustrates the reluctance of the Council in cases that do not attract the 
attention of powerful western states. Western states were occupied with the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, northern Iraq and Somalia during the Liberian conflict. 
ECOWAS action could justify their indifference and reluctance to deal with 
Liberia's internal conflict. Thus, the only task left for the Council was the approval 
of ECOWAS efforts in Liberia. 
As regards the humanitarian aspects of the crisis, it could be said that 
Liberia represents another case of alleged humanitarian intervention 29 However, 
the reasons for intervening in Liberia, according to ECOWAS, were that 
M. Franck, "Lessons of Kosovo", American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 
1999, p. 857. 
28 Murphy, op. cit., p. 163 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 204. 
' Abiew, op. cit., p. 205. 
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"thousands of non-Liberian West African nationals were trapped in Liberia. 
Furthermore, large numbers of refugees had fled to neighbouring countries, 
causing considerable economic and political turmoil in the region. The turbulence 
in Liberia had the potential to expand into a much wider regional conflict ". 30 
Nevertheless, there was a dominant concern for the plight of Liberian citizens 31 
Once again there is a mix of motives in the course to intervening in Liberia. Abiew 
believes that "the precedential value of the intervention as an example in regional 
or sub-regional collective action for meeting the challenge of humanitarianism is 
particularly significant It shows many African states are becoming amenable to 
the idea that egregious human rights violations, whether arising from governments 
or the result of civil war, have been removed from the domestic sphere and have 
become matters of international concern ". 32 
It seems that Abiew's argument is very enthusiastic. No doubt, this 
intervention in Liberia was a precedent for the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra 
Leone. Further, the post facto approval by the Security Council does not mean that 
this intervention was regarded legitimate. However, ECOWAS intervention 
represents another case where a coalition of states intervened, among other 
justifications, to protect human rights and this is a very strong precedent for the 
practice of the 90's. And like any other humanitarian interventions there were 
again oddities that ran against the humanitarian objectives. For instance, 
ECOMOG officers undertook lucrative business ventures to exploit Liberia's 
30 Murphy, op. cit., p. 159. 
311d 
32 Abiew, op. cit., p. 210. 
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timber, diamond, rubber, and gold resources. 33 Another fact that raises suspicions 
is the willingness of an economic organisation to undertake military operations. 34 
Expectedly, the OAU or the UN would have intervened in Liberia. Thus, the 
involvement o ECOWAS should not intervene because such a right does not derive 
from its constituent document. 35 Finally, the records of human rights violations 
were not of a large scale. 
33 Murphy, op. cit, p. 160. 
34 Ibid., p. 163. 
35 Murphy, op. cit., pp. 148-149 and 163. 
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4.4 US-LED INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA (1992) 
INTRODUCTION 
The end of the cold war denoted not only a new era for human rights, but 
also a new era for peacekeeping operations. From traditional peacekeeping we 
move onto a modern type of peacekeeping, which dynamically indicates that peace 
enforcement is the new trend in the international arena. A traditional peacekeeping 
operation is "an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement 
powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help to maintain or restore 
international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are 
voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation. While they involve the use 
of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus 
contrasting them with `enforcement action' of the United Nations" I In another 
traditional apprehension, peace-keeping is: "the prevention, containment, 
moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the 
medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed 
internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to 
restore and maintain peace" s This used to be the definition of peacekeeping in the 
past. Nowadays, this definition does not seem to have remained intact. Rapid 
changes in the international community after the fall of the Cold War and the 
' The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 2nd edition, UN Publication, 1991, 
4. 
Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention and UN Peacekeeping, in Nigel S. Rodley(eds. ), To 
Loose the Bands of Wickedness, International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights, London, 
Brassey's, 1992, p. 166. 
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rivalry of the superpowers had influenced this particular area of the United Nations 
as well as lots of others. 
Let us now consider how the traditional context of peacekeeping has 
changed and which factors triggered this transition. An early omen of this change 
in the normative understanding of peacekeeping operations emerged from former 
UN's Secretary Boutros-Ghali and his "Agenda for Peace". 3 In this work, the 
Secretary General makes a distinction between peacekeeping and peace making. 
He supported that the UN plays a pivotal role for the concept of collective security 
and is competent for the maintenance of international peace and security. He stated 
that there are cases where "cease-fires have been agreed to but not complied with, 
and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore 
and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of 
peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. I 
recommend that the Council consider the utilisation ofpeace-enforcement units in 
clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in 
advance" 4 Somalia was the ideal case for testing and implementing his ambitious 
plans .5 
This is because he had the chance to practically observe if peace- 
enforcement units can succeed. Thus, Somalia became the first witness of peace 
enforcement in a failed-state, where there were no governmental authorities to 
consent on this operation. 
3 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, New York, UN, June 1992. 
` Ibid., p. 20. 
S Walter Clarke, Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia, in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey 
Herbst(eds. ), Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Oxford, 
Westview Press, 1997, p. 6. 
6 Ibid., p. 10. 
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This chapter will examine the alleged humanitarian intervention in 
Somalia, which seems to bring the traditional ground of peacekeeping operations 
into the sphere of intervention for humanitarian purposes. What is more, there will 
be a thorough examination of Security Council Resolution 794 that authorised the 
use of all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment 
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. 7 Resolution 794 seems to be the first 
UN Security Council resolution for explicit humanitarian purposes. 8 Therefore, it 
is very essential to inquire the impacts of this resolution in the international system 
and whether or not it could set a precedent for future Security Council 
interventions for humanitarian reasons. As the legitimacy of the intervention in 
Somalia is not questionable here, because it was authorised by the Security 
Council, it would be interesting to examine the intervention from another point of 
view, the political one. What is more, it would be very essential to check whether 
or not intervention in Somalia has set a precedent for humanitarian intervention in 
the future. In Somalia many scholars and specialists pointed out that military 
intervention is not necessary, especially in a stateless society like Somalia, with its 
clan-based system. The main object is to search if all peaceful measures had been 
exhausted before the resort to military force. Evidence shows that the Secretary 
General held a pro-interventionist role from the beginning of the crisis. As a result, 
the early resort to force without prior profound consultation led to another UN 
7 S/Res/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
8 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 172. 
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failure, signalled firstly by the US withdrawal, and others that followed 
immediately. 9 
THE UN INVOLVEMENT AND INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA 
The UN decided to get involved in the crisis in early 1992, when the 
Somali permanent representative to the UN requested assistance from the 
organisation. 10 By March 1992 thirty to fifty thousand people died, of whom 
14,000 were in the Mogadishu area" After a year of disinterest, the UN appeared 
willing to deal with the Somali problem. The Security Council's first response to 
the Somali crisis came on 23 January 1992, with Resolution 733.12 In this 
resolution the Council "strongly urges all parties to the conflict immediately to 
cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire... decides, under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, that all states shall, for the purposes of establishing 
peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete 
embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia... Calls 
upon all parties to cooperate with the Secretary General to this end and to 
facilitate the delivery by the UN, its special agencies and other humanitarian 
9 Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia? ", Foreign Policy, Summer 1993, vol. 91, p. 138. 
10 Danesh Sarooshi, Humanitarian Intervention and International Humanitarian Assistance: Law 
and Practice, London, HMSO, 1994, p. 26. Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos, 
Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p. 14. 
11 loan Lewis and J. Mayall, Somalia, in J. Mayall (ed. ), The New Interventionism 1991-1994: 
United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, p. 101. Also Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions, Intervening 
in Humanitarian Crises, Lanham Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p. 76. 
12 Christopher Greenwood, "Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention? ", The World Today, 
vol. 49, February 1993, p. 37. Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of 
Humanitarian Intervention, Dordrecht-the Netherlands, 1999, p. 162. Weiss, op. cit., p. 81and 
Wheeler, op. cit., p. 175. 
164 
organisations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the 
supervision of the coordinator. " 13 However, the imposition of such an arms 
embargo was an uncertain mandate, given the flow of arms from the neighbouring 
states, mainly from Kenya. 14 In the same month, James Jonah, the then UN 
Undersecretary-General for special Political Affairs, was sent to negotiate a cease- 
fire between Mahdi and Aideed. 15 A cease-fire was agreed, but its provisions were 
never implemented. 16 
The main problem the UN had to counter in Somalia was the successful 
delivery of humanitarian aid to the people in need. Yet, this object failed to 
become reality because of the armed gangs and the warlords, who demanded a 
share of the incoming aid as the price for providing aid agencies with security 
against attack. '? In other words, the problem was not the lack of international 
humanitarian aid, but looting, as well as control and late distribution by the 
warlords. '8 This fact obstructed the UN's task and demanded further action. On 17 
March the Security Council approved Resolution 746, where it "Urges the Somali 
factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements signed at 
Mogadishu on March 31992... Strongly supports the Secretary-General's decision 
urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, accompanied by the 
13 S/RES/733 (1992), 23 January 1992. 
14 loan M. Lewis, Making History in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless Society, 
London, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, 1994, p. 14. 
15 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: 
A Reconceptualisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 202, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 175, and Weiss, 
o 
1Wp. 
cit., p. 81. 
Wheeler, op. cit., p. 176, and Weiss, op. cit., p. 81. 
17 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 176. 
18 Lewis, op. cit., pp. 7-8, and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 176. 
I 
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Coordinator... " 19 The only innovation by this resolution was the dispatch of a 
technical team to Somalia, whose effectiveness was totally dubious. 
A more effective resolution had been approved on 24 April 1992. 
Resolution 751 introduces new promising ways for improving the situation in 
Somalia. Accordingly, the Security Council "Decides to establish under its 
authority and in support of the Secretary-General... a United Nations Operation in 
Somalia. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to deploy a unit of fifty 
United Nations observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. -Agrees, in 
principle, also to establish under the overall direction of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General a United Nations security force to be 
deployed as soon as possible... " 20 According to this resolution, fifty military 
observers, unarmed and dressed as civilians, were deployed to monitor the "Green 
Line", which divided Mogadishu in Mahdi and Aideed controlled areas. 21 As 
regards to the establishment of a UN security force under the direction of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General, it had been agreed that 500 
peacekeepers would move to Somalia to assist the delivery of humanitarian aid. 22 
Yet, the deployment of these 500 peacekeeping forces demanded the 
consent of the most powerful warlords of Mogadishu. 23 This is because 
peacekeeping operations are based on the consent of the state concerned. But 
Somalia was a failed state and there was no central authority. Thus, the UN 
Secretary General's Special Representative for Somalia tried to get the consent of 
19 S/RES/746 (1992), 17 March 1992. 
20 S/RES/751(1992), 24 April 1992. 
21 Weiss, op. cit., p. 81. 
22 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 176. 
23 Id 
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Somali warlords, given the absence of a government. Indeed, Mohamed Sahnoun 
contributed profoundly to the deployment of the security forces with the consent of 
Somali warlords. 4 He was appointed Special Representative for Somalia on 28 
April and arrived in the country on 1 May. 25 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse call 
him "the major exponent of non forcible intervention. " 26 Indeed, the Algerian 
diplomat skilfully contributed to understanding the Somali society. 27 He started 
immediately negotiations with the warlords and local elders in order to ensure the 
successful delivery and distribution of food to the people in need of it. 28 
Sahnoun understood that "clans are politically interesting because they 
dilute power. "29 Hence, he aimed to put the clan system to work for Somalia. 30 He 
believed that respect for and the ability to work closely with the people of an aid- 
receiving country clearly lies at the moral core of humanitarian intervention .3' 
The 
truth is that with his negotiations and his understanding of the Somali society he 
managed to persuade the Somali warlords for the deployment of 500 Pakistani 
soldiers in Mogadishu and to secure the Mogadishu international airport. 32 
Nevertheless, his continuing criticism of the UN for its late arrival and for its 
bureaucratic agencies, as well as the failures of the UN in Somalia appeared to cost 
24 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 146, Weiss, op. cit., pp. 81-82 and Lewis, op. cit., p. 9. 
zs Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 203, and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 176. 
sb Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 203. 
r Mohamed Sahnoun, Mixed Intervention in Somalia and the Great Lakes, Culture, Neutrality, and 
the Military, in Jonathan Moore(ed. ), Hard Choices, Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian 
Intervention, Lanham Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 88-89. 
' Wheeler, op. cit., p. 176, Lewis, op. cit., p. 9, Stevenson, op. cit., p. 146, and Clarke, op. cit., p. 7. 29 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 146, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 176, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 203, 
and Sahnoun, op. cit., p. 89. 
30 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 146. 
31 Sahnoun, op. cit., p. 91. 
32 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 147. 
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him Ghali's esteem. 33 On the other hand, he won respect from the Somali society. 34 
What matters is that his criticism prompted the UN Secretary-General to castigate 
the neglect of Somalia by the major powers by calling the conflict in Yugoslavia "a 
rich man's war". 35 
However, his work seems to be interrupted by Ghali's more forcible 
approach. 36 On 28 August 1992 the Security Council authorised "the increase in 
strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the 
subsequent deployment as recommended... " 37 Ghali decided to increase the 
number of forces in Somalia without Sahnoun's consultation and regardless of the 
warlords' wishes. 38 An immediate response came from Aideed, who threatened to 
send the soldiers home in body bags. 39 Thus, decisions taken in New York had 
undone Sahnoun's four months of arduous and fruitful diplomacy. 40 As a result, in 
late October Sahnoun sent a resignation letter to the Secretary-General and he, in 
turn, accepted the resignation 41 As Ramsbotham and Woodhouse put it, Sahnoun's 
resignation "brought to an end an experiment in what was... effectively non- 
military humanitarian intervention". 2 Moreover, the demotion of Sahnoun left an 
empty space for the Secretary General's forcible options. 
33 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 203, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 177, and Stevenson, op. cit., 
148. 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 203, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 177, and Stevenson, op. cit., 
P; 151. 
s Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 204. 
36 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 205, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 173, and Stevenson, op. cit., 
147. 
S/RES/775 (1992) 28 August 1992. 
38 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 147 and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 177. 
39 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 205, and Stevenson, op. cit., p. 147. 
40 Ibid., p. 148. 
41 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 205, Stevenson, op. cit., p. 148 and Wheeler, op. cit., 
p. 177. 
4z Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 205. 
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In November 1992 Boutros Ghali disclosed his approach on the matter: "At 
present no government exists in Somalia that could request and allow such use of 
force. It would therefore be necessary for the Security Council to make a 
determination under Article 39 of the Charter that a threat to the peace exists, as a 
result of the repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire region, and to 
decide what measures should be taken to maintain international peace and 
security. The Council would also have to determine that non-military measures as 
referred to in Chapter VII were not capable of giving effect to the Council's 
decisions". 43 Suddenly, although in the past the US President did not seem willing 
to get involved in the Somali crisis, he felt strongly committed to respond to the 
humanitarian disaster in Somalia. Media had been one of the factors that explain 
Bush's change of policy. On 25 November, Bush proposed to the Secretary- 
General that Washington would lead a military operation in Somalia. 45 
Accordingly, on 3 December 1992 the Security Council approved 
Resolution 794, which: "Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, authorises the Secretary-General and member states cooperating to 
implement the offer to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia "46 This 
resolution's innovation is the assertion that "the magnitude of the human tragedy 
caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being 
created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to 
43 Greenwood, op. cit., p. 37. 
44 Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 179-181, Weiss, pp. 82-83. 
45 Greenwood, op. cit., p37 and Weiss, op. cit., p. 83. 
46 S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
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international peace and security". 7 It was literally the first time in the UN history 
that the Council acknowledges that the human suffering causes a threat to 
international peace and security and authorises the use of force to establish a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. There will be a 
comprehensive analysis of the meaning of resolution 794 and the impacts it might 
have for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in the next chapter. 
A few days after the adoption of resolution 794, the first forces of 
"Operation Restore Hope" were landing in Mogadishu. 48 The United States was in 
command of 30,000 soldiers (24,000 US soldiers and 6,000 from other 
countries)49 The primary object of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was the 
distribution of food and other humanitarian supplies securely to the worst affected 
areas of southern Somalia. 50 More specifically, UNITAF had to secure the airport 
of Mogadishu and Kismayu, to open supply routes and secure towns and feeding 
centres. 51 But the UN and the Secretary-General wanted to expand the functions of 
this-limited in time and scope-operation. Within a week of launching Operation 
Restore Hope, the US and UN publicly clashed over the matter of disarmament of 
Somali militias. 52 The Secretary General believed that the creation of "a secure 
environment" envisaged in Resolution 794 presupposed disarming, the gunmen 53 
Further, in his letter to President Bush argued that the UNITAF should ensure 
47 Id 
48 Lewis, op. cit., pp. 9-10 and Weiss, op. cit., p83. 
49 Makinda, op. cit., p. 70-73 and Lewis, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
"Lewis, op. cit., 10. 
st Makinda, op. cit., p. 70. 
52 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, 
Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol2l, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1996, pp. 226-227. Robert G. Patman, Securing Somalia: A Comparison of US and 
Australian Peacekeeping during the UNITAF Operation, Oslo, Institute for Forvarsstudier, 1997, 
8. Also Lewis, op. cit., p. 10 and Makinda, op. cit., p. 71. 
; Patman, op. cit., p. 8, and Makinda, op. cit., p. 71. 
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before it withdrew that the heavy weapons of the organised factions be neutralised 
and brought under international control. 54 
On the other hand, Robert Oakley, US special envoy to Somalia, stated that 
the mission is clearly defined and its objective is the establishment of security 
conditions in Somalia in order to provide the relief supplies and not disarmament. 55 
President Bush did not want to get involved in the domestic affairs of Somalia due 
to his respect of Somalia's "sovereignty and independence". 56 It could be said that 
the disagreement between Washington and the UN had to deal with their 
interpretation of the phrase "secure environment". 57 The main point is that 
UNITAF succeeded in securing the distribution of food. 58 Boutros Ghali, in his 
report to the Security Council, on 26 January 1993, claimed that UNITAF had 
fulfilled its mission of ensuring that humanitarian aid reached those most in need. 59 
However, this operation was limited on time and scope and expectedly the UN was 
preparing for the replacement of UNITAF by another operation. 
Indeed, on 26 March 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 814. In 
its preamble the Council acknowledges the need for a prompt, smooth and phased 
transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). 60 This Resolution acting under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter decided to expand the size of the UNOSOM force and its 
mandate in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 56-58 
u Patman, op. cit., p. 8, and Makinda, op. cit., p. 71. 
ss Wheeler, op. cit., p. 189, and Patman, op. cit., p. 8. 
56 Ibid., p. 9. 
57 Makinda, op. cit., p. 71- 
m Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 208Lewis, op. cit., p. 10 . 59 S/24868,29 November 1992. 
60 S/Res/814 (1993), 26 March 1993. 
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of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993, and the provisions of this 
resolution; emphasised the crucial importance of disarmament; demanded that all 
Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the 
commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the 
Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa; 
further demanded that all Somali parties... take all measures to ensure the safety of 
the personnel of the United Nations and its agencies; requested the Secretary- 
General to provide security, as appropriate, to assist in the repatriation of 
refugees and the assisted resettlement of the displaced persons, utilising UNOSOM 
11 forces... 61 
Wheeler argues that Resolution 814 was unprecedented in UN history, 
because it authorised UN forces under Chapter VII to use force and it had 
expanded mandates, like the promotion of political reconciliation and the 
establishment of the rule of law. 62 UNOSOM II had to undertake the 
reconstruction of economic, social, and political life of Somalis. 63 Makinda argues 
that UNOSOM II represents the first peace-keeping operation in UN history that 
had been given the mandate to use force not only in self-defence but to pursue its 
mission 64 China, Morocco and Spain emphasised on the "exceptional" and 
"unique" character of this Security Council mandate under Chapter VII, in order to 
avoid setting a precedent for future mandates in peacekeeping operations 65 
Nevertheless, the facts are irreversible and UNOSOM is the first UN peacekeeping 
61 Id 
62 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 193. 
63 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 211. 
64 Makinda, op. cit., p. 76. 
65 Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 193-194. 
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operation with a mandate to use force for the enforcement of peace in a failed state 
and not for the security of its personnel. 66 Thus, UN enforcement action and 
traditional peacekeeping became one from this dubious resolution. This is because 
for the first time in the UN history a peacekeeping operation had been authorised 
to use force. It is possible that many similar will follow. Boutros Ghali argued for 
this precedent setting operation in his report to the Security Council as early as 19 
December 1992.67 The Secretary General achieved to accomplish his 
interventionist plans, as published in his "Agenda for Peace". However, the word 
"Peace" stated in the title of his paper is very questionable. This is because there 
are better means to achieve peace, rather than forcible options. 
UNOSOM II consisted of 20000 peacekeeping troops, 8000 logistical 
support staff and 2800 civilian personnel. 68 UNOSOM II took over from 
UNITAF/UNOSOM I on 4 May 1993.69 As an operation with much more 
obligations than UNITAF/UNOSOM I and, oddly, with reduced troops, it would 
be predictable that its effectiveness would be tested soon. A month after 
UNOSOM II officially took over, Aideed's forces attacked UN Pakistani troops in 
an ambush close to Aideed's radio station and killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers, 10 
soldiers were missing and 54 were wounded. 70 This attack was reported to the 
Security Council, which strongly condemned the "unprovoked armed attacks" 
66 Clarke, op. cit., p10. 
67 Makinda, op. cit., p. 77. 
68 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 211, Lewis, op. cit., p. 12, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 194, and 
Weiss, op. cit., p. 88. 
6' Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: US Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo, 
Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 48. Also Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 
o. cit., p. 211, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 194 and Lewis, op. cit., p. 13. 
7F amsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., pp. 211-212, Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 194-195, Lewis, op. cit., 
p. 13, Abiew, op. cit., p. 165, Weiss, op. cit., p. 89 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 230. 
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against the personnel of UNOSOM II and acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter noted "that the Secretary-General is authorised under Resolution 814 
(1993) to use all necessary measures against all those responsible" for these 
attacks . 
71 This resolution named the SNA (SNA/USC is the United Somali 
Congress, Aideed's group) responsible for the clash and the UNOSOM II 
commenced the hunt of General Aideed, as the one responsible for the Pakistani 
casualties. 
It had been this phase of the crisis that Admiral Howe, in a Wild West style 
that included a reward poster, offered $25,000 for the capture of Aideed. 73 Thus, 
the tasks of rebuilding and reconstructing the Somali economic, social and political 
life, as well as the enforcement of a secure environment and peace turned into hunt 
for the most powerful Somali leader. UNOSOM II, an operation with a very 
ambitious and unprecedented mandate, got another dubious and uncertain mandate: 
to arrest General Aideed. As a result of this odd mandate, in early June US air 
forces attacked Aideed's bases, radio station and other key installations. 74 It had 
been reported that the civilian casualties of the US attacks, including women and 
children, were more than 100.75 Was this included in the Secretary-General's 
Agenda for "Peace"? Was the Security Council content with the results of its 
policies in Somalia? The Security Council, although regretted the civilian 
casualties, it had stated "some Somali factions and movements had used women 
71 S/RES/837 (1993), 6 June 1993. 
n Id Also Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 212, Lewis, op. cit., p. 13, Makinda, op. cit., p. 80, 
and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 195. 
n Wheeler, op. cit., p. 195 and Weiss, op. cit., p. 89. 
74 Lewis, op. cit., p. 13, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 195, and Makinda, op. cit., p. 80. 
75 Robert C. DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 47, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 212, Wheeler, op. cit., 
p. 195, Lewis, op. cit., p. 13, and Makinda, op. cit., p. 81. 
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and children as human shields to perpetrate their attacks against UNOSOM". 76 
Not surprisingly, this explanation was invented by the Secretary-General in his 
report to the Council, where he expressed his view that the Somali gunmen 
themselves were firing upon civilians to produce bodies for the international 
media. 77 Once again he managed to influence the Council with his dangerous 
calumniations. 
The Security Council's hypocritical statement pointed at the SNA as 
responsible for the civilian casualties. This kind of excuse is very common for 
cases of aerial bombing and very frequently used, especially by the US, when 
tragic mistakes occur. In Kosovo for instance, many times that NATO had been 
accused of humanitarian law violations it had put forward such justifications. 78 
Yet, excuses like this are very difficult to become credent. Some scholars try to 
explain those attacks against Aideed on a rational basis. They argue that the 
Secretary-General feared that a failure to respond to Aideed's attacks could place 
in jeopardy the lives of other peacekeepers across the world. 79 However, is it 
rational to compensate the lives of other UN personnel with civilian casualties? 
This is a good question that the former Secretary-General should answer. It could 
be said that the UN response was not proportionate and accordant to the 
humanitarian objectives of the operation. 80 This is because the means of UNOSOM 
II were against the humanitarian ends. UNOSOM II was there to protect the 
76 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 212. 
77 S126022,6 June 1993. 
78 ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. For further details see: 
http: //www. un. orgricty/pressreal/natoO6 l 300. htm. 
79 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 196. 
80 Id 
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civilian population, not to kill innocent people. The decision to hunt Aideed was 
not only uncritical, but it was also dangerous for future UN missions. 
It did not take long for the international community to observe the results 
of this paradoxical policy. On 3 October 1993 in an effort to seize key Aideed 
aides two US helicopters (black hawks) were shot down, 18 US soldiers were 
killed, and 75 were wounded. 81 TV cameras that motivated Western states to 
intervene had commenced turning the public opinion against the intervention. 82 
President Clinton rushed to state that US troops would be withdrawn by 31 March 
1994.83 After the US withdrawal from Somalia, the UN mission focused back to 
traditional peacekeeping-food relief and distribution-and left aside its nation 
building scope. 84 The announcement of US withdrawal ended any hopes of 
UNOSOM II success. 85 Actually, it ended Ghali's interventionist plans and 
justified Sahnoun's non-military efforts. Many scholars argued that the main 
achievements of the UN operation in Somalia would almost have resulted from 
Sahnoun's softer techniques. 86 In addition, many scholars observed that Somalia 
would limit future humanitarian interventions. 87 The US stated in a Presidential 
8' Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 212, Weiss, op. cit., p. 90, Murphy, op. cit., p. 233, and 
Wheeler, op. cit., p. 1 98. Wheeler argues that 84 were wounded and one pilot was captured. Murphy 
says 12 killed. 
82 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 212, and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 198. 
83 Id 
84 Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd edition, 
New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 244. 
85 Weiss, op. cit., p. 91. 
96 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 154. 
87 Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, Centre 
of International Studies, Monograph Series, Nog, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1. 
Also Stevenson, op. cit., p. 138. 
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Decision that it would not become involved in any peace-operation that was not 
judged within US strategic interests. 88 
The humiliating withdrawal of UN troops and personnel from Somalia 
ended Ghali's experiment in peace-enforcement. 89 Maybe Somalia was to become 
a good lesson for him and his dangerous precedents, as envisaged in his "Agenda 
for Peace", or better "Agenda for the New Interventionism". Yet, the second 
edition of his paper on UN peacekeeping is less optimistic about the possibilities 
for intervention than in the first edition, due in large part to the UN's failed 
experience in Somalia. 90 There, he believes that "conflicts the United Nations is 
asked to resolve usually have deep roots and have defied the peacemaking efforts 
of others. Their resolution requires patient diplomacy and the establishment of a 
political process that permits, over a period of time, the building of confidence and 
negotiated solutions to longstanding differences. Such processes often encounter 
frustrations and set-backs and almost invariably take longer than hoped It is 
necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up". 91 
Unfortunately, he did not hold the same view during the 1992 intervention in 
Somalia. Nevertheless, the former Secretary-General did not give up. He tried to 
develop his interventionist skills on other occasions of alleged humanitarian 
interventions, such as Rwanda and Haiti. He tried to incite the Western allies to 
contribute militarily in Rwanda, but after the failure in Somalia there was no 
Weiss, op. cit., p. 90. 
Patman, op. cit., p. 5. 
90 Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, op. cit., p. 2. 
91 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 2nd edition, New York, UN, 1995, p. 36. 
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enthusiasm between the US and other members. 92 He did not, however, have 
another opportunity like Somalia, to test his "Agenda for Peace" in another 
"fiasco" peacekeeping operation. 
The ethical lesson from this peacekeeping operation is of a great 
importance for legal scholars as well. The UN Secretary-General has to be strongly 
committed to international peace and his efforts should only focus on this 
objective. Personal ambitions should not obstruct his prominent task. What 
happened in Somalia is an oxymoron. The voice of the Secretary-General, instead 
of being a voice for peace turned into a battle cry. His efforts to influence the 
Council were persistently evident. Boutros Ghali, as a very ambitious person, 
wanted to write history and to shake the stagnant waters with his subversive 
"Agenda". And his "Agenda for Peace" is subversive because it tries to move from 
traditional peacekeeping to peace-enforcement (which is an interventionist 
position). He used Somalia to experiment if his peace-enforcement units could 
operate. Nevertheless, a prudent Secretary-General has to seek for peaceful means, 
as regards to the restoration of order in failed states. The changing world order 
does not require the change of traditional peacekeeping. The effectiveness of 
Sahnoun's efforts clearly illustrates that diplomatic means can bring a better end. 
The UN Secretary-General should honour his chair by holding such a position. 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 794 
92 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris, Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the end 
of the Cold War, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds. ), International Society After the Cold War: 
Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, Basingstoke-England, McMillan, 1996, pp. 156-157. Also Tom J. 
Farer, "Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons from the First Phase", 
Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 18,1996, p. 1. 
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Although in 1991 the Security Council had been indifferent to the collapse 
of the Somali state and the deterioration of the situation, in 1992 it passed six 
resolutions, all of which put emphasis on humanitarian grounds. 93 The most 
significant for the legal debate on humanitarian intervention is resolution 794. In 
its preamble, resolution 794 determined that "the magnitude of the human tragedy 
caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being 
created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security... , 94 Further, the resolution provided that the 
Security Council "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
authorises the Secretary-General and member states cooperating to implement the 
offer to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia ". 95 This UN 
enforcement action, based on a determination of a threat to international peace and 
security and caused by the magnitude of the human suffering had set up new 
challenges for the debate of UN humanitarian intervention. 
Undoubtedly, it is the first time that the Council determines that internal aspects 
of a humanitarian problem threaten international peace and security. 96 It could be 
argued that the conflict in Somalia did not pose any serious threat to international 
93 Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", International 
Affairs, vol. 69, NO, 1993, p. 439. 
94 S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
95 Id 
96 Peter Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, 
Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis, 1993, p. 24. Also Wheeler, op. cit., p. 183, Teson, op. cit., p. 247, and 
Abiew, op. cit., p. 170. 
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peace and security. 97 The actual reason for invoking Chapter VII of the Charter had 
been the plight of the Somalis. 98 Unlike resolution 688 where "the repression of 
the Iraqi civilian population... led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across 
international frontiers and to crossborder incursions which threaten international 
peace and security in the region ", 
99 resolution 794 explicitly stresses out the 
humanitarian dimension of the Somali crisis. Even Roberts acknowledges that 
reference to "international peace and security" is "duly" mentioned once in 
resolution 794, but the word humanitarian occurs 18 times. 
'00 He argues that the 
Secretary-General by putting the intervention in the legally safe context of a 
response to a threat to the peace intended to make "the awkward facts of a crisis fit 
the procrustean bed of the UN Charter". 
101 Robert's argument justifies the 
assertion above for the Secretary-General's fervent interventionist plans. 
In addition, it had been the humanitarian motives that led to the unanimous 
adoption of resolution 794.102 Even China voted in favour of resolution 794, but 
the allegation that China is becoming receptive to the idea of humanitarian 
intervention is very doubtful. 103 It could be said that China kept on moving on its 
traditional pathways. China always insisted and continues to insist that the UN 
should not get involved in the internal matters of states. It is obvious that the 
wording of resolution 794 strongly opposes the setting of a precedent for future 
Security Council action. Accordingly, the resolution acknowledges that "the 
97 Teson, op. cit., p. 245, and Greenwood, op. cit., p. 38. 
vs Greenwood, op. cit., p. 38, Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 149, Teson, op. cit., p. 245. 
"9 S/RES/688 (1991), 5 April 1991. 
100 Roberts, op. cit., p. 440- 
101 Id 
102 Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 184-185. 
103 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 150 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 164. 
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unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its 
deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and 
exceptional response ". 104 Many scholars noticed that the use of words such as 
"unique", "extraordinary" and "exceptional" undermine the significance of this 
resolution for setting a precedent for future Security Council involvement in other 
cases of internal disorder or instability. los On the other hand, Teson thinks that the 
word "unique" cannot limit the significance of resolution 794 in future cases 
because unique does not mean that this is the only case, but it means that this is an 
extraordinary case covered by a principal that authorises intervention only in this 
class of extraordinary cases. 106 
Nevertheless, although China voted for the resolution, it was the first 
among other states to emphasise the unique character of the crisis. 107 Actually, the 
terms unique, extraordinary and exceptional seem to have been inserted in order to 
avert China from blocking the adoption of this resolution. 108 Therefore, it seems 
that the above assertion that China is becoming receptive to the idea of 
humanitarian intervention is false. On the contrary, the wording of resolution 794 
indicates that it is motivated by a fear of eroding Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 109 
However, many scholars ignore China's concerns that this resolution should not be 
seen as a precedent for humanitarian intervention and end up in the contrary 
argument. Abiew thinks "the Council's action is unprecedented to the extent that it 
104 S/Res/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
105 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 151, , Wheeler, op. cit., p. 186, Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 26, and 
Abiew, op. cit., p. 169. 
106 Teson, op. cit., p. 249. 
107 S/PV. 3145 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
108 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 151. 
109 Ibid., p. 152. 
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clearly specifies the use of collective intervention for humanitarian purposes ". 110 
Teson goes even further by noting "human suffering thus has taken precedence 
over state sovereignty, which is precisely the policy that under girds humanitarian 
intervention ". 111 
Teson's predictable argument, given his usual positions, would not 
surprise or worry any legal scholars or any other people well aware of his specific 
views. His understanding of the situation and its implications for future 
interventions was literally expected. What is really scary is the Secretary General's 
belief on the matter. Boutros Ghali stated that the Security Council had 
"established a precedent in the history of the United Nations: it decided for the 
first time to intervene militarily for strictly humanitarian purposes". 112 His views 
are especially dangerous because he is the UN Secretary-General and he should be 
very cautious for every single word of his. Roberts successfully describes him as 
"more hawkish than the Pentagon ". 113 Indeed, Ghali was the one that threatened 
international peace and security. Somalia clearly illustrates the impacts of an 
uncritical and bellicose UN Secretary-General's failure. Although it was gratifying 
that he has no legal authority, it could be said that his views could influence the 
Council. 
Another issue that raised an extent debate on whether the UN intervention 
in Somalia would set a precedent for future UN involvement in intrastate 
humanitarian crises with the lack of government. Malanczuk argues "the fact that 
10 Abiew, op. cit., p. 170. 
111 Teson, op. cit., p. 247. 
112 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
Oxford, oxford University Press, 2001, p. 142. 
113 Roberts, op. cit., p. 440. 
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Somalia has no government and nothing akin to a structure of government must 
not be underestimated when evaluating the relevance of this precedent for the 
future ". 14 Roberts said that Somalia is not a humanitarian intervention in the 
classic sense because it is "not a case of intervention against the will of the 
government, but of intervention when there is a lack of government. Thus 
Operation Restore Hope could have been justified in terms of the long-standing 
proposition in international law that when a state completely collapses into chaos, 
there can be grounds for military intervention by other states if such a course has 
a serious chance of restoring order. This proposition is contentious among lawyers 
and historians, and it is associated with European colonial practices in the 
nineteenth century"! 15 He further states that the UN Secretary-General fitted this 
proposition in the modern legally safe context of a response to a threat to the 
peace. ' 16 
Nevertheless, Wheeler and Morris strenuously attacked his explanation. 
They probably did so because they misunderstood his proposition. They interpret 
his argument as if he said that the state had collapsed because the government had 
collapsed and thus a state and its government are synonymous. "7 They point out 
that government is one of the criteria for statehood, but governments are not 
wholly constitutive of statehood! 18 Teson raised the same argument. 19 Indeed, 
114 Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 24. 
15 Roberts, op. cit., p. 440. 
116 Id Boutros Ghali letter of 29 Nov 2003 as cited in Robert's Humanitarian War: "At present no 
government exists in Somalia that could request and allow such use of force. It would therefore be 
necessary for the Security Council to make a determination under Article 39 of the Charter that a 
threat to the peace exists, as a result of the repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire region, 
and to decide what measures should be taken to maintain international peace and security". 
117 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 151. 
11sId 
119 Teson, op. cit., pp. 246-247. 
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government is one of the criteria of statehood, which also include a defined 
territory, a permanent population and the capacity to enter into relations with other 
states. 120 Yet, Wheeler and Morris misunderstood Roberts's proposition. He did 
not say that government equals to state. He was very accurate in stressing that 
Somalia is not a classic case of intervention against a sovereign state, because at 
the time of the conflict, no doubt, Somalia was a failed state. 121 There was no 
government and no legally sanctioned authorities or state structures to provide or 
withhold consent. 122 As Murphy noted, had there been authorities fully in control 
of Somalia, it is not clear that the international community would have viewed the 
decision to intervene in the same way. 123 Further, as Patman masterfully observes 
"this was an unchartered territory for the UN. The UN Charter made no provision 
how to deal with failed states ". 124 This is what Roberts tried to express in another 
more sophisticated and more analytical way. Nobody argued that the Somali state 
did not exist because of the lack of government. Many scholars pointed out the 
extraordinary nature of a failed state in the current legal system. Even Wheeler 
acknowledged in a later work of his that the Somali case is different from other 
humanitarian interventions because the cause of the suffering was not governments 
murdering their citizens, but it was the break down of civic authority. 125 
As regards the significance of resolution 794 for setting a precedent for 
humanitarian intervention in international law, the valuations differ and this is 
120 Article I of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States includes the 
above criteria. 
121 Clarke, op. cit., p. 4,11-12 and DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 45. 
122 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 207, Clarke, op. cit., p. 10. 
123 Murphy, op. cit., p. 238. 
124 Patman, op. cit., P. S. 
lu Wheeler, op. cit., p. 206. 
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because of the different interpretations. For instance, Teson's understanding of this 
resolution is that "human suffering has taken precedence over state sovereignty, 
which is precisely the policy that undergirds humanitarian intervention ". 126 Yet, 
many scholars are more critical and cautious. For example, Morris and Wheeler are 
quite sceptical over the emergence of a new norm that is fuelled by the "caveats" 
attached to resolution 794.127 Of course, these caveats are the words "exceptional", 
"extraordinary" and "unique". But even if we leave aside these words the 
precedent would be: the Security Council will be competent in future cases to 
intervene militarily in the internal affairs of states to protect human rights. 
Accordingly, Abiew said that resolution 794 "sent a strong signal that the UN will 
no longer be prevented from interfering on humanitarian grounds in the internal 
affairs of member states ". 128 
However, the wording of the resolution does not, at least explicitly, allow 
such a precedent. As regards to Teson's above argument, humanitarian 
intervention outside the UN realm will undoubtedly remain impermissible in 
international law. This is because the alleged UN humanitarian intervention 
constitutes Security Council practice, in other words state practice. But as the 
Council is the political body of the UN it does not have the possibility to grant 
opiniojuris for the creation of an international customary law. As Davidson argued 
"the Security Council is a political organ of the UN, and while its resolutions 
might have legal force they are more likely to be informed by extra-legal 
'26 Teson, op. cit., p. 247. 
127 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 150. 
129 Abiew, op. cit., p. 171. 
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considerations than not". 129 Thus, resolution 794 does not legitimise the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention. It seems that Murphy is very close to as what 
precedent resolution 794 might set: "the intervention in Somalia serves as a 
precedent for UN Security Council authorisation of states to intervene for 
humanitarian purposes, at least in situations where there has been a collapse of 
the local government ". 130 
129 Scott J. Davidson, "Kosovo, Human Rights, and the Use of Force", Human Rights Law and 
Practice, vol. 5, No. 3, December 1995, p. 169. Also Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of 
Force: Legal Aspects", European Journal of International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 11. 
130 Murphy, op. cit., p. 240. 
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POLITICAL AND MORAL INCENTIVES 
Malanczuk argues that the case of Somalia is a normative landmark of 
genuine Security Council practice of humanitarian intervention. 131 Roberts 
observes that Operation Restore Hope is widely seen as a classic case of 
humanitarian intervention. 132 Wheeler and Morris support exactly the same 
assertion-' 33 In a later work of his, Wheeler characterises the US intervention in 
Somalia as historic, because it is the first time that the Security Council authorised 
a Chapter VII intervention, without the consent of a sovereign government, for 
explicitly humanitarian reasons. 
134 Yet, he did not underscore that there was no 
government to ask for its consent. This part of this thesis aims to prove that 
humanitarian intervention in Somalia does not lack all the oddities and the 
hypocrisy in current state practice. Although in the eyes of some scholars Somalia 
seems to be a classic case and illustrative of a pure humanitarian intervention, a 
profound and analytical examination proves the contrary. This intervention had 
other incentives far from humanitarian ones. Weiss observes that "the underlying 
reasons for US intervention went much deeper than a "humanitarian impulse ". 135 
These motivations will be exposed straightforward. 
First of all, the real incentives were the media that socked the public 
opinion with images from the Somali plight and not the humanitarian concerns of 
13' Peter Malanczuk, op. cit., p25. 
`32 Roberts, op. cit., p. 439. 
133 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., pp. 148-149. 
134 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 172. 
135 Weiss, op. cit., p. 83. 
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the intervening states. 136 Most scholars agree that media had been the primary 
motive for intervention in Somalia. Teson, perhaps the most fervent advocate of 
humanitarian intervention, masterfully veils the contribution of media to military 
intervention by providing doubtful and uncertain motives. 137 Morris and Wheeler 
believe that "there is no evidence to suggest that in the case of Somalia, 
Washington was covertly pursuing national self-interest behind the figleaf of 
humanitarianism. Nevertheless, there is a little doubt that the primary driving 
force behind US policy was the desire to placate a public opinion saturated by 
media coverage of suffering Somalis ". 
138 Nevertheless, if the US had no vital 
national interests in the region, it was in the US government's interest to intervene 
in order to avoid further public reaction against its inaction and placate the public 
opinion. Otherwise, had the intervention been so purely motivated by humanitarian 
concerns, the US would not have intervened that late, a whole year after the Somali 
state collapsed into anarchy and its society suffered from starvation, diseases and 
deaths. 139 Actually, it had been the CNN effect on US policymaking because of its 
influence on public opinion; there was similar suffering to Sudan and elsewhere in 
Africa, but it was in Bush's interest to intervene in Somalia because of the media 
coverage. 140 Further, the fact that the US had interest in intervening in Somalia is 
proved by the reference of Wheeler and Morris that "the loss of US service 
136 Hugo Slim and Emma Visman, Evacuation, Intervention and Retaliation: United Nations 
Humanitarian Operations in Somalia, 1991-1993, in John Harass (ed. ), The Politics of 
Humanitarian Intervention, London, Pinter, 1995, p. 157. Also Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 
op. cit., p. 204, Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 150, Weiss, op. cit., p. 82, Clarke, op. cit., p. 8, Makinda, 
op. cit., p. 69, Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 179-180, and 201, Murphy, op. cit., p. 237, and DiPrizio, op. cit., 
p. 50 and p. 55. 
137 Teson, op. cit., p. 243. 
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personnel leaves Washington's policy of intervention in Somalia vulnerable to the 
realist critique that state leaders violated their primary ethical responsibility to 
place soldiers at risk only when national interest requires it ". 
141 
Another reason in favour of intervention in Somalia was Bush's desire to 
leave office with a last foreign policy success. 142 Further, he might wish to leave 
his successor a difficult and diverting foreign policy legacy. 143 Wheeler thinks that 
another motivation for intervention related to the fact that Somalia was perceived 
as a relatively risk-free and short-term operation. 
144 It would not be useful to 
further analyse these two factors because the key motivation for intervention was 
the media. It would be prejudiced, however, if we sink the humanitarian objectives. 
The main humanitarian arguments for intervention had been starvation, high levels 
of looting of relief supplies and the high death rate. 
145 The media management of 
the conflict and the images of starving people in Western television had 
underpinned these humanitarian objectives. Thus, it could be argued that the US 
intervention and interest for Somalia followed the interest of the media and the 
public opinion. Murphy cites another two possible factors for intervention; the first 
is US national security interests, and the other is US obligation because it provided 
Somalia extensive weaponry. 146 As regards the claims on Bush's humanitarian 
concerns147, it could be said that such allegations are very naif. His actual concern 
14' Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 154. 
12 Murphy, op. cit., p. 237, Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 181, Slim and Visman, op. cit., p. 157, and 
Clarke, op. cit., p. 9. 
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Wheeler, op. cit., p. 180. 
'43 Slim and Visman, op. cit., p. 158. 
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was to respond to Clinton's criticisms for inaction in Somalia and to media 
pressure. 148 
Apart from the main realist argument, which notes that interests are 
strongly affiliated with humanitarian intervention, there is the problem of prudence 
and proportionality. Humanitarian interventions will always bear Robert's 
substantial argument that "humanitarian war is an oxymoron ". 149 Indeed, it is 
difficult to reconcile the words "humanitarian" and "war". Therefore, those 
responsible for the conduct of a humanitarian war should be very cautious not to 
offend the values that they promised to promote and protect. In order to support 
that the US intervention in Somalia was prudent, there should be evidence that 
diplomatic efforts had been exhausted. Did it happen in Somalia? The answer is 
unfortunately no. The UN special representative for Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, 
struggled to secure the distribution of food and humanitarian aid, as well as to find 
a permanent political solution through his cooperation with clans and local 
elders-150 Sahnoun strongly contributed to the improvement of the situation in 
Somalia and his negotiations with the Somalis strongly facilitated the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. 151 Nevertheless, his work had been abruptly terminated by the 
UN Secretary-General's more forcible approaches. '52 
Sahnoun's resignation signalled the interception of the efforts for non- 
military humanitarian intervention and favoured Ghali's forcible approaches. '53 
148 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 50. 
'49 Roberts, op. cit., p. 429. 
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Stevenson argues that the goals of Operation Restore Hope would almost certainly 
have resulted from Sahnoun's softer techniques. 
154 We will never know, however, 
whether or not Sahnoun's efforts would work, since his work had been stopped by 
Ghali's interventionist trends. The only thing sure is that his diplomatic efforts 
during his duties were successful. Once again the role of the UN Secretary-General 
during the crisis is uncertain and dubious. As Clarke puts it, diplomacy and 
mediation are the best responses to failed-states situations. 
155 But the UN 
Secretary-General had a totally different understanding for such situations. His 
task was to exhaust all peaceful means, but he preferred to test his dangerous skills, 
as printed in his "Agenda for Peace". His understanding of peace, however, was 
very ambiguous. How can we talk about the prudence of this intervention when the 
UN Secretary-General acted so ill advisedly? No doubt, his ardent desire for 
intervention should be consider as one of the main motives for intervention. 156 This 
explains why he interrupted Sahnoun's efforts and replaced him. The most 
provocative act of his, however, is that most of the main elements in the UN 
Secretary General's letters of 24 November 1992 to the Security Council, which 
triggered the decision in favour of forcible intervention, are seen as falsehoods. 157 
Thus, an ambiguous UN Secretary-General disregarded one of the main criteria for 
humanitarian intervention, that war should be the last resort. 151 
154 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 154. 
Iss Clarke, op. cit., p. 6. 
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When talking about prudence, the intervention in Somalia will always be 
vulnerable. The above mistakes and omissions are not the only ones. The illusive 
hunt for Aideed is a scandal. A few months before Sahnoun negotiated with him 
for the 500 UN troops, the security of relief supplies and the international airport 
of Mogadishu. Suddenly, the UN judged that his apprehension was vital to the 
stability of Somalia. 
'59 Yet, the hunt for Aideed signalled the UN failure. The 
initial humanitarian objectives turned on a hallucinogenic hunt for Aideed. 160 Thus, 
it could be said that the UN ran out of its intentions. Tom Farer, former legal 
consultant to the United Nations, has pointed out that the intervention reached its 
most extreme form in the demonisation of General Aideed in the second half of 
1993.161 Thus, the UN embodied the classic western technique of the demonisation 
of leaders when they want to justify their odd interventions. 
162 
Last but not least, a thorough analysis of humanitarian intervention requires 
an estimation of proportionality. Was the military response to the Somali plight 
proportionate? Were the means used acceptable and effective? First of all, although 
UNITAF succeeded in its objectives, security and distribution of food and relief, it 
had no long term outcomes. 
163 But the doctrine of humanitarian intervention aims 
to a long-term outcome, not a temporary solution. Another disproportionate 
activity of the intervention had been the killing of civilian people, including 
women and children. Wheeler wondered whether civilian casualties from UN-US 
attacks against Aideed's weapon sites, radio stations and control facilities were 
'39 Wheeler and Moms, op. cit., p. 154. 
160 Id 
161 Slim and Visman, op. cit., p. 148. 
162 Michael Maccgwire, "Why Did We Bomb Belgrade? ", International Affairs, vol. 76, No. 1, 
January 2000, p. 1. 
163 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 204, and Roberts, op. cit., p. 441. 
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compatible with the jus in bello requirement of proportionality. ' In addition, 
bombing a meeting of elders under the mistaken impression that Aideed was 
among them does not sound proportionate. 165 Lewer and Ramsbotham argue that 
one of the criteria for military humanitarian intervention is that non-combatants 
should be immune from direct attack. 166 Further, there were many violations of 
basic human rights by the UN forces, like the detention without charge of captured 
Somalis and reports of excessive force against Somali civilians, including 
torture. 167 Finally, intervention in Somalia did not meet the criteria of 
proportionality for another very obvious and unambiguous reason: the UN and US 
decided to intervene in Somalia only a year after Somalia sank into chaos and 
anarchy. 168 Had they authentically been interested for Somalia, they would have 
intervened earlier to prevent the plight of the Somali nation. Nevertheless, they 
were totally indifferent until media images shocked the public opinion in western 
countries. Thus, it is clear from the above that the UN response in Somalia was not 
proportionate. A proportionate response would be a peaceful approach to situations 
where failed states and the subsequent anarchy lead to a humanitarian crisis. 
Nevertheless, when intervention is the option, intervening states have to be very 
careful as to the means they use to attain their aims. 
As regards to the matter of abuses in humanitarian intervention, everything 
is very clear from above. Teson's and Abiew's misinterpretations of resolution 794 
have already been mentioned. Many other fervent exponents of the doctrine of 
164 Wheeler, op. cit., p-196- 
'65 Sahnoun, op. cit., p-98- 
166 Lewer and Ramsbotham, op. cit., p. 88. 
167 Murphy, op. cit., pp. 134-135. 
168 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 200, and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 201-202. 
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humanitarian intervention will support that Somalia clearly illustrates the 
precedence of human rights over sovereignty. 169 Yet, such views are overoptimistic 
and far from reality and current international law. Article 2(4) and the principle of 
non-intervention is the basis of international relations. It is premature to claim that 
human rights are above sovereignty. No doubt, there is an active eagerness of the 
world community to protect human rights, but at the same time, an evident 
reluctance to accept a right of humanitarian intervention. The specific wording of 
Security Council resolutions, as well as the avoidance of states to explicitly claim a 
right to humanitarian intervention illustrates that sovereignty and the principle of 
non-intervention is still very significant for international relations. As regards to 
the matter of selectivity, the UN did not intervene in Somalia before 1992 because 
it had been preoccupied with Iraq and Bosnia. 170 It is stated above that states do 
not intervene unless they have to hunt their interests. Somalia did not draw their 
attention, until media took the matter on its hands. Thus, the assertion that states 
intervene militarily for the protection of human rights only when they seek to 
attain their interests is proved to be veracious. In Somalia, because of the lack of 
interests, the US and the UN would not have intervened if western governments 
did not get all the pressure from the public opinion. 
'69 Teson, op. cit, p. 247, and Abiew, op. cit., p. 171 and pp. 174-175. 
170 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 175, Patman, op. cit., p. 7, and Makinda, op. cit., p. 14 and 60. 
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CONCLUSION 
To sum up, although many scholars viewed the UN intervention in Somalia 
as the best example of humanitarian intervention in the post Cold War era and a 
good illustration of the precedence of human rights over sovereignty, such 
arguments seem to be very dubious. The humiliating withdrawal of the US and 
other UN forces out of Somalia signalled the failure of the UN intervention in 
Somalia. 171 One of the illustrative oddities of the intervention in Somalia is the 
alternation of intervening forms: from traditional UN peacekeeping operation 
(UNOSOM I) to UN authorised humanitarian intervention (UNITAF) and then to a 
radical peacekeeping operation (UNOSOM II) with UN authorisation and 
expanded mandate for the use of force not only for the safety of the UN personnel, 
but for peace enforcement and nation-building as well. Such an ambivalent 
mandate conflates the traditional UN peacekeeping with UN enforcement action 
(although by the traditional definition peacekeeping operations contrast UN 
enforcement action). 
ln 
Boutros Ghali fought obsessively for the implementation of his experiment 
and as a result he is responsible for the failure in Somalia. It seems that his role as 
a UN Secretary-General was very ambiguous. During his office the UN authorised 
another two similar interventions: Haiti and Rwanda. Although the failure in 
Somalia curtailed the future of humanitarian intervention 173, his thrust for forcible 
responses led to similar UN authorisations for the use of force in similar situations. 
11 Slim and Visman, op. cit., p. 163, Stevenson, op. cit., p. 138, Clarke and Herbst, op. cit., p. 1 and 
p. 4, Patman, op. cit., p. 5, and Sahnoun, op. cit., p. 98. 1n 
The Blue Helmets, op. cit., p. 4. 
173 Clarke and Herbst, op. cit., p. 1. 
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Not surprisingly, during his successor's office, none similar intervention had been 
granted with a UN authorisation for the use of force. Unlike Somalia, in Kosovo 
the UN proved to be very cautious and Kofi Anan, the new UN Secretary-General, 
tried to seek diplomatic solutions and never sought after forcible response. The 
cut-down of UN forcible involvement in states' internal affairs since Anan took 
over strongly illustrates Ghali's bellicose role. It could be said that the 
international community is now released from his ineligibility and threat to 
international order. 
As regards to the dubious precedents in Somalia, there are possibly two. 
The one might be that the UN can authorise a military intervention to protect 
human rights in failed states. The other would be a precedent for future 
peacekeeping operations in obtaining a mandate to use force for the enforcement of 
peace, as Ghali envisioned it in his "Agenda for Peace". However, the use of 
words "unique", "extraordinary" and "exceptional" in both of the resolutions limits 
the possibilities for a precedent. Further, the notion that the international 
community is now prepared to intervene in the domestic affairs of states and 
sovereignty can be overruled when massive human rights abuses exist is not valid. 
The right notion is that after the end of the Cold War western states became keener 
to the idea of effective protection of human rights. However, it would be difficult 
to argue that the international community accepted the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. Most countries, especially the developing ones, stick with the 
classical norm of non-intervention and do not recognise a right to humanitarian 
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intervention-174 On the other hand, western states are more eager to protect human 
rights. 175 This contradiction is evident in resolution 794, where states determined 
that "the magnitude of the human tragedy in Somalia... constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security", but also acknowledged that "the unique 
character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, 
complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional 
response". The former represented innovative trends, while the later proclaims 
devotion to traditional understanding of state sovereignty. Thus, it would be 
premature to argue that human rights have taken precedence over state sovereignty. 
As regards to the moral part of this intervention, the belated response of the 
world community indicates the disinterest of states to intervene in Somalia's 
domestic affairs. Only when the images of the media shocked the publics of 
Western states, these states decided to get involved in the crisis. Furthermore, it 
could be said peaceful avenues had not been exhausted. Sahnoun's diplomatic 
efforts had been replaced by Ghali's interventionist goals. What is more, although 
the UN granted authorisation for the use of force, the means of the intervening 
forces were against the humanitarian ends of this resolution. As a result, the killing 
of civilians in the heart of Mogadishu darkens the UN-authorised intervention. 
Thus, it seems that the case of Somalia is a bad precedent for humanitarian 
intervention. Yet, no one can underestimate the fact that the Council authorised the 
174 Thomas G. Weiss, Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention, in Walter Clarke and 
Jeffrey Herbst (eds. ), Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, 
Oxford, Westview Press, 1997, pp. 209-210. 
17SChristine M. Chinldn, "Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War? ", American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 846. 
197 
use of force for humanitarian purposes, even if the wording of the resolution has 
got some setbacks. 
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4.5 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN RWANDA (1994) 
On 6 April 1994, the airplane carrying Rwanda's moderate Hutu President 
Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down. Although there is no evidence to support 
who was responsible for this incident, it seems that Hutu government military 
forces shot down the plane because they were suspicious for his efforts to reconcile 
with the Tutsis (Tutsis constitute 15% of Rwanda and are a minority in this state, 
while Hutus constitute the majority). 
' In the next day militant Hutus had killed 
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiymana. These incidents reflected the inter-ethnic 
tensions in Rwanda since Rwanda's decolonisation. They were used, however, by 
the Hutus to seize control of the government by claiming that Tutsi's rebels had 
killed the President. 2 Within hours the Hutu-dominated Rwandan military 
responded by slaughtering innocent Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 
3 The world 
community witnessed one of the worst tragedies of the century. There was an 
obvious attempt by the Hutu-dominated army to destroy the Tutsi tribe. Many 
scholars, commentators, states, UN personnel etc. described the situation as 
genocide, given the fact that about a million people had been exterminated. 
4 
1 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, 
Philadelphia, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, vol2l, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1996, p. 243. Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 144. Fernando R. Teson, 
Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2"' edition, New York, 
Transnational Publishers, 1997. 
2 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 144, Murphy, op. cit., p. 243. 
3 Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, 
Dordrecht-the Netherlands, 1999, p. 192. Also Teson, op. cit., p. 258. 
4 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 208. Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: US 
Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2002, 
p. 64. Romeo A. Dallaire, The End of 
Innocence, Rwanda 1994, in Jonathan Moore (ed. ), Hard 
Choices, Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, Lanham Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 
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UN INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA 
Immediately, the Security Council in a presidential statement expressed its 
concerns for the situation in Rwanda and strongly condemned all acts of violence. 5 
In addition the Council condemned all breaches of international humanitarian laws 
and recalled that the killings of members of an ethnic group with the intention of 
destroying such a group in a whole or in part constitute a crime punishable under 
international law. 6 The UN Secretary-General reported the widespread killings in 
Rwanda derived from political and ethnic tension. 7 In a later report of his he 
reported that between 200,000 and 500,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsis, had been 
killed and that "there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide ". 8 What was 
the response of the Council to this situation? First of all, it has to be clarified that 
during the crisis there was already a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, 
established by resolution 872.9 Yet, inaction is the best word to describe the 
Council's practice. Actually, the Council was not only indifferent in the case of 
Rwanda, but it also decided to reduce the number of its peacekeepers from 2,500 to 
270.10 This reduction had been a response to the killing of Belgian troops and 
1998, p. 77. Abiew, op. cit., p. 189, Teson, op. cit., p. 260, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 144. Also various 
states condemned the genocide in Rwanda in the Council meetings: S/PV. 3392 (1992), 22 June 
1994 and the reports of the UN Secretary General: S/1994/640 and S/1994/728. 
5 S/PRST/1994/16,7 April 1994. 
6 S/PRST/1994/21,30 April 1994. 
7 S/19941470,20 April 1994, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda. 
8 S/1994/640,31 May 1994,31 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in 
Rwanda. 
9 S/RES/872 (1993), 5 October 1993. 
10 S/RES/912 (1994), 21 April 1994. 
199 
Belgium's decision to withdraw its 440 troops. " But this reduction on 
peacekeeping forces is highly questionable, since the same resolution recognises 
the deterioration of the crisis, the heightened number of deaths and the increase in 
refugees to neighbouring countries. 12 
Indeed, the inactivity of the world community in Rwanda contrasts to the 
past practice in other preceding humanitarian crises: Iraq, Bosnia, Liberia and 
Somalia. The premises of the New World Order and the increased willingness of 
the world community to protect human rights were absent in the case of Rwanda. 
Although the UN had authorised intervention in Somalia for strictly humanitarian 
purposes, there was an evident reluctance not only to intervene militarily in 
Rwanda, but also to reinforce the remaining peacekeeping troops. This 
contradiction of state practice will be explored further down in this chapter. The 
main task here is to explore the Council's practice until it takes action and 
authorises the French "Operation Turquoise". The next response of the Council 
came after a report of the UN Secretary-General. There, the Secretary-General 
after reporting the results of the widespread violence and the number of nearly 2 
million displaced people, asked for an expanded mandate of UNAMIR, which 
would support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and other groups 
in Rwanda affected by the hostilities. 13 Further, this expanded mandate for 
UNAMIR II should be consisted of 5,500 troops and it should also provide security 
to humanitarian organisations. 14 
11 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 145, Teson, op. cit., p. 259, DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 66. 
12 S/RES/912 (1994), 21 April 1994. 
13 S/1994/565,13 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda. 
14 Id 
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In the coming days, the Council "deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the 
human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the 
situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region" 
authorised an expansion of UNAMIR force up to 5,500 troops and imposed an 
arms embargo under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 15 Moreover, the Council 
recalled "the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying 
such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under 
international law ". 16 Of course this wording is very close to the definition of 
genocide 17. It is very clear that the Security Council adopted the proposals of the 
UN Secretary-General, as expressed in his report to the Council. With another 
report of his he suggested that UNAMIR has to immediately commence its 
additional tasks, as prescribed in his previous report and resolution 918.18 The 
Council responded with the adoption of resolution 925, where "noting with the 
gravest concern the reports indicating that acts of genocide have occurred in 
Rwanda and recalling in this context that genocide constitutes a crime punishable 
under international law" it endorsed the immediate initiation of the deployment of 
UNAMIR II. 19 
15 S/RES/918 (1994), 17 May 1994. 
16 Id 
17 Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide gives a 
broad definition of the term: "In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups 
as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. F 
S/1994/640,31 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda. 
19 S/RES/925,8 June 1994. 
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All the above resolutions have to do with the UN involvement prior the 
adoption of forcible measures by the Council. It could be argued that the response 
of the world community to the plight of the Rwandan people was lukewarm. 
Western states were reluctant to seek for a viable solution and it was evident that 
they were not eager to engage in military activities. Although the crisis in Rwanda 
had much more tragic impacts of the one in Somalia, it had been the choice of 
western states not to provide the UN with their forces. As a result, approximately 
half a million people was slaughtered in Rwanda before France's intervention. 
Hence, it could be said that the world community did not do anything to prevent 
this "humanitarian catastrophe". There were no serious efforts either to end to a 
political solution, or to resort to military intervention. Let us now consider what 
changed this indifference of the world community and how France became keen to 
the idea of UN enforcement action. 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 929 
Suddenly, there was a shift to the French foreign policy. From its initial 
stance of non-intervention, France felt committed to halt genocide in Rwanda. On 
June 15, France's Foreign Minister Alain Juppe announced that France was 
prepared to intervene in Rwanda "along with its main European and African 
partners" to protect groups threatened with "extinction" 20 He also found that 
20 Murphy, op. cit., p. 247 and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 146. 
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France had a "duty to intervene" in Rwanda in order to halt the massacres. 1 The 
French Prime Minister held the same view. u Nevertheless, he set out five criteria 
for military intervention: the operation must have UN authorisation and the support 
of other countries; all operations should be limited to humanitarian actions; troops 
should remain near the Zairian border; they should not enter into the heart of 
Rwanda; the mission should be limited to a maximum of several weeks before 
handing over to a strengthened UNAMIR force. 23 France initially insisted that it 
would not intervene alone, but soon it became clear that none of its allies would 
join the intervention. 24 When it became clear that none of its allies would follow, 
France dropped this prerequisite. 
On June 20, the UN Secretary-General reported the "need for an urgent 
and coordinated response by the international community to the genocide which 
has engulfed this country "25 He further expressed his view that "UNAMIR may 
not be in position, for about three months, to fully undertake the tasks entrusted to 
it by those resolutions. Meanwhile, the situation in Rwanda has continued to 
deteriorate and the killing of innocent civilians has not been stopped... In these 
circumstances, the Security Council may wish to consider the offer of the 
Government of France to undertake, subject to Security Council authorisation, a 
French-commanded multinational operation in conjunction with other Member 
21 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 231. Also Murphy, op. cit., p. 248. 
22 Abiew, op. cit., p. 194 and 200. 
23 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris, Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the end 
of the Cold War, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds. ), International Society After the Cold War: 
Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, Basingstoke-England, McMillan, 1996, p. 159. 
24 Murphy, op. cit., pp. 248-9. 
25 S/1994/728,20 June 1994, Letter dated 19 June 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President 
of the Security Council. 
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States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the 
security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. Such 
an operation was one of the options envisaged in my letter of 29 April 
(S/1994/518) and a precedent exists for it in the United States-led operation 
Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF), which was deployed in Somalia in 
December 1992' . 26 It is obvious that the Secretary-General urged the Council to 
accept France's offer. It is very questionable though why he referred the precedent 
of Somalia. This is because the failure of the United Nations in Somalia cannot be 
the best precedent to support intervention in Rwanda. 
Nevertheless, on June 22, the Security Council adopted resolution 929. In 
this resolution, the Council "noting the offer by Member States to cooperate with 
the Secretary-General towards the fulfilment of the objectives of the United 
Nations in Rwanda, and stressing the strictly humanitarian character of this 
operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall 
not constitute an imposition force between the parties... Recognising that the 
current situation in Rwanda constitutes a unique case which demands an urgent 
response by the international community... Determining that the magnitude of the 
humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the 
region... welcomes the Secretary-General's letter dated 19 June 1994 and agrees 
that a multinational operation may be set up for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda 
until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength" 27 
26 Id 
27 S/RES/929 (1994), 22 June 1994. 
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And acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations, the Security Council 
authorised "the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to conduct 
the operation referred to in paragraph 2 above, using all necessary means to 
achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in paragraphs 2(a) and 4(b) of 
resolution 925 ". It further decided that "the mission of Member States cooperating 
with the Secretary-General will be limited to a period of two months following the 
adoption of the present resolution, unless the Secretary-General determines at an 
earlier date that the expanded UNAMIR is able to carry its mandate ". 28 It could be 
said that this resolution reflects the proposals of the UN Secretary-General, as set 
in his letter to the Council. However, the main challenge for this chapter is 
resolution 929 and the precedents it has set for an emerging rule of humanitarian 
intervention. 
First of all, it is the second time in UN history that the UN has authorised 
intervention for strictly humanitarian purposes. In Somalia, the magnitude of the 
human tragedy constituted a threat to peace and security and this was the reasoning 
for the Council to authorise intervention. 29 In Rwanda, the magnitude of the 
humanitarian crisis constituted threat to international peace and security. Thus, it is 
the second time that the Council finds that humanitarian crises constitute a threat to 
peace and security and authorises military action. No doubt, Rwanda seals and 
verifies the practice of the UN authorised humanitarian intervention. The changes 
in the world community after the end of the cold war are evident. The UN 
intervenes in humanitarian crises under its Chapter VII enforcement authorities. 
28 Id 
29 S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
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There is no doubt that the UN intervened for strictly humanitarian purposes, as 
resolution 929 explains that "a multinational operation may be set up for 
humanitarian purposes". 30 The fact that China did not block the adoption of a 
second resolution authorising the use of force for humanitarian purposes 
(intervention in the internal affairs of states) is really questionable. 
And although in Somalia there was the recognition of the "unique" 
character of the present situation and an "extraordinary" nature that required an 
"exceptional" response, in Rwanda the Council only found a "unique" case that 
demanded an urgent response. 31 It seems that the Security Council did not pay 
much attention in the case of Rwanda for setting dubious precedents. In Somalia 
there were three words put in resolution 740 as obstacles for future interventions of 
a similar character. On the other hand, there was only the word "unique " in 
resolution 929. Did this represent the fact that states become more familiar with the 
idea of the UN intervening in the internal affairs of states when massive human 
suffering occurs? It seems that many states are not ready to accept intervention in 
the internal affairs of states. The word "unique" is strong enough to create caveats 
for precedents for the creation of an emerging norm. Yet, it could be argued that 
states paid less attention in the case of Rwanda, in contrast to Somalia. But the fact 
is that there are now two "unique" cases in a two years time dictates that these 
cases are not probably "unique ". This iteration of the practice of UN humanitarian 
intervention does not verify the exception, but normative changes in the world 
31 S/RES/929 (1994), 22 June 1994. 
31 S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
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community. And this change does not support unauthorised humanitarian 
interventions, but UN authorised humanitarian intervention. 
To this extent, this thesis tried to detect the possible signs for the creation 
of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, there are some 
failures and omissions that create setbacks for the creation of such a norm. The 
argument that political failures and omissions create setbacks for the creation of an 
emerging norm of humanitarian intervention is pivotal in this thesis. The case of 
Rwanda is very significant for the support of the above argument. Disinterest alone 
could not explain the western indifference in Rwanda. The three traditional 
"humanitarian" allies, US, UK and France, had been reluctant to intervene in 
Rwanda to halt genocide. What happened to their claims on a duty to intervene? 
What caused this evident shift in their foreign policy? First and foremost, although 
the human tragedy was much worse then in Somalia, the world community 
remained inactive, because of the UN failure in Somalia. 
32 And this inactivity has 
not to do only with military action, but with the peacekeeping operation in Rwanda 
as well. The "armed humanitarians" of the 90's were bond by the "Somali 
Syndrome ". They would not risk the lives of their soldiers in an African state, far 
away from their countries, where they have no vital interests. 
The paradigm of the US is very convincing and approves the above 
argument. Bill Clinton did not want to engage in military operation in Rwanda 
because of the failure in Somalia that turned the US executive, congressional, 
military and public opinion against intervention. 33 As a result, the Clinton 
32 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 224. 
33 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 71 and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 260. 
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I 
administration had adopted the Presidential Decision Directive 25, which set the 
guidelines for determining when the United States would support a UN 
peacekeeping operation, when it would participate in an operation and when it 
would contribute combat troops. 34 These conditions required a response to a threat 
to international peace and security, the existence of US interests and an 
international consensus. 5 As Ramsbotham and Woodhouse pointed out, 
Presidential Decision 25 is often interpreted as a brake on forcible humanitarian 
intervention. 6 Indeed, this decision curtailed the future of US contribution to 
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions. 
37 Given the fact that 
President Clinton was very keen to the idea of an increased role of the UN in such 
activities, 38 the failure in Somalia made this enormous shift to his foreign policy. 
The impacts of the failure in Somalia had been also reflected in the 
Security Council meeting regarding the adoption of resolution 929. In this meeting, 
the five abstaining states explicitly explained their position on the failure of 
Somalia. Brazil, for instance, stressed, "we are also keenly aware of the difficulty 
of maintaining simultaneous but separate peace-keeping and peace-enforcement 
operations in the same country" 
39 Of course, this difficulty was evidenced in 
Somalia with the parallel course of UNOSOM and UNITAF. Thus Brazil implied 
the failure in Somalia. New Zealand, however, referred expressly to Somalia: 
Somalia has shown us that even where we have the best of intentions, if we do not 
34 Ibid., p. 73. 
35 Id 
36 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict. 
A Reconceptualisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 141. 
37 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 73. 
38 Ibid., p. 72. 
39 S/PV. 3392,22 June 1994. 
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employ the right means, tragedy can be the result. Trying to run two separate 
operations in parallel with different command arrangements does not work and, in 
the long run, those whom we sent out to save can be those who suffer". 40 Thus, 
there is little doubt that intervention in Somalia was a black spot for humanitarian 
intervention. 
Another point that implies Somalia is the reference of impartiality. Both 
the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council spoke of a strictly 
humanitarian operation, "which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral 
fashion, and shall not constitute an interposition force between the parties ". 41 This 
reflects what happened Somalia, where the initial humanitarian objectives turned 
on a hallucinogenic hunt for General Aideed. 42 As Farer noted, "one of the main 
criticisms of the UN operation in Somalia was that it had breached its commitment 
to impartiality and thereby precipitated the conflict"43 From this reference of the 
Secretary-General and the Council it is clear that they try to avoid past mistakes 
that led to failure. Another explanation for this insistence on the impartial character 
of this operation had been the concern of the world community that France would 
intervene in support of the Hutus, given its military support in the past. But this 
existence of interests will be explored further down in this chapter. Last but not 
least, this resolution was the least supported resolution that authorised the use of 
force for humanitarian purposes. Five countries abstained from the vote and the 
40 Id 
41 S/1994/728,20 June 1994 and S/RES/929 (1994), 22 June 1994. 
41 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 154. 
43 Tom J. Farer, "Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase", 
Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 18, p. 5. 
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remaining ten voted in favour of resolution 929. This fact shows the lack of 
support for UN intervention on humanitarian purposes in Rwanda. 44 
All the impacts of the UN failure in Somalia had been exposed so far. 
Somalia decelerated the dynamics of the potential emerging norm. Overall, it could 
be said that Rwanda reflects the failures of the past practice of humanitarian 
intervention. It is a big omission that the world community did not intervene to halt 
genocide. The crisis in Rwanda was much worse than the ones in Iraq, Liberia, 
Bosnia and Somalia. However, the world community did not respond promptly to 
halt genocide. Furthermore, there was an evident reluctance and lack of support for 
UN humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. This practice weakens the credibility of 
humanitarian intervention. This is because humanitarian intervention remains 
vulnerable after the genocide in Rwanda and the inactivity of the world 
community. In addition, inaction in Rwanda recalled the two major problems 
connected to humanitarian intervention: interests and selectivity. States intervened 
in situations with lesser human rights violations and loss of lives because of their 
interests, but they disregarded Rwanda. Late intervention was not adequate to halt 
the tragedy. 
As regards to the impacts of the French intervention, it could be said that 
the safe areas created in south-western Rwanda by Operation Turquoise saved 
many lives. 45 Murphy thinks that part of the success of the French operation was 
its recognition of the importance of using military force to achieve limited goals 
while at the same time acting as impartially as possible with respect to the local 
44 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 147. 
45 Id 
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warring factions 46 However, there are many signs that avert the above assertion. 
The French intervention was not by all means impartial, but this will be examined 
with in the political part. As Wheeler noted, "Operation Turquoise had only 
temporarily saved lives... with perhaps as few as 13,000 rescued against over a 
million killed during the previous three months, Operation Turquoise represented 
a dismal response on the part of the society of states to the Rwandan genocide. 47 
Indeed, the late French intervention was a hypocritical response to the tragedy of 
Rwanda. The French troops intervened only after the massacres and at the time that 
Tutsi rebels were gaining control of the country. Thus, the next task is to examine 
why France changed its initial stance and decided to intervene after the massacres. 
POLITICAL MOTIVES AGAINST HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES 
This part will examine the existence of two problems related to 
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. First of all, there is the problem of 
selectivity. The world community was eager to respond to crises such as Iraq and 
Bosnia, but was reluctant to intervene in Rwanda, where genocide was taking 
place. This fact weakens the practice of humanitarian intervention, as well as the 
prospects for the creation of a norm, because this practice of states will keep on 
exciting the suspiciousness of states against selfish interests and the erosion of the 
principle of non-intervention. Rwanda is a clear instance that states did not feel 
committed to intervene, but at the same states intervened in less critical 
46 Murphy, op. cit, p. 259. 
f7 Wheeler, op. cit, p. 237. 
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humanitarian crises. Thus, Rwanda reaffirms that states intervene to protect human 
rights only when vital interests are at stake. 
And this is the second problem of humanitarian intervention. Many states 
invoke the protection of human rights when they pursue their selfish motives and 
the French intervention verifies this assertion. Teson is the only person who 
supports that the French intervention was not motivated by interests, as evidenced 
by its prompt withdrawal. 8 Yet, this is another insubstantial argument of Teson's 
since the Security Council authorisation spoke of a limited in time operation of two 
months49 On the other hand, Wheeler and Morris are very censorious of the 1994 
French intervention in Rwanda. They asserted, "there is evidence to suggest that 
Paris was also covertly pursuing national self-interest behind the figleaf of 
humanitarianism ". S0 This is because France did not act to stop the massacres, but 
voted along with the other Security Council members to cut back UNAMIR. 51 In 
addition, France was fearful that an RPF (Tutsi rebels) victory in French-speaking 
Rwanda would result in the country coming under the influence of Anglophones. 52 
This is why France intervened at that time in the south-western part of Rwanda. 
Because Hutu forces loyal to the ousted government were strongest. 53 Maybe this 
was the fear of the world community that asked for an impartial intervention by the 
French forces. They were suspicious that France would intervene in support of the 
Hutu-forces to suppress the rebellion. 
48 Teson, op. cit., p. 262. 
49 S/RES/929 (1994), 22 June 1994. 
50 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 158. 
31 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 232, Dallaire, op. cit., p. 81 and Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 159. 
52 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., pp. 158-159 and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 233. 
53 Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 159 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 248. 
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Accordingly, Nicholas Wheeler argued that there are two spots for the 
"safe humanitarian zone" created by France in the south-western part of Rwanda. 
Firstly, although resolution 929 spoke of impartiality and not "an interposition" 
force, in declaring the zone the French Government and its commanders on the 
ground made clear that the RPF would not be allowed to enter the zone 54 
Secondly, the zone provided a sanctuary for the retreating Rwandan armed forces 
and militias that had been responsible for the genocide. 
55 Thus, it is obvious that 
France was not impartial by setting these safe humanitarian zones and it did not act 
for humanitarian purposes but for primary selfish motives. This disqualifies its 
intervention from humanitarian. Indeed, the French intervention saved the ones 
that committed the genocide from the Tutsi-led retribution. 6 However, the French 
"humanitarianism" was not in favour of the victims, but of the victimisers. France 
went in Rwanda to save the people responsible for genocide. This intervention can 
by no means be a humanitarian one. 
EVALUATION OF THE FRENCH INTERVETION IN RWANDA 
It could be argued that Rwanda, as a case of mass human suffering and 
genocide, reflected the failures of the past. Somalia had damaged severely the 
practice of humanitarian intervention. As a result, almost a million people died and 
the world community did not do anything about these people. As regards the 
French intervention, it could be argued that it further curtailed the prospects of 
S` Wheeler, op. cit., p. 234. 
55 Id 
56 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 147 and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 234. 
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future humanitarian intervention. Wheeler argued, "if the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention is defined in terms of the primacy of humanitarian 
motives, then the French intervention fails the test"57 and in his article with Morris 
they claim that "this is a clear case of a state abusing the concept of humanitarian 
intervention ". 58 They both are very critical of Operation Turquoise. On the other 
hand, Abiew thinks that "Rwanda demonstrates the tenuous commitment of states 
to humanitarian intervention ". 
Indeed, Rwanda proved that there are two major problems of humanitarian 
intervention. Firstly, Rwanda reaffirmed that states intervene selectively when vital 
interest are at stake. Secondly, this intervention proved that humanitarian 
intervention is vulnerable to political omissions and failures. The two above 
problems are obstacles to the emergence of a norm favouring intervention on 
humanitarian purposes. It is not accidental that Teson is not at all enthusiastic with 
France's intervention in Rwanda. Although in Somalia he supported that "human 
suffering has taken precedence over state sovereignty"59, in the case of Rwanda he 
did not repeat such an argument. He only described Operation Turquoise as a case 
of "legitimate humanitarian intervention ". 
60 He did not try, however, to support 
this argument of his, because he knew the difficulties of such a task. Therefore, he 
resorted to a brief and groundless conclusion. 
Wheeler, op. cit., p. 234. 
ss Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., p. 160. 
59 Teson, op. cit., p. 247. 
60 Ibid., p. 262. 
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4.6 US-LED INTERVENTION IN HAITI (1994) 
The Duvalier family ruled Haiti dictatorially for decades during the 
twentieth century. ' In December 1990 Jean Bertrand Aristide became President of 
Haiti with 67% of the popular vote. 2 This has been the first free and fair 
democratic election in Haiti, internationally monitored and supervised. 3 In 
September 1991, few months after the elections took place, the Haitian army led 
by General Raoul Cedras seized power and expelled Aristide. 4 The international 
response was belated. The Permanent Council of the Organisation of American 
States has condemned the coup in an emergency session and it demanded the 
restoration of democratic rule-5 Moreover, the OAS has called for the diplomatic 
isolation of Haiti and imposed economic sanctions. 6 Although the OAS had called 
1 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, 
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 260. Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of 
the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, Dordrecht, Kluwer Law International, 
1999, p213. 
2 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, "You, the People ": Pro-Democratic Intervention in 
International Law, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth (eds. ), Democratic Governance and 
International Law, Cambridge, University Press, 2000, p. 284. Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2id edition, New York, Transnational Publishers, 
1997, p. 249. David Whippman, Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation, in Gregory H. Fox and 
Brad R. Roth (eds. ), Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge, University Press, 
2000, p. 301. Also Reisman, op. cit., p. 247, Abiew, op. cit., p. 213 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 260. 
3 Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians, US Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo, 
Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 87. Lois E. Fielding, "Taking the Next Step 
in the Development of New Human Rights: the Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to 
Promote Democracy", Duke Journal of International Law, vol. 5, Spring 1995, p. 358. W. Michael 
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, in Gregory H. Fox 
and Brad R Roth (eds. ), Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge, University 
Press, 2000, p. 247. Also Abiew, op. cit., p. 213, Whippman, op. cit., p. 301and Murphy, op. cit., p. 260. 
` Tom J. Farer, "Collectively Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States: The Western 
Hemisphere's Prospect", Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 15,1993, p. 736. Also Reisman, op. cit., 247, 
Whippman, op. cit., p. 301, Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 285, Abiew, op. cit., pp. 212-213, Teson, 
op. cit., p. 249, DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 87, DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 90 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 260. 
5 Farer, op. cit., p. 736 and DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 91. 
6 Fielding, op. cit., p. 358, Farer, op. cit., p. 736, Murphy, op. cit., p. 260, Michael Byers and 
Chesterman, op. cit., p. 284, DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 87, Teson, op. cit., p. 250, DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 91 and 
Abiew, op. cit., p. 214. 
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the UN to impose sanctions to Haiti, the Council did not take any action, because 
China and other UN members saw the coup as an internal matter, which did not 
constitute a threat to international peace and security. 7 This fact reflected the fears 
of China and other states regarding the increasing Council's involvement in the 
domestic affairs of states .8 Nevertheless, the UN General Assembly had 
condemned "the illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti and 
the use of violence, military coercion and the violation of human rights" in Haiti. 9 
The first Security Council involvement in the crisis had been witnessed in 
16 June, almost two years after the overthrown of the democratically elected 
authorities. Then, the Council determined that "in these unique and exceptional 
circumstances, the continuation of this situation threatens international peace and 
security in the region" and under Chapter VII of the UN Charter it had imposed 
sanctions-10 In other words, the situation that threatened international peace and 
security was the overthrow of the Haitian government by the military junta and the 
following public unrest and violations of human rights. There are two further 
remarkable points in this resolution (841). First, the Council repeated the wording 
of resolution 794 on Somalia. It made reference to the unique and exceptional 
circumstances, as well as the warranting extraordinary measures by the Security 
Council in support of the efforts undertaken within the framework of the 
Organisation of American States. 1' No doubt, the use of this wording reflects the 
7Teson, op. cit., pp. 249-250 and Abiew, op. cit., pp. 214-215. 
s Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 152. 
9 UN GA/Res. 46/7,11 October 1991. 
10 S/RES/841 (1993), 16 June 1993. 
11 Id. 
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fears of China and other states not to create precedents for future Security Council 
involvement in essentially domestic crises. Secondly, resolution 841 on Haiti 
repeatedly refers to the OAS and its efforts to solve the Haitian problem. In the 
first paragraph the Council "aff rms that the solution of the crisis in Haiti should 
take into account the above-mentioned resolutions of the Organisation of 
American States and of the General Assembly of the United Nations ". 12 It could be 
argued that this fact reflects an era of closer cooperation between the UN and 
regional organisations after the end of the Cold War. 
The embargo imposed by the UN seems to have forced the military junta 
to accept the Governors Island Agreement. 13 Aristide and Cedras signed this 
agreement on 3 July 1993 in New York. 14 It provided for Aristide's return and the 
restoration of democracy, as well as amnesty for the coup leaders and the 
deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. 15 After reaching the agreement, the 
Council, in a new resolution, had called for the suspension of measures adopted 
under resolution 841.16 This lift of sanctions was of a temporary nature. The 
agreement collapsed when violence against Aristide's supporters resumed in 
September and October of the same year. " After the escalation of politically 
motivated violence in Haiti, the Council authorised "the establishment and 
12 Id 
13 Byers and Chestenman, op. cit., p. 285. 
"Murphy, op. cit., p. 262, DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 91 and Abiew, op. cit., p. 216. 
15 Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, "Disobedient Generals and the Politics of 
Redemocratisation: The Clinton Administration and Haiti", Political Science Quarterly ", vol. 112, 
No3, Autumn 1997, p. 368. Also Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 285, DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 91, 
Murphy, op. cit., pp. 262-263, Teson, op. cit., p. 251, Abiew, op. cit., p. 216 and Chesterman, op. cit., 
154. Pe 
S/RES/861(1993), 27 August 1993. 
17 Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 285-286, Teson, op. cit., p. 251, Murphy, op. cit., p. 263, 
DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 91 and Morley and McGillion, op. cit., p. 369. 
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immediate dispatch of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a period 
of six months ". 18 In a later resolution (873), the Council decided to terminate the 
suspension of measures against Haiti and re-imposed the embargo. 
19 
In addition, resolution 875 had called upon Member States to "halt inward 
maritime shipping as necessary in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and 
destinations "20 This naval blockade was obviously authorized for guaranteeing the 
effective imposition of sanctions. Similarly, resolution 917, decided that "all 
States shall without delay deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in, 
or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in, or has taken of from the 
territory of Haiti, with the exception of regularly scheduled commercial passenger 
flights, unless the particular flight has been approved, for humanitarian purposes 
or for other purposes consistent with the present resolution" 
21 What is more, all 
officers of the Haitian military and police, as well as their family and supporters 
were barred from travelling outside Haiti. 
22 Finally, the Council had urged all 
States to freeze without delay the funds and financial resources of the above named 
people 23 
Most resolutions have to do with the imposition of sanctions against Haiti 
and its military and police forces. Actually, all sanctions failed to remove the 
military junta and to restore democratic order. Although in the first place it seemed 
that sanctions urged the coup to sign the Governors Island Agreement, in the 
18 S/RES/867 (1993), 23 September 1993. 
19 S/RES/873 (1993), 13 October 1993. 
20 S/RES/875 (1993), 16 October 1993. 




course it became obvious that the junta did not actually wish to implement the 
terms of this agreement. It could be argued that the Cedras regime preferred to 
make some manoeuvres in order to save time and to shape a cooperative profile. 
Yet, its reluctance to restore democratic order became evident immediately after 
the lift of sanctions by the UN. Several months of economic sanctions and 
diplomatic pressure had failed to remove the de facto government. 24 This reflects 
the incapacity of economic sanctions alone to squeeze a de facto government. 25 In 
fact, sanctions managed to damage severely the Haitian economy, already the 
poorest in the hemisphere, while creating economic opportunities for the ruling 
military elite that focused on its contraband narco-traffic business 26 The actual 
victim of these sanctions had been the Haitian citizen that faced malnutrition, 
deteriorating health care and hunger. 27 According to a study, about 1000 more 
children were dying monthly with the sanctions, and the sanctions helped create 
100,000 new cases of moderate or severe malnutrition. 8 
Given the ineffectiveness of sanctions, on 20 May 1994, President Clinton 
stated that he was considering military intervention in Haiti 29 The US President 
had listed six reasons for why it would be in the US interest to intervene: (1) Haiti 
was in our backyard; (2) Haiti had been used as a staging area for drug shipments 
bound for the United States; (3) Haiti was the only Western Hemisphere country 
where military leaders had seized power from an elected leader; (4) several 
24 Monroe Leigh, "The Political Consequences of Economic Embargoes", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 89, Nol, January 1995, p. 74. Also Whippman, op. cit., p. 301. 
25 Farer, op. cit., p. 737. 
I Reisman, op. cit., p. 248 and Morley and McGillion, op. cit., p. 371. 
27 Murphy, op. cit., p. 265, Leigh, op. cit., p. 74 and Reisman, op. cit., p. 248. 
28 Murphy, op. cit., p-265- 
29 Ibid., p. 266. 
219 
thousand US nationals live in Haiti; (5) one million Haitian Americans live in the 
United States; and (6) continued military rule could result in massive refugee flows 
to the United States. 30 It could be argued that the actual threat for the United States 
had been the influx of political refugees from Haiti. 31 Yet, the United States 
exercised the tactic of forced repatriation of refugees, a program that, according to 
Byers and Chesterman, "was as aggressive as it was illegal ". 32 Among the reasons 
that urged the Clinton administration to intervene had been the deteriorating 
political and humanitarian situation in Haiti and domestic pressure for more 
effective action. 33 The restoration of democracy, however, had also become an 
objective of the US foreign policy on Haiti . 
34 
After the Haitian military authorities ordered the joint UN-OAS mission 
monitoring human rights in Haiti to leave within two days, the Clinton 
administration began seeking explicit UN authorization for military intervention in 
Haiti. 35 Finally, on July 31 the Security Council adopted resolution 940. The 
council had reaffirmed "that the goal of the international community remains the 
restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected 
President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide ". 36 It further determined that "the situation in 
Haiti continues to be a threat to peace and security in the region ". 37 However, the 
most important part of this resolution is the authorization for the use of force to 
restore democracy: "Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
30 Ibid., pp. 266-267. 
31 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 93. 
32 Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 285, Murphy, op. cit., pp. 267-268 and DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 92. 
33 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 93 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 267. 
34 Murphy, op. cit., p. 267 and DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 94. 
35 Murphy, op. cit., p. 268- 
-16 S/RES/940 (1994), 31 July 1994. 
37 Id 
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Nations, authorises Member States to form a multinational force under unified 
command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to 
facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the 
Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected 
President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of 
Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will 
permit the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement ". 38 
This is the first time that the Security Council authorised the use of force 
in order to restore the democratic order in a country. 39 Murphy noted that although 
it seems from this resolution that the UN was driven by a concern of human rights 
atrocities and by a concern for refugee flows, the actual goal had been the 
restoration of democracy 
40 Fielding noted that a right to assist democratic 
restoration is only the core of a much broader right of humanitarian assistance. 41 In 
resolution 940 the Council had been `gravely concerned by the significant 
deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing 
escalation by the de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties, the 
desperate plight of Haitian refugees, and the recent expulsion of the staff of 
International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) "42 Although the international 
community had been concerned of the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, it reaffirmed 
that its goal remains the restoration of democracy. 
39 id 
39 Reisman, op. cit., p. 248. 
40 Murphy, op. cit., p. 276. 
41 Fielding, op. cit., p. 330. 
42 S/Res/940 (1994), 31 July 1994. 
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Teson, as well as other imaginative authors, has noted that the case of Haiti 
is "the most important precedent supporting the legitimacy both of an 
international principle of democratic rule and of collective humanitarian 
intervention". 43 Once again, Teson's argument constitutes a misinterpretation of 
facts. First of all, it could be argued that the Council did act to restore democratic 
order in Haiti-44 The United States had called the military blockade of Haiti 
"Operation Support Democracy". 45 But the fact that the Council authorised the use 
of force has nothing to do with any precedent for the legitimacy of unilateral and 
unauthorised pro-democratic and humanitarian intervention. The only precedent 
from this resolution has to do with Security Council authorised pro-democratic and 
humanitarian interventions. This is because all resolutions made reference to the 
situation in Haiti, implying the humanitarian crisis, the refugee flows and the 
overthrow of the democratically elected government. Further, the Council had used 
the specific wording, well known from resolution 794 on Somalia. In resolution 
940 on Haiti, the Council recognised "the unique character of the present situation 
in Haiti and its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an 
exceptional response". 
46 It is obvious that, once again, this wording had been used 
in order to avoid a prospective Chinese veto. China is the strongest advocate of 
Article 2(7) in the Security Council and would not allow such a precedent for 
future Council practice. 
4s Teson, op. cit., p. 249, Abiew, op. cit., p. 217- 
44 Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 151-152. 
45 Murphy, op. cit., p. 276 and DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 85 and Glennon, op. cit., p. 71. 
46 S/RES/940 (1994), 31 July 1994. 
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Nevertheless, Teson argues that the existence now of two "unique" 
situations proves that at least Somalia was not strictly a unique case, but an 
extraordinary one4' It could be argued that his argument is very strong because 
there are not only two, but three "unique" situations: Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. 
In Somalia the world community faced a failed state with major humanitarian 
problems, in Rwanda genocide against an ethnic group and in Haiti the 
unconstitutional overthrown of a democratically elected government. There is no 
connecting link between these three paradigms because they are two totally 
different situations. In Somalia there was no central authority to negotiate, while in 
Haiti there was the military coup. In fact, all three cases are "unique" in nature, 
but, as regards to their ultimate goal, they are quite similar: improvement to the 
humanitarian situation. 
Another claim of his suggests that in resolution 940 the Council did not 
determine that the situation in Haiti constituted a threat to international peace and 
security, while at the same time asserting that it was acting under Chapter VII 48 
This estimate of his, however, outwits any limits of imagination and 
misinterpretation. This is because the Council determined that "the situation in 
Haiti continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region". 49 What 
is more, the Council had determined that the crisis in Haiti constitutes a threat to 
peace and security from the previous resolutions. 50 Teson's imprecise points render 
his views totally unreliable. He invented this false dilemma in order to claim, "the 
4' Teson, op. cit., p. 253. 
48 Id 
49 S/RES/940 (1994), 31 July 1994. 
50 S/RES/841 (1993), 16 June 1993, S/RES/873 (1993), 13 October 1993, S/RES/875 (1993), 16 
October 1993, S/RES/917 (1994), 6 May 1994, S/RES/933 (1994), 30 June 1994. 
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practice of states has accepted serious violations of human rights as grounds for 
action by the Security Council under Chapter VII". 51 However, it is clear that 
resolution 940 found a threat to peace and security. If Teson would like to 
introduce a rational and valid argument, he could have said that this is clearly an 
atypical conception of a threat to peace and security. 52 This is because in Haiti 
there were no massive flows of refugees and the impacts humanitarian situation 
were not grave to cause a threat to international peace and security. In addition, the 
unconstitutional overthrow of the Haitian government could not itself cause a 
threat to international peace. A more notable point is the fact that the Council did 
not refer to international peace and security, but to the peace and security in the 
region. 53 This is a field where Teson and other imaginative authors could offer 
various interpretations. 
Thus, some scholars could point out that there was no actual threat to 
peace and security. 54 That would be a better case for Teson. After the overthrown 
of the legitimately elected authorities there had been a humanitarian crisis in Haiti, 
as well as a slight refugee problem. Hence, it could be argued that the 
transboundary effects of the refugees did constitute a threat to peace and security 
in the region. However, compared to other similar conflicts (Liberia, Iraq, Somalia, 
Sudan and Rwanda) the number of refugees from Haiti had been very small. 55 In 
addition, the forced repatriation of refugees by the United States would not allow 
51 Teson, op. cit., p. 253. 
52 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 153 and Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 284. 
53 Id 
54 Glennon, op. cit., p. 72 and Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 284. 
55 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 153. 
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making such an interpretation. 56 Teson suggested that such a "refugee problem" 
does not justify intervention because the United States receives a huge flux of 
illegal migrants from Mexico every year, but the US takes no action, even non- 
forcible, against Mexico 57 This is a really persuasive argument that shows how 
states selectively detect problems, when it is in their interest to intervene. The 
refugees from Mexico do not pose any threat to the US society, but Haitian 
refugees constitute a threat to peace and security in the region. 
Nevertheless, the Council had been gravely concerned by the systematic 
violations of civil liberties and by the plight of refugees and this determination is 
sufficient in determining a threat to the peace. Reisman argues that in previous 
resolutions the Council found massive and systematic human rights violations that 
constituted a threat to the peace, and that in making this determination, the Council 
was hardly departing from precedent. 58 Indeed, previous Security Council 
resolutions led to the adoption of resolution 940. However, it could be argued that 
Reisman overestimated the findings of the resolutions regarding the situation in 
Haiti. All resolutions make reference to the situation that threatens international 
peace and security, but do not explicitly state that "systematic violations of human 
rights" constitute a threat to international peace and security. This situation can be 
caused by the refugee flows, the overthrow of the Haitian government, or the 
humanitarian crisis. Yet, all resolutions are unclear as to what threatens 
Murphy, op. cit., p. 67 and Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 285. 
s' Teson, op. cit., p. 255. 
S8 W. Michael Reisman, "Haiti and the Validity of International Action", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 89, Nol, January 1995, p. 83. 
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international peace, but they all stress the unique and exceptional circumstances of 
this situation. 
The overall assessment of this intervention, however, suggests that there 
was no actual threat to peace, nor were there any massive human rights violations. 
No one can claim that there was ethnic cleansing, genocide, or massacre. The 
refugee problem was not of a considerable dimension to challenge and justify 
intervention. On the other hand, it seems that the Council acted with the purpose of 
protecting and restoring the democratic order in Haiti. The OAS and its efforts to 
promote and strengthen democracy had affected the Council. In all resolutions 
regarding the Haitian crisis, the Council recalls the efforts and actions taken by the 
OAS. By intervening in Haiti, the UN has manifested its own interest in 
strengthening and protecting democracy. Furthermore, the fact that the Council 
authorised the use of force after Aristide signalled support for a surgical 
intervention to remove the illegal regime59 supports the claim that resolution 940 
authorised a pro-democratic intervention. Although China has added the 
"exceptional" vocabulary to resolution 940, it seems that the Council had acted in 
order to restore democracy in Haiti and not for a threat to peace that did not 
actually exist. From this specific wording, it is obvious that the Council was 
cautious not to create a precedent for future similar interventions. Yet, it is difficult 
to assert such an argument, after the precedence of another two "unique" cases. 
According to some scholars, resolution 940 is not an important precedent 
supporting the legitimacy both of an international principle of democratic rule and 
19 Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 154-155 and Murphy, op. cit., p. 276. 
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of collective humanitarian intervention 60 States negotiate before the Council with 
the criterion of interests, not with legal standards. Thus, the lack of opinio juris is 
undisputable. Hence, it could be argued that the practice of the Council alone 
cannot set precedents for the creation of customary international law. Teson uses to 
over-generalise and overestimate the meaning of several Security Council 
resolutions. Nevertheless, each and every resolution of the Council should be 
considered as a reflection of state practice and more specifically as a reflection of 
state practice of the 15 present members of the Council and not of the whole world 
community. Evidence of opinio juris can be found in the statements of 
governments and states, but not from a Security Council resolution that reflects the 
negotiation and the political bargains of its 15 members. But the world community 
counts much more than 200 states. Nevertheless, it could be argued that after the 
precedence of Somalia and Rwanda, Haiti proves a continuum in the Council's 
practice, regarding intervention on humanitarian purposes. It seems that the 
Council became keen to legitimise armed humanitarian interventions. It becomes 
evident that the Council intervenes in the domestic affairs of states to protect 
human rights. However, this practise cannot legitimise unauthorised and unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. 
Let us now consider the action taken after resolution 940 and the 
authorisation for the use of force. On September 15, President Clinton delivered an 
ultimatum to Haiti's military junta via a television address to the American 
public6' The next day, on the eve of the invasion Clinton sent a negotiation team 
60 Ibid., p. 249. 
61 Ibid., p. 252. 
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to Haiti, led by former President Jimmy Carter, the former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powel and the Democratic Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia to 
convince Cedras to surrender power to President Aristide and leave the country. 62 
The Carter delegation achieved to reach an agreement shortly after President 
Clinton ordered the commencement of the intervention. 63 The certain forthcoming 
defeat of the Haitian army led the junta to surrender and sign the agreement. The 
next morning 3,000 forces landed in Haiti that later became nearly 20,000, without 
any opposition and took control of its airfields and ports 65 This had been a no- 
casualty intervention66 Aristide was soon restored to power and all economic 
sanctions were lifted67 
In conclusion, it could be said that excessive efforts by regional 
organisations and the UN to support democracy illustrate the eagerness of many 
states to spread the democratic values. No doubt, democracy is becoming a right in 
international law. Once it appears in treaties it then acquires international status. 68 
Hence, it could be argued that democracy is not an internal matter, but an 
international concern of states. Recent practice of states illustrates that the world 
community cannot accept the unconstitutional overthrow of governments. 
However, there is no legal basis for intervention to protect democracy, save the 
UN Security Council enforcement action after the determination of a threat to 
62 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 93, Teson, op. cit., p. 252, Murphy, op. cit., p. 271 and Morley and McGillion, 
op. cit., p. 380. 
6 Murphy, op. cit., p. 271, DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 93, Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 286 and Morley 
and McGillion, op. cit., p. 381. 
64 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 93. 
65 Murphy, op. cit., p. 272, Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 286 and Teson, op. cit., p. 252. 
66 Teson, op. cit., p. 252. 
67 S/RES/944 (1994), 29 September 1994. Also DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 93. 
66 Rosalyn Higgins, Intervention and International Law, in Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World 
Politics, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p29. 
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international peace and security. First of all, the UN Charter does not provide for a 
right to pro-democratic intervention. What is more, all regional organisations that 
make efforts to promote and protect democracy do not have any provisions for 
such a right. Further, the practice of such interventions is very limited and there is 
no evidence that states has accepted a right to pro-democratic intervention. In the 
case of Haiti, the Council authorised the use of force to restore international peace 
and security, but it did not explicitly act to restore democracy, but it repeatedly 
stressed the implications of the humanitarian crisis and the refugee flows. In 
addition, its special wording was used to eliminate the chances for similar 
interventions in the future. Thus, it could be argued that pro-democratic 
intervention, out of the realm of the Council's enforcement action remains 
impermissible under international law. 
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4.7 ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN SIERA LEONE (1997) 
Sierra Leone won its independence from the British colonists in 19611. Since 
then, alternation of coup and democracy dominated in the political life of the 
country. During the eighties a rebel movement called the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) appeared in the political scene of the country. In March 1996 Ahmed 
Tejan Kabbah was elected through democratic elections. Kabbah tried to end the 
RUF rebellion and signed a peace-agreement with Sankoh, the RUF leader, in which 
the RUF would become a legal political party. However, in May 1997 Kabbah was 
overthrown in a military coup, led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. Since then, the 
military coup faced the opposition of African states, most importantly of Nigeria, 
and of most of other countries on the planet. 2 Koroma's government tried to 
strengthen its power, instead of its diplomatic isolation by the international 
community. The United Nations and other international organisations had strongly 
condemned the militaryjunta. 
After the military coup had overthrown the legal and democratically elected 
government of Sierra Leone, the initial consequences of such regimes had 
immediately appeared. A good illustration is the ban of political parties, as well as 
demonstrations against this illegal regime, violations of human rights, and of course 
thousands of refugees taking shelter in neighbouring countries3. The military coup 
faced opposition within the boundaries of the country from the majority of Sierra 
Leone's society. Unfortunately, the coup attained cooperation with the rebels of 
1 James Ciment, Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, London, Fitzroy Dearborn 
Publishers, 1998, p. 1142. 
2 S/PV3822,8 October 1997. Also Whippman, op. cit., p304. 
3 Whippman, op. cit., p. 303. 
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RUF, which had fought in the past against former governments4. However the illegal 
regime could not control RUF and many government soldiers, which were 
committing violations of human rights. RUF in cooperation with the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council made a lot of atrocities against innocent civilian people. 5 All 
those facts led to a series of reactions from the neighbouring countries and from the 
world community. 
Firstly, the Organisation of African Unity (the recently called African Union) 
immediately condemned the military coup. 6 From the beginnings the OAU Council 
of Ministers had stressed on the relevance between popular sovereignty and 
international political legitimacy and it had called the International Community and 
particularly the African states to condemn the coup and to avoid the recognition of 
the illegal regime. Moreover the OAU supported the legal elected government of 
Sierra Leone, which was overthrown by the coup. The OAU suggested that the 
neighbouring countries should take action to restore the democratically elected 
government, implying the use of force to remove the de facto regimes. Actually, 
OAU impliedly authorised the Economic Organisation of West African States 
(ECOWAS) to undertake the military enforcement in order to restore democracy in 
Sierra Leone9. Two months after the OAU meeting, ECOWAS declared that the 
military coup constituted a threat to international peace and security10 for the 
countries surrounding Sierra Leone and took measures against the illegal 
4 Ibid., p. 304. 
s Ibid., p. 303. 
6 Harnoff op. cit., p. 92. 
7 Reisman, op. cit., p252. 
a\ hippman, op. cit., p. 304. 
9 Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 288. 
10 Whippman, op. cit., p. 305. 
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government, such as embargo on arms and petroleum and asked all the neighbouring 
countries to implement this agreement. 
In a parallel course, the UN Security Council condemned with a statement of 
the president of the Security Council the military coup and demanded the restoration 
of democracy in Sierra Leone just after the illegal overthrow of Kabbah. 11 
Immediately after the first statement, another one had followed and supported the 
efforts of ECOWAS and the International Community to help the people of Sierra 
Leone restore the constitutional order 12. Moreover, the second statement had 
condemned the atrocities, the humanitarian consequences on the civilian people, 
including the refugees. A third statement had once again condemned the junta, 
supported ECOWAS in the efforts to negotiate with representatives of the junta and 
considered the junta's attempt to set conditions for the restoration of democracy in 
Sierra Leone as "unacceptable , 13. Further, this statement regarded the disruption of 
democracy in Sierra Leone as a threat for peace, security, and stability of the 
region. 14 At the same time, the legally elected president of Sierra Leone appeared in 
the General Assembly of the UN and asked the Security Council to proceed in 
harder measures against the coup and to support the efforts of the Economic 
Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for 
the restoration of his democratically elected government's. He expressed his fears 
for the situation in Sierra Leone and his reservations for the negotiations with the 
junta. After this, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan sent a letter to the Security 
11 S/PRST/199729 (May 27,1997). 
12 S/PRST/1997/36 (July 11,1997). 
13 S/PRST/1997/42 (6 August 1997). 
'4 Id 
'5 Whippman, op. cit., p. 306. 
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Council supporting the efforts for peaceful resolution and the democratic 
governance. 16 Immediately, the Security Council responded with a unanimous 
resolution for the situation in Sierra Leone. 
In Resolution 1132, the Security Council recalling the statements of its 
President, taking note of the OAU summit and the ECOWAS meeting of the foreign 
ministers on Sierra Leone, taking also note of the Secretary-General's letter, 
expressing its supports for the mediation of the ECOWAS Committee, concerning 
the violence loss of life and the deterioration of the human conditions following the 
military coup, and finally determining the situation in Sierra Leone as a threat to 
international peace and security and acting under Chapter VII of the UN, decided a 
series of measures. 17 First of all, the Council demanded that "the military junta take 
immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the 
restoration of the democratically-elected government and a return to constitutional 
order". 18 Furthermore, it decided that all states should prevent the sale or supply to 
Sierra Leone of petroleum products and arms. Acting also under Chapter VIII of the 
United Nations Charter, the Council authorised ECOWAS to cooperate with the 
democratically elected Government of Sierra Leone to ensure strict implementation 
of the provisions of this resolution relating to the supply of arms and petroleum 
products-19 
It seems that the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces considered an arms embargo 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter a Security Council authorisation for the use of 
force. ECOWAS continued to operate instead of the Council's mandate and the 
16 Id 




Nigeria-led ECOMOG forces launched a major military assault in February 1998 
that led the AFRC's to flee the country20. This intervention had been a clear 
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, as it had not been self-defence, nor was 
it a Security Council enforcement action to restore international peace and security. 
The Nigerian Government, in order to defend its actions had claimed that the forces 
of AFRC and RUF had persistently attacked ECOMOG and that ECOMOG acted in 
self-defence against the aggression of the junta's military21. Once again intervening 
states had justified their use of force on self-defence and not on their "legal" right of 
humanitarian (or even pro-democratic) intervention. Nevertheless, the actual goal of 
the Nigeria-led ECOMOG forces was the restoration of the democratically elected 
government. It seems odd that a dictatorial regime (Nigeria) seeks the restoration of 
democracy in its neighbouring country. This verifies the fact that selfish interests of 
states are the real motives of such interventions. Actually, the stability in the region 
and the halt of refugee flows had been the major objectives of the Nigerian 
authorities. 
The permanent representative of Sierra Leone in the UN supported 
ECOMOG's action with the argument that the Security Council had failed to 
implement adequate measures to restore the democratically elected government of 
the country and that Sierra Leone had the right in self-defence to seek regional 
military assistance. 22 According to Roth, as regards to the principle in which a State 
accepts the external use of force in its territory, in accordance with its democratic 
entitlement thesis should allow the pro-democratic intervention only in two ways: 
20 Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p289 and Harhoff, op. cit., p. 92. 
21 Whippman, op. cit., p. 307. 
22 Ibid., p. 308. 
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"by designating a government that enjoys an electoral mandate (or other 
"democratic" credentials), but not effective control, as bearer of the legal capacity 
to render contemporaneous consent on behalf of the State; by validating the effort of 
an elected government to render the State's consent in advance, by treaty, to 
forcible restoration of the constitutional government upon the occurrence of a 
revolution or a coup d' etat". 23 Yet, as Whippman noted, "effective control is an 
essential (perhaps the only) component of government's authority to represent a 
state in international affairs... control therefore ordinarily affords de facto rulers a 
partial, if not exclusive, claim to speak in the name of the state" 24 
The Security Council with a presidential statement welcomed the fact that 
the military junta had been defeated, without referring how this had been achieved25. 
It seems that this statement constitutes a post facto legitimacy of intervention by the 
Council. However, the Council did not mention anything about the ECOMOG 
intervention in Sierra Leone, nor did it refer to the legitimacy or not of this 
intervention. After the restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone, the Security 
Council had passed a new Resolution that terminated the embargo26, and a later 
Security Council resolution had established the UNOMSIL to monitor the security 
situation, disarmament, and observance of international humanitarian law. 27 This 
implicit ex post facto approval of intervention by the Security Council is not a new 
one. The precedence of Liberia in 1992 quite resembles the case of Sierra Leone, as 
regards to this matter (ex post facto approval of intervention). Yet, the fact that the 
23 Brad R. Roth, The Illegality of "Pro-Democratic" Invasion Pacts, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. 
Roth (eds. ), Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge, University Press, 2000, 
p329. 
24 Whippman, op. cit., p. 309. 
's S/PRST/1997/52,14 November 1997. 
26 S/RES/1156 (1998), 16 March 1998. 
r S/RES/I 181 (1998), 13 July 1998. 
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Council did not condemned intervention, or welcomed the restoration of democracy, 
does not mean that it approved this intervention, or it deemed it legal. This issue will 
be reconsidered in Chapter 5 and the legal aspects of Kosovo intervention. 
Brad Roth thinks "Sierra Leone is the best evidence of a fundamental change 
in international legal norms pertaining to `pro-democratic" intervention. The 
Security Council in this case took authorisation of action against the" illegitimate" 
regime beyond the context of United Nations peace making cum electoral 
"arbitration", not even bothering to take refuge in assertions of "extraordinary", 
"exceptional ", or "unique" circumstances in invoking Chapter VII. Moreover, its 
post hoc ratification of the regional organisation's forcible acts neither comported 
with a literal interpretation of Chapter VIII nor could be rationalised by a threat of 
imminent humanitarian disaster. The argument can be made, with at least a 
modicum of plausibility, that coups against elected governments are now, per se, 
violations of international law, and that regional organisations are now licensed to 
use force to reverse such coups in member states". 28 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that Roth's conclusions on the 1997 
ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone are overoptimistic. Indeed, the Council 
intervened in the internal affairs of Sierra Leone without the use of the specific 
wording "extraordinary", "exceptional" and "unique". This is probably because of 
the lack of authorisation to use all necessary means. It could be said that human 
rights and democracy are no longer an internal matter of states, but an international 
one. However, there is no provision for the use of force to protect human rights and 
democracy. Roth claims that the Security Council took authorisation of action 
28 Brad It Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999, 
p. 407. 
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against the illegitimate regime, but he does not clarify that this action had been oil 
and arms embargo. 29 As regards to his estimates on UN post hoc ratification of 
ECOMOG's forcible acts, it could be said the UN Security Council welcomed the 
fact that the military junta had been defeated. However, the Council never explicitly 
referred to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the use of force. In other words, the 
Council welcomed the restoration of democratic order, but not the military action 
that led to this outcome. Last but not least, it seems that Roth's evaluation for 
fundamental change in international legal norms pertaining to pro-democratic 
intervention is premature, because there is little evidence in state practice. The only 
legitimate aspect for pro-democratic intervention, as the precedent of Haiti 
illustrates, is pro-democratic intervention under the auspices of the Security Council. 
Yet, the Council did not authorise the use for force in order to restore the 
democratically elected government in Sierra Leone. The fact that the world 
community supported the Kabbah government should not be underestimated. Yet, 
this support does not bear recognition of a right to pro-democratic intervention 
outside the Council's realm. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems that there is plenty of evidence that democracy is becoming a right 
in international law. However, this does not automatically give a rise to a right to 
unauthorised pro-democratic intervention. International law is not static, but it is an 
evolving body of rules. The UN has done much about democracy, as well as 
29 SIRES/1132 (1997), 8 October 1997. 
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regional organisations. Recent trends in the international community indicate that 
state practice, as well as practice of world and regional organisations, tries to 
strengthen and promote democracy. But this practice of states and world 
organisations is not supportive of a unilateral right of pro-democratic intervention. 
On the contrary, imposing sanctions, denying recognition of regimes that 
unconstitutionally overthrow democratically elected governments and suspending 
rights of the country in question is the main concern of regional organisations. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that none of the regional organisations or the UN 
have any provisions for pro-democratic intervention. 
The new human rights agenda will include democracy as a non-deprivable 
right. The democratic entitlement has been spread in Europe, America and Oceania 
and takes rapid steps in Africa. The reformed African Union and its Constitutional 
Act affirm the organisation's will to promote and strengthen democracy within the 
continent. In Asia thinks are more complicated, given the traditional dictatorial rules 
and monarchies. What is more, there is not a regional organisation promoting 
democracy, like in the other continents. Current state practice has shown that 
regional organisations contribute to the effective promotion of human rights and 
democracy. After a breach of the above they immediately report the situation to the 
Council and in cooperation with it search for an optimistic resolution. Thus, the fact 
that Asia does not have a regional organisation, equal to others examined before, is a 
drawback for the democratisation process of Asian states. Yet, as this wave of 
democracy spreads around the world, it could be argued that this trend of the world 
community will be expanded in Asian countries. 
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Moreover, there are some points to stress regarding pro-democratic 
interventions. First of all, it could be argued that pro-democratic interventions are 
vulnerable to the same critics of humanitarian intervention. The fear of abuses of the 
principle of non-intervention is eminent. States seek and invent justifications for the 
use of force. Such a right might create further abuses. Two more issues have to do 
with interest and selectivity. Accordingly, powerful states intervene to restore 
democracy only where there are vital interests at stake. As a result, they intervene 
selectively. For instance, the overthrown of the democratically elected government 
in Pakistan did not touch the US and its European allies. However, the US found it 
very important to restore democracy in Haiti. Furthermore, the great paradox of the 
pro-democratic intervention in Sierra Leone is the role of Nigeria and its dictatorial 
leader and chairman of ECOWAS Sani Abacha, which is a nullifier of electoral 
results30. He was the one that fought against the military coup and pursued the 
restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone. A dictator's desire to restore democracy in 
a neighbouring country is an oddity. The only reasonable explanation is the 
existence of Nigerian interests in restoring democracy in Sierra Leone. 
Further, the western governments, legitimately elected by free and fair 
elections, ignore the laws and rules of the world community and intervene in various 
places across the world, thus violating international law. Western democracies have 
the worst records of intervention after the end of the Cold War. Secondly, Adolph 
Hitler had been also a democratically elected by the German people. Thus, a 
legitimately elected person is not necessary better than a dictator. Thirdly, states that 
now promote democracy used to impose dictatorial rules in many countries, and 
11 Roth, op. cit, p. 408. 
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more specifically in the Middle East, in order to attain their political goals. This 
tactic has been widely used by the US during the Cold War. Nowadays, there is a 
notable shift in US policy that dictates that democracy is the ideal way of promoting 
the US interests. Recent practice has proven that western democracies are becoming 
hegemonial powers that ignore international law in order to accomplish their goals 
of power politics. Accordingly, democracies are not that democratic in their 
international affairs. Thucydides describes in the 5t' book of his histories how 
classic Athenian democracy, one of the best democracies in history, became a 
hegemonial power that ignored basic democratic principles, like dialogue. It seems 
that these principles are forgotten by the US, the current superpower that imposes its 
will by its economic and military power. Thus, this practice of pro-democratic 
intervention simply reflects a form of interventionism and power politics in the 90's, 
rather than a norm of international law. 
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4.8 EVALUATION OF POST-COLD WAR CASES (SAVE KOSOVO) 
All post-Cold War cases dealing with humanitarian intervention have 
been examined so far. The normative changes in the world community are 
evident, as regards enforcement of military intervention for the protection of 
human rights. The Council had dealt many times with matters of the domestic 
affairs of states. No doubt, human rights and their protection became a pivotal 
goal of the Security Council. Many resolutions have been passed condemning 
violations of human rights, imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions, 
commanding bans of flights, setting safe areas and various other demands. 
Democratic governance has also gained respect and the world community 
proved that it is eager to protect democracy from unconstitutional regimes. It 
became evident that the post-Cold War threats to international peace and 
security did not have to deal with international crises, but with domestic crises. 
The differences from the Cold-War period are obvious. Article 2(7) 
and the rule of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states did not bind the 
Council, but it actively intervenes in humanitarian crises. What is more, the 
East-West rivalries have terminated, and states are eager to cooperate and vote 
together for Security Council resolutions without paralysing the Council with 
veto, or veto-threats. This does not mean that states have not exercised their 
veto right after the fall of the Cold War, but they significantly reduced this 
custom. Moreover, from unilateral interventions during the Cold War, we move 
to collective interventions, many times authorised by the Security Council. In 
Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti (in Bosnia the Council authorised a limited use of 
force, but this is not a clear instance of humanitarian intervention) the Council 
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authorised the use of force for humanitarian purposes. In Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, ECOWAS intervened without obtaining an authorisation by the 
Council, but the Council had welcomed its interventions. Finally, US, UK and 
France intervened in Iraq without the authorisation of the Council, primarily 
based on Security Council resolution 688, which censured Iraq without 
adopting any measures under Chapter VII. 
The most significant development, however, is the fact that the UN 
Security Council authorised the use of force for the protection of human rights 
and democracy. Although the fear of states was still apparent, the Council 
recognised that mass violations of human rights and the abruption of 
democracy can threaten international peace and security. Thus, for the first time 
in UN history, it managed to authorise military intervention for the protection 
of human rights and democracy under its Chapter VII powers. Although the 
special wording (unique, extraordinary, and exceptional) makes some caveats 
for the creation of a new norm, the practice is clear and unmistakeable. Yet, the 
iterance of this wording in three different cases proves that this practice is not 
an exception, but a new trend of the Council. Possible interventions in the 
future will render this practice a custom of the Council. 
Nevertheless, there are only a few cases supporting such a right and the 
exceptional wording weakens such claims. If one has to determine an emerging 
norm from this practice of the 90s, the emerging norm would be: the Council is 
competent to authorise intervention in the domestic affairs of states in order to 
halt egregious violations of human rights in the target state. But this suggestion 
does not mean that humanitarian intervention became permissible as a whole 
because of the Council's intense occupation with humanitarian objectives. That 
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would be a misapprehension. Humanitarian intervention outside the Council's 
realm still remains impermissible under international law. In other words, 
humanitarian intervention has not been accepted as a right under customary 
law. Thus, the only legitimate humanitarian intervention would be intervention 
under the Council's legacy and this is what the practice of the 90s supports. 
Kosovo is a good case for the exploration of humanitarian intervention without 
the Council's authorisation. Thus, Kosovo can provide useful lessons for the 







The New Interventionism of the 90's has come to its zenith and at the same 
time its nadir with the 1999 NATO intervention in the Federal Republic 
Yugoslavia (FRY). After a "promising" decade of drastic protection of democracy 
and human rights, an international organisation (NATO) intervened militarily in 
Kosovo to protect the Albanian population of Kosovo from ethnic cleansing and 
widespread human rights violations. The international community and more 
specifically the western states gave signs of a community eager to defend human 
rights. The debate on Kosovo is much more complicated than all the other alleged 
humanitarian interventions of the 90's. Unlike Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, where 
intervening states secured a Security Council authorisation for the use of force, 
NATO did not obtain such an authorisation to support the legality of its action. 
What is more, NATO is a regional organisation that bypassed the UN Security 
Council that is the only competent institution to respond to threats to international 
peace and security. 
The advocates of humanitarian intervention rushed to discern an 
"unambiguous" precedent of humanitarian intervention and a "landmark" for the 
future of humanitarian intervention in international law. Images of harassed 
Albanian refugees, the bodies of dead women and children, as well as the 
demonisation of the Serb President Slobodan Milosevic had convinced the public 
opinion for a forcible intervention in Kosovo. Yet, this enthusiastic cry of the 
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public before the war turned into a clamour against intervention during and after 
the war. A large number of civilian casualties, the intensified campaign of ethnic 
cleansing and the increased number of refugees, the bombing of public utilities, 
bridges, hospitals, schools, TV station and the Chinese Embassy made the initial 
objective of humanitarian intervention highly questionable, given the fact that the 
means used were contrary to the humanitarian ends. Despite the fact that NATO 
intervention had been sharply criticized by many international lawyers for the lack 
of legitimacy, the organisation had to answer questions regarding violations of 
humanitarian laws. In this chapter there will be a five-stage analysis. After 
commencing with a brief historical exploration, this thesis will have to deal with 
the questions of legality vs. illegality and alleged precedents for future 
humanitarian interventions, violations of the laws of war, the future status of 
Kosovo, the political and moral motives and, finally, the future of humanitarian 
intervention after Kosovo (in the concluding chapter). 
HISTORICAL FLASHBACK 
The question of Kosovo and the history of this region of Serbia are very 
complicated and demand a profound investigation. Kosovo is an autonomous part 
of the Republic of Serbia. It is a crossroad between Serbia, Montenegro, Albania 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This region is 
traditionally known as a Serbian land. The Serbs regard Kosovo the birthplace of 
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their state. ' Many historians believe that this is an exaggeration deriving out of 
legends rather than history. 2 The myth comes out of the 1389 battle against the 
Ottoman rule, where Prince Lazar was defeated and killed by the Ottoman forces 
of Murat. 3 The collapse of the medieval Serb state became through the years the 
central event of the Serbian history. 4 Although Serbs consider Kosovo as their 
birthplace, the Albanian population of the region believes that they are the original 
inhabitants of Kosovo. They claim that they are descendants of the Illyrians and 
refer to an ancient Albanian state called Illyria. 5 Another theory supports that the 
Albanians are descendants of the ancient Thracians. 6 However, Kosovo's area is 
sacred to the Serbs for historical and religious reasons, and is legally part of 
Serbia. 7 In the 1974 constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia it 
is clearly stated that the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the 
Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo are constituent parts of the Socialist 
Republic of Serbia. 8 
Given the fact that the Slavs appeared in the region during the 5`h and 6t' 
century BC9, the Albanians support that they are the original inhabitants of the land 
' Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics 1945-2000,8th edition, London, Longman, 2001, p. 351. 2 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, London, Macmillan, 1998, p. 58. Also Calvocoressi, 
op. cit., p. 351. 
3 Malcolm, op. cit., p. 61. 
4 Marie-Janine Calic, Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Account, in Albrecht Schnabel 
and Ramesh Thakur (eds. ), Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: Selective 
indignation, Collective action, and International Citizenship, New York, United Nations University 
Press, 2000, p. 24- 
3 Ibid., p22. 
6 Malcolm, op. cit., p. 28. 
7 Per Fr. I. Pharo, Necessary not Perfect: NATO's War in Kosovo, Institute for Forsvarsstudier, IFS 
Info 112000, p. 5. 
S Heike Krieger (ed. ), The Kosovo Conflict and International Law, an Analytical Documentation, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 3-8. 
9 Radomir Popovic, Serbian Orthodox Church in History, Belgrade, Grafiprof, 2002, p. 7. 
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of Kosovo. 1° Yet, there is no evidence to prove the theory of the Illyrian origin of 
the Albanians, nor of the Thracian. " As regards the arguments on the Illyrian 
origins of the Albanians, it would be quite interesting to cite the argument of 
Professor Israeli. He noted that "interestingly enough, like the Palestinians who 
are competing with Israel over their ancestral land by conveniently claiming that 
they are the descendants of the ancient Cana'anites who had preceded the 
Israelites on the land, the Albanians now advanced the claim that they inherited 
the ancient heritage of the Illyrians who were the original inhabitants of 
Kosovo ". 12 His argument is really persuasive and if anyone wishes to explore it 
further will find out that most of ethnic minorities that raise claims over their 
independence use similar arguments. For instance, the Basques and the Kurds 
claim to be the original inhabitants of their regions and find their traces back in 
antiquity. 
To this point, there is no persuasive proof of the Albanian national heritage 
in Kosovo. There is only a theory that cannot be approved or rejected. Actually, 
the first time that the Albanians emerged in a historical record is 1043.13 On the 
other hand, as already said above, the first Slav tribes invaded the territory of 
Kosovo in 547 and 548.14 In the ninth century, the Bulgarians invaded Kosovo and 
they ruled the area until 1014.15 The new rulers of this region (for approximately a 
period of two centuries, 111h-12th century DC. ) became the Byzantine Emperors, 
10 Malcolm, op. cit, p. 23 and Calic, p. 22. 
" Calic, op. cit., pp. 22-23 and Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 26-40. 
12 Raphael Israeli, From Bosnia to Kosovo: The Re-Islamisation of the Balkans, Christian Thought 
Special Edition, Belgrade, 2002, p. 56- 
13 Malcolm, op. cit., p. 28. 
14 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
15 Ibid., p. 27 and 41. 
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starting with the conqueror, Emperor Basil "the Bulgar-killer". 16 In 1160 Stefan 
Nemanja conquered Kosovo and the Serbs ruled the territory for more than two 
centuries. 17 During this time, Slavs have constituted a majority in Kosovo18 and, no 
doubt, Kosovo played an important role in the Serbian state. 19 Despite some claims 
on myths and the epic of Kosovo, the significance of this region for the medieval 
Serb state is undisputable. After the Ottoman domination of the Balkans, Kosovo 
remained under the Ottoman rule. 
The Albanians, having decided to convert and embrace Islam, enjoyed a 
privileged status in the Ottoman Empire. 0 During these years it was clear that 
there was a steady flow of Albanians into Kosovo. 21 In 1878 the Albanian League 
was established in Prizren, which presented the Greater Albania plan. 22 Yet, it had 
been the Serbs that liberated Kosovo from the Ottoman rule in 1912, when the 
Serb army defeated the Ottoman army units of approximately 16000 men. 3 At the 
same year Albania declared independence from the Ottoman Empire and raised 
claims to Kosovo. 24 Many arguments had been raised on ethnic cleansing against 
the Albanians, committed by the Serbs during this time. 25 As regards the 
demographic balance in Kosovo in the beginnings of the twentieth century there 
are diverging views. Some scholars claim that the Albanians were the majority 
16 Ibid., pp-27-28 and 42. 
17 Ibid., p. 43. 
18 Calic, op. cit., p. 23. 
19 Malcolm, op. cit., p. 49. 
20 Israeli, op. cit., p. 54 and Malcolm, op. cit., p. 173. 
21 Malcolm, op. cit., p. 73. 
22 Israeli, op. cit., p. 54. 
23 Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians, US Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo, 
London, The John Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 131. Also Malcolm, op. cit., p. 251. 24 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 131. 
25 Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 3. 
Also DiPrizio, op. cit., pp. 251-255 and Calic, op. cit., p. 23. 
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with 75% and some others that the population of Albanians did not exceed 44% of 
the overall population of Kosovo. 6 This discrepancy can be easily explained in the 
following argument: the Serbs were leaving their land and immigrated from 
Kosovo to other parts of Serbia, while the Albanians increased their percentage 
with high birth rates. 7 
During World War II, apart from the German and Italian rule, Bulgarians 
and Albanians took control of parts of Kosovo 28 This is because of the Albanian 
and Bulgarian cooperation with the fascists of the Axis. The only countries 
opposing fascism in the Balkans had been the Greeks and the Serbs. There is 
plenty of evidence of Albanians fighting against Greek and Serb forces. However, 
the Serbs had been the victims of the Albanian cooperation with the Axis, due to 
expulsions of Serbs out of Kosovo. 29 As regards to the Albanians in Kosovo, they 
considered the Axis conquest as a kind of liberation. 30 
After the end of the Cold War, Tito passed a new Yugoslav constitution, 
comprised of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Macedonia) and two autonomous regions of the Republic of 
Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo). 31 Tito was more than willing to protect the 
26 Malcolm and Calic argue that the Albanians were the majority in Kosovo in the beginnings of the 
20`h century. However, Professor Israeli has more profound details and insists that the Albanians 
did not exceed 44% of the total population. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 257, Calic, op. cit., p. 23 and Israeli, 
op. cit., p. 54. 
s DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 131. 
28 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 131. 
29 Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 293-296. 
30 Ibid., p. 297. 
31 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
Oxford, oxford University Press, 2001, p. 207. Also DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 131, Malcolm, op. cit., 
p. 316. 
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Albanian population in Kosovo. First of all, he banned the return of the Slavs32 
exiled during World War II by the Albanians and always under the Nazi tolerance. 
Under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution Kosovo was granted a significant decree of 
autonomy. 33 The years after 1974 gave numerous records of ethnic cleansing of 
Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. The Albanians threatened, verbally abused, 
harassed and attacked the Serbs in Kosovo. The Serbs had to face violations of 
property, destruction of crops, beatings and rape on ethnic grounds. 34 As a result, 
the Slav Populations of Kosovo departed to inner Serbia. 35 This evident reduction 
of the Slav population along with the sharp increase of the Albanian population in 
Kosovo affirms the argument that the Serbs had also been victims of ethnic 
cleansing, as their numbers dramatically decreased in Kosovo during the twentieth 
century. 36 
KOSOVO TODAY 
32 Malcolm, op. cit., p. 317. Malcolm refers to a ban on the exiled Serb "colonists", but a research 
proves that the Albanians did not harass and expel colonists, but all Serbs. 
3 Agon Demjaha, The Kosovo Conflict. A Perspective from inside, in Albrecht Schnabel and 
Ramesh Thakur (eds. ), Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: Selective 
indignation, Collective action, and International Citizenship, New York, United Nations University 
Press, 2000, p. 33. Also Malcolm, op. cit., p. 327 and Krieger op. cit., pp. 2-8. 
34 Duska Anastasijevic, The Closing of the Kosovo Cycle: Victimisation Versus Responsibility, in 
Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds. ), Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian 
intervention: Selective indignation, Collective action, and International Citizenship, New York, 
United Nations University Press, 2000, p. 48. 
3s Malcolm, op. cit., pp329 and 331 and Anastasijevic, op. cit., p. 48. 
Interview with Professor Avramovic, Law School, University of Belgrade. Also Israeli, op. cit., 
p. 64. 
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In 1989 the Serbian parliament abrogated the enhanced autonomy granted 
to Kosovo in 1974.37 The Albanians immediately reacted with a unilateral 
declaration of independence in 1991.38 Albania recognised the self-declared 
"Republic of Kosovo" as well as its head, Ibrahim Rugova, who opened an office 
in Tirana. 39 However, this policy was not granted either by Serbia or by the 
international Community and was not given the chance for discussion in Dayton, 
where the G8 and Serbia agreed on the future of Bosnia40. The only way left for 
the Albanians to achieve their political goal was a violent response. The Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA or UCK), formed in 1995, commenced its attacks on Serb 
police and state officials 41 By late 1997 Kosovo Albanians had begun to refer to 
Drenica as a liberated territory because of the local KLA presence, while the 
government considered Drenica the hotbed of Albanian terrorism. 42 In January and 
March 1998 the Serbian police mounted attacks on this region to suppress 
terrorism; in these attacks approximately 100 ethnic Albanians had been killed, 
between of who children and women. 43 In mid-July, after the assassination of more 
then 60 Serb policemen, Milosevic ordered an all-out offensive with more than 
2000 ethnic Albanian casualties and thousands of refugees displaced from 
Kosovo. 44 
37 Krieger, op. cit., p. 9, Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 351, DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 133, Chesterman, op. cit., 
207, Demjaha, op. cit., p. 33, Davidson, op. cit., p. 166 and Malcolm, op. cit., p. 344. 
3s Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 351, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 207, Davidson, op. cit., p. 166, DiPrizio, op. cit., 
p133. 39 Krieger, op. cit., p. 12-12, Israeli, op. cit., p. 56 and DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 133. 
40 Demjaha, op. cit., pp. 33-34 and DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 133. 
41 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 133. 
42 Human Rights Watch, Humanitarian Law Violations, New York, Human Rights Watch, 1998, 
p. 18. 
as Ibid., pp. 18-37 and DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 133. 
44 DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 133. 
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During the coming days the internationalisation of the domestic crisis 
became apparent. Regional organisations, subsequent Security Council resolutions, 
as well as the Contact Group got involved to the settlement of the crisis. Richard 
Holbrooke and the Contact Group (under the support of NATO threats) were the 
major actors for the diplomatic efforts. The "Contact Group" summoned the 
warring parties to attend at Rambouillet, to agree an interim political settlement to 
the Kosovo conflict 45 Key points in Rambouillet were that interim agreements 
were to be agreed for a period of three years, during which the final settlement 
would be negotiated; that the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was to be 
respected, implying continued Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo; that the rights 
of all communities were to be respected, implying far-reaching autonomy for 
Kosovo; and that these interim agreements were to be implemented through 
international participation. 6 The KLA was unwilling to accept the draft, as there 
was no commitment to an ultimate option of independence, while Milosevic had 
no difficulty in accepting these principles as the basis for a settlement, as the Serb 
parliament had endorsed the restoration of Kosovo autonomy. 47 
However, Serbs could not stomach certain aspects of the implementation 
provisions, most importantly the insistence that the 28,000 strong implementation 
force (K-FOR) would be an arm of NATO; hence, their initial position was that 
they would only agree to an unarmed, non-NATO force. 48 Finally, the negotiations 
in Rambouillet failed because both the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians refused to 
45 Michael Maccgwire, Why did we bomb Belgrade?, International Affairs, vol. 76, Nol, January 





accept the interim agreement. 49 To persuade the KLA to sign, the United States is 
reported to have committed itself to early elections to considering the issue of 
independence if regional and international circumstances permitted. 50 On the other 
hand, the Yugoslav Army used force in an excessive and indiscriminate manner, 
thus causing numerous of civilian casualties, the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of innocent people from their homes and a massive flow of refugees into 
neighbouring and more distant countries. 51 
The failure of diplomacy led to a series of air strikes against Yugoslavia. 
NATO could not ask for Security Council authorisation because it was clear that 
Russia would veto any Council resolution containing a mandate or an authorisation 
to employ threats or the use of force against the FRY. 52 On 24 March the bombing 
against Kosovo began and lasted for ten weeks. 53 These bombings failed to protect 
the Albanians of Kosovo, although this was the aim, but they forced Milosevic to 
capitulate. 54 The final solution to the crisis came by the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244, which authorised the international civilian and security presence 
in Kosovo to exercise all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities. 55 However, 
NATO could not achieve its goal of multi-ethnic and tolerant society of Kosovo. 
After it stopped the ethnic cleansing of the Albanians, ethnic cleansing of Serbs 
and other minorities had commenced. Five years after the 1999 intervention and 
49 Ibid., p. 8. 
50 Id 
51 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 6. 
52 Ibid., p. 7. 
" Andrew Brookes, Hard European Lessons from the Kosovo Air Campaign, Institute for 
Forsvarsstudier, IFS Info 2/2000, p. 5. 
54 Peter Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 352. 
55 Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 830. 
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the status of this province remains unresolved. What is more, the Serb, 
Montenegrins, Roma, and other minority refugees have not returned in Kosovo. 
Further, the recent outbreak of violence illustrated that NATO goals have not been 
accomplished in Kosovo. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LEGALITY VS. ILLEGALITY: NATO'S INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The Charter, to be sure, is much more specific on respect for sovereignty than on respect for 
human rights, but since the day it was drafted the world has witnessed a gradual shift in that 
balance, making respect for human rights more mandatory and respect for sovereignty less 
absolute. Today, we regard it as a generally accepted rule of international law that no sovereign 
state has the right to terrorise its own citizens... One day, when the Kosovo crisis will be a thing of 
the past, we hope that the Security Council will devote a debate to the balance between respect for 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity on the one hand and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on the other hand, as well as to the shift to which I referred This will not be 
a pro-Western or anti-third-world debate. The shift from sovereignty to human rights spells 
uncertainty, and we all have difficulties with it. But the Security Council cannot afford to ignore the 
phenomenon. Times have changed, and they will not change back 
Mr. van Walsum (Netherlands)' 
Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs are basic principles 
of the United Nations Charter. Since the end of the Cold War, the international situation has 
undergone major changes, but those principles are by no means outdated... In essence, the "human 
rights over sovereignty" theory serves to infringe upon the sovereignty of other states and to 
promote hegemonism under the pretext of human rights. This totally runs counter to the purposes 
and the principles of the United Nations Charter. The International Community should maintain 
vigilance against it. 
Mr. Shen Guofang (China)2 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo is another illustration of the wider chasm 
among states and scholars regarding the legal status of humanitarian intervention. 
NATO commenced its air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 
' S/PV. 401 1,10 June 1999, debate of the Security Council concerning resolution 1244. 2 Id 
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24 March 1999 as a response to widespread human rights violations and 
discrimination against the Albanian population in Kosovo. Advocates of 
humanitarian intervention rushed to discern a precedent for future interventions 
and for the creation of a new customary rule. Opponents of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention highlighted the exceptional character of the 1999 
intervention. In any case, most lawyers deemed the intervention as a clear breach 
of the UN Charter. Needless to say, in the heart of our system lies the UN Charter, 
where anyone can find the foundations of the world community after 1945. Article 
2 (4) clearly declares that "all members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations". The only two exceptions on this rule are Articles 51 on 
self-defence and Article 42 on UN Security Council enforcement action, after a 
determination of a threat to international peace and security. What is more, Article 
2(7) points out that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII". These are the provisions of the UN 
Charter regarding intervention. Yet, what happened in the case of Kosovo? Was 
this intervention in accordance with the rules above? 
Before answering the question, it would be very helpful to take a brief 
look into the situation in Kosovo from 1989, when Milosevic abrogated the 
enhanced autonomy of Kosovo, to 1999, when NATO intervened in Kosovo to 
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protect the Albanians. Apart from UN reports and resolutions, there is a lot of 
evidence for the situation in Kosovo form Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGO's). NGO's contribute significantly to international law of human rights. 
Amnesty International in its 1997 report witnessed many violations of human 
rights including indiscriminate arrests and illegal detentions of ethnic Albanians, 
torture and ill-treatment by the police. 3 Yet, this report finds that the Serb 
indiscriminate attacks began after nine Serbs, including five police officers, were 
shot dead and six others were wounded by the KLA 4 In the next year, torture and 
ill-treatment by the police increased dramatically, since the conflict between the 
KLA and the police started in February. 5 Many of the instances, however, were 
response to the violent attacks on Police and Serbian civilians. 6 In 1998 the conflict 
got dramatic form and the situation in Kosovo became perilous. 
The 1999 Amnesty International report cites: "hundreds of ethnic 
Albanians and smaller numbers of Serbs or Montenegrins were killed in armed 
conflict in Kosovo. Many of them were extra judicially executed by police or 
deliberately and arbitrarily killed by armed ethnic Albanians. Hundreds of people, 
all of them ethnic Albanians, "disappeared" at the hands of security forces. More 
than 250,000 people, the vast majority of them ethnic Albanians, were displaced, 
many of them forcibly, by police, soldiers or opposition ethnic Albanian forces. 
Armed opposition forces were responsible for human rights abuses, including the 
abduction of dozens of people, many of whom remained unaccounted for. There 
3 Amnesty International, Report 1997 on Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of), from January to 
December 1996, for more details see: http: //www. amnesty. org/ailib/aireport/ar97/EUR70. htm. 
a Id 
3 Amnesty International, Report 1998 on Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of), from January to 
December 1997, for more details see: http: //www. amnesty. org/ailib/aireport/ar98/eur70. htm. 
6 Id 
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were numerous reports of ill-treatment, torture and excessive use of force. At least 
five people died in police custody. At least 1,000 ethnic Albanians were detained 
and placed under investigation on charges of "terrorism" and "armed rebellion ". 
Many were reportedly tortured or ill-treated during interrogation" .7 What makes 
the Amnesty International differ sharply from other institutions and organisations 
is the fact that it acknowledges the significant contribution of the KLA in the 
worsening of the situation by violating humanitarian laws. 8 
Another NGO, Human Rights Watch, issued an edition on humanitarian 
law violations in Kosovo during 1998. In this edition, Human Rights Watch reports 
the attacks in the Drenica region, conducted in January and March 1998 following 
KLA offensive in the region-9 In these attacks, 26 ethnic Albanians had been killed 
in an indiscriminate manner in Likosane and Cirez, including a pregnant woman. 10 
In January, the police attacked the village of Donji Prekaz, focusing on the 
compound of Shaban Jashari, whose son Adem was known as local KLA leader. " 
In this attack an estimated of fifty-eight ethnic Albanians were killed, including 
eight women and ten children under the age of sixteen. 12 The organisation also 
reports violations in the Yugoslav-Albania border region to cut off the supply 
routes of the KLA. 13 Among other violations, Human Rights Watch mentions 
' Amnesty International, Report 1999 on Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of), from January to 
December 1999, for more details see: http: //www. amnesty. org/ailib/aireport/ar99/eur70. htm. 
8 Id 
9 Human Rights Watch, Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, London, Human Rights Watch, 
1998, p. 18. 
10 Ibid., pp. 19-26. 
11 Ibid., p. 27. 
12 Ibid., p. 28. 
13 Ibid., p. 38. 
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forcible disappearances, arbitrary detentions and arrests and restrictions on the 
media. 14 
On the other hand, Human Rights Watch finds that the KLA has committed 
violations of humanitarian law, including the taking of hostages, operations to 
drive Serbs out of Kosovo, attacks, abductions (at least 138 individuals, mostly 
ethnic Serbs, but also some Albanians and Roma who were consider collaborators 
with the Yugoslavia government by the KLA), and summary executions. 15 This 
information on the number of abducted people by the KLA had been also 
confirmed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 16 Further, the 
massacre in Racak that precipitated intervention in Kosovo had been a Serbian 
police response to KLA activities in this region. Human Rights Watch reports that 
a number of ethnic Serbs were kidnapped in the region and three policemen were 
killed and one wounded. 17 The police responded in January by burning and looting 
the village, torture, indiscriminate killings and extrajudicial executions. 18 The 
international community had been horrified by the brutality of the Serbian police in 
Racak and public opinion in western states became in favour of intervention in 
Kosovo. 
Let us now explore the findings and resolutions of the UN instruments. 
First of all, the UN General Assembly noted the deterioration of the situation from 
the beginnings of the 90's. In its resolution 48/153 it condemned the police 
14 Ibid., pp. 50-74. 
15 Ibid., pp. 75-87. 
16 international Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1998, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia, Montenegro), for further details go to http: //www. icrc. org. 
17 Human Rights Watch, Report on the Massacre in Racak, January 1999. For further details see: 
http: //www. hrw. org/press/1999/jan/yugoOI29. htm. 
18 Id 
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brutality against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the discriminatory removal of ethnic 
Albanian officials, the arbitrary imprisonment of ethnic Albanian journalists and 
the repression by the Serbian police and military. 19 In the same resolution, the 
General Assembly urges the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) to revoke all discriminatory legislations, in particular that which has entered 
into force in 1989, to re-establish the democratic institutions of Kosovo and to 
resume dialogue with ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. ° In the next year, the General 
Assembly added in the list of human rights violation the harassment and 
persecution of political parties and associations of ethnic Albanians and their 
leaders, as well as the elimination in practice of the Albanian language, particularly 
in public administration and services 
21 
In the coming years General Assembly resolutions repeated the same 
violations of human rights in Kosovo, as there was no improvement of the situation 
in Kosovo zi In 1998 however, things had dramatically changed. The sharp 
worsening of the situation is evident in resolution 52/164, where the General 
Assembly was "gravely concerned about the systematic terrorisation of ethnic 
Albanians, as demonstrated in the many reports, inter alia, of torture of ethnic 
Albanians, through indiscriminate and widespread shelling, mass forced 
displacement of civilians, summary executions and illegal detention of ethnic 
Albanian citizens of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) by 
19 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/153,20 December 1993. 
20 Id 
21 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/204,23 December 1994. 
22 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/190,22 December 1995, and 51/111,12 
December 1996,52/139,12 December 1997. 
261 
the police and military". 3 On the other hand, the General Assembly was 
"concerned about reports of violence committed by armed ethnic Albanian groups 
against non-combatants and the illegal detention of individuals, primarily ethnic 
Serbs, by those groups". 4 
Pursuant to the UN General Assembly, the UN Commission on Human 
Rights describes the worsening of the situation in Kosovo in a similar manner. The 
1992 report of the UN Commission on Human Rights refers the discrimination and 
oppression of the Albanian population in Kosovo, as well as torture and killings. 
25 
In Commission Resolution 1993/7, there is evidence of the violations reported by 
the UN General Assembly of the same year: police brutality against ethnic 
Albanians, arbitrary searches, seizures and arrests, torture and ill-treatment during 
detention and discrimination in the administration of justice; discriminatory 
removal of ethnic Albanian officials and arbitrary imprisonment of ethnic Albanian 
journalists, closure of Albanian-language mass media. 26 All reports and resolution 
of the Commission include the same findings of human rights violations in Kosovo 
from the beginnings of the 90's until the end of 1997. With the deterioration of the 
situation in 1998 and 1999, however, the reports include new evidence of worse 
tactics against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The Commission now refers to ethnic 
cleansing, massive military operations against unarmed civilians, systematic and 
23 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/164,9 December 1998. 
24 Id 
u UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Former 
Yugoslavia, E/CN. 4/1992/S-1/9,28 August 1992. 
26 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1993/7, Situation of Human Rights in the 
territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 23 February 1993. 
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planned massacres, destruction of property and forced mass exoduses to 
neighbouring countries, as well as internal displacement. 27 
To this point, the situation in Kosovo during the years of the crisis is well 
manifested through various NGO and UN reports. What did the international 
community do for the improvement of the situation? Did NATO commence its 
aerial bombing in the FRY before exhausting all political and peaceful means of 
settlement of the crisis? Indeed, before the war started, many states, individually or 
collectively, had expressed their concern on the worsening of the situation. Many 
efforts had been made by the Contact Group, which was established in 1994 as the 
Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina and consisted of the Foreign Ministers 
of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the UK, the US, and in 1996 Italy. 28 
Furthermore, many organisations, and more specifically European ones (i. e. the 
European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe etc. ) contributed in the efforts to bring a peaceful solution. 9 
Among the first efforts for political solution of the crisis, is the Hill proposal, 
which failed to end to an agreement. 30 Of a great importance had been the 
Hoibrooke Agreement, where the FRY and the UN Special Envoy, Richard 
Holbrooke, agreed on a basis of a political solution for Kosovo. 31 Another 
27 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1999/2, Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo, 13 
April 1999. 
za Heike Krieger(ed. ), The Kosovo Conflict and International Law, an Analytical Documentation 
1974-1999, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 115. 
29 Ibid., chapter 3. 
30 Ibid., pp. 116-117 and 155-185. 
31 Ibid., p. 290. 
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agreement reached for the improvement of the situation had been the establishment 
of the OSCE verification Mission in Kosovo. 
32 
Nevertheless, the major effort for a political solution had been the 
Rambouillet negotiations in France. Although Rambouillet presented a realistic 
opportunity for both sides to settle their disputes peacefully, this conference 
embraces many oddities and it could be said that the negative outcome was 
predictable. First of all, this conference was held under the NATO threats on air 
strikes against Yugoslavia. 
33 NATO insisted that its threats of force had been 
decided in order to back up diplomatic efforts to achieve peace in Kosovo and 
open the way for a political solution to the crisis. 
34 At the end of it NATO 
informed Yugoslavia that if it did not sign the whole draft, Yugoslavia would be 
subjected to aerial assault. 35 This kind of coercive diplomacy, as well as the 
inflexibility of the US, and more specifically of the US Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright, led to failure of achieving an agreement. 36 Another oddity is 
that NATO states exercised pressure on Yugoslavia to negotiate with KLA 
representatives. 37 This action is highly questionable, given the fact that the KLA is 
considered a terrorist organisation by various regional organisations, UN 
resolutions and the Contact Group itself. 
38 Furthermore, few months before the 
32 Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
33 Nicholas Tsagourias, "Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo and Legal Discourse: Self- 
Deception or Self-Consciousness? ", Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 13,2000, p. 14. Also 
Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society, New York, Palgrave McMillan, 2002, pp. 120- 
130. 
34 NATO, statement by the Secretary General, 27 October 1998 (Krieger, op. cit., p. 298). 
35 Mark Littman, Kosovo: Law and Diplomacy, London, Centre for Policy Studies, 1999, p. 9- 
31 Richard A. Falk, "Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law", American Journal 
off International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 854. 
3 Bellamy, op. cit., pp. 130-131. 
38 Michael Maccgwire, "Why Did We Bomb Belgrade? ", International Affairs, vol. 76, Nol, 
January 2000, p. 7. Maccgwire cites that in 1998 the KLA was still classified by the State 
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war, the KLA had been considered an international terrorist organisation by the US 
Department of State and by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 39 How 
could a state negotiate with a terrorist organisation that threatens its national 
security? What is more, although Russia was a member of the Contact Group, it 
was only involved in the outskirts of the proximity talks, which were strictly 
confined to NATO members. 40 
The key points of the Rambouillet Conference affirm the argument that 
wise and preventive diplomacy was not present to the Kosovo crisis. The main 
objectives were: an interim agreement for the period of three years; an immediate 
end to the violence; peaceful settlement of the conflict through dialogue; respect 
for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia; free and fair elections in Kosovo, 
supervised by the OSCE; respect to the rights of members of all national 
communities; amnesty and release of political prisoners . 
41 Yugoslavia had 
accepted the substance of the political proposals well before the ultimatum date. 2 
Yet, the implementation conditions of the interim agreement provided for the 
establishment of a NATO-led multinational military implementation force in 
Yugoslavia, which would be endorsed by a UN Security Council Resolution under 
Department as a terrorist organisation. Further, the Contact Group had condemned terrorist actions 
by the KLA in many statements (i. e. Contact Group Meeting, Statement on Kosovo, Moscow, 25 
February 1998 and Contact Group Meeting, Statement on Kosovo, London, 9 March 1998). The 
EU also condemns terrorism and violence acts committed by the KLA (EU, Common Position 
Defined by the Council, 19 March 1998). All the statements above can be found in Krieger (ed. ), 
o9p. cit , p. 
121,122,125. 
3 Edward McWhinney, The United Nations and a New World Order for a New Millennium: Self- 
Determination, State Succession, and Humanitarian Intervention, The Hague, the Netherlands, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 70. Also Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 7. 
40 Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 7 and Falk, op. cit., p. 854. 
4' Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 7, Bellamy, op. cit., pp. 131-132, Krieger, op. cit., pp. 261-278. 
42 Littman, op. cit., p. 9 and Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 6. 
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Chapter VII of the Charter. 43 But the Serbs could not accept that the 28.000 strong 
implementation forces would be an arm of NATO. 44 As Yugoslavia could not 
accept the military clause, NATO could have dropped the requirement that the 
military clauses were non-negotiable and continued negotiation on the basis of the 
Yugoslav offer to accept an international force to implement the agreed political 
settlement. 45 But NATO did not wish any amendment on its proposals. Thus, it is 
obvious that diplomatic means had not been exhausted. 
Diplomatic efforts by states, groups of states and regional organisations 
failed to resolve the Kosovo crisis. But what was the response of the UN Security 
Council, as the only body competent for the maintenance of international peace 
and security? In March 1998 resolution 1160 had condemned the excessive use of 
force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in 
Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism by the KLA 46 Further, acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it calls upon the FRY immediately to take 
the further necessary steps to achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo 
through dialogue... calls also upon the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn 
all terrorist action... calls upon the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of 
the Kosovar Albanian community urgently to enter without preconditions to into a 
meaningful dialogue... agrees, without prejudging the outcome of that dialogue, 
with the proposal in the Contact Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998 that 
the principles for a solution of the Kosovo problem should be based on the 
43 Krieger, op. cit., p. 272. 
44 Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 7. 
45 Littman, op. cit., p. 12. 
46 UN Security Council, S/RES/1160, adopted by the Security Council at its 3868' meeting on 31 
March 1998. 
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territorial integrity of the FRY... 47 What is more, the Council imposed an arms 
embargo in Yugoslavia for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in 
Kosovo 48 Thus, it could be said that the Security Council intervened in the internal 
affairs of the FRY. However, this had been a non-forcible intervention and it did 
not imply the use of force. 
In September of the same year the Council adopted another resolution on 
Kosovo, resolution 1199. In this resolution, the Security Council had been gravely 
concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive 
and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army, 
which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate 
of the Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their 
homes; deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and other European countries... deeply concerned by the rapid 
deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo ... 
49 In this 
resolution the Council had determined that the deterioration of the situation in 
Kosovo constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region. 50 This 
determination is of a great significance because it endorses the internationalisation 
of the crisis. The Council further demanded under Chapter VII of the Charter that 
all parties cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, that they take 
immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and that they enter 
immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with 
47 Id 
48 Id 




international involvements' It also demanded the FRY to facilitate the safe return 
of refugees. 52 
The last resolution before the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo was 
resolution 1203. In this resolution the Council welcomed the agreement between 
the FRY and OSCE for the establishment of the OSCE verification mission in 
Kosovo, as well as the agreement between the FRY and NATO for the 
establishment of an air verification mission over Kosovo. 53 Acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the Council endorsed the above agreements and demanded 
that both the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership comply fully and swiftly 
with resolutions 1160 and 1199 and cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification 
Mission in Kosovo, and that the FRY fully cooperate with the NATO Air 
Verification Mission in Kosovo. 54 Resolution 1203 did not authorise the use of 
force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, nor did resolutions 1160 and 1199. 
Thus, NATO was not authorised by the UN Security Council to use all necessary 
means. NATO states offered a plethora of justifications for the use of force in 
Kosovo. But was the 1999 intervention in Kosovo legal? Were the massacres and 
human rights violations enough to justify military intervention? 
NATO violated Article 2(4), as its action was not an action of self-defence 
(Article 51), nor was it UN Security Council enforcement action as a response to a 
threat to peace and Security (Article 42). The threat or use of force is illegal in 
international law, save the two above exceptions. NATO had violated the rule 
51 Id 
52 Id 




twice, as it started threatening a sovereign state almost half a year before the 
intervention. 55 Most lawyers considered the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo 
illegal. Davidson argued that "since the use of force is clearly proscribed by the 
UN Charter and a variety of other instruments, as well as customary international 
law, it would seem that the use of military might as a means of securing 
compliance is, at present, not a legally acceptable way of proceeding ". 56 Charney 
said that "indisputably, the NATO intervention through its bombing campaign 
violated the United Nations Charter and international law ". 57 Falk thinks that the 
"textual level of analysis cannot give a satisfactory basis for NATO 
intervention" 58 Thomas Franck accurately observed that "neither the US 
Department of State, nor NATO seriously attempted to juste the war in 
international legal terms". 59 
Michael Reisman added "all appreciate that NATO's action in Kosovo did 
not accord with the design of the United Nations Charter". 60 Professor Lowe 
believes that "the analysis of the text of the UN Charter... yields no clear 
justification for the NATO action. On the contrary, it suggests that the action was 
unlawful " 61 Littman argues that "given the weight of opinion and legal authority 
against the NATO position, the paucity of evidence in its favour and the reluctance 
55 Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects", European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 2. 
56 Scott Davidson, "Kosovo, Human Rights, and the Use of Force, Human Rights Law and 
Practice, vol. 5, No3, December 1999, p. 173. 
57 Jonathan I. Charney, "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 834. 
58 Falk, op. cit., p. 853. 
59 Thomas M. Franck, "Lessons of Kosovo", American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, No4, 
October 1999, p. 859. 
60 W. Michael Reisman, "Kosovo's Antinomies", American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, 
No4, October 1999, p. 860. 
61 Krieger, op. cit., p. 336. 
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of the UK to test its view before the ICJ, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
the NATO action was illegal,. 62 Cassese noted that the use of force against 
Yugoslavia was contrary to the UN Charter. 63 It is clear from the above that most 
scholars of international law criticised sharply the 1999 NATO intervention in 
Kosovo. What was the NATO response to such criticisms? The alliance and its 
member states offered a wide range of legal aspects for the 1999 intervention. In 
the efforts to prove that NATO intervention was legal, those legal justifications 
many times contradict each other. With humanitarian intervention, most of the 
times invoked implicitly, in the core of this argumentation, NATO states attempted 
mis-interpretations of the UN Charter and international legal norms to persuade the 
world community that they acted legally and in conformity with international law. 
Nevertheless, this tactic of various justifications is evident in each and every 
alleged humanitarian intervention. This thesis insists on this argument. States 
imply the alleged doctrine of humanitarian intervention, but they try to justify their 
intervention on various other justifications, not on a right of humanitarian 
intervention. This fact itself proves that states are well aware that such a right does 
not exist. Let us now consider these justifications. 
62 Littman, op. cit., p. 7. 
63 Antonio Cassese, "Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? ", European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 23. 
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NATO JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE 
As it has been already stated above, at the core of NATO intervention in 
Kosovo lays implicitly the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Given the 
ambiguous character, the suspiciousness and the criticism that surround the 
doctrine, NATO states had chosen the easy way of relying on mixed 
justifications. It is not the first time in history that states intervening for 
humanitarian purposes rely on a wide range of legal justifications. A detailed 
analysis of humanitarian intervention indicates that states evoking humanitarian 
intervention take refuge in other legal justifications, being well aware that such a 
doctrine is not a legally accepted norm. 65 The intervening states in Kosovo, not 
unlike states in the past that alleged a right to humanitarian intervention, used a 
variety of justifications. Before exploring arguments on humanitarian intervention, 
it would be very essential to take a brief look on other legal aspects. 
First of all, some states and lawyers spoke of humanitarian necessity. 66 For 
instance, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of State told the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the British House of Commons that states had the right to use force 
in the case of "overwhelming humanitarian necessity where, in the light of all the 
64 Major General William Moorman, "Humanitarian Intervention and International Law in the Case 
of Kosovo", New England Law Review, vol. 36, No4, Summer 2002, p. 777. 
65 Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 70-80. In all of the three major instances of the Cold War era, India, 
Tanzania and Vietnam had justified their interventions on self-defence. In Iraq, US, UK and France 
offered a wide range of legal aspects in support of the "Safe Havens" (Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 200- 
205). Also Davidson, op. cit., pp. 164-165. 
66 Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in J. L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and Political 
Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 132; Ruth Wedgwood, "NATO's 
Campaign in Yugoslavia", American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, 
p. 832; Daniel H. Joyner, "The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive 
Paradigm", European Journal of International Law, vol. 13, No. 3,2002, p. 602; and Adam Roberts, 
"NATO's `Humanitarian War' over Kosovo", Survival, vol. 41, No. 3,1999, p. 106. 
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circumstances, a limited use of force is justifiable as the only way to avert 
humanitarian catastrophe' . 67 Belgium advanced the same justification before the 
ICJ, when the FRY brought proceedings against ten NATO members. 68 Yet, the 
doctrine of necessity does not apply in the case of Kosovo, as a state of necessity 
may only be invoked as justification if "the act was the only means of 
safeguarding an essential interest of the state against an imminent peril" and "the 
act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the state towards which [an 
international] obligation existed, '. 69 It would be difficult to argue that NATO's 
action would have justified these requirements. 
70 
Furthermore, many politicians of the intervening states stressed upon the 
internationalisation of the crisis and stated that they cannot sit idly by and see 
another massacre like Bosnia. 71 Before the International Court of Justice, the US 
claimed that it finds justification on "the humanitarian catastrophe that has 
engulfed the people of Kosovo as a brutal and unlawful campaign of ethnic 
cleansing has forced many hundreds of thousands to flee their homes and has 
severely endangered their lives and well-being", as well as "on the serious 
violation of international humanitarian law and human rights obligations by forces 
67 Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After Kosovo, New 
York, Palgrave, 2(01, p. 24. 
68 International Court of Justice, "Legality of Use of Force", Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium, 
1999, oral pleadings, for more details see: http: //www. icj- 
cij. org/icjwww/docket'iybehybeframe. htm. 
69 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 51# session (1999), A/54/10, 
p. 72. Also Jans Elo Rytter, "Humanitarian Intervention without Security Council: From San 
Francisco to Kosovo-and Beyond", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 70,2001, p. 134. Ole 
Spiermann, "Humanitarian Intervention as Necessity and the Threat or Use of Jus Cogens", Nordic 
Journal of international Law, vol. 71,2002, p. 527. And Davidson, op. cit., p. 172 and Chesterman, 
op. cit., p. 214 citing the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. 
70 Davidson, op. cit., p. 172 and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 214. 
71 International Court of Justice, "Legality of Use of Force", Serbia and Montenegro v. United 
States of America, oral pleadings, 1999, see: http: //www. icj- 
cij. orgrlcjwwwridocketri)us, riyusframe-htrn- 
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under the control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including widespread 
murder, disappearances, rape, theft and destruction of property It could be 
argued, that although the international community has recognised some 
international standards of human rights and international obligations, it has not 
adopted coercive measures for the protection of human rights ". 72 
The US advocate in the ICJ, however, did not explain before the Court how 
this preposition provides a legal justification, since he admitted himself that the 
international community has not adopted coercive measures for human rights. No 
doubt, the obligation of states to respect and protect the basic rights of all human 
people is the concern of all states, in other words, they are erga omnes. 73 Gross and 
widespread violations of human rights constitute an obligation erga omnes. 74 But, 
every state is obliged to respond to those violations by countermeasures that do not 
involve the threat or use of armed force. 75 The 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations confirms that countermeasures must not involve the use of force. 76 
Further, although many violations of human rights had been witnessed in Kosovo, 
it is difficult to support that the Serbian Government perpetrated acts genocide 
against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo-'n Thus, the US and NATO justification is 
72 International Court of Justice, "Legality of Use of Force", Serbia and Montenegro v. United 
States of America, oral pleadings, 1999, see: http: //www. icj- 
cij. orglcjwww/idocketJyus/iyusframe. htm. 
73 Peter Hilpold, "Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal? ", European 
journal oflnternational Law, vol. 12,2001, p. 453. Also Simma, op. cit., p. 2. 
74 Catherine Guicherd, "International Law and the War in Kosovo", Survival, vol. 41, No2, Summer 
1999, p. 21. Also Davidson, op. cit., p. 170 and Charney, op. cit., p. 835. 
's Charney op. cit., p. 835, Simma, op. cit., p. 2, and Guicherd, op. cit., p. 21. 
'b General Assembly Resolution, GA/Res. 2625(XXV), Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations (A/8082), 24 October 1970. 
" Davidson, op. cit., p. 172, Simma, op. cit., p. 2 and Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 1. 
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totally inadequate to prove that NATO action was in conformity with international 
law. 
The most dominant justification put forward by NATO states was that 
NATO intervention was in conformity with Security Council resolutions 1160, 
1199 and 1203, which had demanded Serbian forces to stop their violations of 
human rights in Kosovo 78 The US Department of State had argued that no 
Security Council authorisation was needed. 79 Before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), the US found justification in "the resolutions of the Security Council, 
which have determined that the actions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and, pursuant to Chapter Vii 
of the Charter, demanded a halt to such actions ". 
80 After the Campaign had ended, 
the UN Secretary General offered various legal justifications, including the 
justification of the use of force on the UN Security Council resolutions. 81 Yet, 
NATO and its members did not explain how those Security Council Resolutions 
were sufficient to provide legitimacy to their intervention. 82 
'= Nicholas J. Wheeler, Reflections on the Legality and Legitimacy of NATO's Intervention in 
Kosovo, in Ken Booth (ed. ), The Kosovo Tragedy, the Human Rights Dimensions, London, Franck 
Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 153 and 155; J. L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in 
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 49. N. D. White, "The 
Legality of Bombing in the Name of Humanity", Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol. 5, No. 1, 
2000, pp. 29-30. Enrico Milano, "Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the Legality of 
Kosovo's Territorial Status", European Journal of International Law, vol. 14, No. 5,2003, p. 1012. 
Also Guicherd, op. cit" p. 26, Wedgwood, op. cit., p. 829, Glennon, op. cit., pp. 25-26, Joyner, op. cit., 
602, Krieger, op. cit., p. 393 and Roberts, op. cit., p. 105. 
Glennon, op. cit., p. 25. 
&o international Court of Justice, "Legality of Use of Force" Serbia and Montenegro v. United 
States of America, oral pleadings, 1999, see: http: //www. icj- 
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s' Glennon, op. cit., p24. 
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The UN Charter is clear in its prepositions. Article 2(4) on the ban of the 
threat or use of force provides only two exceptions, which are Articles 42 and 51. 
The fact that the UN Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII 
of the Charter does not mean that NATO was authorised to intervene. Chesterman 
argued that "the resolutions passed cannot provide a legal basis for the action, 
lacking even the ambiguity of resolution 688 (1991) on Iraq ". 83 Resolution 1199 
refers to the situation in Kosovo as being a threat to international peace and 
security within the terms of Article 39; however, this does not justify resort to 
force, since nowhere in resolution 1199 is there explicit authorisation for the use of 
force to protect human rights. 84 Thus, this justification is at least specious. 85 NATO 
countries were well aware that obtaining Security Council authorisation was 
impossible, given the threat of a Russian or a Chinese Veto. 86 Thus, NATO chose 
to rely upon misinterpretations of the UN Charter, being well aware that its action 
was illegal. 
Another justification oddly alleged by lawyers and NATO countries had 
been collective self-defence. 87 Even the US Department of State spokesman 
claimed that Article 51 supported NATO's attack. 88 Nevertheless, it cannot be 
regarded as a species of self-defence within Article 51 of the Charter, because 
Kosovo is not a state, which is a basic requirement for self-defence under 
p Chesterman, op. cit., p. 214. 
"Davidson, op. cit., p. 168. 
as Holzgrefe, op. cit., p. 49. 
ab Luis Henan, "Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 825. Thomas M. Franck, "Break It, Don't Fake 
It", Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, No. 4,1999, pp. 116-117. Also Chesterman, op. cit., p. 210, Wedgwood, 
op. cit., p. 831. Moorman, op. cit., p. 781 and Roberts, op. cit., p. 104. 
Christine Chinkin, "Kosovo: A `Good' or a `Bad' War?, American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 843. Also Guicherd, op. cit., p. 28. 
13 Glennon, op. cit., p. 22. 
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international law. 89 What is more, no armed attack occurred against any of the 
NATO states. 90 Thus, the existence and purposes of NATO come into question. 
NATO was established in 1949 on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter. 91 Its 
existence had to do with the Soviet threat and the Cold War. 92 After the fall of 
Communism and the Cold War, NATO leaders reemphasised that the alliance 
would remain defensive, stressing that none of its weapons will ever be used 
except in self defence. 93 NATO, given the fact that its action is not justified under 
Article 51, violated its own 1949 treaty, which does not provide any convincing 
legal grounds for recourse to force aside from self defence. 94 
The imaginative lawyers and scholars managed to find many more legal 
aspects for intervention. One of them is the rejection of the Russian draft resolution 
that called NATO's intervention a flagrant violation of the principle of sovereignty 
and demanded an immediate cessation of the use of force against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia-95 The draft resolution was not adopted since it was 
89 Brendan Howe, On the Justifiability of Military Intervention: The Kosovan Case, in Alexander 
Moseley and Richard Norman (eds. ), Human Rights and Military Intervention, Hants, Ashgate, 
2002, p. 170; Julie Mertus, Human Rights Should Know no Boundaries, American Society of 
International Law, ASIL Insights, April 1999. For more details see: 
wysiwyg"J29/httpJ/www. aril. org/insights/insigh3l. htm. Also Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., 
182, Davidson, op. cit., p. 168, Guicherd, op. cit., p. 28 and Krieger, op. cit., p. 336. $0 
Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. 
Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 182. Also Glennon, op. cit., p. 22 and Buchanan, op. cit., p. 168 
91 Nicola Butler, NATO: From Collective Defence to Peace Enforcement, in Albrecht Schnabel and 
Ramesh Thakur (eds. ), Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: Selective 
indignation, Collective action, and International Citizenship, New York, United Nations University 
Press, 2000, p. 273. Also Simma, op. cit., p. 10. 
92 Butler, op. cit., p. 273. 
93 Id 
94 Independent international Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International 
Response, Lessons Learned Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 166; Doug Bandow, NATO's 
Hypocritical Humanitarianism, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's Empty Victory: A 
Postmortem on the Balkan War, Washington D. C., CATO Institute, 2000, p31. Also Glennon, 
o. cit., p. 21 Buchanan, op. cit., p. 168, Krieger, op. cit., p338 and White, op. cit., p. 36. 
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rejected by 12 votes to three (China, the Russian Federation and Namibia). Some 
NATO states and lawyers precipitated to discern another legal rationale for 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo. 97 Yet, the Council's rejection of the Russian draft 
resolution does not mean that the NATO intervention was legally acceptable 
because the Council did not condemn the use of force against Yugoslavia. 98 of 
great interest is the fact that some scholars presaged that this vote constitutes a new 
practice and opinio juris in support of humanitarian intervention. 99 It could be said 
though that this proposition is immature and false, but it will be examined below. 
The last legal aspect to be examined before exploring the vague and 
ambiguous claim of the right of humanitarian intervention in customary 
international law has to do with resolution 1244 that brought an end to hostilities 
and decided for the future of the Serbian province. Some lawyers claimed that this 
resolution could be taken to imply post facto approval of the military action. 100 The 
same justification had been raised in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where a presidential 
statement welcomed the fact that the military junta had been defeated. 101 Yet, it is 
difficult to believe that resolution 1244 added a sense of ex post UN legitimacy to 
' Martha Brenfors and Malene Maxe Petersen, "The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention -A Defence", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 69,2004, p. 497. Also 
Davidson, op. cit., p. 169, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 213, Wheeler, op. cit., p. 152, Milano, op. cit., p. 1011 
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the operation, since it did not approve or ratify the NATO action. 102 The UN 
Charter is clear in its prepositions. The only Security Council resolution that 
legitimises the use of force is a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter that 
authorises the use of force (under Article 42). Any other interpretation of the 
Charter remains void. Russia and Namibia that voted for the Russian draft 
resolution calling NATO's intervention a violation of the Charter, voted for the 
resolution 1244 as well. Russia would never vote for this resolution if it would 
legitimise NATO's use of force against Yugoslavia. Indeed, Russia repeated its 
accusations of NATO by calling NATO "an aggressor" that violated international 
law. 103 China also criticised NATO action and made reference to violation of the 
UN Charter and international law. 104 It is obvious from the above that resolution 
1244 does not reflect any post facto legitimacy, rather that the desire of states to 
settle the dispute peacefully. 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
NATO and its members offered various justifications for the threat and 
use of force by the organisation against the FRY. Although some scholars and 
lawyers argued that in the heart of the 1999 intervention in Kosovo implicitly lies 
102 Kohen Marcelo, L' Emploi de la force et la crise du Kosovo: Vers un nouveaue desordre 
juridique international", Revue Belge de Droit International, vo132,1999, p. 141. Also White, 
op. cit., p. 32, Hilpold, op. cit., p. 441, Simma, op. cit., p. 11 and McWhinney, op. cit., p. 74. 
163 S/PV. 4011.10 June 1999. 
104 Id 
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the doctrine of humanitarian intervention' 05, NATO countries and NATO itself 
barely referred to such a right. 106 Most states justified their action as a response to 
prevent humanitarian catastrophe. 107 When the FRY brought ten NATO states 
before the ICJ asking for provisional measures against those states, only Belgium 
explicitly referred to a right of humanitarian intervention in international law. '°8 
Belgium supported its view on the well known interventionist argument that 
NATO's actions had been compatible with Article 2(4) because it was not directed 
"against the territorial integrity or political independence" of the FRY. 109 
Moreover, Belgium referred a number of precedents that support NATO's 
legality-110 It could be said that humanitarian catastrophe implies the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. Why did NATO states not refer to humanitarian 
intervention explicitly? Chesterman noted that "though this phrase (humanitarian 
catastrophe) recalls the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, some care appears 
to have been taken to avoid invoking that doctrine by name ". 111 NATO states were 
well aware that the international community is very suspicious of humanitarian 
intervention and it opposes the establishment of such a right. This is why they did 
not explicitly invoke it; simply because the community of states would not support 
NATO. 
105 Dino Kritsiotis, "The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Armed Force against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 49,2000, 
p340. 106 Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: the Case for Incremental Change, in 
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 235. Also Roberts, op. cit., 
p. 107. 
107 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 214, Littman, op. cit., p. 1, O'Connell, op. cit., p. 80. 
108 Charney, op. cit., p. 837. Also ICJ, "Legality of Use of Force", Serbia and Montenegro v. 
Belgium, 1999, oral pleadings, see: http: //www. icj-cij. org/icjwww/idocketriybe/iybeframe. htm. 
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Before the end of the Cold War, many states raised humanitarian claims 
for their interventions, but the world community had been reluctant to accept a 
right of humanitarian intervention. Even in the major instances of alleged 
humanitarian intervention states relied upon other legal rationales and mostly on 
Article 51 on self-defence. "2 In 1985, when USA alleged violations of human 
rights in support of its actions in Nicaragua, the ICJ rejected this justification and 
stated that "while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as 
to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the 
appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect. With regard to the steps 
actually taken, the protection of human rights, a strictly humanitarian objective, 
cannot be compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil installations, 
or again with the training, arming and equipping of the contras. The Court 
concludes that the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in 
Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United States, 
and cannot in any event be reconciled with the legal strategy of the respondent 
state, which is based on the right of collective self-defence ". 113 
No doubt, the ICJ rejects any claim to a right of humanitarian intervention 
in customary international law. 114 Interestingly enough, Teson, one of the most 
fervent advocates of humanitarian intervention noted that "the Court's discussion 
of human rights and humanitarian intervention is unsatisfactory. Its reasoning is 
overly pro-governmental and insufficiently concerned with human dignity. One 
12 Davidson, op. cit., p. 165 and Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 70-80. 
113 Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, ICJ Rep (1986), 14, at 134-135, pars 268. 
114 Nigel Rodley, "Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World 
Court", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 38,1989, p. 321,332. Also Glennon, 
op. cit., pp. 23-24, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 62. 
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cannot avoid the impression that the Court has missed a unique opportunity to 
develop the law in the sense of reinforcement of human rights. The main effect of 
the Court's endorsement of the sacredness of national borders will be to reassure 
tyrants from the right and the left against legitimate demands for freedom and 
human rights ". 115 Teson acknowledges that the ICJ decision does not allow the 
creation of a right to humanitarian intervention. This is why he turns against the 
Court that missed this unique opportunity to legitimise humanitarian intervention. 
Yet, he exaggerates things when he claims that the Court's decision will favour 
tyrants that violate human rights. On the contrary, the Court found that the use of 
force cannot be the appropriate method to ensure respect for human rights. 
However, Kritsiotis argued that the Court concluded its assessment of the 
military and paramilitary activities of the US in Nicaragua on the basis of the 
justifications advanced by the US "on the legal plane", and not of those pleaded at 
"the political level"' 16. Accordingly, the Court found that the US relied solely on 
the exercise of its right of collective self-defence, while it did not claim that its 
intervention, which it justified on the political level, was also justified on the legal 
level, alleging the exercise of a new right of intervention regarded by the US as 
existing in such circumstances. "? Thus, the Court considered the legal justification 
and not the political ones. No doubt, however, the Court rejected the claim that the 
use of force is the appropriate method to ensure human rights and this is what 
115 Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2d edition, 
New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 312. 
116 Dino Kritsiotis, "Arguments of Mass Confusion", European Journal of International Law, 
vol. 15, No. 2,2004, p. 236. For the original source see Nicaragua v. United States of America, ICJ 
Reports (1986), 14, at 109 (para. 208). 
117 Id 
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counts here. It does not matter if this was a political argument, but the fact that the 
Court did not accept this political argument as a legal one. 
In the case Legality of Use of Force ten NATO states would have the 
chance to test again the same matter. Although Belgium was the only state the 
made an explicit reference to humanitarian intervention, the ICJ did not decide on 
the legality of the use of force, since the case fell on a jurisdictional issue. "8 
However, supporters of NATO argue that the right of humanitarian intervention 
has developed in customary international law. ' 19 Greenwood believes that the right 
of humanitarian intervention is based on state practice, but that this is state practice 
which had evolved since the end of the Cold War. 120 It could be said that 
Greenwood preferred to include only the instances after the end of the Cold War, 
because the Nicaragua case affirmed that there is not a right to humanitarian 
intervention in international law. Yet, even the instances of alleged humanitarian 
intervention after the end of the Cold War manifestly show that such a right does 
not exist as a legal one. Many lawyers insist that there is paucity of state practice 
and opinio juris to support a right of humanitarian intervention under customary 
law. 121 Their argument rejects Greenwoods view that state practice after the end of 
the Cold War provides a right of humanitarian intervention in customary law. The 
expansion of alleged instances of humanitarian intervention in the 90's illustrate 
the international community's willingness to protect human rights, but states were 
reluctant to claim or acknowledge a general right of humanitarian intervention. 122 
118 Littman, op. cit., p. 6. 
119 Krieger, op. cit., p337. 
120 Ibid., p. 338. 
121 O'Connell, op. cit., p. 70, Charney, op. cit., p. 837, Davidson, op. cit., p. 164. 
122 Davidson, op. cit., p. 165, White, op. cit., p. 32 and Simma, op. cit., p. 11. 
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What is more, most interventions of the 90s were collective and authorised by the 
UN Security Council. This practice, however, does not legitimise unauthorised 
interventions. In other words, there is lack of opinio juris, despite the claims of 
some lawyers that the Security Council has authorised the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes and it has set a precedent for humanitarian intervention. 
The Security Council is a political organ of the UN and its resolutions are mostly 
governed by extra-legal considerations. 123 Thus, unlike the UN General 
Assembly 124, the Security Council resolutions reflect state practice, not opinio 
juris. 
State practice in the 90's witnessed the willingness of the world community 
to respond to humanitarian crises through significant involvement of the UN 
Security Council that authorised such interventions. It could be argued that 
intervention for humanitarian purposes authorised by the UN Security Council is 
permissible under international law. 125 This is because Article 42 on UN Security 
Council enforcement action is one of the two available exceptions to Article 2(4). 
As regards military interventions without prior Security Council authorisation, they 
remain in breach of international law. 126 Oscar Schachter noted that "international 
law does not, and should not, legitimise use of force across national lines except 
self-defence (including collective defence) and enforcement measures ordered by 
the Security Council. Neither human rights, democracy nor self-determination are 
123 Ibid., p. 169. 
124 Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 189. 
125 Anne Orford, Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism, 
"European Journal of International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 680. Also Simma, op. cit., p. 5. 
126 Simma, op. cit., p. 6. 
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acceptable legal grounds for waging war". 127 Thus, humanitarian intervention 
lacking the Council's authorisation cannot provide a legal aspect for NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo, because it is obvious that such a right does not exist as a 
customary rule in international law. Yet, did NATO intervention set a precedent 
for the creation of such a rule? 
KOSOVO INTERVENTION: AN EXCEPTION OR A PRECEDENT FOR 
THE CREATION OF A NEW CUSTOMARY RULE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW? 
Simma noted that "the lesson which can be drawn from this is that 
unfortunately there do occur "hard cases" in which terrible dilemmas must be 
faced and imperative political and moral considerations may appear to leave no 
choice but to act outside the law',. 128 Nevertheless, he concluded that NATO 
should not set out to include breaches of the UN Charter as a regular part of its 
strategic programme for the future because it would have a destructive impact on 
the universal system of collective security embodied in the Charter. 129 Thus, it is 
clear from the above that professor Simma believes that NATO's intervention 
should be of an exceptional character and not a precedent for a new customary law 
127 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, London, Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, 
pp. 128-129. is Simma, op. cit., p. 22. 
129 1d 
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in international law. Many other distinguished lawyers rushed to express their view 
that NATO intervention should be seen as an exception. 130 
What is more, most NATO states supported this view simply by stating that 
their intervention is an exception which will not be repeated., 31 Before the ICJ, 
although Belgium justified NATO intervention on the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, it clarified that the intervention is of a quite exceptional character. 132 
The German Minister of Foreign Affairs spelt out that Kosovo is a special case and 
should not be considered as constituting a precedent. 133 The French President 
Jacques Chirac argued that the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can 
justify an exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is. 134 US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair supported the same 
view. 135 
On the other hand, Cassese although he agrees with Simma that the threat 
of force followed by the use of armed violence is contrary to the UN Charter, he 
disagrees that NATO's action in Kosovo must not set a precedent and should 
remain exceptional. 136 Cassese thinks that from an ethical point of view NATO's 
resort to armed force was justified, because the international community should not 
130 Franck, op. cit., p. 859, Davidson, op. cit., p. 173, and Joyner, op. cit., p. 609. 
131 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., p. 174, Byers and Chesterman, 
op. cit., p. 202, O'Connell, op. cit., p. 57, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 216, Guicherd, op. cit., p. 20, 
Stromseth, op. cit., p. 239 and Roberts, op. cit., p. 107. 
131 International Court of Justice, "Legality of Use of Force", Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium, 
1999, oral pleadings, for more details see: http: //www. icj- 
cij. org/icjwww/idocketrybe/iybeframe. htm. 
13 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 262. Also Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 199, 
Guicherd, op. cit., p. 29, Krieger, op. cit., p. 398 and Stromseth, op. cit., p. 2391. 
134 Guicherd, op. cit., p. 28. 
'35 Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 199 and Chesterman, op. cit., p. 216. 
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sit idly by and watch the massacres and expulsions. ' 37 Further, he believes that 
there are six premises or roots of NATO intervention in the present international 
community. First of all, human rights do not belong anymore to the internal affairs 
of a state and they are increasingly becoming the main concern of the world 
community as a whole. 138 No doubt, after the end of the Cold War the world 
community has shown its eagerness to promote and protect human rights. 139 
Secondly, the concept now is commonly accepted that obligations to respect 
human rights are erga omnes and any state, individually or collectively has the 
right to take steps (admittedly, short of force) to attain such respect. 140 
Undoubtedly, human rights are erga omnes obligations, but Cassese did not 
explain how the use of force can be justified since states are obliged to respond to 
those violations by countermeasures that do not involve the threat or use of armed 
force. Even the US advocate before the ICJ acknowledged that although "the 
international community has recognised some international standards of human 
rights and international obligations, it has not adopted coercive measures for the 
protection of human rights ". 141 
The third premise, according to Cassese, is that the idea is merging in the 
international community that large scale and systematic atrocities may give rise to 
an aggravated form of state responsibility, to which other states or international 
organisations may be entitled to respond by resorting to countermeasures other 
137 Ibid., p. 25. 
139 Ibid., p. 26. 
139 Davidson, op. cit., p. 165. 
140 Cassese, op. cit., p. 26. 
141 International Court of Justice, "Legality of Use of Force", Serbia and Montenegro v. United 
States of America, oral pleadings, 1999, see: http: //www. icj- 
cij. org/icjwww/idocket/iyusliyusframe. htm. 
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than those contemplated for delictual responsibility. 
] 42 Fourthly, the international 
community is increasingly intervening through international bodies in internal 
conflicts where human rights are in a serious jeopardy. 
143 Indeed, regional 
organisations, as well as the UN Security Council got involved in humanitarian 
crises during the 90's. In all cases the deterioration of the humanitarian situation as 
well as the influx of refugees caused a threat to international peace, according to 
the Security Council, which authorised the use of force or imposed sanctions. 
However, this represents state practice that has not been formalised into a set of 
rules of international law. 
144 State practice is not enough for the emergence of 
customary law. Thus, the lack of opinio juris makes the crystallisation of such a 
rule impossible. 
Fifth, peaceful settlements of disputes are very important and peaceful 
measures must always precedence before resorting to the use of force. 
145 It is not 
difficult to guess that Cassese believes that diplomatic efforts and all peaceful 
means had been exhausted before NATO's recourse to war. He clarifies this 
premise further down in this article. He transparently points out that "peaceful 
means of settling disputes commensurate to the unfolding crisis had been tried and 
exhausted by the various countries concerned, through the negotiations promoted 
by the states comprising the Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia, and at 
Rambouillet, and later Paris ". 146 It could be said that he was misinformed, 
because wise and preventive diplomacy was not present in the case of Kosovo, but 
'42 Cassese, op. cit., p. 26. 
143 Id 
144 Guicherd, op. cit., p. 29. 
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coercive diplomacy under the threats of NATO. 
147 As Littman argued, in the 
Rambouillet Conference the proposals provided a form of dictation, not 
negotiation. 148 But whether NATO exhausted all diplomatic efforts or not will be 
thoroughly examined in the following chapter. Finally, he thinks that under certain 
exceptional circumstances, where atrocities reach such a large scale as to shock the 
conscience of all human beings may need to outweigh the necessity to avoid 
friction and armed conflict. 149 
Based upon these trends of the international community, Antonio Cassese 
believes that under certain strict conditions resort to armed force may gradually 
become justified, even without a Security Council authorisation. 150 Those 
conditions according to professor Cassese are: if grave violations of human rights 
and crimes against humanity occur on a territory of a sovereign state by the 
governmental authorities; if the crimes against humanity result from anarchy in a 
sovereign state and it does not call upon or allow other states or international 
organisations to assist in terminating the crimes; if the Security Council is unable 
to take any coercive action to stop the violations of human rights because of veto 
of one of its permanent members; if all peaceful remedies are exhausted; if a group 
of states decides to try to stop the atrocities with the support of the majority of 
member states of the UN; and if armed force is exclusively used for the limited 
147 Bellamy, op. cit., pp. 120-130. 
148 Littman, op. cit., p. 10. 
149 Cassese, op. cit., p. 26. 
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purpose of stopping the atrocities and restoring respect for human rights, not for 
any goal going beyond this limited purpose. 
151 
To this extent, it could be argued that the argument of professor Simma that 
NATO intervention in Kosovo should not be a precedent for international law, 
leading to the alteration of the current international legal system, is more prudent 
than the contrary argument of professor Cassese. Thomas Franck also believes that 
NATO's action in Kosovo is best seen as an exception from which may be derived 
a few useful lessons for the future, rather than as the future itself. 
152 Of course 
there had been many alleged humanitarian interventions in the past. Nevertheless, 
apart from the fact that those interventions reflect state practice, they were 
condemned in legal terms. Professor Cassese rushed to discern a precedent for 
future interventions, where states or a group of states will have the right to 
intervene in a sovereign state when humanitarian crises occur, without a Security 
Council authorisation. Further, he did not wonder if this new rule would lead to 
further abuses to the principle of non-intervention. In addition, Professor Cassese 
did not carefully observe that most of NATO member states argued that the 
situation in Kosovo was exceptional and should not change the importance of the 
UN Security Council on the future. 153 
It seems that his ideas threaten the UN foundation and the current system of 
collective security. He justifies his views upon the Latin dictum "iniuria ius 
oritur", which means that the law comes up from injustice. In our case this dictum 
implies that what happened to Kosovo was unfair and from this injustice might 
151 Id 
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raise a new customary rule. This customary rule could lead to further abuses to the 
principle of non-intervention ruling the current international system, as many law 
scholars argue. '54 Moreover, professor Cassese did not observe another Latin 
dictum, which is: "dura lex sed lex ". This means that "law is tough, but it is law". 
This is what professor Simma wisely meant when he noted that NATO 
intervention in Kosovo was illegal and should not become a precedent for 
international law, although it was morally justified. 
The final respond on this debate came with the latter article of professor 
Cassese, where he recognises that it is premature to maintain that a customary rule 
has emerged from NATO intervention in Kosovo. 155 Additionally, he suggests that 
the element of usus or diuturnitas is clearly lacking. 
156 Thus, it is clear from the 
above that Cassese confutes his previous view that from NATO's intervention 
might emerge a new customary rule in international law. He concluded to this later 
argument after a thorough examination of the position taken by the states 
concerned and the reaction of other states both outside and within the United 
Nations. 157 Firstly, he noted that the overwhelming majority of states did not 
condemn NATO intervention. 158 Secondly, he observed that states participating in 
the use of force have not claimed that they acted in conformity with international 
154 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin C. Morris, Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the 
End of the Cold War, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds. ), International Society after the Cold 
War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, Basingstoke-England, Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 137. 
155 Antonio Cassese, "A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
Necessitatis", European Journal of International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 796. Stromseth agrees with 
the above Cassese's argument (Stromseth, op. cit., p. 252). 
156 Cassese, op. cit., p. 796. 
157 Ibid., p. 791. 
158 Ibid., p. 792. 
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law. 159 Literally, neither the US Department of State nor NATO seriously 
attempted to justify the war in international legal terms. 160 Obviously, NATO 
countries were well aware that their intervention was illegal. 
In addition, Cassese noted that participating states in Kosovo intervention 
have justified their actions by stressing that they were going to avert a 
humanitarian disaster. 161 Yet, this constitutes a moral, not a legal justification and 
this fact is clear from the terms used. Moreover, he claimed that all states placed 
emphasis upon the fact that they regarded their action as justified only because it 
was not taken by one state, but by a group of states acting unanimously within the 
framework of an intergovernmental organisation. 162 However, NATO constitutes 
an international organisation on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the 
only enforcement action envisaged in this Article is self-defence. 163 What is more, 
the fact that the intervention was undertaken from a regional organisation does not 
mean that the intervention is justified. 
Another claim of his supports that the same states insisted that they had 
never stopped attaching crucial importance to the central role of the Security 
Council and that the armed attack was initiated only as an exceptional measure 
justified by the failure of that body to act. 164 Even this notion does not justify 
NATO intervention, because current international law does not provide recourse to 
the use of force without a Security Council authorisation because of the UN 
1591d 
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deficiencies. Moreover, NATO states could have acted under the UN General 
Assembly's Uniting for Peace resolution. The Uniting for Peace resolution had 
been adopted in 1950 by the General Assembly and resolved that "if the Security 
Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise 
its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 
in any case where there appears a threat to the peace, or act of aggression, the 
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making 
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in 
the case of a breach to the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when 
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security,,. ' 65 This 
process had been adopted when in 1950 Council could not respond to China's 
armed intervention in Korea because of the Soviet Veto. 166 Nevertheless, NATO 
states did not follow this procedure. 
Last but not least, Cassese noted that many states did not participate 
because they considered the Security Council as the only body entitled to 
legitimise resort to force in the world community. 167 It could be argued that only 
these states acted in conformity with current international law. These are the 
results from Cassese's examination of states' positions. Through them he tried to 
explain that he was mistaken when he supported the view that a new customary 
rule has emerged. However, Cassese was not the only one that proclaimed the 
emergence of a new customary norm. 168 Some others observed that the rejection of 
165 GA Res 377A(V), Uniting For Peace, 3 November 1950. 
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the Russian draft resolution presents a strong precedent for the creation of a 
customary norm in favour of humanitarian intervention. 
169 Wheeler seeks for 
opinio juris in the statements of participating states in the Council. 170 In any case, 
however, Russia, China, and India spoke out against NATO intervention, as well 
as Namibia, Belarus, Ukraine, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia and South Africa. 
171 
Further, five out of the fifteen members of the Council were NATO states172 (USA, 
France, UK, the Netherlands, and Canada) plus one state hostile to the FRY due to 
prior warfare, Slovenia. On the other hand, Russia was weak and had no allies in 
the Council. Thus, the political character of the Council is evident. There is no 
sufficient evidence that this practice of humanitarian intervention is followed by 
legal considerations. The lack of condemnation cannot be interpreted as an implied 
opiniojuris supporting an expansion of the right to use force unilaterally beyond 
the Charter's principles. 173 What is more, the small number of states participating 
in the Council's discussions is not adequate to determine whether or not the world 
community is eager to accept a new customary rule. 
Teson noted that "state practice is at the very least ambivalent on the 
question of humanitarian intervention, so any interpretation of that practice (for or 
against) has to rely on extra-legal values. There is no such a thing as a `state 
practice' that mechanically yields a legal rule. Diplomatic history has to be 
interpreted in the light of our moral and empirical assumptions about the purposes 
169 International Court of Justice, "Legality of Use of Force", Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium, 
1999, oral pleadings, for more details see: http: //www. icj- 
cij. orgrcjwwwrdocket/iybe/iybeframe. htm. Also Brenfors and Petersen, op. cit., p. 497 and 
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of international law. If this is correct, the positivist rejection of humanitarian 
intervention is far from objective, notwithstanding the claims of international 
lawyers to the contrary". 174 However, this is not correct. It is simply another 
Teson's mis-interpretation. He explicitly suggests that interpretation of state 
practice has to rely on extra-legal values. It could be argued that his argument is 
totally unreasonable. He is a scholar of international law, but he disregards Article 
38 of the ICJ statute that defines international custom "as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law ". 175 It is obvious that his understanding of international 
law ignores basic documents from treaties and other legal works and decisions. 
However, international lawyers will have to depend on Article 38 of the ICJ statute 
and not on Teson's conception of international custom. Further, the fact that Teson 
makes this notion implies that he acknowledges, although he has made excessive 
efforts to prove the legality of humanitarian intervention, that there is no 
customary rule of humanitarian intervention in international law in the traditional 
at least sense, nor is it going to emerge in the near future. 
In the case of Kosovo was not the first time that the "noble" objectives of 
humanitarian intervention mitigated the reaction of states against the illegality of 
such interventions. '76 Interestingly enough, the 133 developing states of the G77 
"rejected the so-called right of humanitarian intervention, which had no basis in 
174 Fernando R. Teson, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in J. L. Holzgrefe and 
Robert 0. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 109. 
17$ Statute of the ICJ, Article 38. For more details: www. icj-cij. org. 
176 A good illustration is India's intervention in East Pakistan, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 73. Also 
Franck, op. cit., p. 226. 
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the UN Charter or in international law ". 177 This number of countries undoubtedly 
proves that weak states oppose the creation of customary law of humanitarian 
intervention after Kosovo. 178 The part of opinio juris remains unsatisfied, since a 
large number of states reject the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
What is more, there is evidently a `fatal deficiency of relevant opiniojuris by the 
intervening states involved ". 179 Thus, setting up a precedent for future 
interventions becomes unlikely. Although the US literature makes reference to 
"leading" and "major" states, implying that some states matter more than others for 
the formation of custom180, it could be argued that the views of the international 
community are much more important factor in the development of international 
law than many Anglo-American authors believe. ' 81 Suffice it to mention that the 
ICJ statute does not speak of major and minor states for the creation of custom, but 
for state practice accepted as legal. 
The UN General Assembly resolution 54/172 is very determinative on 
whether or not the use of force for the protection of human rights can become 
acceptable. In this resolution the Assembly "Recalling that the World Conference 
on Human Rights, held at Vienna from 14 to 25 June 1993, called upon States to 
refrain from any unilateral coercive measure not in accordance with international 
law and the Charter of the United Nations... Urges all States to refrain from 
adopting or implementing any unilateral measures not in accordance with 
'n 23`' Annual Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77, Ministerial 
Declaration, 24 September 1999. For further details see: http: //www. g77. org/Docs/Dec11999. html. 
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international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in particular those of a 
coercive nature with all their extraterritorial effects... Rejects unilateral coercive 
measures with all their extraterritorial effects as tools for political or economic 
pressure against any country, in particular against developing countries... "' 82 The 
above General Assembly resolution is catalytic against all those who support that 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo sets a precedent for the creation of a customary 
rule of humanitarian intervention in international law. Along with the Ministerial 
Declaration of the Group of 77, this resolution bans the unilateral use of force for 
the protection of human rights, if it is out of the realm of the UN Charter and 
international law. Thus, all imaginative "precedent" theories for new customary 
law fall into space. 
In addition, there is another factor that renders the creation of a customary 
law of humanitarian intervention impossible. Chesterman and Byers skilfully noted 
that since clear treaty provisions prevail over customary international law, an 
ordinary customary rule allowing intervention would not have been sufficient to 
override Article 2(4)... the only way the Kosovo intervention could have been legal 
was if a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention had somehow achieved the 
status ofjus cogens and thus overridden conflicting treaty provisions. 183 The above 
argument finds support in Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. Nevertheless, state practice before Kosovo does not fit on the 
above definition. In fact, NATO intervention itself does not meet the above 
criteria. A customary international law can only emerge if most states accept, and 
182 GA Res 54/172, UN General Assembly Resolution, 15 February 2000. 
183 Byers and Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 182-183. Also Simma, op. cit., p. 3. 
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none or only few oppose, a general practice as legal. 184 But since such a norm 
would conflict with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is void, unless it acquires the 
form of a peremptory norm of general international law. 
KOSOVO AND PAST INTERVENTIONS IN THE 90s 
It could be said that, although Kosovo is the last of a series of alleged 
humanitarian intervention in the 90s, the world community did not manage to 
authorise the use of force to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The past practice of 
UN authorised intervention had not been witnessed in this case. There are two 
contrary explanations for this fact: first of all, the Council was bound by veto- 
threats; secondly, some member states, notably China and Russia, had a good 
reason for opposing such an intervention. From the above exploration, it seems that 
Kosovo did not set any precedent for future unauthorised interventions. 
Humanitarian intervention outside the Council's realm remains impermissible in 
international law. Nevertheless, this case shows that there is a continuum from 
northern Iraq to Kosovo. In Iraq the intervening states offered resolution 688 as a 
justification for their action, while in Kosovo NATO states based their intervention 
on resolutions 1160,1199 and 1203. What is more, in both cases, intervening 
states offered a plethora of justifications. Yet, this iteration in state practice does 
not reflect the emergence of customary law in favour of unauthorised humanitarian 
interventions. The fact that NATO intervention in Kosovo was not authorised by 
184 Ibid., p. 179. 
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the Council was also a setback to the practice of UN authorised humanitarian 
interventions in the 90s. Thus, it weakens the claims for the emergence of UN 
authorised humanitarian intervention. 
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CHAPTER 7 
KOSOVO AND THE FALL OF THE HUMANITARIAN "MYTH": NATO'S 
DISPROPORTIONATE RESPONSE, VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN 
LAWS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE "MILITARY HUMANISM" 
This chapter will deal not only with NATO's violation of international 
humanitarian laws, but it will also assess the outcomes of NATO's intervention in 
Kosovo, which seem to be far from humanitarian ones. On March 24 1999 NATO 
blatantly violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by commencing an aerial 
campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FYR). Thomas Franck 
argued that "neither the US Department of State, nor NATO seriously attempted to 
justify the war in international legal terms". ' NATO advanced various 
"humanitarian" justifications (humanitarian necessity, disaster, catastrophe and 
intervention) to persuade the public that its intervention would be at least morally 
justified. No doubt, the humanitarian motives of an intervention sometimes 
mitigate the reactions of the public and the international community. This chapter 
aims to illustrate that this intervention was disproportionate and far from a 
humanitarian one. Further, it supports that this intervention not only does not set a 
precedent for future humanitarian interventions, but it eliminates the possibilities 
of such a right. Last but not least, this chapter will put forward an extensive 
' Thomas M. Franck, "Lessons of Kosovo", American Journal of International Law, vo1.93, No4, 
October 1999, p. 859. 
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analysis of the traditional argument against humanitarian intervention which 
dictates that humanitarian war is an "oxymoron". 2 
First and foremost, it would be quite determinative to enquire whether or 
not the 1999 intervention in Kosovo had been proportionate. The first thing to 
explore is whether peaceful and diplomatic efforts had been exhausted. Peaceful 
settlement of conflicts is very significant according to the UN Charter. Article 2(3) 
of the Charter states that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and 
justice, are not endangered". Further, Article 33 of the UN Charter declares that 
"the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution 
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice ". States should exhaust all peaceful means before they resort to force and 
recourse to war should be the last available option. 3 Did NATO states and the 
international community exhaust all peaceful and diplomatic efforts before the 
outbreak of war? 
Lewer and Ramsbotham believe that proportionality and exhaustion of 
peaceful remedies are two of the criteria for the recourse to armed action, as 
regards humanitarian intervention. The International Law Association has cited 
2 Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military intervention and Human Rights, International 
Affairs, vol. 69, No3,1993, p. 429. 
3 Martha Brenfors and Malene Maxe Petersen, "The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention -A Defence", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 69,2004, p. 482. 
° Nick Lewer and Oliver Ramsbotham, "Something Must Be Done ": Towards an Ethical 
Framework for Humanitarian Intervention in International Social Conflict, Bradford, Department 
of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 1993, pp. 87 and 90-91. 
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among other criteria for humanitarian intervention that "all non-intervention 
remedies available must be exhausted before a humanitarian intervention can be 
commenced ". 5 Yet, NATO's intervention in Kosovo does not seem to accomplish 
the above criteria. To say that the NATO countries and other states in the 
international community did not make any efforts for the peaceful settlement of the 
conflict would be unfair. Apart from NATO, many other organisations, states and 
group of states (i. e. the OSCE, the WEU, the EU, the Council of Europe and the 
Contact Group) contributed to efforts for a political solution to the crisis. The 
United Nations was also involved in the efforts to find a peaceful solution through 
political dialogue. On the other hand, this does not mean that all diplomatic efforts 
had been exhausted before the recourse to war. The Rambouillet and Paris 
conferences that presented the major prospects for political solution were very 
uncritical diplomatic documents. Wise diplomacy had been subrogated by coercive 
diplomacy under the NATO threats. NATO stated that its threats were decided in 
order to back up diplomatic efforts to achieve peace in Kosovo and open the way 
for a political solution to the crisis. 8 In fact, this was a folly perception of 
diplomacy by NATO. The UN Charter advances diplomacy but bans the threat or 
use of force. In the traditional sense, diplomacy should not be backed up by threats 
of force. 
S Peter Hilpold, "Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal? ", European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 12, No. 3,2001, p. 455. 
6 Major General William Moorman, "Humanitarian Intervention and International Law in the Case 
of Kosovo", New England Law Review, vol. 36, No4, Summer 2002, p. 782. 
7 Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society, New York, Palgrave McMillan, 2002, pp. 120- 
130 
8 Heike Krieger(ed. ), The Kosovo Conflict and International Law, an Analytical Documentation 
1974-1999, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 298. 
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What is more, the Rambouillet and Paris conferences introduced an odd 
form of diplomacy: dictation, not negotiation. 9 NATO informed Yugoslavia that if 
it did not at once sign the whole draft agreement submitted to it, Yugoslavia would 
be subjected to aerial assault unlimited in scope, character or duration until it 
submitted. 1° The inflexibility of the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, led 
to failure of achieving an agreement. " Although Yugoslavia had accepted the 
substance of the political proposals well before the ultimatum date 12, it could not 
stomach the establishment of a NATO-led multinational military implementation 
force in Kosovo. 13 Yugoslavia could not agree to NATO forces, but it was ready to 
accept the participation by certain European members of NATO and of course 
Russia. 14 As Yugoslavia could not accept the military clause, NATO could have 
dropped the requirement that the military clauses were non-negotiable and 
continued negotiation on the basis of the Yugoslav offer to accept an international 
force to implement the agreed political settlement. 15 
But NATO implacability led the negotiations and diplomatic efforts to an 
end. Littman argues that "these proposals' were draconian and might be regarded 
as a model for the military occupation of an enemy country that had been defeated 
9 Mark Littman, Kosovo: Law and Diplomacy, London, Centre for Policy Studies, 1999, p. 10. Also 
Michael Radu, Stabilising Borders in the Balkans: The Inevitability and Costs of a Greater 
Albania, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War, 
Washington D. C., CATO Institute, 2000, p. 123. 
10 Ibid., p. 9. 
" Richard A. Falk, "Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law", American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 854. 
12 Michael Maccgwire, "Why Did We Bomb Belgrade? ", International Affairs, vol. 76, Nol, 
January 2000, p. 6. Also Littman, op. cit., p. 9. 
13 "Kosovo: Air Strikes against Serbia", in Sean D. Murphy (ed. ), "Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to International Law", American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, issue 
3, July 1999, p. 629. Also Krieger, op. cit., p. 272 and Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 7. 
'4 Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 7. 
15 Littman, op. cit., p. 12. 
302 
in war. They provide not only for NATO to have the right to a complete occupation 
of Kosovo, but also to have an unlimited right of access, for an unlimited time, for 
unlimited purposes, throughout Yugoslavia under conditions of total immunity. 
They are not terms that Yugoslavia, or any other sovereign state that had not been 
defeated in war, could possibly have been expected to accept ". 16 Many others 
pointed out the fact that no sovereign state would have accepted the NATO 
terms. '? Professor Avramovic added that the conference "brought such a kind of 
ultimatum for the Serbs that resembled very much to the Austrian one, which was 
taken as the grounds for World War I. It was nearly impossible to accept it for any 
government, and the policy of Madeleine Albright was founded exactly upon 
expectation that Serbs can not accept it. "Casus belli ", excuse for a war was 
found". 18 Cohn and Chesterman also agree that Rambouillet "was less of a 
negotiating round than an ultimatum to the FRY delegation ". 19 Noam Chomsky 
expressed that "it has been speculated that the wording was designed so as to 
guarantee rejection" 
20 In the same context, Dr Henry Kissinger, former US 
Secretary of State, said of the Rambouillet proposals: "The Rambouillet text, which 
called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia was a provocation, 
an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb 
16 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
17 Hilaire McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis, in Ken Booth (ed. ), 
The Kosovo Tragedy, the Human Rights Dimensions, London, Franck Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 185, 
and 
Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, Lessons from Kosovo, Monroe ME, Common 
Courage Press, 1999, p. 107. 
18 Sima Avramovic, Professor of Law, Belgrade Law School, personal interview, 22 August 2003. 
19 Marjorie Cohn, "NATO Bombing of Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention or Crime against 
Humanity? ", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, vol. 15,2002, p. 81 and 94. Also 
Chesterman, op. cit., p. 223 
20 Chomsky, op. cit., p. 107 and Falk, op. cit., p. 854. 
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could have accepted It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have 
been presented in that form". 21 
Indeed, NATO's hallucinogenic terms for the implementation conditions 
(military clause) and the fact that they were non-negotiable led to the end of the 
diplomatic efforts and the recourse to war. The lack of proportionality is more 
evident in the aftermath of the conflict. NATO agreed to amend the 
implementation provisions of the Rambouillet draft, which were non-negotiable 
few months ago. As a result, the signatories to the Peace Agreement would be the 
UN and Yugoslavia and the party responsible for enforcing the resultant Treaty 
would be the UN, not NATO; the monitoring force would be an international force 
with a Russian element; the civil administration would be under the control of the 
Security Council; the international force would have no access to any part of 
Yugoslavia outside Kosovo; the sovereignty of Yugoslavia over Kosovo would be 
acknowledged and confirmed without any limit of time. 22 It could be argued that 
this agreement could have been reached before the recourse to war if NATO 
clauses were negotiable. 3 Thus, it is clear from the above that NATO did not 
exhaust all peaceful means before waging war against the FRY. 
Another oddity of those diplomatic efforts was that the NATO states 
compelled Yugoslavia to negotiate with KLA representatives, despite its initial 
resistance. 24 The KLA had been a secessionist movement within the FRY and it 
had considered a terrorist organisation by various regional organisations, UN 
21 Littman, op. cit., p. 12. 
221bid., p. 19. 
23 Falk, op. cit., p. 855. 
24 Bellamy, op. cit., pp. 130-131. 
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resolutions and the Contact Group itself. 25 In 1998 the KLA was still classified by 
the State Department as a terrorist organisation. 26 Suddenly, the KLA terrorists 
became some sort of popular liberation force27, probably because this term assisted 
the US and NATO to the attainment of their objectives. In Rambouillet, in order to 
convince the KLA to sign the agreement, it is said that NATO and more 
specifically the US Secretary of State promised that a referendum on self- 
determination would be held after three years. 28 It is not difficult to guess why the 
NATO and the US favoured so openly a secessionist movement and a terrorist 
organisation: because NATO would be unable to bomb Serbia if the KLA did not 
sign 29 
However, the US and NATO hypocrisy became evident two years after the 
intervention in Kosovo. Two years later, when a KLA branch had launched attacks 
against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the American Department of 
State reconsidered the KLA a terrorist organisation and its member's extremists. 30 
This fact reflects unscrupulous power politics that cannot meet any requirement of 
proportionality. McWhinney argues that "the sudden switch, in a matter of a few 
months only, from the US Central Intelligence Agency's original classification of 
is The Contact Group had condemned terrorist actions by the KLA in many statements (i. e. Contact 
Group Meeting, Statement on Kosovo, Moscow, 25 February 1998 and Contact Group Meeting, 
Statement on Kosovo, London, 9 March 1998). The EU also condemns terrorism and violence acts 
committed by the KLA (EU, Common Position Defined by the Council, 19 March 1998). All the 
statements above can be found in Krieger (ed. ), op. cit., p. 121,122,125. 
26 Edward McWhinney, The United Nations and a New World Order for a New Millennium: Self- 
Determination, State Succession, and Humanitarian Intervention, The Hague, the Netherlands, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 70. Also Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 7. 
I McWhinney, op. cit., p. 70. 
zs Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 211. Also Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 8 and Bellamy, op. cit., 
132. 
Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 8. 
30 US Department of State, Report, for more details: 
http: //usinfo. state. gov/topical/pol/terror/01031902. htm 
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the Kosovo Liberation Army as an international terrorist organisation, to the 
acceptance of the KLA by the US administration as some sort of popular liberation 
force, might appear to lend credence" for the US forcible approaches. 31 Further, 
the KLA branch that took action in FYROM is not a separate case of the KLA in 
Kosovo, since KLA's stated goal is a "Greater Albania". Both the FRY and the 
FYROM faced the same terrorist threat, but different confrontation was given in 
each of the above cases. 
What is more, NATO's lack of impartiality was evident from the 
beginnings of the crisis. Although the Council and various states used to condemn 
both the FRY authorities and the KLA terrorists, NATO focused only on the FRY. 
And although NATO was very strict in criticising the Yugoslav policies, it was 
never that strict with the actions of the KLA. If NATO were impartial and 
objective, the humanitarian crisis could have been avoided in Kosovo. For 
instance, following the adoption of resolution 1203 the Yugoslav military and 
police forces commenced a gradual withdrawal, pursuant to Security Council 
resolutions. Yet, as the Yugoslav military withdrew from the province of Kosovo, 
the KLA started advancing its forces and occupying several areas. The UN 
Secretary General welcomed the reports of the withdrawal of Government forces 
in Kosovo, but also noted the fact that Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units had 
occupied some areas and is responsible for several violations, including attacks on 
civilians. 32 NATO also confirmed the withdrawal of the FRY security forces. 33 The 
return of the Serbian security forces and the January 1999 strong Yugoslav 
31 McWhinney, op. cit., p. 70. 
32 S/1998/1068,12 November 1998. 
33 Eric, Suy, "NATO's Intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", Leiden Journal of 
International Law, vol. 13,2000, p. 202. 
306 
response in Racak was a result to this KLA policy. Thus, it is difficult to see why 
the FRY should be blamed for reacting as it did, when strengthening its military 
presence and its police units in order to defend itself against "terrorist activities". 34 
Nevertheless, the US and its NATO allies turned a blind eye on the KLA's 
atrocities and terrorism. 
To this extent, the lack of proportionality regarding the intervention in 
Kosovo is obvious. But a humanitarian war must be fought for a proportionate 
reason. 35 Teson, a fervent supporter of humanitarian intervention writes: "The 
seriousness of the reaction against human rights abuses must be proportionate 
both to the gravity of the abuses and to the probability of remedying the situation. 
If an oppressive government can be forced to enact democratic reforms through 
economic or political pressure, then those measures are preferable to forcible 
action and should be tried first. Military intervention, as a remedy against human 
rights violations, should only be resorted to when all peaceful means have failed or 
are likely to fail ". 36 Many other advocates of humanitarian intervention believe 
that peaceful means should be exhausted. 37 Cassese, the judge that rushed to 
discern a precedent for future interventions without Security Council authorisation 
34 Id 
35 Nicholas Hopkinson, Humanitarian Intervention?, London, HMSO, 1996, p. 10. Also Lewer and 
Ramsbotham, op. cit., p. 87. 
36 Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2d edition, 
New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 122. 
37 Robert C. Johansen, Limits and Opportunities in Humanitarian Intervention, in Stanley 
Hoffmann (ed. ), The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, Indiana, University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1996, p. 69. Also Lewer and Ramsbotham, op. cit., p. 87. 
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under certain strict conditions, places among those conditions that "all peaceful 
avenues... have been exhausted" 
38 
However, he is one of the few authors and analysts of the intervention that 
believe that all `peaceful means of settling disputes commensurate to the unfolding 
crisis had been tried and exhausted by the various countries concerned, through 
negotiations promoted by states comprising the Contact Group for the Former 
Yugoslavia, and at Rambouillet, and later Paris". 9 This argument had been put 
forward by Stromseth as well 40 Yet, this argument of Cassese is equally deceptive 
and hallucinatory as the other one supporting that intervention in Kosovo should 
not remain exceptional41, which had been recalled with a later article of his. 42 Most 
lawyers and political analysts insist on the fact that NATO states did not exhaust 
all non-forcible remedies 43 
It is clear from the above that that the requirement of proportionality before 
recourse to armed intervention has not been fully met by the intervening states. 
The next step is to explore whether or not the principle of proportionality had been 
met during the NATO aerial campaign against the FRY. As regards the conduct of 
war, Lewer and Ramsbotham insist on two specific requirements: the harm judged 
38 Antonio Cassese, "Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? ", European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 27. 
39 Ibid., p. 28. 
40 Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in 
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 249. 
41 Cassese, op. cit., p. 24. 
42 Antonio Cassese, "A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
Necessitatis", European Journal of International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 796- 
43 Jonathan I. Charney, "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 840. Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000, p. 166. Also Falk, op. cit., p. 855. 
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likely to result from a particular military action should not be disproportionate to 
the good aimed at; and non-combatants should be immune from direct attack. 
44 
Similarly, Teson thinks of a humanitarian intervention: to be morally acceptable it 
must be narrowly aimed at the delinquent government and its military supporters, 
and not at the general population. 
5 Johansen believes that the nature of the means 
employed in international intervention should be carefully constrained by 
internationally established norms against excessive use of force and the protection 
of innocent people 46 No doubt, the above criterion applies to all alleged 
humanitarian interventions, including the NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
This criterion for humanitarian intervention is also accordant with 
traditional international humanitarian laws, which govern the laws regarding the 
conduct of war. The two Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols have to 
do with the effective protection of civilians during an armed conflict. Articles 48 
and 51 of the 1977 Additional Protocol Ito the 1940 Geneva Conventions reflect 
the current regime: 
Article 48: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives 
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives ". 
Article 51(2): "The civilian population as such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack Acts or threats of violence the primary 
04 Lewer and Ramsbotham, op. cit., p. 88. 
45 Teson, op. cit., p. 122. 
46 Johansen, op. cit., p. 76. 
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purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited". 
Article 51(4): "Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited Indiscriminate 
attacks are: 
" Those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
" Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective; or 
" Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such 
case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects 
without distinction ". 
Article 51 (5) includes two other types of attack which are considered as 
indiscriminate: 
an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single 
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives 
located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of 
civilians or civilian objects; and 
" an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. " 
The laws of war had been stressed to this point. No doubt, these laws apply 
to alleged humanitarian interventions as well. Thus, intervening states should be 
more sensitive with these laws, because of the noble and humanitarian objectives 
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they invoke. Let us now consider whether or not NATO intervention in Kosovo 
had been consistent to the above criteria of humanitarian intervention and laws of 
war. Before the recourse to war, NATO declared a "war without casualties", but it 
probably meant a war without casualties on the NATO alliance side. 
7 Widespread 
critics of NATO's bombings and the reactions of the public opinion, lawyers, 
NGO's, and states reflect the situation. The humanitarian "war without casualties" 
promised by NATO proved to be an "inhumane" humanitarian intervention turned 
against innocent civilians, public utilities, infrastructure, historical monuments, 
schools and hospitals. Although NATO and its members used to stress that this war 
did not aim against the Serbs and Yugoslavia48, their bombing campaign 
manifested their cruel intentions. In fact, the victim of this campaign had been the 
Serbs within proper Serbia and Kosovo, as well as ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. 
NATO had been repeatedly accused of widespread breaches of humanitarian laws. 
Bombings turned against civilian infrastructure49, public utilities50, and cultural 
heritage 51 are of a questionable character. The bombing of the Zastava car industry 
under the suspicion that it produces hunting riffles and pistols is unacceptable. 
52 
There is further evidence of NATO's damage to Yugoslav industry. 53 
47 McWhinney, op. cit., p. 47. 
48 Krieger, op. cit., pp. 304,395,396,399. 
49 Christine M. Chinkin, "Kosovo: A Good or a Bad War? ", American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 844. Also Falk, op. cit., p. 852. 
5° Murphy, op. cit., p. 632 and Falk, op. cit., p. 851. 
51 Chinkin, op. cit., p. 844. 
52 Dino Kritsiotis, "The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Armed Force Against the 




Environmental damage caused by the NATO bombardment is equally 
blameworthy. 54 
For all the above targets, as well as for many other indiscriminate ones, the 
public, many NGO's and states had criticised NATO rigorously. For instance, 
Amnesty International believes that NATO committed serious violations of the 
laws of war, leading in a number of cases to the unlawful killings of civilians. 55 
Human Rights Watch investigation concluded that NATO violated international 
humanitarian law 56 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International considered 
a number of NATO targets indiscriminate. Further down in this chapter there will 
be an examination of alleged "indiscriminate" bombings. First of all, the attack on 
Grdelica Railroad Bridge, hitting passenger train and killing at least 12 civilians is 
arguably considered illegitimate by the Amnesty international. 57 NATO said that 
the target had been the bridge itself and that the train had been hit accidentally. 58 
Furthermore, NATO Attacks on a convoy of ethnic Albanians near Djakovica 
caused the civilian death toll of more than 70 ethnic Albanians and harm of more 
than 100. Initially, NATO attributed the incident to Serbian forces, but later 
admitted that its forces had been responsible for the attack on the convoy and 
expressed regret for the loss of life. 
59 Human Rights Watch reported that the most 
dramatic losses of civilian life from the NATO offensive in Kosovo came from 
54 Falk, op. cit., p. 851 and Chinkin, op. cit., p. 844. 
55 Amnesty International, "Collateral Damage" or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of 
War by NATO during Operation Allied Force. See: 
http: //web. amnesty. org/library/index/ENGEUR700182000. 
ss Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, for further details go to the 
link: http: //www. hrw. org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200. htm. 




attacks on fleeing or travelling refugees confused with military forces. 60 NATO 
was supposed to protect refugees from fleeing Kosovo, but not by bombing the 
refugee convoys. This thesis does not support that NATO purposively targeted 
these groups. However, the conflict between NATO's ends and means was evident 
in Kosovo. 61 How could this response be considered proportionate, when you 
target the ones you have promised to protect? Thus, it could be argued that NATO 
"humanitarian war" is liable to its inhuman means. 
Other acts that caused civilian harm, according to Amnesty International, 
are: attacks on northwest and southeast of Djakovica; civilian bus and ambulance 
hit at Luäane; market and hospital at Nis hit by cluster bombs; ethnic Albanian 
civilians bombed at Korisa; Varvarin Bridge; and attack on Surdulica. 
62 Human 
Rights Watch found that there were ninety separate incidents involving civilian 
deaths during the NATO campaign and determined that nine incidents were a 
result of attacks on non-military targets that Human Rights Watch believes were 
illegitimate. 63 These include the headquarters of Serb Radio and Television in 
Belgrade, the New Belgrade heating plant, and seven bridges that were not on 
major transportation routes nor had other military functions. 64 Human Rights 
Watch believes that the attacks on those bridges were of questionable military 
effect because they were urban or town bridges that are not major routes of 
communications 65 
60 HRW Report, supra note 56. 
61 McWhinney, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 
62 AI Report, supra note 55. 




One of the most contradictory actions had been the use of highly 
questionably weapons, especially when the intervening states declare that they 
intent to minimise civilian casualties. Among those weapons are cluster bombs, as 
well as depleted uranium bombs. Both the Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch reported that a high number of civilian casualties (from 90 to 150) 
derived from the use of cluster bombs in populated areas. 66 Amnesty International 
said of cluster bombs: "Cluster weapons are not banned under international law, 
but they do present a high risk of violating the prohibition of indiscriminate attack. 
In addition, cluster weapons present a humanitarian issue due to their high dud 
rate (NATO officials acknowledged to AI that the rate is approximately five per 
cent). This means that unexploded sub-munitions are a continued threat to anyone 
who comes into contact with them". 
7 As regards the use of depleted uranium 
munitions, pending conclusive studies on the long-term health and environmental 
effects of the deployment of this weapon, Amnesty International had been 
concerned about the possible health risks of an indiscriminate nature which 
depleted uranium munitions may in fact pose. 68 The ICTY report had noted that no 
treaty restricts the use of cluster bombs and depleted uranium projectiles. 69 
Moreover, the ICTY committee found that the NATO campaign did cause some 
damage to the environment, but it held the opinion that this environmental damage 
does not reach additional Protocol I threshold. 70 
66 Al Report and HRW Report, supra notes 55 and 56. 
67 Al Report, supra note 55. 
68 Id 
69 International Court Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the 
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Yugoslavia. For further details: http: //www. un. org/icty/pressreal/nato06l300. htm. 
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Another indiscriminate target, according to both NGO's, had been the 
bombardment of the Serb Radio and Television Headquarters. In this attack 16 
civilians had been killed and another 16 wounded. 71 It is important to report that 
120 civilians had been working in the building at the time of the attack. 72 This 
means that the number of casualties could be much more than the above. Human 
Rights Watch says that according to military sources, there was considerable 
disagreement between the United States and French governments regarding the 
legality and legitimacy of the target, and there was a lively public debate regarding 
the selection of Yugoslav civilian radio and television as a target group. 73 Finally, 
NATO had placed this attack in the context of NATO's policy to "disrupt the 
national command network and to degrade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's 
propaganda apparatus". 74 Yet, this attack had been a blatant violation of 
international humanitarian law, since it is difficult to consider propaganda alone a 
justified military target. 75 
Article 52 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions states that 
"military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage". According to the above rule, the Serb 
Radio and Television Headquarters did not constitute a legitimate target. On the 
71 W. J. Fenrick, "Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO Bombing Campaign against 
Yugoslavia, European Journal of International Law, vol. 12, No. 3,2001. Also AI Report and HRW 
Report, supra notes 55 and 56. 
72 Al Report, supra note 55. 
73 HRW Report, supra note 56. 
74 Al Report, supra note 55. 
75 Fenrick, op. cit., p. 496. 
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contrary, it had been an indiscriminate NATO's target that confirmed its abhorrent 
"humanitarian" tactics. The ICTY committee found that "if the attack on the RTS 
was justified by reference to its propaganda purpose alone, its legality might well 
be questioned by some experts in the field of international humanitarian law. It 
appears, however, that NATO's targeting of the RTS building for propaganda 
purposes was an incidental (albeit complementary) aim of its primary goal of 
disabling the Serbian military command and control system and to destroy the 
nerve system and apparatus that keeps Milosevic in power ". 76 Evidently, the ICTY 
committee tried hard to justify NATO's breaches of humanitarian laws. However, 
its assessments seem to be far from objective. Below there will be an assessment of 
the ICTY's findings. 
The most striking, questionable and odd NATO target had been the 
Chinese Embassy in the heart of Belgrade. On the night of 7 May, NATO bombed 
the Chinese Embassy in New Belgrade, killing 3 journalists and injuring 20 
Embassy staff members. 77 This incident had significantly increased opposition to 
Operation Allied Force in the West. 78 Before the Security Council, on May 8, 
China condemned this "barbaric" action as "a gross violation of China's 
sovereignty and a flagrant flouting of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations and the basic norms of international relations, a rare occurrence in the 
76 ICTY report, supra note 69. 
77 Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War against Yugoslavia", Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 78, No. 5, Sept/Oct 1999, p. 2; and 
US Department of State, Oral Presentation by Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering on June 
17 to the Chinese Government Regarding the Accidental Bombing of the PRC Embassy in 
Belgrade, Released July 6 1999. For more details see: 
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history of diplomacy ". 79 The Yugoslav Representative noted: "the attack is in 
gross violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and of international law. It is, 
without any doubt, a war crime ". 80 The Russian Ambassador to the UN 
condemned "this barbaric action " and noted that "all norms of international law 
are beingflouted". 81 On the other hand, NATO states tried to overshadow this fact 
by expressing their condolences and by stressing Yugoslavia's responsibility for 
the escalation of the crisis. 82 
The US Department of State spoke of a mistake, an accidental bombing and 
a series of errors and omissions led to that mistake. 83 The Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) described the action as a tragic mistake and a major error. 84 NATO 
expressed its "deep regret for the tragic mistake of the bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade" as well as its sympathy and condolences to the victims, 
their families and the Chinese government. 85 President Clinton said that "this was 
an isolated, tragic event, while the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, which has led to the 
killing of thousands of people and the relocation of hundreds of thousands, is a 
deliberate and systematic crime ". 86 The US and NATO investigation proved that 
CIA had been responsible for three failures that led to the bombing of the Chinese 
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Embassy. 87 Although NATO intended to bomb the Federal Directorate for Supply 
and Procurement (FDSP) as a potential target for NATO Allied Force strike 
operations, miscalculations led to this fatal accident. 
CIA used three maps that none of them had any reference to the FDSP 
building, nor did they accurately identify the current location of the Chinese 
Embassy. 88 The US Department of State acknowledged that although the 1997 US 
Government map shows the Chinese Embassy in Old Belgrade, one map predated 
the Embassy's move. 89 Both the CIA and the US Department of State expressed 
their belief that satellite imagery of the target provided no indication that the 
building was an embassy; there were no flags, seals, or other markings to indicate 
that the building was an embassy-90 Last but not least, the US Department of State 
and CIA acknowledged that some of their employees and diplomats knew the 
location of the Chinese embassy, but they were not consulted, since the intended 
target was not the Embassy. What is more, they found maps which show the 
correct current location of the Chinese Embassy although there are others that do 
not. 91 
All this background of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade 
created a number of conspiracy theories. 92 The Chinese Government itself did not 
accept the US explanations: "It must be pointed out that the Chinese Embassy in 
Yugoslavia has unmistakable symbols and it is also clearly marked on the US 
$7 William M. Arkin, Infamous Anniversary, Washington Post, for further details go to link: 
http: //www. washingtonpost. com. Also CIA, supra note 75, and US Dept of State, supra note 68. 
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maps. The US claimed that it did not know its exact location is not justified The 
Federal Directory of Supply and Procurement is not a secret agency and its 
building is half a kilometre away from the Chinese Embassy. The two buildings 
look totally different. So it was impossible for the US side to mix up these two 
buildings. According to the US explanation, several individuals all neglected their 
duties and its review process failed to detect the mistake at every level. This is hard 
for people to believeP,. 93 No doubt, the US explanations are not that persuasive. It 
is hard to believe that the US intelligence did not have the correct maps with the 
exact location of each building. The new location of the Chinese Embassy was 
clearly illustrated on tourist maps. 94 How could the CIA, one of the best 
intelligence agencies internationally, have consulted outdated maps? Further, 
numerous military experts have told Western news outlets that the CIA could not 
have been the sole source of target information. 95 
What is more, CIA and the US Department of State stressed that from the 
satellite imagery of the building there were no flags, seals, or other markings to 
indicate that the building was an embassy. But when they came to defend the pilots 
they claimed that they "had no way of seeing any identifying markers that would 
show the building was an embassy. A flag in front of the building or any such 
features would not be discernible at night and at the speeds and altitudes at which 
. The argument regarding the embassy flags and seals and our planes jly"96 
93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China , for more details see: 
http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/eng/topics/3755/3809/3810/tl9451. htm. 
94 Mike Head, How Could the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy Have Been a Mistake?, World 
Socialist Website, 10 May 1999. See: http: //www. wsws. org/articles/1999/mayl999/bomb- 
m10. shtml. 
95 Id 
96 Dept of State, supra note 68. 
319 
indications is from its nature highly contradictory, since all embassies have their 
national symbols and flags out of the embassy buildings. Hence, this US argument 
was unsatisfactory and insufficient. Many journalists and scholars advanced their 
ambiguities on the US excuses. Some of them pointed out that it is difficult to call 
the bombing of the Chinese Embassy just an accident, but it is also dishonest to 
label it deliberate. 97 
The most blaming report for NATO came from a team of British and 
Danish journalists. This team advanced the argument that the Chinese Embassy 
had been deliberately targeted because it was being used to transmit Yugoslav 
army communications. 98 This report claims that according to senior military and 
intelligence sources in Europe and the US, the Chinese Embassy was removed 
from a prohibited targets list after NATO electronic intelligence (ELINT) detected 
it sending army signals to Milosevic's forces. The Guardian supported that three 
NATO officers confirmed in detail the above story. In support of its argument, the 
report cites that two out of the three killed people had not been journalists, but 
intelligence officers. 99 Furthermore the FDSP building is located approximately 
half a kilometre away from the embassy. 100 It could be argued that this theory is 
quite credible, even among people that held a different view. 101 Others stress the 
fact that the bombing was deliberate for other reasons. Among those reasons are: 
China's veto threat for future NATO plans before the UN Security Council, 
97 Washington Post, supra note 78. 
98 Guardian, NATO Bombed Chinese Deliberately, NATO Hit Embassy on Purpose, 16 May 1999, 
for more details see: http: //www. guardian. co. uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,203214, OO. html. 
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heightened Sino-American tensions at the time of the incident, and the fact that 
China was representing the Yugoslav interests in Washington. 102 
A spokesman for the Chinese embassy in London said: "we do not believe 
that the embassy was bombed because of a mistake with an out-of-date map ". 103 It 
is clear from the above statement that China considered the bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade deliberate. In addition, the Chinese Government had 
not yet accepted the US explanations and excuses. The ICTY Report, however, 
accepted the US explanations and deemed that the OTP should not undertake an 
investigation concerning the bombing of the Chinese Embassy. 104 It did so 
probably because it considered that the compensation offered by the US to the 
Chinese Government, the families of the victims and the injured, as well as the 
dismissal of one intelligence officer and the reprimands of six senior managers 
were enough to prove that NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy was a 
mistake. 105 But the ICTY report was not objective enough to observe that the US 
explanations and compensations were not enough to convince the Chinese 
Government and people. If one reads the whole text of this report it is easy to 
understand that this paper is, if not at all, in substance prejudiced by the commands 
of NATO states. 
No doubt, an independent investigation would not have rejected 
investigations for all NATO's indiscriminate targets that caused heavy civilian 
damage. This report is at least provocative in the sense that it is overly 
contradictory with reports of various states, human rights organizations and NGOs, 
102 World Socialist Website, supra note 94. 
103 Guardian, supra note 98. 
104 ICTY report, supra note 69. 
105 Id 
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which had accused NATO of violating international humanitarian laws. 106 In 
addition, this report relied heavily on NATO statements, documents which may be 
considered as not being entirely reliable in the context of war, where the 
belligerents need the strong support of national and international public opinion. 107 
On the other hand, the Committee did not pay the same attention to Belgrade press 
statements. 108 Thus, it could be said the ICTY report lacks any objectivity. The fact 
that the ICTY committee decided that no investigation be commenced is highly 
questionable. ' 09 This is because of the evident ICTY Committee's lack of 
impartiality. ' 10 If the ICTY Committee was objective and reliable, it should allow 
the commencement of an independent investigation. The fact, however, that this 
committee did not even wish to start an investigation proves that it undoubtedly 
favours NATO and it protects it from very severe accusations. Further, the 
members of this expert group have remained anonymous, thus inviting educated 
guesses as to who is behind the report of the group, which had indeed been 
rendered public. "' The anonymity of this group adds suspicions for the objectivity 
and credibility of its report. As a scholar noted, the report is more interesting in its 
106 Kamyar Mehdiyoun, "NATO Air Campaign against Serbia and the Laws of War", American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 94, issue 4, October 2000, pp. 690-691. Also Al Report and HRW 
Report, supra notes 55 and 56. 
107 Paolo Benvenuti, "The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing Campaign 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", European Journal of International Law, vol. 12, No. 3, 
2001, p. 506. 
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general legal discussion than convincing in its conclusions regarding the 
application of the law to the particular facts. 112 
NATO's conduct of war has been examined so far. To this extent one 
argument can come up for sure. No matter if NATO breached international 
humanitarian laws or not, it definitely violated one of the most essential premises 
of humanitarian intervention: its aerial campaign had not been proportionate and 
civilians were not immune from NATO's intervention. ' 13 The number of civilian 
deaths in the NATO air campaign against the FRY varies in different reports, but 
the Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the ICTY report agree that 
this number ranges from 400 to 600.114 NATO advanced various justifications for 
those deaths: collateral damage, regrettable mistake, and incidents where civilians 
had been used by the Yugoslav Army as human shields. The above justifications, 
however, do not satisfy the doctrinal prerequisite of humanitarian intervention that 
civilians should not be affected from intervention. The hundreds of dead people 
and thousands of injured people will remain a dark spot to NATO's intervention in 
Kosovo. 
The argument made by Dr William Schulz, executive director of Amnesty 
International, is very illustrative of the nature of NATO's bombings: "those who 
act in the name of human rights bear a responsibility to see that their own actions 
scrupulously accord with human rights standards ". 115 Nelson Mandela noted that 
112 Id 
113 Richard Falk, "Humanitarian Wars", Realist Geopolitics and Genocidal Practices: "Saving the 
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"NATO's actions are equally criminal with those of Milosevic ". 116 US Former 
President, Jimmy Carter said: "our destruction of civilian life there [Yugoslavia] 
has now become senseless and excessively brutal, '. 117 All the arguments above 
clearly illustrate the contradiction between NATO's military means and 
humanitarian ends. "8 The fact that NATO's declared "humanitarian war" turned 
against innocent civilians is a shadow in NATO's strategic plans. NATO's 
promises for a "war without casualties" proved to be a big lie. What is more, 
NATO's and its members' statements that this war was not aimed against Serbia, 
but against its evil regime proved to be another unsuccessful premise. No doubt, 
the bombing of public utilities, infrastructure, hospitals, cultural heritage, factories, 
etc. ' 19 did affect the civilian population and not superficially. 120 It is questionable 
whether or not it affected Milosevic more than innocent Serb citizens. Falk argued 
that "the magnitude and effects of such bombing are difficult to reconcile with the 
humanitarian claims made by NATO spokespersons ". 121 
In addition, had NATO really sought a humanitarian war without 
casualties, it would have avoided aerial bombings and it would use ground 
troops. 122 This is because aerial bombing often impedes humanitarian relief and is 
indiscriminate in its targets. 123 The International Independent Commission on 
116 Littman, op. cit., p. ii. 
117 Id 
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Kosovo concluded that "the high-altitude tactic does not seem to have legal 
significance, although it does weaken the claim of humanitarianism to the extent 
that it appears to value the lives of the NATO combatants more than those of the 
civilian population in Kosovo and Serbia [proper], and especially the lives of the 
Kosovar Albanians that it was acting to protect. 124 In other words, air-power 
conflicts with the humanitarian aims of NATO's operation. 125 Yet, the prerequisite 
of humanitarian intervention is not to protect the combatants, but the civilian 
population. As regards to the reason why NATO did not commit ground troops, it 
is very easy to detect it. NATO did not wish to have a great number of casualties 
among its combatants because such a thing would threaten the smooth continuation 
of the campaign. 126 NATO's priority to protect its combatants rather than the 
civilian population in the FRY is another evidence of the lack of proportionality. 127 
A further attestation of the lack of proportionality is that NATO failed to 
terminate its campaign within the estimated time. The initial NATO estimates for 
the duration of the air campaign128 fitted to the traditional requirement of 
humanitarian intervention that it should be limited in time and scope. 129 Madeleine 
Albright declared "I don't see this as a long-term operation". 130 Nevertheless, 
124 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International 
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NATO campaign had been largely extended from a one week campaign to eleven 
weeks. 131 Had the FRY and NATO not concluded before an agreement, and had 
the ground troops been involved in the conflict, then NATO's intervention would 
extend for several weeks further. 132 It is difficult to believe that NATO strategic 
commanders did not know that making Milosevic capitulate would be a very 
difficult and time-consuming task. They probably kept it secret to avoid public 
opposition. 
Further, NATO expressed its intension to halt Milosevic's campaign of 
ethnic cleansing against the Albanian population in Kosovo. 133 On the contrary, it 
could be said that NATO intervention precipitated it. 134 Within one month of the 
start of the bombing campaign, thousands of ethnic Albanians had been killed in 
Kosovo and over half a million were driven out from Kosovo, while hundreds of 
thousands had been refugees internally displaced within Kosovo. 135 Thus, not only 
NATO did not protect the Kosovar Albanians, but it also worsened the situation for 
the refugees-'36 The expansion of the Serb brutality and the intensification of the 
Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing were predictable according to the Supreme 
Commander of the NATO forces in Kosovo, the CIA Director and the Pentagon 
131 McWhinney, op. cit., p. 71. 
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133 Chomsky, op. cit., p. 3. 
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spokesman. ' 37 They did not explain, yet, why the commenced the aerial bombing if 
this tragedy was predictable from their own estimates. 
What is more, NATO's claim that it would stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo 
was a damn lie, not only because the Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing against 
ethnic Albanians was predicted, but because they did not try to prevent it. NATO 
commander General Wesley Clark stated that "air power alone cannot stop 
paramilitary action". 138 In addition, a senior NATO officer stated: "we said from 
the outset that we couldn't prevent atrocities and crimes against humanity with just 
an air campaign. But knowing that we had to keep an alliance of 19 nations 
together, we knew that if we asked for ground troops, we would be asking the 
impossible ". 139 From both the above enlightening statements, one can easily 
understand that NATO's war against Yugoslavia was disproportional. NATO knew 
that Milosevic would respond with intensified ethnic cleansing campaign, it also 
knew that aerial bombing was not adequate to halt ethnic cleansing, and yet, 
NATO commenced its air campaign against Yugoslavia! Some interventionists 
would support that Yugoslavia would commit ethnic cleansing against the 
Albanian population in Kosovo irregardless of NATO's intervention. But it would 
be unfounded to support an argument only with hypotheses. The only thing sure is 
what Charney noted: "we will never know if those violations would have taken 
place in the absence of the removal of the observer mission [OSCE verification 
mission] and the initiation of the campaign ". 140 
137 Layne op. cit., p. 52 and Littman, op. cit., p. 17. 
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Had NATO states been that keen to protect the human rights of the 
Kosovars, they would involve ground troops to avert the Serb military brutality, 
regardless of the possibility to face big losses in their own combatants. That would 
frankly be a moral case for humanitarian intervention, where states disregard their 
losses with the purpose of attaining a desirable humanitarian outcome. But this is a 
moral case for the theory, not for the practice of humanitarian intervention, as most 
instances of alleged humanitarian interventions have proved so far. 14' In a recent 
intervention, for instance, the US government withdrew its forces from Somalia 
because TV cameras commenced turning the public opinion against the 
intervention by showing images of the US heavy losses in Mogadishu. 142 It is 
evident that western governments calculate the humanitarian objectives with their 
losses, which is a thing that does -not reconcile with the noble objectives of 
humanitarian intervention. This proposition is also contradictory to the principle of 
proportionality that recommends the protection of the innocent civilian, not of the 
combatant. 
To this point, it is evident that NATO intervention had not met the principle 
of proportionality neither before the recourse to war (gunboat-coercive-implacable 
diplomacy), nor during the conduct of war (civilian deaths, indiscriminate targets, 
aerial bombing inadequate to halt ethnic cleansing, worsening of the situation). 
The last thing to define is whether or not NATO intervention managed to set up the 
prospects for a free and democratic multiethnic Kosovo that it had proclaimed. '43 
Although the researcher's view might seem to be prejudiced because of its 
141 Roberts, op. cit., p. 110. 
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143 Krieger, op. cit., p. 261 and 299. 
328 
consistency on the lack of proportionality, the facts assure that the outcome of 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo is at least disappointing and blameworthy. NATO 
did not achieve the multiethnic and democratic Kosovo after the end of the 
conflict, even with the presence of the KFOR military presence and the UN 
civilian presence. The most blameworthy fact, however, is that after five years of 
international monitoring of this Serbian province, the situation still remained tense 
and ethnic cleansing along with repression of ethnic minorities was largely 
witnessed, but this time the Serbs and Roma had been the target (see below). Thus, 
it could be argued that NATO intervention does not meet the principle of 
proportionality even five years after Milosevic withdrew his forces from Kosovo, 
because it did not attain another criterion of humanitarian intervention (as 
described in Chapter 1): reasonable prospect of success that will lead to a positive 
humanitarian outcome and not to failure. 
First of all, the fact that the UN Security Council undertook to settle the 
problems regarding the future of Kosovo, as the only UN organ responsible for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, had been a positive NATO step. 
Security Council resolution 1244 demanded that the FRY put an immediate end to 
violence and repression in Kosovo, and that it withdraw from Kosovo; further, it 
decided on the employment of international civil and security presences, the 
demilitarisation of the KLA, the return of refugees and the protection and 
promotion of human rights. 144 But facts proved that not only NATO, but the whole 
world community would be unable to settle things down in this troubled region. 
After the withdraw of the Yugoslav military and police forces, ethnic Albanians 
144 S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. 
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commenced their campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Serbs and other 
minorities in Kosovo 145, unmolested by the KFOR security presence in the 
province. In order to have a detailed and documentary presentation of the situation, 
this paper will exhibit quotations from various international organisations and 
NGO's. 
The immediate departure of the Serb forces from Kosovo led to another 
humanitarian catastrophe. The UN Secretary-General's Report, a month after the 
withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces, presents the savageness in the region: "while 
the first wave of Kosovo Serb departures was prompted by security concerns 
rather than by actual threats, a second wave of departures resulted from an 
increasing number of incidents committed by Kosovo Albanians against Kosovo 
Serbs. In particular, high profile killings and abductions, as well as looting, arsons 
and forced expropriation of apartments, have prompted departures, %146 A later 
report of the Secretary General, illustrates the deterioration of the situation: "the 
level and nature of violence in Kosovo, especially against vulnerable minorities, 
remains a major concern. Measures taken to address this problem are having a 
positive effect, but continuing vigilance is necessary... In the period since mid- 
June, non Albanian groups, primarily Serbs and Roma, have been targets for 
harassment, intimidation and attacks. As a result, many have left Kosovo. 
According to the Yugoslav Red Cross, approximately 150,000 displaced persons 
have registered for assistance in Serbia and Montenegro since mid-June 1999. 
Freedom of movement for those who remain is extremely limited and, in some 
t45 Whitman, op. cit., p. 176. 
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cases, virtually non-existent. In effect, non Albanians are restricted from making 
use of public facilities such as hospitals or visiting shops and markets. 147 The 
above reports reflect the harsh situation in Kosovo, even under the auspices of the 
UN and the security presence in the region (KFOR). 
Let us now examine the OSCE report on post-war Kosovo. Accordingly, 
this report found that "one discernible leitmotif emerges from this report. Revenge. 
Throughout the regions the desire for revenge has created a climate in which the 
vast majority of human rights violations have taken place... the first, obvious, 
group that suffered revenge attacks are the Kosovo Serbs... the report repeatedly 
catalogues incidents throughout the area where vulnerable, elderly Kosovo Serbs 
have been the victims of violence. The result of this has been a continuous exodus 
of Kosovo Serbs to Serbia and Montenegro and an inevitable internal 
displacement towards mono-ethnic enclaves, adding fuel to Serb calls for 
cantonisation. Other particular victims of violence documented in the report are 
the Roma and Muslim Slavs ". 148 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe had been deeply concerned by "the plight of almost 200,000 Serb and 
Roma internally displaced persons, constituting more than 80 per cent of their pre- 
war population, who fled Kosovo after the withdrawal of Serb military forces ", 149 
Well-known NGO's have also described the post-war situation in Kosovo. 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International noted that the province's 
147 S/1999/987,16 September 1999, Report of the UN Secretary-General. 
148 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Kosovo report: As Seen, As Told Part II, 
June to October 1999. For more details: http: //www. osce. org/kosovo/reports/hr/part2/03- 
execsum. htm. 
149 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1424 (1999), Evaluation of the 
Humanitarian Situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo and 
Montenegro, September 1999. For further details: http: //www. coe. int. 
331 
minorities, and especially the Serb and Roma (Gypsy) populations, as well as some 
ethnic Albanians perceived as collaborators, faced daily attacks, abductions and 
murders; another tactic of the Albanians had been the burning and looting of Serb 
and Roma property in order to force occupants to leave and to discourage their 
return; ill-treatment and torture of detainees were happened on a daily basis. '50 
Amnesty International cites that according to UN estimates 50 per cent of the non- 
Albanian population had fled Kosovo by the end of 1999.151 Human Rights Watch 
reports that the most serious incidents of violence have been carried out by 
members of the KLA and that the response of KFOR and the United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to abuses against minority populations has been 
belated and uneven. 152 
This is a good illustration of NATO's unwise policy. At first, NATO 
favoured the KLA terrorists by offering its support; then it forced the Serbs to 
negotiate with KLA representatives in Rambouillet first, and in Paris latter; finally 
it called the KLA to disarm and it believed that it would do so. But NATO should 
not forget that a terrorist will never leave his arms and his brutal tactics. This is 
what happens when someone becomes loyal to an unwise policy. The transmuted 
terrorists into freedom fighters removed their masks and revealed their cruel 
purposes; and their intension had not only been the removal of the Milosevic 
suppressive regime, but the removal of all non-Albanian entities in Kosovo. 
Disarming the KLA would be a difficult task, as terrorist do not submit their 
'50 Human Rights Watch Report, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Abuses Against Serbs and Roma 
in the New Kosovo. For more details see: http: //www. hrw. org/reports/1999/kosov2/. Also 
Amnesty International Report 2000, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see http: //www. amnesty. org. 
'51 Id 
152 Human Rights Watch, supra note 150. 
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weaponry that easily. No doubt, the KLA is not a liberation movement, but a 
terrorist organisation that chases the "Greater Albania" goal. 153 In support of this 
argument come all those acts for "revenge" against the Serbs in Kosovo. Some 
pro-Albanian authors noted that these acts of revenge should not come as a 
surprise-l-"4 But if it is to claim such an immoral and inhuman premise, it would be 
affordable and justifiable only for the first months after the withdrawal of the 
Yugoslav army and police units, and in absentia of the KFOR security presence. 
Yet, the continuation of Albanian terrorism within the fifth year after the Yugoslav 
withdrawal cannot be justified on revenge, but on the cruelty, savagery and 
barbarity of the Kosovo Albanian population, if we accept that the KLA is not a 
terrorist organisation and that they condemned the post-war violence. 155 Yet, it is 
unreasonable to claim that all Kosovo Albanians are cruel and brutal. It is the 
Kosovo Albanian extremists that caused this savagery against the remaining 
Kosovo minorities. NATO is responsible for the situation because it treated those 
armed gangs gently and the present situation is an outcome of its mistaken policy. 
Let us now consider in brief the situation in Kosovo from 1999 until 
recently. In 2003, the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council 
condemned the violent attacks in Kosovo, including shootings, in which the 
victims were members of the Kosovo Serb Community, as well as UNMIK law 
153 McWhinney, op. cit., p. 70 and Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 7. 
154 Agon Demjaha, The Kosovo Conflict: A Perspective from Inside, in Albrecht Schnabel and 
Ramesh Thakur (eds. ), Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: Selective 
indignation, Collective action, and International Citizenship, New York, United Nations University 
Press, 2000, p. 33. Also Malcolm, op. cit., p. 327. 
155 Human Rights Watch, supra note 150. 
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enforcement authorities. 156 He also noted that `freedom of movement still remains 
of great concern to minority residents, particularly after the attacks involving 
primarily Serb victims that occurred during the reporting period". 157 Two of the 
victims of these violent attacks had been two Serb teenagers shoot dead, and 
another four injured-l" But the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council did 
not opine on the role of the UNMIK and KFOR in creating a secure environment 
in Kosovo. Five years after their entry in Kosovo they are unable to create the 
conditions of a multiethnic Kosovo and they failed to confront the Albanian 
terrorism. NATO intervention did not bring its promising fruits. 
This is because neither NATO, nor the UN achieved to accept that the KLA 
had been unscrupulous terrorist organisation aiming to destabilise the whole 
Balkan region. NATO had only targeted the Serbs, leaving the KLA terrorist 
immune from any kind of threat. 159 As a result, the Kosovo Protection Corps, 
created by UNMIK, consisted of "the leadership and ranks of the demilitarised 
UCK [KL4] and the remainder from the civilian population at large ". 160 Not 
surprisingly, the Serb representatives resisted this plan because they considered the 
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) as the KLA in disguise. 161 It could be argued that 
they had been realistic and wise. Indeed, the UN Secretary-General admitted that 
"a number of security incidents and crimes have taken place which reportedly 
'S6 S/2003/996,15 October 2003, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo. 
157 Id Also SC/7870, Press Release, 12/09/2003, security Council 4823`d Meeting, for more details 
see: http: //www. un. org/News/Presstdocs/2003/sc7870. doc. htm. 
158 S/2003/996,15 October 2003. 
159 Layne, op. cit., p. 14. 
160 Krieger, op. cit., p. 555. 
161 S/1999/1250,23 December 1999, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo. 
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involved former members of the KLA and potential members of KPC ". 162 On 3 
December, the head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) has ordered that 12 Kosovo Protection Corps officers be 
suspended, with pay, for six months while a police investigation takes place into 
their role in the demolition of a railway bridge in the northern Kosovo town of 
Loziste in April. 163 The involvement of the KPC in terrorism and organised crime 
is evident every day in many incidents involving inter-ethnic crime. 164 
In addition, although the ICTY rushed to hunt Milosevic and other Serbs 
responsible for violations of international humanitarian laws, they left the KLA 
terrorist immune until recently. It took the ICTY some years to understand that not 
only the Serbs violated international standards. What was the Albanian 
population's response to the indictments of KLA members by the ICTY? Kofi 
Anan's report to the UN Security Council responds thoroughly: "Kosovo's 
political leadership pledged full cooperation with the Tribunal, but some elements 
of the Kosovo Albanian public did not support those arrests. There were 24 
peaceful demonstrations associated with the arrests made by the Tribunal and with 
sensitive trials, arrests and judicial investigations, primarily of former KLA 
members charged inter alia with war crimes, terrorism and organised crime ". 165 
Nevertheless, it is very questionable how peace and multi-ethnic Kosovo can be 
achieved, when people demonstrate (even peacefully) in favour of terrorists. 
162 id 
163 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Official Website News Coverage. 
For more details see http: //www. unmikonline. org/news. htm#0312. 
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Summer 2001, p. 39. Also S/PV. 4770,10 June 2003. 
165 S/2003/421,14 April 2003, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo. 
335 
An unaware reader would suppose that the Kosovo Albanian public 
provides support for the KLA terrorists, but its greatest fear is the possible 
indictment of its leader Hashim Thaci, former KLA leader, accused many times by 
Belgrade for war crimes. Indeed, the fact that he is not in Hague now is really 
questionable, because he had been the leader of a secessionist movement that 
adopted unscrupulous terrorist skills and violated humanitarian laws. But again, 
this reflects the world community of the double standards. The same had happened 
with the leaders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Franco Tudjman and Alia 
Izetbegovic, that had never been indicted by the ICTY, although there is plenty of 
evidence against them. 166 Let us not take a brief glance of other reports on the 
situation in Kosovo. In March 2003, OSCE and the UNHCR submitted the tenth 
assessment of ethnic minorities in Kosovo. According to this report, the key areas 
of concern for minorities in Kosovo are: "security and freedom of movement, 
access to essential services, participation in political and civil structure, incentives 
to inter-ethnic dialogue, and patterns of the return process ". 167The report further 
notes that "discrimination continues to represent a significant obstacle to the 
ability of minorities to live reasonable lives in Kosovo ", 168 
An examination of the situation by NGOs is essential for the overall view 
and understanding of the situation. Four years after the intervention the Amnesty 
International found that "despite the efforts of the NATO-led Kosovo Force 
166 James George Jatras, NATO's Myths and Bogus Justifications for Intervention, in Ted Galen 
Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War, Washington D. C., 
CATO Institute, 2000, p. 27. Also Avramovic, supra note 18. 
167 OSCE AND UNHCR, Tenth Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (period 
covering from May 2002 to December 2002), March 2003. For further details see OSCE 
http: //www. osce. org/documents/mik/2003/03/903_en. pdf. 
168 Id 
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(KFOR) and the UN Civilian Police (UNMIK Police) to provide security and 
protection, members of minority communities continue to both suffer and fear 
assaults by the majority community on their lives and property... This climate of 
fear, insecurity and mistrust, exacerbated by continued impunity, has resulted in 
the effective denial of the right of minorities to enjoy freedom of movement in 
Kosovo. Additionally, those who are able to gain some measure of freedom of 
movement, find themselves subjected to both direct and indirect discrimination 
when seeking access to basic civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights... 
Serbs and Roma - were both individually and indiscriminately targeted, on the 
basis of their identity - and irrespective of their individual responsibilityfor human 
rights violations, including war crimes perpetrated by Serbian forces ", 169 
From all the reports so far, the plight of the Serbs and other minorities in 
Kosovo is evidently illustrated. Four years after the UN civilian and security 
presence (2003) and the international community seemed to be unable to restrain 
the Kosovo Albanian hatred and brutality. Thus, the fruits of NATO intervention in 
Kosovo are highly ambiguous, save NATO intervened with the purpose of only 
protecting the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. An ICRC survey found that 88 per cent 
out of the 227,800 Serb Kosovo refugees in Serbia have to survive in extremely 
harsh economic conditions with an estimated average of 2.40 euros per day. 170 Yet, 
this huge number of refugees seems unlikely to return in Kosovo, given the 
169 Amnesty International Report, Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo/Kosova), "Prisoners in our own 
homes": Amnesty International's concerns for the human rights of minorities in Kosovo/Kosova. 
For more details see: http: //web. amnesty. org/library/Index/ENGEUR700102003? open&oýENG- 
YUG. 
170 International Committee of the Red Cross, internally displaced facing bleak fate in Serbia and 
Montenegro, ICRC study for internally displaced people in Serbia and Montenegro, for more details 
see 
http: //www. icrc. org/web/eng/siteeng0. nsfriwpList471 /7FB81 E9B791139C5C 1256D8E0043FE88. 
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inhuman security conditions for minorities in Kosovo. There is another reasonable 
question regarding NATO's disproportionate response to the crisis of Kosovo. If 
NATO were to stop ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, why did it not try to halt the 
Albanian campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Serbs and other minorities171, 
given that NATO forces cover their fifth year in Kosovo? NATO's inability to 
protect the minorities in Kosovo and improve the situation illustrates the fact that 
NATO's actual goal has not been the improvement of the humanitarian situation in 
Kosovo, but the fondling of the Albanians. 
Yet, there is another thing that darkens NATO's intervention. More than a 
dozen Christian nations approved this intervention in order to protect the Muslim 
Albanians of Kosovo. What was the Albanian response as a thanksgiving to these 
nations? Literally, it has been the destruction of Christian Orthodox churches and 
monasteries all over Kosovo. A special publication of the Serb Patriarchate clearly 
illustrates the dimension of the cultural destruction in Kosovo. The second edition 
of this publication presents 76 instances of desecrated and destroyed Orthodox 
Serbian Churches and Monasteries in Kosovo, while the third edition 107.172 There 
is enough evidence that the Albanians are well aware of exploding and burning 
churches, desecrating cemeteries and religious icons (Saints, Mother Mary and 
17' Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, Unbridled Humanitarianism: Between Justice, ' Power, 
and Authority, in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds. ), Kosovo and the Challenge of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship, 
New York, United Nations University Press, 2000, p. 497. Also Falk, op. cit., p. 332. 
12 Crucified Kosovo, Destroyed and Desecrated Serbian Orthodox Churches in Kosovo and 
Metohia (June-October 1999), 2°d edition, publisher. "The Voice of Kosovo and Metohia" Media 
and Publishing Centre of Raska and Prizren Orthodox Eparchy, November 1999; Crucified Kosovo, 
Destroyed and Desecrated Serbian Orthodox Churches and Monasteries in Kosovo and Metohia 
(June1999-May 1999), 3rd edition, publisher: "The Voice of Kosovo and Metohia" Media and 
Publishing Centre of Raska and Prizren Orthodox Eparchy, 2001. Photographs and more 
information available in the official website of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosovo: 
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Jesus), and destroying cultural, historical and religious monuments. 173 All those 
acts of vandalism, flagitiousness, impiety, cruelty and inhumanity reveal the 
temperament of the Kosovo Albanians. These can only be terrorist acts and reveal 
the real incentives of the KLA and its supporters. The Council of Europe strongly 
condemned the "continuing criminal destruction of cultural heritage ". 174 
The fact that the world media do not present the plight of the non-Albanian 
population in Kosovo five years after the UN involvement in the area is really 
provocative. The Albanian refugees are back, but Serb, Roma and other minorities 
are still expatriated and cannot return until they feel that there is a secure 
environment in Kosovo that would assist their decision to return. But all the above 
acts of Kosovo Albanian-oriented terrorism and vandalism eliminated the hopes 
for return in their mother land. NATO failed to create a peaceful Kosovo and a 
"multi-ethnic" society. The Kosovo Albanian extremists illustrate their will to 
ethnically cleanse the area and create an independent Albanian Kosovo that, no 
doubt, their ulterior goal will be the unification with their motherland, Albania 
(although they rule out this possibility for reasonable purposes). 175 But are these 
people worthy of gaining this independence? Or, will independence solve these 
problems? Yet, these questions are to be answered in a following chapter. 
Last but not least, the clashes of March 2004, five years after the UN and 
KFOR presence, constitute a clear proof that NATO's intervention did not bear 
any fruits for Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians indiscriminately attacked Serb homes, 
173 Id 
174 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1422,1999. For more details 
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orthodox churches and public offices. 176 Human Rights Watch reported that most 
of the violence had been directed at the ethnic Serb minority. 177 One of the most 
brutal tactics, however, had been the arson attacks on newly built homes of Serbs 
who had recently returned to Kosovo following their forced displacement in 
previous years. 178 The UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Kosovo, 
Harri Holkeri, stated to the media and before the UN Security Council that the 
violence was the most serious setback to the efforts of UNMIK and KFOR of the 
past five years. 179 NATO decided to send additional troops in Kosovo. 180 The Serb 
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica described the attacks as "planned in advance 
and coordinated". 181 "This was an attempted pogrom and ethnic cleansing against 
Kosovo's Serbs", he said. 182 In addition, he noted that these attacks showed the 
true nature of Albanian separatism, "its violent and terrorist character". ' 83 The 
Kosovo Albanians had been also condemned by the US Commander of NATO 
forces for southern Europe, Admiral Johnson, has linked the recent violence in 
Kosovo to ethnic cleansing. 184 This statement is of a great importance because it 
proves that NATO was unable to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Indeed, NATO's 
16 Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Calls for Restraint on all Sides after Attacks in 
Kosovo and Reprisals in Serbia", for more details see: 
http: //web. amnesty. org/library/mdex/engeur700082004. 
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intervention stopped ethnic cleansing against the Kosovo Albanians, but it did not 
manage to put an end to the Albanian efforts to expel the Serbs out of Kosovo. 
Five years after NATO intervention in Kosovo, it is now evident that NATO's 
humanitarian intervention did not bring the prospects of peace in Kosovo. 
The report of the UN Secretary-General explains everything in detail: "the 
onslaught led by Kosovo Albanian extremists against the Serb, Roma and Ashkali 
communities of Kosovo was an organized, widespread, and targeted campaign. 
Attacks on Kosovo Serbs occurred throughout Kosovo and involved primarily 
established communities that had remained in Kosovo in 1999, as well as a small 
number of sites of recent returns. Properties were demolished, public facilities 
such as schools and health clinics were destroyed, communities were surrounded 
and threatened and residents were forced to leave their homes. The inhabitants of 
entire villages had to be evacuated and, following their departure, many homes 
were burned to the ground... 730 houses belonging to minorities, mostly Kosovo 
Serbs, were damaged or destroyed. In attacks on the cultural and religious 
heritage of Kosovo, 36 Orthodox churches, monasteries and other religious and 
cultural sites were damaged or destroyed. Two of them are listed by UNSESCO as 
major sites of universal significance and a third is listed as a site of regional 
significance ". 185 What is the impact of these violent attacks? Harri Holkeri stated 
before the Security Council that "the impact of the violent attacks on members of 
the Kosovo Serb, Roma and Ashkali communities was dramatic. Some 4100 
185 S/2004/348,30 April 2004, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration in Kosovo. 
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persons were displaced in just two days ". 186 No doubt, the extremist elements of 
the Kosovo Albanian society wanted to expel the remaining minority populations 
out of Kosovo. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) noted that "the events of 
17-19 March have severely limited the ability of members of minority communities 
to live, travel and work in Kosovo and let back their trust in the ability of KFOR, 
UNMIK Police and the KPC to maintain a secure environment and police 
effectively ,,. 1 87 
After the world community had strongly condemned ethnic violence in 
Kosovo, the crisis calmed down. Nevertheless, it will take a lot of time to heal the 
wounds of the Kosovo minorities. Nothing can convince them that they will not 
meet the same challenges in the future. What is more, there have been several other 
violent events since the March violence, as Harri Holkeri addressed before the UN 
Security Council in May. 188 Yet, the situation has slightly changed in 2005 and 
2006. Although the security situation in Kosovo has improved, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo reported before the Security 
Council "members of the minority communities continue to feel insecure ". 189 Kofi 
Anan reported that "although security for minorities has improved since the 
violence of March 2004, freedom of movement remained precarious.. . 
Minorities 
fears are fed by isolated incidents... The Government has not taken sufficient action 
to punish ethnically targeted crime ". 190 In his 2006 reports, he observed that the 
security situation in Kosovo, while generally stable, remains fragile and that 
186 S/PV. 4967,11 May 2004. 
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violent incidents have continued to occur. 191 He also stressed that these incidents 
create a perception of insecurity for the members of minority communities. 
The situation in Kosovo from 1999 up to date has been examined so far. 
Although armed intervention ended in 10 June 1999, the intervention in Kosovo 
continues. NATO has its forces in Kosovo (KFOR) together with the United 
Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). However, NATO's 
"humanitarianism" did not attain the tolerant society in Kosovo. Terrorism and 
violence continue to threaten the remaining minorities in Kosovo. To achieve its 
goals, the world community, and more specifically western powers, has to stop 
fondling the Albanian separatism and condemn all its extremist parameters. Serbs 
and the other remaining minorities are the ones to be treated gently and 
protectively, because they are the victims, since the fall of Milosevic. If NATO had 
been eager to protect the Albanians from Milosevic's brutal tactics, now it will 
have to prove its humanitarianism in favour of the Serbs and other vulnerable 
minorities. In the past Milosevic had been culpable for the brutalities in Kosovo. 
What about today? Who is responsible for the violence in Kosovo? Unfortunately, 
there is no name for this violence. This is because separatism has no name. Now 
the separatists see their dream of a "Greater Albania" very close and they will not 
give up. Their aim is to drive Serbs and other minorities out of Kosovo. It is 
difficult for NATO to heal the wounds it has opened. 
What matters here is the fact that this intervention violated in many aspects 
the UN Charter, humanitarian laws, and fundamental standards of the so called 
"humanitarian intervention". In other words, this intervention approved the realist 
191 S/2006/45,25 January 2006 and S/2006/361,5 June 2006. 
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argument that humanitarian intervention is an "oxymoron", "paradox", a 
"contradiction" in terms. 192 Too many scholars argue that there is no war to call 
humanitarian. 193 On the other hand, scholars who oppose that humanitarian 
intervention is an oxymoron194 are not only liable to the critics against NATO's 
intervention, but they have to calculate the positive outcomes of this `humanitarian 
war'. The situation did not improve and ethnic cleansing has not been halted. 
Deprivations of fundamental human rights are evident in every-day Kosovo. 
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo succeeded only on behalf of the Kosovo 
Albanians. The UN-NATO declared multi-ethnic Kosovo seems to be a legend, as 
the false promises of humanitarian intervention. 
The interventionists would expectedly argue that doing something is better 
than doing nothing. Indeed, this premise is right and it is difficult to disagree. But 
doing something does not mean waging war. Humanitarian intervention should 
express other forms of intervention, rather than military engagement. Among these 
forms are peaceful efforts of settling disputes. For instance, diplomatic means are 
the ideal way of dealing with humanitarian crises. Yet, wise diplomacy was absent 
in the case of Kosovo, as in other alleged humanitarian interventions. In Somalia, 
for example, the hawkish former UN Secretary-General disregarded Sahnoun's 
192 192 Ian Brownlie, The Principle of Non-Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, in 
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diplomatic efforts and sought a forceful intervention. But this is not what 
humanitarian intervention should aim at. Other means of intervention for 
humanitarian purposes are sanctions (i. e. economic sanctions) by the world 
community against a state violating its obligations to human rights standards. But 
if the UN and powerful states wish to attain a world of justice, equality and respect 
of human rights in rogue and evil states, they should invest on education of these 
countries. This is the only way to achieve a long-term respect for human rights. In 
Kosovo, the outcome illustrated that bombardments are not adequate to improve 
the human rights situation. Thus, it could be argued that war is counterproductive 
in the realm of human rights and the only way to improve human rights 
internationally is to educate the societies that enjoy the minimal standards of these 
rights. 
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LEGAL AND MORAL CAVEATS FOR THE CREATION OF AN 
EMERGING NORM IN FAVOUR OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
According to this thesis, the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo is a very bad 
precedent for the future of humanitarian intervention. Many fundamental premises 
of humanitarian intervention have been violated by the intervening states. As a 
result, NATO intervention in Kosovo has not fulfilled most of the criteria of 
humanitarian intervention, as expressed in Chapter 1. Accordingly, it could be said 
that NATO did not exhaust all peaceful avenues before the commencement of its 
bombings. From the analysis in this chapter it becomes evident that the 
Rambouillet and Paris conferences on Kosovo did not present realistic diplomatic 
efforts. They were a kind of dictation under the NATO threats, not negotiation. 
What is more, NATO did not meet the principle of proportionality. The means it 
used were against the noble humanitarian ends. As a result, the bombing of refugee 
conveys, hospitals and against the civilian population in general are severe 
violations of international humanitarian laws. These tactics are more blameworthy 
when they are used in an intervention that aims to protect fundamental human 
rights. 
In addition, the bombings of public utilities and civilian infrastructure are 
against another fundamental premise, which dictates that intervention to protect 
human rights should have a minimal effect on authority structures of the affected 
states. Yet, the bombing on roads, churches, electricity and water supply cannot 
justify the above criterion. As regards to the reasonable prospects of success as 
well as the long-term goal of humanitarian intervention, it could be argued that 
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NATO intervention did not accomplish any of them. Ethnic cleansing kept on, but 
this time the Albanian population tried to push the Serbs out of Kosovo. It seems 
that a multiethnic and tolerant society in Kosovo has not yet been accomplished. 
Therefore, it is difficult to support that NATO achieved its humanitarian goals by 
intervening in Kosovo. It could be said that NATO intervention in Kosovo, was 
not only illegal under international law, but it was also not justified on the moral 
ground. Yet, the emergence of a new norm requires support in all stages: legal, 
moral and political. NATO's bombings of civilian infrastructure and population 
also shocked the moral conscience of the publics. This is why NATO became 
liable to critics against its bombings. Hence, NATO has set a very bad precedent 
for the future of humanitarian intervention. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE FUTURE STATUS OF KOSOVO 
Article 2(4) declares that "all members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations". Yet, some prominent international lawyers believe that 
Article 2(4) is not a ban to unilateral humanitarian intervention. This chapter has to 
deal with this traditional argument of interventionists. A thorough analysis will 
lead to the collapse of such an argument, which seems to be pivotal for lawyers in 
favour of humanitarian intervention. This analysis will begin with the examination 
of arguments of both sides. In a second stage follows an analysis of alleged 
humanitarian intervention in state practice. The purpose of this research is to 
observe whether or not this theory fits into the practice of this kind of intervention. 
Many well-known lawyers in the past and today claim that Article 2(4) 
allows humanitarian intervention, because this kind of intervention is not directed 
against "the territorial integrity or political independence of any state", and 
because it is not "inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations"' Teson 
Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd edition, 
New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997, pp. 146-157; Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the 
Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, The Hague, The Netherlands, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999, pp. 91-102; Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian 
Brawnlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in J. N. Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the 
Modern Workt, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1974, pp. 235-244; Anthony D' Amato, 
International Law: Process and Prospect, , New York, Transnational Publishers, 1987, pp. 50-75; 
W. Michael Reisman and Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in R. 
B. Lillich (ed. ), Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, Charlottesville, Virginia 
University Press, 1973, pp. 167-177; Martha Brenfors and Malene Maxe Petersen, "The Legality of 
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thinks that "a genuine humanitarian intervention does not result in territorial 
conquest or political subjugation". Hopkinson also thinks that humanitarian 
interventions should not interfere, influence, act, against or put in question the 
political independence and territorial integrity of the state concerned. 3 
Nevertheless, it would be naive to believe that an armed intervention in the internal 
affairs of a state is not a clear breach of the state's sovereignty. What is more, state 
practice has proved that alleged humanitarian interventions turn against the 
territorial integrity and political independence of states. Such instances will be 
explored after a brief analysis of the opponents of this interpretation, who believe 
that Article 2(4) bans all kinds of military force, save the exceptions made by 
articles 51 and 42 of the UN Charter. 4 
The theoretical examination will be examined in two stages. First of all, it 
is very essential to detect whether or not humanitarian intervention is consistent 
with the "purposes of the United Nations". No doubt, the promotion of human 
rights is a declared purpose of the UN Charter, as it is clearly stated in Article 
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention -A Defence", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 69, 
2004, p. 467; Frederik Harhoff, "Unauthorised Humanitarian Interventions - Armed Violence in the 
Name of Humanity? ", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 70,2001, pp. 81-82. Also 
International Court of Justice, "Legality of Use of Force", Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium, 
1999, oral pleadings, see: http: //www. icj-cij. org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe. htm. 
2 Teson, op. cit., p. 151. 
3 Nicholas Hopkinson, Humanitarian Intervention?, London, HMSO, 1996, p. 11. 
4 Rosalyn Higgins, Intervention and International Law, in Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World 
Politics, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 38; Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in J. N. 
Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 
1974, pp. 222-223; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 267-268; Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in Hedley Bull 
(ed. ), intervention in World Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 104-106; Oscar Schachter, 
"The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion", American Journal of International Law, vol. 75,1984, 
pp. 645 and 649; Oscar Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", Michigan Law 
Review, vol. 82, pp. 1624-1626; Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 48-51; Nicholas 
Tsagourias, "Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo and Legal Discourse: Self-Deception or Self- 
Consciousness? ", Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 13,2000, p. 16. 
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1(3). 5 Other UN instruments on human rights, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, affirm the fact 
that one of the UN's primal purposes is the promotion of human rights. However, 
the UN Charter and the other UN instruments do not refer among the purposes of 
the United Nations the military enforcement for the protection of human rights. 
Moreover, as Akehurst noticed6, the first purpose of the UN listed in the Charter is 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 7 Accordingly, Akehurst 
argues that Article 2(4) means that every use of force is "inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations", unless the state concerned can point to some 
other provision of the Charter which expressly authorises the use of force. 8 Thus, it 
could be argued that humanitarian intervention is not in conformity with the 
purposes of the United Nations, that Article 2(4) declares. 
The second point to make here is that humanitarian interventions are 
directed against "the territorial integrity or political independence of any state", 
despite the opposite claims of the advocates of humanitarian intervention. Many 
scholars of international law have accurately supported that any humanitarian 
intervention, however limited, constitutes a clear violation of state's political 
S UN Charter, Article 1(3) declares that among the purposes of the United Nations is "to achieve 
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion". 
6 Akehurst, op. cit., p. 105 and Chesterman, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
UN Charter, Article 1(1) declares that the purposes of the United Nations are: "To maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles 
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace". 
8 Akehurst, op. cit., p. 106. 
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independence and territorial integrity. 9 In support of the above argument comes the 
ICJ's decision in the Corfu Channel case. The UK had carried out a minesweeping 
operation in Albanian territorial waters and argued before the ICJ that it did not 
threaten the territorial integrity or the political independence of Albania. But the 
Court decided that "the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of 
Albanian sovereignty". 10 Although the argument did not have to do explicitly with 
humanitarian intervention, it seems that the judgment of the Court condemns any 
kind of intervention, including humanitarian intervention. " In other words, the 
Court opined that any kind of intervention is a clear breach of a state's territorial 
integrity and political independence. Oscar Schachter noted that the idea that a war 
waged in a good cause would violate neither the territorial integrity nor political 
independence of the target state demands an "Orwellian construction" of those 
terms. 12 
The above part concerns the theory of humanitarian intervention regarding 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Let us now consider whether of not the practice of 
alleged humanitarian intervention violates Article 2(4). No doubt, a detailed 
analysis of state practice can prove that all humanitarian interventions have 
constituted a violation of a state's territorial integrity and political independence, 
however limited in time and scope. In some cases, this violation becomes evident 
in a very unambiguous way. For instance, India's intervention in East Pakistan led 
9 Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, 
Morality and Politics", Journal of International Affairs, vol. 3,1983/84, p. 318. Also Akehurst, 
op. cit., p. 105. 
10 ICJ Pleadings, 1948, Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), vol. 3, p. 296. Also available on the 
Internet http //www. icj-cij. org. 
" Akehurst, op. cit., p. 110. 
12 Schachter, op. cit., pp. 645,649. 
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to a state's secession with the creation of independent Bangladesh. In addition, the 
US, UK, and French "Safe Havens" to protect the Kurdish population of northern 
Iraq constitutes a clear violation of the Iraqi territorial integrity and political 
independence, since Iraq was not able to exercise its sovereign rights over its 
territory. The aerial control of northern Iraq without a Security Council 
authorisation is, no doubt, a violation of the Iraqi territorial integrity and political 
independence. All other interventions for humanitarian purposes have imposed to a 
lesser or greater extent limitations to state sovereignty. Thus, all cases of alleged 
humanitarian intervention lead up to the collapse of the pseudo-dilemma that 
humanitarian intervention does not affect the territorial integrity and political 
independent of any state. However, it is not possible for a brief chapter to analyse 
all instances of humanitarian intervention and the extent that the territorial integrity 
and political independence of a state had been violated. Hence, this chapter will 
focus on the case of Kosovo and the limitations imposed upon the sovereignty of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Further, this essay will cover matters relating 
to legality vs. illegality in the current Kosovo administration and its future status. 
Initially, before the commencement of the bombings, the intervening 
states had declared that they would oppose the creation of an independent Kosovo 
and they expressed their support and respect for the Yugoslav territorial integrity 
and political independence. First of all, the UN Security Council stressed the 
importance of the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 13 The Contact Group had also stressed that it would 
13 S/RES/1160 (1998), 31 March 1998, S/RES/1199 (1998), 23 September 1998, S/RES/1203 
(1998), 24 October 1998, and S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. 
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support neither independence nor the maintenance of the status quo in Kosovo. 14 
The European Union expressed that the principles for a solution of the Kosovo 
problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and should be in accordance with OSCE standards, including those set 
out in the Helsinki Final Act, and the Charter of the UN, and expressed support for 
an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a substantial degree of 
autonomy and meaningful self-administration. 15 Accordingly, the Council of 
Europe stressed their respect for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and they 
expressed their support for an enhanced autonomy for Kosovo within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 16 
Let us now examine the major diplomatic documents regarding the quest 
of a solution to Kosovo's political problem, prior to the recourse to force. First of 
all, the Hill Proposals supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and did not 
even imply independence for the province. 17 Moreover, the Rambouillet Draft 
recalled the commitment of the international community to the territorial integrity 
14 Contact Group Foreign Ministers, Statement on Kosovo, New York, 24 September; Contact 
Group, Statement on Kosovo, Bonn, 25 March 1998; Contact Group, Statement, Rome, 29 April 
1998; Contact Group Meeting, Statement on Kosovo, Washington, D. C., 8 January 1998. All the 
above cited documents can be found in: Heike Krieger (ed. ), The Kosovo Conflict and International 
Law, An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, 
116,121,127,140 and 187. '-EU, 
1950th Council Meeting, General Affairs, PRES/96/253, Luxembourg, 1 October 1996; EU, 
2078'h Council Meeting, General Affairs, PRES/98/86, Brussels, 30/31 March 1998; EU, 2085th 
Council Meeting, General Affairs, PRES/98/109, Luxembourg, 27 April 1998; EU, Cardiff 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions, DOC/98/10,15/16 June 1998; EU 2111' Council 
Meeting, General Affairs, PRES/98/227, Luxembourg, 29 June 1998. The above documents are 
cited in Krieger (ed. ), op. cit, pp. 120,128,139,144 and 147. 
t6 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1360 (1998), Crisis in Kosovo, 
18 March 1998; Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1384 (1998), Crisis 
in Kosovo and situation in the FRY, 24 September 1998. The above documents are cited in Krieger 
(ed. ), op. cit., pp. 125,154. 
17 Hill Proposals for a Settlement in Kosovo, October 1998-January 1999, cited in Krieger (ed. ), 
op. cit., p. 155. 
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of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
18 The agreement reached by Milosevic and 
the UN special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, known as the Holbrooke Agreement, 
had also affirmed the commitment to the respect to sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the FRY. 19 NATO positively expressed its full support for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. 
20 Many powerful states, including 
France, Germany, Canada, Russia, Japan, China, the US, and the UK opposed 
independence for the province of Kosovo and insisted for a greater autonomy and 
self-administration of Kosovo within the FRY 
21 
Subsequently, it is clear from the above that major organisations, powerful 
states and the international community in general strongly opposed the creation of 
an "independent Kosovo". Instead of the Kosovo Albanian separatism and the idea 
of a "Greater Albania", the world community preferred another way to solve the 
political problem in this Yugoslav province. Hence, before the Security Council 
and other international fora, states clarified their intention to contribute to the 
efforts for an enhanced autonomy of Kosovo within the FRY, respecting the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. All Security Council resolutions 
regarding Kosovo, for instance, speak of a greater autonomy and self 
administration for Kosovo and not of the creation of an independent state. What is 
18 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Rambouillet, 23 February 1999, 
cited in Krieger, op. cit., p. 261. 
19 Accord Reached by Slobodan Milosevic, President of the FRY, and the UN Special Envoy, 
Richard Holbrooke, UN Doc. S/1998/953, Annex, 14 October 1998, cited in Krieger, op. cit., p. 290. 
20 NATO, statement by the Secretary General on behalf of the North Atlantic Council, Press 
Release (99)020,19 February 1999; NATO, Statement on Kosovo issued at the Ministerial Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release M-NAC-1(98)61,28 May 1998; NATO, Statement on 
Kosovo Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Press 
Release M-NAC-D-1(98)77,11 June 1998. The above documents are cited in Krieger (ed. ), op. cit., 
pp. 260,288 and 289. 
21 Krieger, op. cit., pp. 129-136,153,298,380,395 and 398. 
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more, all those resolutions stress their devotion to the respect to sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the FRY . 
22 
Thus, the pre-war practice clearly illustrates the will of states to respect the 
Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo. This initial position of states seems to be in 
conformity with the traditional argument of interventionists that humanitarian 
intervention is not directed against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state. Yet, a military intervention, however limited in time and scope, 
constitutes a temporary breach of a state's territorial integrity and political 
independence. As regards to the plans for the future status of Kosovo, it could be 
said that urging Yugoslavia to cede autonomy and self administration in Kosovo is 
an unambiguous long-term violation of a state's territorial integrity and political 
independence. In other words, even if Kosovo is not to become an independent 
state, an autonomous status imposes restrictions to the Yugoslav sovereignty, thus 
violating its territorial integrity. 
The positions of states, international organisations and group of states, 
before the aftermath of the conflict, regarding the solution of the political problem 
of Kosovo have been set out so far. It is very essential, however, to consider how 
the war ended up and under which circumstances a political settlement for Kosovo 
can be achieved according to this settlement. Security Council resolution 1244 had 
been the document that ended the war and that sketched out the prerequisites for a 
final solution. The fact that the war ended with a Security Council resolution is of a 
great importance, because NATO acknowledged the exclusivity of the Council as 
22 S/RES/1160 (1998), 31 March 1998, S/RES/1199 (1998), 23 September 1998, S/RES/1203 
(1998), 24 October 1998, and S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. 
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the only organ responsible for the advancement of international peace and security. 
Accordingly, the Council reaffirmed the commitment of all Member States to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia, as set out 
in the Helsinki Final Act 23 It also reaffirmed the call of previous resolutions for 
substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo. 
24 In addition, 
the Council decided that "a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based 
on the general principle in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and 
other required elements in annex 2" 
25 According to annex 1, "a political process 
towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing 
for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the 
Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic Yugoslavia "26 
There is no doubt the Council does not provide any chance for 
independence of the Yugoslav province and it spoke of substantial autonomy and 
self-administration. Annexes 1 and 2 also provide for the same thing and reject any 
possibilities for the secession of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. A further detail of 
annex 1 notes that this substantial self-government of Kosovo should be in 
conformity with the Rambouillet accords. Yet, the Rambouillet accords affirm the 
commitment of the international community to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia. 27 What is more, this agreement for 
peace and self-government in Kosovo is evidently a plan for an autonomous 




27 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Rambouillet, 23 February 1999, 
cited in Krieger (ed. ), op. cit., p. 261-262. 
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Kosovo and not an independent state. An objective observer can easily feel that the 
terms of the Rambouillet agreement acknowledge that the FRY has competence 
over the following areas: territorial integrity, common market, monetary policy, 
defence, foreign policy, customs services, federal taxation, and federal elections 28 
Thus, it would be a hallucination to claim that resolution 1244 and the Rambouillet 
accords provide the basis for an independent Kosovo. On the contrary, they 
provide a basis for enhanced autonomy for Kosovo. The only shadowy remark 
rests on the Rambouillet clause: "three years after the entry into force of this 
Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism 
for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of people... "29 It could be 
argued, that although this premise seems to allow greater flexibility for various 
misinterpretations, 30 the whole draft is committed to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the FRY. 
As regards to the Council's reference to the 1975 OSCE Helsinki Final Act, 
there are some points to be advanced. First of all, the participating States expressed 
in Article I that "they consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance 
with international law, by peaceful means and agreement". 
31 Furthermore, Article 
II contains exactly the same provisions with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Thus, 
the Helsinki Final Act reaffirms the respect to territorial integrity and political 
independence of any state. In Article III, "the participating States regard as 
inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe 
zs Ibid., p. 62. 
" Krieger, op. cit., p. 278. 
30 Carsten Stalin, "Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations Constitutional 
Framework for Self-Government", Leiden Journal of international Law, vol. 14,2001, p. 539. 
3' Helsinki Final Act, http: //www. osce. org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e. pdf. 
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and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these 
frontiers ". 32 There is no doubt that the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act 
devote respect to state sovereignty and political independence. In Security Council 
resolution 1244 there is no provision for the creation of an independent Kosovo, 
nor is there any similar provision in the statements of states and international 
organisations until the adoption of this resolution. Accordingly, it could be argued 
that the international community rejected the dream of "Greater Albania" and 
KLA's separatism. Reference to an independent Kosovo was not evident in any 
UN document, nor was it evident in any diplomatic document. 
In addition, many scholars have observed that apart from the fact that the 
Council spoke of a greater autonomy and self-administration, it did not make any 
reference to a right to self-determination or independence for the Kosovo 
Albanians. 33 It could be argued that the Council supported the view that Kosovo 
should remain an integral part of the FRY. 
34 In other words, it did not acknowledge 
a right to secession for Kosovo. What is more, Kosovo is not a state, but an ethnic 
minority within a state, and the right of self-determination is not a right of a 
minority to secede. 
35 Moreover, Kosovo does not satisfy the criteria of statehood 
under international law. 
36 Under those circumstances, the only legitimate solution 
32 Id 
33 Andreas Zimmermann and Carsten Stahn, "Yugoslav Territory, United Nations Trusteeship or 
Sovereign State? Reflections on the Current and Future Legal Status of Kosovo", Nordic Journal of 
International Law, vol. 70.2001, pp. 428 and 453. Helen Quane, "A Right to Self-Determination for 
the Kosovo Albanians? ", Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 13,2000, p226. Also Carsten 
Stahn, op. cit., p. 538 and 541. 
34 Jacques Rupnik, "Yugoslavia After Milosevic? ", Survival, vol. 43, No2, Summer 2001, p. 22. Also 
Zimmermann and Stahn, op. cit., p. 427. 
35 Quane, op. cit., p. 227. 
36 Enrico Milano, "Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the Legality of Kosovo's 
Territorial Status", European Journal of International Law, vol. 14 , 
No. 5,2003, p. 1002. Also 
Stalin, op. cit., p. 544. 
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of the political problem seems to be the attainment of substantial autonomy and 
self-administration for the Kosovars. Yet, the Council is the only competent 
instrument of the world community to have the final say on the future legal status 
of Kosovo. 37 
AUTONOMY 
Let us now consider the available options for the future legal status of 
Kosovo. The first option has to do with the UN Security Council resolution 1244 
and its call for "substantial autonomy and self-administration". In this case we 
have to do with an autonomous province of Kosovo within the structures of Serbia 
and Montenegro (former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). 
38 Resolution 1244 
decided that UNMIK's basic task is to promote the establishment of substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo and to organise and oversee the 
development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self- 
government pending a political settlement. 
39 Yet, things do not work out properly 
and UNMIK repeatedly violates the provisions of Security Council resolution 
1244. Not only it did not prepare Kosovo for substantial autonomy, but it cut off 
all the connections of Kosovo with Serbia. 
40 On the other hand, it could be said 
that UNMIK prepares Kosovo for an independent course, since it introduced a 
37 Ibid., p. 541. 
38 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, Conflict, International 
Response, Lessons Learned, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 269-271. Also Rupnik, 
op. cit., pp. 24-25, and Zimmermann and Stahn, op. cit., pp. 457-458. 
39 S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, para 11. 
40 Alexandros Yannis, "The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and its 
Implications in International Politics", European Journal of International Law, vol. 13, No. 5,2002, 
p. 1047. 
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different currency and a different legal system and it deprived Serbia of its 
sovereign rights over Kosovo. 41 This blatant violation of resolution 1244 can only 
be described by the word "peremptoriness". The basic document adopted by 
UNMIK is the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government. Not 
surprisingly, the document lacks the reference of "substantial autonomy", since it 
contains no reference to the authority of Serbia and Montenegro organs in 
Kosovo. 2 While typically and theoretically remaining a part of Serbia and 
Montenegro, Kosovo has been transformed into an internationalised territory under 
UN administration 43 
All these breaches of norms and rules by UNMIK led some scholars and 
authors in the view that autonomy is not a feasible political solution for Kosovo. 
No doubt, UNMIK has the authority to decide and implement the form of self- 
government for Kosovo. Nevertheless, this authority is restricted by resolution 
1244, which envisages the provisions for an autonomous province. It seems that 
UNMIK, the UN Secretary-General, the Secretary-General Representatives in 
Kosovo and some members of the Council disregard and veil UNMIK violations of 
resolution 1244. In many Security Council meetings, China, Russia and Ukraine 
protested against many decisions and policies of UNMIK because they considered 
them incompatible with resolution 1244 and an erosion of the Yugoslav 
41 Stahn, op. cit., p. 540. 
42 UNI\IIK, Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, UNMIK/REG/2001/9,15 
May 2001. For more details see: http: //www. unmikonline. org/constframework. htrr Also 
Zimmermann and Stahn, op. cit., p. 428. 
43 Stahn, op. cit., p. 540 and Zimmermann and Stahn, op. cit., p. 428. 
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sovereignty. 44 This cut off among the relations of Serbia and Kosovo, as well as 
the status quo in the province and the Albanian desire for independence, led some 
scholars to the view that returning Kosovo to the authority of Belgrade is 
unrealistic, or a utopia. 45 One of the basic arguments in support of the above claim 
is that no Kosovo Albanian would accept to live under the Serbian rule after the 
bloodshed of the past years 46 
INDEPENDENCE 
The second option is the creation of an independent Kosovo. 47 This option 
satisfies the ultimate goal of Kosovo Albanians for political independence. The 
1991 referendum on independence in Kosovo and the election of Rugova as the 
president of the so called "Republic of Kosovo" is a good illustration of this 
Albanian will48 Although this attempt lacked any form of international 
recognition49, the Kosovo Albanians became highly optimistic after the 1999 crisis 
and the UN administration of the province. Interestingly enough, the two major 
leaders of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova and Hashim Thaci, both see 
44 S/PV. 4138,11 May 2000, S/PV. 4153,9 June 2000, S/PV. 4171,13 July 2000, S/PV. 4190,24 
August 2000, S/PV. 4200,27 September 2000, S/PV. 4225,16 November 2000, S/PV. 4250,19 
December 2000. 
4s John J. Mearsheimer, The Case for Partitioning Kosovo, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's 
Empty Victory. A Postmortem on the Balkan War, Washington D. C., CATO Institute, 2000, p. 133. 
Also Rupnik, op. cit., p. 23 and the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., 
pp. 270-271. 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., p. 270. 
47 Ibid., pp. 268-269. 
48 Agon Demjaha, The Kosovo Conflict. - A Perspective from Inside, in Albrecht Schnabel and 
Ramesh Thakur (eds. ), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective 
Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship, New York, United Nations 
University Press, 2000, p. 33. Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, Lessons From 
Kosovo, Monroe, Common Courage Press, 1999, p. 27. Also Krieger, op. cit., p. 118, Stahn, op. cit., 
g. 534, Chesterman, op. cit., p. 211. 
Stahn, op. cit., p. 535, Milano, op. cit., p. 1002 and Demjaha, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
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independence as the final solution for Kosovo. 50 NATO's victory in the eyes of the 
Kosovo Albanians had been interpreted as the accomplishment of their perennial 
dream of a greater Albania. But the problems of an independent Kosovo will be 
more than its prospects. A future independent State will have to gain recognition 
from Yugoslavia. Even if the world community recognises an independent 
Kosovo, it would be difficult to imagine Serbia accepting and recognising an 
independent Kosovo. What is more, the international community has not 
recognised a right to secession for Kosovo in the past. Why should it do it now? 
The right to self-determination is not a right of an ethnic minority within a state to 
secede. 
In addition to the above arguments, there is a major reason against the 
creation of an independent state. This is that Kosovo remains a potential source of 
instability in the Balkans 51 Suffice to mention that the KLA's stated goal had not 
only been the creation of an independent Kosovo, but also the accomplishment of a 
"greater Albania". 52 The creation of an independent Kosovo and its unification 
with this greater Albania is the long-term desirable outcome. 53 Independence of 
Kosovo would revive nationalist Albanian claims in other neighbouring countries 
54 55 and other parts of Yugoslavia. These countries are FYROM and Greece. From 
50 Demjaha, op. cit., p. 38. 
S1 Alexandros Yannis, "Kosovo Under International Administration", Survival, vol. 43, Not, 
Summer 2001, p. 31. 
s2 Michael Maccgwire, "Why Did We Bomb Belgrade? ", International Affairs, vol. 76, Nol, 
January 2000, p. 4. Michael Radu, Stabilising Borders in the Balkans: The Inevitability and Costs of 
a Greater Albania, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the 
Balkan War, Washington D. C., CATO Institute, 2000, p. 126. 
53 Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 133 and Radu, op. cit., p. 126. 
54 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., p. 269. 
ss James George Jatras, NATO's Myths and Bogus Justifications for Intervention, in Ted Galen 
Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War, Washington D. C., 
CATO Institute, 2000, p. 24. Also Radu, op. cit., p. 129. 
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the above states only Greece does not receive an actual threat from the Albanian 
nationalism. Greece is both a NATO and EU member state and it is much stronger 
economically and militarily than Albania. 56 What is more, despite the unfounded 
extremist Albanian claims, the only Albanian population in Greece is the large 
proportion of economic migrants. 
Nevertheless, the actual threat lies in FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro. 
Albanian extremist raise claims against South Serbia and against Montenegro, 
including the capital, Podgorica, as well as against FYROM, including the capital 
Skopje. 57 Those actual threats have been confirmed to date. For instance, the crisis 
in Presevo Valley, in southern Serbia, after the 1999 crisis, represents the revived 
Albanian nationalism in the whole Balkan region. The Liberation Army of 
Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB) constitutes an offshoot of the KLA 
(UCK). 58 In December 2000, the Security Council strongly condemned the violent 
actions by ethnic Albanian extremist groups in Southern Serbia and called for the 
dissolution of these groups 59 Another KLA subsidiary took action in FYROM. 60 
The removal of the Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo fostered the hopes for a greater 
Albania in FYROM 61 This is because former KLA members became convinced 
that the West was unconditionally behind them and decided to constitute a guerrilla 
force in FYROM to assert irredentist claims. 62 Thus, the new KLA offshoot in 
36 Radu, op. cit., p. 129. 
57 Id 
58 Tim Judah, "Greater Albania? ", Survival, vol. 43, No3,2001, p. 10. Also Rupnik, op. cit., p. 35. 59 S/PRST/2000/40,19 December 2000. 
60 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 21. 
61 Id 
62 Judah, op. cit., p. 11. 
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FYROM became the NLA, which soon controlled the Tetovo region. 63 The longer- 
term Albanian goal in FYROM became the secession and union with a future 
independent Kosovo, or even with a greater Albania. 64 The outbreak of the crisis in 
FYROM after Kosovo clearly reveals the wider Albanian extremist desires. The 
Security Council had strongly condemned the violence committed by ethnic 
Albanian armed extremists. 5 Oddly, NATO intervened in FYROM by sending its 
forces, but this time not to protect the extremists, but avert them from destabilising 
the region. How can one explain this shift in NATO policy? 
It is clear from the above that an independent Kosovo would affirm the 
"domino theory" for future crises in the whole Balkans, affecting initially 
FYROM. 66 No doubt, the desirable goal of Kosovo Albanians, independence, will 
create much more problems in the area than it might solve. A future independent 
Kosovo is a prerequisite to a greater Albania. 67 The world community should 
topple the extremist Albanian hopes in Kosovo. What we witness today is that 
Belgrade is making democratic process, while the Kosovo Albanians are 
extremists. 68 And these extremist elements in the Kosovo Albanian society are 
evident in recent Security Council debates, UNMIK statements and Kofi Annan's 
reports. However, there will be an extensive analysis of this issue later in this 
chapter. In addition, the current Greater Albania nationalism has replaced the 
63 Ibid., p. 7. 
64 Ibid., p. 12. 
65 S/PRST/2001/7,7 March 2001, S/RES/1345 (2001), 21 March 2001, S/PRST/2001/20,13 
August 2001. 
66 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 22. 
67 Judah, op. cit., p. 15. 
68 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 20. 
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Greater Serbia nationalism of the 90's. 69 The crises Presevo Valley and FYROM 
after Kosovo, together with the Albanian efforts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo with 
terrorism and acts of violence have changed the pre-war analogies and the world 
community considers the Serbs good and the Albanians extremists. 70 Thus, it could 
be said that the seeds of humanitarian intervention did not bring any fruits for the 
peoples of the Balkans. The only change was the mutual succession of roles: from 
victim to victimiser, and from victimiser to victim. Overall, it seems that the dream 
of independence is far from reality. First and foremost, the Council will have the 
final say on Kosovo's future legal status. Undoubtedly, China and Russia would 
block any effort to create am independent Kosovo for two reasons. Firstly, because 
they are devoted to the Yugoslav sovereignty and territorial integrity; and 
secondly, they are afraid of setting a precedent that might undermine the stability 
and integrity of their own multi-national and multi-ethnic states. 71 
CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
The third option regarding the future status of Kosovo is conditional 
independence. This kind of solution would diminish the fears of neighbouring 
states and reactions among the international community and it would also 
accomplish the desire of the large population of Kosovo. 73 The Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo believes that conditional independence is the 
I Judah, op. cit., p-7- 
70 Id 
71 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., p. 269. 
72 Ibid., pp271-272 and Rupnik, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 
73 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 25. 
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best available solution because it would give the people of Kosovo the chance to 
determine their political future, and because full and unconditional independence is 
impossible in nature, since an independent Kosovan state lacks the key property of 
statehood, the means to defend itself against external attack and the ability to 
guarantee internal order. 74 Thus, Kosovo will remain dependent on some form of 
international security presence, both police and military. 75 Others believe that this 
conditional independence should embrace another three conditions, namely 
denunciation of greater Albanian and change of borders, constitutional guarantee 
of human rights and renunciation of violence in settling internal or external 
disputes. 76 
However, the definition of conditions and the acceptance by the Kosovars 
is going to be a much more difficult task. This is because it is difficult to imagine 
an extended international intervention into the FRY. What is more, for how long 
will this international presence remain in Kosovo? Is this conditional independence 
a leading step to full independence? Or will this conditional character will be 
permanent? Or, what will be the competences of this international presence? And 
will these competences conflict with the competences of the state? There are many 
questions regarding the vagueness of this option. The implied continued 
intervention in Kosovo will trigger various reactions among states. Such an option 
entails years of planning and negotiation in order to get to final conclusions. No 
doubt, the answers to the above questions will be the most difficult task. In 
addition, KFOR (the security presence in Kosovo) constitutes of various forces of 
74 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., pp. 271-272. 
73 Ibid., p. 272. 
76 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 25. 
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different states. It would be dubious to claim that these states will keep timelessly 
sending their forces in Kosovo. It could be argued that conditional independence 
will produce more problems than it will solve. 
INDEFINITE PROTECTORATE 
The fourth possible political solution is that Kosovo remains an indefinite 
protectorate and the maintenance of the current status quo in the province. This 
would mean an indefinite extension of UNMIK's mandate under resolution 1244.77 
The advantage of the indefinite protectorate would be that it will freeze the 
political problem for the future status of the province, since the international 
community will not have to choose between independence (the Kosovo Albanian 
will) and autonomy within a democratic Yugoslavia (the Serb objective). 78 But, no 
doubt, both sides would remain disappointed, since no side will attain its ultimate 
goal. More specifically, the Kosovo Albanians that envisage an independent 
Kosovo since 1999 is difficult to accept the indefinite extension of the mandate of 
resolution 1244. On the other hand, the maintenance of the current status quo 
would mean that many years after the conflict UNMIK was inadequate to prepare 
the people of Kosovo to enjoy substantial autonomy and self-government, as 
resolution 1244 proclaimed. 79 In other words, such an option would certify the 
failure of UNMIK to accomplish the plans for a multi-ethnic and democratic 
Kosovo, where all nations reconcile and respect human rights and the rule of law. 
"Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., pp. 263-266 and Rupnik, op. cit., p. 23. 
78 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 23. 
"International Independent Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., p. 264. 
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This is because the Council will have the final say on the future status of Kosovo 
after Kosovo meets the standards of human rights and the rule of law. Hence, the 
continuing international presence in Kosovo would certify its failure of the UN to 
attain its stated goals. In addition, it is contestable that states will keep sending 
their forces in Kosovo for an indefinite time. Thus, the continuation of the current 
legal status of Kosovo is practically impossible. 
PARTITION 
Last but not least, there is the option of partition. According to some 
scholars this is the only viable solution. 80 This is because co-existence of 
heterogeneous people in the Balkans is a very difficult task and reconciliation of 
different ethnic or religious groups much more unlikely. 81 Partition in Kosovo 
would mean the creation of two separate and ethnically homogenous territories. 82 
Such a solution would, no doubt, wipe off ethnic cleansing, inter-ethnic violence 
and human rights violations among both sides. According to the plan of partition, 
Serbia would get the northern part of Kosovo, the Mitrovica region, which already 
contains the majority of the Serb minority, as well as the most Serbian historical 
and religious sites, churches and monasteries. 83 On the other hand, Albanians will 
get most of Kosovo and will be able to decide for their future political status. 
Among the pros of the partition would be the extinction of inter-ethnic crime, 
I Radu, op. cit., p. 127 and Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 133. 
81 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 23. 
82 International Independent Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., p. 267. 
83 Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 135, Rupnik, op. cit., p. 23, Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo, op. cit., p. 267. 
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permanent solution of the refugee problem (more than 250,000 Kosovo Serbs have 
fled to Serbia proper), and the departure of the international forces from Kosovo. 84 
The beneficiary impacts of such a solution are evident, but the cons should also be 
calculated. 
One of the major objections to partition is that it may constitute a new form 
of ethnic cleansing with massive forced population movement for both 
communities. 85 The Independent International Commission of Kosovo believes 
that partition is an undesirable option. 86 However, this estimation is not that valid. 
According to the Commission, the only solution is conditional or full independence 
for the province. These pro-Albanian sentiments are clearly manifested in its 
position for partition. There, the Commission notes that partition would deprive the 
"majority population" of the Trepce mine complex that would reduce the economic 
viability of an "independent Kosovo". 87 This injudicious premise reveals two 
important elements of the Commission's preconception against the Serbs. First and 
foremost, it calculates the "majority population", but it probably ignores that the 
majority population is Serb because Kosovo belongs to Serbia. Secondly, it 
transparently worries that its beloved "independent Kosovo" will not survive if 
partition becomes reality. To this point it should be noted that the KLA repeatedly 
opposes partition. 88 Obviously the Commission embraces the same view with the 
secessionists, but it ignores the other side of the coin. To this extent, it could be 
argued that although massive forced population movement is not the most 
84 Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 136. 
85 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., p. 267 and Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 137 
and Rupnik, op. cit., p. 23. 
86 International Independent Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., p. 268. 
87 Ibid., p. 267. 
88 Radu, op. cit., p. 128. 
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desirable goal, it might become imperative, given the temperament and mentality 
of the Balkan peoples and the ethnic hatreds and tensions. 
Maybe in the end, the separation of the two different ethnically and 
religiously groups lead to the permanent squash of the tensions. In addition, the 
experience in Bosnia and the cantonisation of this Yugoslav Republic may give 
some crucial lessons for a possible future partition of Kosovo. The explicit 
partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Republika Srpska becoming attached 
to Serbia, Herzegovina becoming attached to Croatia and a small Muslim entity 
squeezed between them, testifies that similar practices elsewhere in the former 
Yugoslavia can flourish. 89 The paradigm of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the one that 
headaches the KLA. This is because it cannot attain its final goal of a Greater 
Albania with a "smaller Kosovo". The US and many states in the West seem to 
side the Kosovo Albanians. The International Independent Commission on Kosovo 
does not reject partition by accident. It reflects this line of western policy. Yet, few 
years ago the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher observed that ethnic 
cleansing in Krajina was "simplifying matters". 90 In that sense, partition in Kosovo 
would mean the same thing, but probably the US would like to simplify once again 
the matters by deporting the whole Serb population out of Kosovo. Instead of 
doing this thing that expresses the will of the Albanian majority, they could 
support partition as a more just solution. 
To this extent it should be noted that Serb representatives in Kosovo had 
asked for the cantonisation of the province since 1999, as the only way to beat the 
89 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 23. 
90 Chomsky, op. cit., p. 32. 
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wave of violent revenge attacks against his community. 91 However, the Albanian 
representatives refused to consider the Serbian proposal, which would lead, 
according to their arguments, to the partitioning of Kosovo. 92 Not surprisingly, the 
head of the United Nations administration in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, declared 
that he is opposed to plans put forward by Kosovar Serb leaders to create ethnic 
Serb cantons in Kosovo. 93 An imaginative excuse for the rejection of cantonisation 
plans had been the pretext that UNMIK wants to preserve a united, multi-ethnic 
Kosovo. 94 Yet, this multi-ethnic Kosovo exists only as a dream, since five years 
after the war inter-ethnic clashes are present, but this time the Kosovo Albanians 
are the ones that do their best to ethnically cleanse Kosovo from its Serb and other 
minorities. This paper will criticise further down UNMIK's alignment with the 
Albanian will, since UNMIK could not create a secure environment for a multi- 
ethnic Kosovo and it failed to protect all minorities. Thus, UNMIK is liable to all 
those acts of terror and crime against the Serb population, which could be avoided, 
had cantonisation taken place in the province. 
WHAT IS THE BEST AVAILABLE SOLUTION FOR KOSOVO? 
All possible options for the future legal status of Kosovo have been 
explored: autonomy within a democratic Serbia and Montenegro, full 
91 Chris Bird, "Ethnic Zones Urged for Kosovo, Serbs demand `Cantonisation' as protection against 
revenge attacks", for more details see: http: //www. guardian. co. uk/print/0,3858,3895753- 
103558,00. html. Also Gabriel Partos, "A Divided Kosovo? ", BBC, see: 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/europe/428185. stm 
92 BBC, "cantonisation of Kosovo on the agenda", see: 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/ l /hi/world/europe/429821. stm 
93 Gabriel Partos and Chris Bird, supra note 91. 
94 Id 
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independence, conditional independence, indefinite protectorate and partition. The 
only task left now is to examine which option presents the best available solution 
under the current situation and the enlivenment of the crisis five years after the 
1999 intervention. First of all, it could be argued that the current legal status is 
international protectorate under the UN administration. According to resolution 
1244, UNMIK should prepare the people of Kosovo to enjoy substantial autonomy 
and self-government, but it prepared them for a kind of conditional, if not full, 
independence. This clear violation of resolution 1244 is evident in each and every 
document that has to do with matters of the administration in the Serb province of 
Kosovo. For example, the Constitutional Framework for Self-Government totally 
ignores the provisions of resolution 1244 for autonomy within the FRY. This it to 
clarify why autonomy from the more feasible and possible solution, became the 
more unrealistic. 
However, it could be argued that only few efforts have been made for the 
permanent solution of the status problem. UNMIK has engaged recently on the 
status issue by proposing ten standards that should be attained before deciding the 
future status of Kosovo. This policy bears the title "Standards before Status" and 
it contains 8 principles. These principles are: functioning of the democratic 
institutions, the rule of law, freedom of movement, the return of refuges and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), economy, property rights, dialogue, and the 
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). 95 According to the UN Security Council, the 
fulfilment of these targets is essential to commencing a political process designed 
95 S/PRST/2003/1,6 February 2003 and S/PRST/2003/26,12 December 2003. 
372 
to determine Kosovo's future, in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999). 96 Yet, 
the recent outbreak of violence on 17,18 and 19 March 2004, all the above targets 
proved to be a hallucination. The paralysis of law and order, the destruction of 
Serb property and religious sites, the forceful pogrom of Serbs and the efforts 
made by the Kosovo Albanians to ethnically cleanse the province97 prove that 
these eight standards are unattainable. Five years after the 1999 have proved that 
UNMIK and KFOR are either deficient to meet the problems, or that terrorism and 
crime is a wider phenomenon among the Albanian population of Kosovo. Thus, the 
international community should change its stance against the Kosovo Albanians, or 
change its administrative policies. 
Until the March 2004 clashes the US and western powerful states namely 
Germany, kept on tacitly supporting the Albanian separatism and extremism. In all 
meetings of the Council regarding Kosovo their stance is very rigorous against the 
Serbs. For instance, they condemned Serbia's "declaration on Kosovo" and Serbia 
and Montenegro's "resolution on Kosovo", as well as the Kosovo government's 
stated intention to build an independent state. 
98 It seems that although the 
condemnation is dual it is uncritical, because Serbia has any right to insist on 
autonomy (this right is clearly stated in resolution 1244), since Kosovo is an 
integral part of the FRY. On the contrary, the Kosovo Albanians are the ones to be 
condemned because their calls for independence may lead to the destabilising 
impact of the Albanian terror for the whole Balkan Peninsula. 
96 Id 
97 S/PV. 4942,13 April 2004 and S/2004/348,30 April 2004, S/PV. 4967,11 May 2004. 
98 S/PV. 4823,12 September 2003. 
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The main concern now is to examine which of the possible options fits after 
the clashes of March 2004, almost five years after the UN and NATO presence in 
the province. All major news agencies clearly blamed the Kosovo Albanian side 
for the violent clashes in Kosovo. Yet, before the Council, most states ignored the 
Serbian cries for condemnation of the Albanian terrorism. On the contrary, the 
Council called on "all communities" in Kosovo to stop all acts of violence, to 
avoid further escalation and restore calm. 
99 Before the meeting of the Council in 
March 2004, only the ambassador of the Russian Federation rigorously condemned 
the Kosovo Albanian community: "the scope of the violence, apparently first 
perpetrated by the representatives of the Kosovar Albanian community against 
ethnic minorities and international presences, allows us to speak of targeted 
actions to squeeze the non Albanian population out of the region". 
' 00 In a later 
meeting of the Council, however, there was an evident condemnation of the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership. The German Ambassador stated that "the violence 
highlighted the stark choice between a civilised society and one where extremist 
influence the people... Political leaders must also be unequivocal about their 
determination to isolate and punish extremists ". 101 The French Ambassador noted 
that "the main lesson is doubtless an understanding that, even today, the role 
played by extremist forces in Kosovar society remains extremely significant and 
that we must make a renewed effort to isolate those extremists from the majority 
. population that seeks a 
democratic Kosovo " 102 
" S/PRST/2004/5,18 March 2004. 
100 S/PV. 4928,18 March 2004 and S/PV. 4942,13 April 2004. 
101 S/PV. 4942,13 April 2004. 
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For the first time the two most fervent European states that sough armed 
intervention against Yugoslavia, Germany and France, five years after the 1999 
intervention acknowledged the extremist elements in the Kosovo Albanian 
Community. Had they been more objective in the earlier stages of the crisis, things 
would be much better. The existence of this extremism has been also witnessed by 
the UN Secretary General. Kofi Anan noted in his report to the Council notes that 
"the cumulative effect of those incidents (shooting of a Kosovo Serb youth and the 
death of two Kosovo Albanian children) made worse by inflammatory and biased 
media reporting, were demonstrations, which, although spontaneous at the outset, 
were quickly taken over by organised elements with an interest of driving the 
remaining Serbs out of Kosovo and threatening international presence there", 
103 
The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Guehenno, adds 
that "there were reports of cases in which members of veteran groups of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army participated in the violence ". 104 What happened with the 
"demilitarised" KLA? Why are these people still in Kosovo and not in the Hague? 
It was not only Milosevic responsible for horrible crimes, but this team is equally 
blameable. And if Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing has stopped, their 
campaign keeps on. The world community has to stop treating them gently. First, 
the world community negotiated with them in Rambouillet and then in Paris and 
did not chase them for war crimes. Then they took posts in the Kosovo Protection 
Corps and they accepted those people in the Kosovo government. Now what? Will 
103 S/2004/348,30 April 2004. 
104 S/PV. 4942,13 April 2004. 
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the world community authorise them to ethnically cleanse Kosovo and accomplish 
their dream of "Greater Albania"? 
There is only one explanation for the March clashes. The Kosovo 
Albanians understood that they cannot attain their dream of independence with 
dialogue, but only with force. In 1998-9 they realised that they got closer to their 
goal by the KLA terrorist acts. The fight between the KLA and the FRY military 
and police forces drew the attention of the world community. In March, they 
wanted to attain their goals with their forcible approaches. Kosovo Albanian 
Politicians were reluctant to condemn the attacks on minorities and minority sites, 
including religious sites (Serb sites). 105 On the contrary, as both the Secretary 
General and his Special Representative in Kosovo (Harri Holkeri) noted, some 
politicians used the violence to renew calls for independence. 106 The fact that 
arrests of key suspects in the March violence triggered some protest 
demonstrations107 proves that the Kosovo Albanian society embraces these 
extremists. Thus, it could be argued that Kosovo Albanians will not give up with 
their forcible tactics as the only means for attaining their political goals. 
However, it seems that after the late incidents in Kosovo independence 
(conditional or full) became a less possible option. Undoubtedly, no neighbouring 
state would accept the creation of such a state, since they know that it would be a 
gunpowder storehouse in the heart of the Balkans. What is more, if the world 
community recognises an independent Kosovo it will have to be prepared for the 
destruction of the last Serb property and church, as well as for the removal of all 
105 S/PV. 4967,11 May 2004 and S/2004/348,30 April 2004. 
106 S/PV. 4967,11 May 2004 and S/2004/348,30 April 2004. 
107 S/PV. 4967,11 May 2004. Harri Holkeri's address to the Council. 
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Serbs out of Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians have already proved their intention to 
ethnically cleanse Kosovo and turn it into an Albanian province. Thus, the world 
community will have to be cautious for such an option. As regards autonomy and 
an enhanced self-administration for Kosovo within the structures of Serbia and 
Montenegro, it seems the past policies of western states and UNMIK actually 
rejected the prospects for an autonomous province of the FRY, since they did not 
make any effort to link the Kosovo institutions with the ones in Serbia, as 
resolution 1244 envisages. What is more, the overwhelming majority in Kosovo 
rejects this option. But since resolution 1244 provides for such a solution UNMIK 
should try to implement it and examine whether it works or not. The option of 
Kosovo remaining an indefinite protectorate becomes an automatically rejected 
option after the events of March 2004, because they prove that five years of UN 
administration of the province it did not manage to create the conditions for a 
democratic and peaceful Kosovo, where the respect of law and human rights would 
make all communities feel safe. The dream of a multi-ethnic Kosovo fell into 
chaos. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping operations noted that "the 
brutality and breadth of these events have indicated to all of us that Kosovo still 
has a long way to go on the path to multi-ethnicity,,. 108 Moreover, the "standards 
before status" policy of UNMIK is a utopia. The March clashes proved that most 
standards are practically unattainable. Half of these standards are: the rule of law, 
freedom of movement, return of refugees and IDPs and property rights. Can 
anyone guarantee them after March 2004, at the time that KFOR and UNMIK 
cannot? 
108 S/PV. 4942,13 April 2004. 
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What is the most feasible and realistic option? However hard it may sound, 
the only feasible and long-standing solution would be a form of partitioning 
Kosovo. The Serb premise on cantonisation of the province seems to be the right 
choice. Facts clearly illustrated that Kosovo Albanians are reluctant, if not hesitant, 
to live in peace with any other minority in Kosovo. The facts of March 2004 
constitute clear evidence that Albanian extremists want to ethnically cleanse 
Kosovo, to make it a state consisted of only Albanian citizens. They did not 
hesitate to attack the last Serb enclaves in the province. The burning of houses and 
churches is a tactic of expelling the Serbs out of their land. In their cruel terrorist 
and criminal attacks the Kosovo Albanian extremists did not refrain from targeting 
UN offices and personnel. Thus, it could be argued that the desirable multi-ethnic 
Kosovo is practically a utopia. The UN administration in Kosovo will now have to 
consider alternatives for the future. This thesis suggests that cantonisation of the 
province is the best available solution. Maybe the UN administration in Kosovo 
and the UN Security Council will revise their position and chase a feasible and 
realistic response to the Kosovo Problem. If the UN and UNMIK fail to resort to 
this decisive and effective solution they will loose their credibility and align 
themselves with failure. 
Let us now consider the possibilities of future partition or canonisation of 
Kosovo. First and foremost, there are two options for the cantonisation (or 
partition) of Kosovo. The first option is cantonisation of an independent Kosovo 
with two separate and autonomous regions, in the model of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This means that separation on ethnic lines is an imperative, since 
coexistence is impossible in practice. It is difficult to extinguish the ethnic and 
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religious hatred, mostly expressed by the ethnic Albanian extremists. In this first 
option it is essential to note that these divided areas may expect unification with 
Serbia or Albania. Although it seems that the consolidation of northern Kosovo 
would create no major problem to the neighbouring states, a possible unification of 
Albania and southern Kosovo would trigger a wave of reactions among the Balkan 
states, mostly because of its destabilising factors. FYROM has a large Albanian 
minority and fears future revolution of its Albanian population. The alternative 
option for cantonisation of Kosovo will be a divided autonomous Kosovo within a 
democratic Serbia and Montenegro. This option would be the ideal one because it 
would guarantee the preservation of borders and will not allow the Albanian 
separatism and the idea of a greater Albania to lead to another massacre in the 
Balkans. What is more, this option would be consistent with resolution 1244. 
All possible options for the future legal status of Kosovo had been 
examined to this extent. Accordingly, it has been stressed that the best solution to 
the political problem of Kosovo is partition of an autonomous Kosovo within the 
structures of Serbia and Montenegro. Nevertheless, the last part of this chapter will 
focus on whether each possible solution of the political problem will be against the 
territorial integrity of the FRY. The argument here is that the 1999 intervention in 
Kosovo had and continues to have significant impact on the FRY sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. '09 Despite the arguments advanced by some advocates of 
humanitarian intervention, it could be said that humanitarian interventions 
blatantly violate a state's territorial integrity. If the province is to become 
109 Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: the Case for Incremental Change, in 
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert 0. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 250. 
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independent, (conditionally or fully), its impact will be catastrophic for the 
Yugoslav sovereignty and territorial integrity. Serbia will loose a vital part of its 
country. Such a version would ruin the argument that humanitarian intervention is 
not against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Further, 
the option of the indefinite protectorate will reject the Yugoslav sovereignty over 
Kosovo. Thus, it would also violate the territorial integrity and political 
independence of Serbia and Montenegro. 
Partition is another clear breach of the Yugoslav sovereignty, because if 
Serbia and Montenegro gets the northern part of Kosovo, it will still loose the 
southern, which is also the larger part of Kosovo. The minor limitation upon the 
Yugoslav sovereignty would be the option of autonomy, as it is forecasted in 
resolution 1244, or partition of an autonomous Kosovo. Yet, autonomy still affects 
the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The disappointing fact is that the intervening 
states that waged this "humanitarian war" do not make any effort to fit it into the 
traditional frames of such a practice. The idea of an independent Kosovo is more 
than welcomed among powerful NATO states and more specifically the US. Yet, 
after the clashes of March 2004 the considerations on the future status of Kosovo 
are set on a new basis. But the impacts for the theory of humanitarian intervention 
will be damaged after the 1999 intervention in Kosovo, no matter what its future 
status will be. Five years of international presence and administration over Kosovo 
and the cut-off links and connections of the province with Serbia indicate a serious 
breach (not limited in time) of the Serbian sovereignty. Thus, it could be argued 
that Kosovo reveals another obscure side of humanitarian intervention: its 
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hypocritical and false premises in the theoretical part, which cannot be affirmed by 
the relative practice. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING KOSOVO'S FUTURE STATUS 
In October 2005, the Security Council released a presidential statement, 
where the Council "agrees with Ambassador Eide's overall assessment that, 
notwithstanding the challenges still facing Kosovo and the wider region, the time 
has come to move to the next phase of the political process. The Council therefore 
supports the Secretary-General's intention to start a political process to determine 
Kosovo's future status, as foreseen in Security Council resolution 1244". 110 Since 
then, four meetings have been convened in Vienna between Belgrade and Pristina 
with the purpose of determining Kosovo's future status. The Secretary-General 
reported to the Council in a very recent report of his "The process designed to 
determine the future status of Kosovo has moved forward during the reporting 
period... Four rounds of direct talks between the parties (Belgrade and Pristina) on 
the decentralisation of Kosovo's governmental and administrative functions were 
held in Vienna on 20 and 21 February, 17 March, 3 April and 4 and 5 May ". 111 
10 S/PRST/2005/51,24 October 2005. 
111 S/2006/361,5 June 2006. 
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CHAPTER 9 
POLITICAL MOTIVES VS. HUMAN RIGHTS AND MORALITY 
The last part of the analysis of the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo has 
to deal with other vulnerable perspectives of humanitarian intervention. This 
chapter will check whether the traditional arguments against humanitarian 
intervention are verified by the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, or not. First 
of all, there are two objections to humanitarian intervention that have been 
examined in the two previous chapters. The first has to do with abuses and 
distortion of the principle of non-intervention in international law. ' It is clear from 
the previous legal analysis (Chapter 6) that NATO intervention in Kosovo had 
been a clear breach of the UN Charter and international law. Thus, Kosovo affirms 
the argument that humanitarian intervention generates problems of abuses of the 
principle of non-intervention. The other has to do with prudence and 
proportionality. NATO's response to Milosevic's atrocities in Kosovo was 
disproportionate and ineffective. As already stated in a previous chapter (chapter 
7), the means used by NATO were against the proclaimed humanitarian ends. 
What is more, NATO's intervention did not manage to halt ethnic cleansing in the 
Serbian province, nor did it produce a tolerant and multi-ethnic society, where the 
rule of law and respect for human rights is the basic attained goal. Five years after 
NATO's intervention, inter-ethnic tensions and efforts committed by Kosovo 
' Dino Kritsiotis, "Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention", Michigan 
Journal of International Law, vol. 19,1998, p. 1007. 
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Albanians to wipe out the Serbs and ethnically cleanse the province prove that 
humanitarian war is an oxymoron. 
Apart from the two above arguments that have been thoroughly examined 
in previous chapters, there are another two objections to humanitarian intervention 
that will be explored extensively in this chapter and have to do with the political 
ground. The first task here is to search whether or not political motives and 
interests of states had been involved in NATO's decision to recourse to war. This 
is very important, because people opposing humanitarian intervention claim that 
no state would intervene for purely humanitarian motives, save a state has interests 
involved at stake. Secondly, there will be an extent analysis of the problem of 
selective protection of human rights. State practice has proved that states intervene 
selectively to protect human rights. Human rights should know no boundaries and 
should apply equally to all citizens of the world community. Nevertheless, the 
practice of humanitarian intervention has shown that some people are more worthy 
than other people across the planet. For instance, in the pre-UN era the great 
powers intervened in Turkey to protect the Greeks and the Christian population in 
Syria, but they did not intervene to halt genocide of the Christian Armenian 
people. This chapter will inquire whether or not the intervening states, namely 
NATO, did not intervene elsewhere in the world, where similar or worse atrocities 
had been committed by brutal regimes against its people. If this is the case, the last 
myth of humanitarian intervention will have collapsed after the 1999 NATO 
intervention in Kosovo. 
Let us now consider whether or not selfish interests of states had been 
involved in the case of Kosovo. First of all, it could be argued that selfish motives 
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of states and power-seeking policies usually motivate this kind of intervention. 
This is why many lawyers and scholars of international relations oppose the 
creation of such a rule. This fact replies to the pseudo-dilemma that humanitarian 
interventions are illegal but moral. On the contrary, humanitarian intervention is 
illegal and the morality of such interventions is highly questionable. If one seeks to 
justify humanitarian intervention on moral grounds, then he will have to prove that 
a state had been primarily motivated by such noble incentives and that there had 
been no major selfish interests at stake. However, there are not many scholars that 
would advance such a claim. Most advocates of humanitarian intervention would 
stress that the coexistence of other motives would not overcome the positive 
humanitarian outcome. This argument sounds persuasive, but it is very dangerous. 
Many states in the past advanced humanitarian justifications, but they only served 
their selfish motives. Adolph Hitler belongs to this category. 3 A genuine 
humanitarian intervention would be a relatively interest-free intervention, where 
the main concern would be the positive humanitarian outcome. But such an 
intervention had never existed in the past and it is quite difficult to occur in the 
future. 
2 Oscar Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", Michigan Law Review, vol. 82,1984, 
p. 1629. Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian 
Intervention by Military Force, American Journal of International Law, vol. 67,1973, p. 290. 
Vaughan Lowe, The Principle of Non-Intervention: Use of Force, in Vaughan Lowe and Colin 
Warbrick (eds. ), The United Nations and the Principles of International Law: Essays in the 
Memory of Michael Akehurst, London, Routledge, 1994, p166. Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian 
Intervention, in John N. Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 26. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin C. Morris, Humanitarian 
Intervention and State Practice at the End of the Cold War, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins 
(eds. ), International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, Basingstoke- 
England, Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 138. Jim Whitman, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: NATO's 
Humanitarianism versus Human Rights, in Ken Booth (ed. ), The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human 
Rights Dimensions, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 166. 
3 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 27-28. Also Kritsiotis, op. cit., p. 1021. 
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Kosovo is another paradigm that verifies the above assertion. Selfish 
motives, power-seeking policies and state interests had been once again strongly 
involved. From the beginning of the conflict powerful states rushed to protect the 
rights of the Kosovo Albanians. The political leaders of these powerful western 
states did not lack any cynicism to explicitly state the existence of such interests. 
President Clinton, for instance, in his address to the nation, clearly admitted the 
existence of interests. He said that "by acting now, we are upholding our values, 
protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace... ending this tragedy is 
a moral imperative. It is also important to America's national interests". In 
December 1992 George Bush had warned Milosevic that if Serbia began a war in 
Kosovo, the United States would consider it a direct threat to US national interests 
and would be obliged to act. 
5 Both US Presidents had confirmed the presence of 
US interests in Kosovo since 1992. Their persistence to act in order to protect their 
selfish motives leaves no doubt that humanitarian concerns had not been the 
primary goal of intervening states. This is because President Bush threatened 
Milosevic that he would act to protect US interests in absentia of humanitarian 
purposes. The fact that President Clinton intervened in 1999 under the pretext of 
human rights does not mean that this had been his actual intention. 
Thus, the existence of vital US interests in Kosovo are undisputable. The 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, also stressed the importance of interests in the 
° Heike Krieger (ed. ), The Kosovo Conflict and International Law, an Analytical Documentation, 
1974-1999, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 415. Sean D. Murphy (ed. ), 
"Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93, issue3, July 1999, p. 630. Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: US 
Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo, London, The John Hopkins University Press, 2002, 
140. Also Chesterman, op. cit., p. 211. 
Michael Maccgwire, "Why Did We Bomb Belgrade? ", International Affairs, vol. 76, Nol, January 
2000, pp. 5 and 14. 
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House of Commons: "strategic interests for the whole of Europe are at stake "6 
The remaining task is to detect what these interests could be and what is their 
significance for the US and its western allies. No doubt, it is impossible to obtain 
all relevant information that the US intelligence agencies have (i. e. the CIA). But 
there are many interests easy to detect. First and foremost, President Clinton had 
stressed the importance to act in order to avert the destabilisation of the whole 
Balkan region, the consequences of which might involve two of NATO's allies, 
Greece and Turkey. 7 This argument, however, is misleading, because after the 
1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo the prospects and the impacts of a future 
independent Kosovo are much more dangerous for destabilising the Balkans than 
any other aspect. Thus, it could be argued that peace and stabilisation had not been 
the primary objective of the US. 
The most credible explanation is the fact that Kosovo is rich in mineral 
resources! The Trepce mine in northern had always been a major resource for the 
whole of Yugoslavia. Accordingly, 50% of Yugoslavia's Nickel deposits, 48% of 
the magnesium, and 36% of the lignite come from Kosovo. 9 In addition, one fifth 
of the Serbian energy supply was produced in Kosovo. 10 The mine's director, 
Novak Bjelic, said that "the war in Kosovo is about the mines, nothing else "11. In 
addition, they are very important for the weakening of Serbia, which had been a 
6 Nicholas Tsagourias, "Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo and Legal Discourse: Self- 
Deception or Self-Consciousness? ", Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 13,2000, p. 15. 
7Krieger, op. cit., p. 415, Murphy. 
$ Marjorie Cohn, "NATO Bombing of Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention or Crime against 
Humanity? ", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, vol. 15,2002, p. 91. 
9 Marie-Janine Calic, Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Account, in Albrecht Schnabel 
and Ramesh Thakur (eds. ), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective 
Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship, New York, United Nations 
University Press, 2000, p. 26. 
10 Id 
11 Cohn, op. cit., p. 91. 
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major political goal for the US in the 90's. The extreme Serbian nationalism and 
fears of a Greater Serbia within the whole Balkan region constituted a threat to US 
dominance and control of the region. The US wanted the weakening of Serbia and 
it did accomplish it. It deprived Serbia from its claims over Krajina, Bosnia, and 
now, Kosovo. The continuous shrinkage of Serbia's national borders, as well as 
ethnic cleansing of the Serb population in Krajina and Kosovo brought the US very 
close to its ultimate goal. The creation of new and small, economically and 
terrestrially, states had been a major goal for the US, since it exercises a great 
control over these states. On the other hand, the US did not put an end to the 
exceeding Albanian nationalism and the dreams of a Greater Albania. This is 
because Albania is very weak economically, strategically and culturally. 
Moreover, the US control over Europe would ensure its hegemony over the 
transportation of rich oil deposits from the Caspian Sea, as well as control of 
European markets. 12 A scholar has masterfully observed that "Russia and the 
United States each want to control the flow of Caspian oil to world markets... 
Russia wants Caspian oil pipelines to run through its territory to the Black Sea. 
The US, controversially, wants those pipelines routed through its ally, Turkey... 
The April 1999 bombings of bridges at Novi Sad and other points on the Danube 
River blocked international cargo traffic to the Black Sea... Until April, tankers 
carried Caspian oil on the Danube from the Black Sea directly into Europe. NATO 
bombs halted this flow of oil along the route favourable to Russia ". 13 No doubt, 
the US foreign policy is unscrupulous in attaining its desirable outcomes. A good 
12 Ibid., p. 81. 
13 Ibid., p. 87. 
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illustration is Vietnam, or recently Iraq. In 1998, President Clinton's Energy 
Secretary, Bill Richardson, stated that the extraction and transport of Caspian oil 
"is about America's energy security. It is also about preventing strategic inroads 
by those who don't share our values ". 14 This statement verifies the above assertion 
that the 1999 intervention in Kosovo has strong links with the Caspian oil 
transportation. 
It is clear from the above that the US had selfish motives in intervening in 
Kosovo. For some interventionists the above arguments might be insufficient or 
unpersuasive, but there is a final fact that leaves no doubt for the US power- 
seeking and interest policies over Kosovo. In other words, this fact supports the 
argument that the humanitarian intent had only been a hypocritical reference by 
NATO states, with the purpose of veiling their cruel interests and gaining the 
support of the Western public, who is very sensitive on humanitarian issues. This 
fact bares the title "selective defence of human rights". The practice of powerful 
states after the end of the Cold War offers a wide range of such paradigms. This 
practice proves that states only act when they have interests at stake and they never 
intervene for primarily humanitarian purposes. There is no intervention purely 
motivated by human rights. In the case of Kosovo, although interventionists had 
rushed to proclaim that the intervening states did not have any selfish motives, it is 
now clear that they did. 
There are many instances that states did not intervene to protect the people 
of a state from repression, massacres and genocide committed by a brutal regime. 
Such a case is the Armenian genocide committed by the Turks, where the western 
14 Ibid., p. 89. 
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powers had actually ignored the plight of this people. No doubt, powerful states 
did not have any interest to intervene in Armenia. Therefore, they left the 
Armenians on their own fate. But human rights are universal and apply to each and 
every person in the world community. Human rights disregard colour, race, sex, 
language, religion or any other discrimination. But this selective protection of 
human rights illustrates that some people are worth of protection, while some 
others are not and this is the most vulnerable spot of humanitarian intervention. 
This is because, although the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is about the 
protection of human rights, it discriminates against some people across the planet, 
because of the lack of vital interests of powerful states in that region. Any form of 
discrimination is a violation of human rights. Thus, it could be argued that 
humanitarian intervention is against international law of human rights, because its 
practice discriminates in favour or against people in various places of the world. 
The existence of the problem of selectivity had always been evident in the 
past. However, the main concern here is whether or not this form of discrimination 
been present in the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. Given the practice of 
alleged humanitarian interventions in the past, there is no doubt that Western states 
decided once again to selectively defend human rights. There are many examples 
in support of the above argument. The first and strongest argument comes from the 
inland of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1995 the Croatian 
Government started its own campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Serb 
population from the Krajina region. 
15 In that case, the US and its NATO allies 
15 Adam Roberts, "NATO's `Humanitarian War' over Kosovo", Survival, vol. 41, No3, Autumn 
1999, p. 108. James George Jatras, NATO's Myths and Bogus Justifications for Intervention, in Ted 
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turned a blind eye to the cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Serbs from 
Krajina. 16 What is more, the US and its allies assisted the Croatian army's 
Operation Storm. 17 For the US Department of State ethnic cleansing in Krajina was 
"simplifying matters". 18 However, the crimes of the Croatians against the Serb 
population of Krajina are equal to those of the Serbs against the Kosovo Albanians. 
Yet, the free and democratic Western states did not feel committed to halt ethnic 
cleansing against the Serbs. In the case of Kosovo, the US did not use its previous 
claim that ethnic cleansing was simplifying matters. 
On the other hand, the world community had been horrified by the ethnic 
cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo. In that case, controversially, they tried to stop 
the Serb military, paramilitary and police forces. How could anyone explain this 
shift in the US and western policy? Does the West take into account ethnic 
cleansing or not? Why did they rush to save the Kosovo Albanians, while they 
ignored the Krajina Serbs? These questions are difficult for western politicians and 
diplomats to answer. But there is a realistic explanation: the West only intervenes 
in situations that vital interests are at stake. In absence of such interests the option 
of intervention remains unrealistic. In other words, humanitarian intervention is not 
a moral choice, but a hypocritical justification in order to sanctify and purify the 
evil and bellicose aims. This hypocrisy is also evident in the International Court 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), where Milosevic had been indicted, 
but the Croat President Tudjman and the Bosnian President Alia Izetbegovic that 
Galen, Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's Empty Victory, A Postmortem on the Balkan War, Washington 
D. C., CATO Institute, 2000, p. 26. Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, Lessons from 
Kosovo, Monroe ME, Common Courage Press, 1999, p. 26. Also Cohn, op. cit., p. 103. 
16 Jatras, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
"Cohn, op. cit., p. 103 and Jatras, op. cit., p. 27. 
is Chomsky, op. cit., p. 32. 
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could be accused for exactly the same crimes had been excluded from this process 
(and they will never appear before the ICTY because they are both dead now). 19 
Last but not least, the continuous presence of refugees from Krajina in Serbia 
affirms the negligence of the US and its Western allies for the ethnic cleansing in 
Kraj ina. 20 
At the same time, there were many places in the world, where worse 
humanitarian crises have taken place but the world community has not acted to 
rescue the oppressed people. 21 The US and its NATO allies remained absolutely 
indifferent, or at least ignorant. One instance had been the Western disregard for 
East Timor. East Timor has been the place where the one of the worst atrocities 
since 1945 has taken place. 22 There, more than a quarter of the whole population 
was decimated. 3 Compared to Kosovo, the massacre in East Timor had been 
expressively worse. Thousands of people had been killed and thousands had been 
forced to flee. The situation was much worse that the one in Kosovo. Yet, the 
world community appeared indifferent to the Timorese problem. Frankly, while the 
Western option for Kosovo had been action, for East Timor the West chose 
inaction (as regards military intervention in support of human rights). The 
hypocrisy of western states was obvious, because the crisis in East Timor had 
occurred at the same time with the crisis in Kosovo. Chesterman argued that "at 
19 Sima Avramovic, Professor of Law, University of Belgrade, personal interview. Also Chomsky, 
op. cit., p. 26, Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 5, Jatras, op. cit., p. 27. 
20 Roberts, op. cit., p. 108. 
21 Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power, Interventionism after Kosovo, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002, p. 139. Doug Bandow, NATO's Hypocritical Humanitarianism, in Ted 
Galen Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's Empty Victory, A Postmortem on the Balkan War, Washington 
D. C., CATO Institute, 2001, pp. 32-34. 
22 Chomsky, op. cit., p. 41. 
23 Cohn, op. cit., p. 104. 
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the time there Has great reluctance to intervene, despite the apparent hypocrisy 
given the international response to the situation in Kosovo". 24 
Which factor did finally change the world community's reluctance to 
militarily intervene in East Timor? The answer lies on Australia's (Australian 
troops had been the major components of INTERFET) desire to intervene after 
some conditions were to be met: there was a Security Council mandate; the action 
was consented to by Indonesia; the mission was a short-term one aimed at 
restoring security prior to the establishment of a UN force; and the force had a 
strong regional component. 25 Thus, Australia did not intervene before getting 
consent of the Indonesian government and before domestic political pressure over 
fears of a refugee crisis 26 The consent of the Indonesian government, as well as 
Resolution 1264 had satisfied the Australian prerequisites for intervention. 7 As a 
result, Australia led a multi-national force to restore peace and security in East 
Timor. However, this late intervention raises many questions about the stance of 
major actors in Kosovo. The US, UK, France and Germany had been at least 
reluctant to intervene, with the purpose of protecting the Timorese people. 
Actually, the US and UK had supported the Indonesian brutal regime in many 
ways: diplomatic support and crucial military aid. 28 The major actor here had been 
Australia, but the response had been belated. Yet, where were the superpower and 
24 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 150. 
25 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism", 
International Affairs, vol. 77, No4,2001, p. 807. 
26 Chesterman, op. cit., p. 150. 
27 Tom J. Farer, Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy, in J. L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert 0. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and Political 
Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 58. Also S/RES/1264 (1999), 15 
September 1999. 
28 Chomsky, op. cit., p. 42. 
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the European "humanitarians"? They felt strongly committed to halt ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo, but their absence in Timor illustrates their hypocrisy. They 
went to Kosovo for their own interests and they disregarded East Timor because of 
this lack of interests. No doubt, humanitarian intervention is an integral part of 
power politics. 
One of the major proofs of the selective and hypocritical interventionism to 
protect human rights in the 90's had been the Western reluctance to intervene in 
Turkey. The Turkish authorities had been oppressing the Kurds for many years, but 
campaigns of ethnic cleansing escalated in the 80's and 90's. 9 Turkey has 
perpetrated major atrocities and massacres in the Kurdish populated areas (south- 
eastern Turkey) and it had deprived its people from their most fundamental rights. 
Thus, the Kurds had been deprived from their cultural and linguistic rights for 
many years. 30 Assassination, torture and summary executions had been the main 
characteristic of the Turkish campaign . 
31 Freedom of expression had suffered 
greatly in the 90's. 32 Articles 168,169 and 312 of the Turkish constitution were 
used to prosecute writers, journalists and political activists who challenged the 
government's policies in the southeast. 
33 A great blow to political freedom in 
Turkey came with the banning of the Kurdish-based Democracy Party and the 
29 Bandow, op. cit., p32. 
30 Chomsky, op. cit., pp. 8 and 13. 
31 Amnesty International Report 1997, Turkey, see: 
http: //www. amnesty. org/ailib/aireport/ar97/EUR44. htm 
Human Rights Watch Reports, Turkey, 1994-5-6, for more details see: 
http: //www. hrw. org/reports/1995/WR95/HELSINKI-16. htm#P655_198257, 
http: //www. hrw. org/reports/1996/WR96/Helsinki-19. htm#P960193943 and 
http//www. hrw. org/reports/1997/WR974FiELSINK-17. htm#P6_74_209013. Also Bandow, op. cit., 
36. 
2 Id 
33 Amnesty international, supra note 31. 
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subsequent trial of seven of its parliamentary representatives and one 
independent 34 
Disappearances while in police custody or after being detained had 
occurred very often. 35 In recent years, the Turkish military has destroyed and 
burned about 3000 villages and has prosecuted its own campaign of ethnic 
cleansing. 36 Forced migration became a great problem for the Kurdish population 
of south-eastern Turkey. The internally displaced people varied between 2.5 and 3 
million people, along with unknown numbers who had fled the country. 
37 Tens of 
thousands are estimated to have died in conflict 38 The Council of Europe and the 
European Court of Human Rights had regularly issued judgements finding Turkey 
"responsible for burning villages, inhuman and degrading treatment, and 
appalling failures to investigate allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of the 
securityforces ". 
39 
Turkey is responsible for all the above "crimes against humanity". This 
phrase has been used many times by the NATO allies in the case of Kosovo, but 
they turned a blind eye on Turkey's worse and more appalling crimes. Instead of 
bombing Turkey or imposing an arms embargo, or even just doing nothing, the 
United States of America and the rest of NATO countries has armed it to the teeth 
and downplayed the repression 
40 How could one explain this stance of the US, the 
34 Human Rights Watch, supra note 31. 
33 Amnesty International ad Human Rights Watch, supra note 31. 
36 Eric Herring, From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords: NATO's War against Serbia and Its 
Aftermath, in Ken Booth (eds. ), The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, London, 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 238. Also Cohn, op. cit., p. 103, Chomsky, op. cit., p. 52, and Bandow, 
op. cit., p. 36 and Human Rights Watch, supra note 31. 
3 Chomsky, op. cit., p. 54. 
38 Chomsky, op. cit., p. 52, Bandow, op. cit., p. 36, Herring, op. cit., p. 238, and Cohn, op. cit., p. 103. 
39 Chomsky, op. cit., p. 52. 
4° Herring, op. cit., p. 238. 
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"unchallenged" world representative of the "new humanitarianism"? Undoubtedly, 
the US did not want to punish its sole Middle-East Muslim ally. 41 The fact that the 
US had been the main provider of arm and economic supplies to Turkey reveals 
the US "humanitarian" concerns in the 90's. Neither the US, nor its Western allies 
tried to impose an arms embargo on Turkey, given its bad records of human rights. 
The fact that those weapons had been used against unarmed civilians did not 
restrain the free and democratic western states from selling arms to Turkey. The 
only US action had been a slight reduction to arms and other supplies. 
42 
At the same time, Turkey's human rights records are very bad for other 
violations of human rights. However, the US and the Europe "humanitarians" 
never considered a possible military intervention in Turkey to protect its citizens 
from Turkey's repression. In addition, Turkey has also engaged in ethnic cleansing 
in Cyprus, after its 1974 invasion and occupation of the northern part of the 
independent island. 43 Turkey still occupies 37% of the island and displaced 
between 170,000 to 200,000 ethnic Greek Cypriots, while 100,000 settlers from 
inner Turkey had moved to northern Cyprus. 44 Thousands of Cypriots have been 
killed and thousands more remain missing. 5 The refugees from the northern part 
have lost their property-46 All the above facts had happened in miscalculation of 
Turkey's international obligations under international law. The continuous 
breaches of laws and humanitarian norms by Turkey have never touched its 
western allies. Western states have not prevented Turkey from violating the 
41 Chomsky, op. cit., p. 10- 
42 Human Rights Watch, supra note 31. 
43 Bandow, op. cit., p. 36- 
44 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
45 id 
46 Ibid., p. 37. 
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principles of international law in Cyprus, which is illegally occupied for over thirty 
years by the Turkish military forces. 7 Yet, the US and the European allies of 
Turkey felt sensitive and obligated to act in Kosovo in order to promote and 
protect internationally recognised standards of human rights. 
Having all the above evidence on US and Europe's reluctance to protect 
human rights in Turkey and in other parts of the world, how convincing can the 
argument of intervention become on behalf of human rights? When Turkey 
consistently breaches international law and violates the minimum standards of 
human rights, western states turn a blind eye on these violations. This hypocrisy 
became more evident in 1991, when the US, UK and France had imposed the "Safe 
Havens" and the "no fly zones" in northern Iraq, with the purpose of protecting its 
Kurdish population from the Iraqi mistreatment. At the same time, the same 
countries did not do anything relevant in Turkey, where the population of Kurds is 
far greater than the one in Iraq. Moreover, the operation of the Turkish army was 
not better than Saddam's operation in northern Iraq. Yet, the West cynically and 
unscrupulously intervened in Iraq, while it had turned a blind eye on Turkey. An 
arms embargo had been imposed upon Iraq, but the same thing had not occurred 
for Turkey. Interestingly enough, Western states deemed the Iraqi Kurds capable 
of getting their protection, while they ignored the Kurds of Turkey. This fact is a 
strong proof who certifies the hypocrisy of western states and the falsehood of 
humanitarian intervention. 
47 Judith Rippler Bello, Juliane Kokott, and Beate Rudolf "Loizidou v. Turkey", American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 90, No 1, January 1996, p. 98-99. 
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Humanitarian intervention is vulnerable to such policies. Had such a 
doctrine existed, it would apply to each and every place of the world. But the fact 
that it only applies to places where vital interests of powerful states are at stake 
verifies that humanitarian intervention provides solely another potential abuse of 
the principle of non-intervention in international affairs. Some scholars would 
argue that even this calculation of interests and real politic can lead to a positive 
humanitarian outcome. They would further suggest that "doing something" is 
better than "doing nothing". Nevertheless, it seems that their arguments are vague 
and misleading. This is because they do not really believe that humanitarian 
intervention is a rule of international law. If they believed that there is such a 
norm, then they would not accept this selective form of interventions. Rules and 
laws apply equally to all states. However, state practice has proved that states 
apply the alleged doctrine of humanitarian intervention only when they calculate 
their own benefits. But humanitarian intervention is not a rule and it is quite 
difficult to become in the future. 
Kosovo has ruled out any possible options for the legality and legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention. A Latin dictum says that law comes out from injustice 
(ex injuria ius oritur). However, humanitarian intervention comes out from 
injustice. If it was just to intervene on behalf of the oppressed people around the 
world, then it would apply to each and every people. The fact that some people are 
worth of protecting them, while some others are not, illustrates the injustice of this 
doctrine of "state hypocrisy". People are told that everybody is equal before the 
law. But the practice of humanitarian intervention rejects this view. Nevertheless, 
Kritsiotis thinks that the argument of selectivity "misconceives the theoretical 
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composition and traditional understanding of humanitarian intervention in 
international law, which has been framed as a right of states and not as an 
obligation requiring state action". 48 Accordingly, this is "why it is the right of - 
rather than the right to - humanitarian intervention". 
9 Although his argument 
seems persuasive, he does not actually reply to the problem of selectivity. The fact 
that states are not obliged to intervene does not mean that the selective protection 
of human rights can be acceptable. The selective defence of human right will 
always be reprehensible. Thus, it could be said that international law should not 
embrace and embody such a rule that topples classic values of law and justice. The 
practice of humanitarian intervention is contrary to legal norms and to morality. 
The pseudo-argument that humanitarian intervention is a moral choice is not 
simply a lie, but hypocrisy as well. Hence, the world community should reject any 
claim for the legitimacy of such an unlawful and immoral doctrine that aims to 
legitimise interests of powerful states under the pretext of human rights. Or, if the 
world community adopts in the future a new rule in favour of humanitarian 
intervention, then this rule should apply to every place on earth, not only in places 
where vital interest are at stake. 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? 
The fact that this thesis criticises the US and other European states for their 
hypocritical and selective defence of human rights does not mean that it is in 
48 Kritsiotis, op. cit., p. 1027. 
49 Id 
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favour of intervention against Croatia (Krajina), Turkey (intervention on behalf of 
the Kurds) and other parts where gross violations of human rights have taken 
place. On the other hand, this thesis welcomes the fact that the world community 
has sought for a political solution to such crises. As already said in a previous 
chapter, one of the best ways to assure respect fro human rights is education. The 
use of military force to protect human rights is not a prudent choice. Thus, the last 
part of this chapter will deal with another alternative to the use of force. This is the 
non-military intervention by world community in general, or by regional 
organisations in particular. Accordingly, this last part explores the situation in 
Turkey, a state that massive human rights violations have taken place but no 
military action was undertaken by western states. 
First of all, it could be argued that European regional organisations and 
more specifically the European Union had shifted the Turkish policy towards 
respect and protection of human rights. In the 2004 Amnesty International report, it 
is noted that "important legal reform packages (known as the "harmonisation 
laws') relating to human rights protection and aimed at meeting the criteria for 
accession to the European Union continued to be introduced by the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government. Implementation of the reforms was uneven 
and it was too early to gauge significant progress of human rights as a result of the 
legislation" 50 Further, Turkey ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 51 It is obvious that the EU Copenhagen criteria for 
50 Amnesty International Report 2004, Turkey. 
51 Id 
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acceding countries have attained a significant shift in Turkey's human rights 
policy. Although it is very early to reach the desirable goals, it could be argued that 
Turkey is on its own way to guarantee democracy and human rights in this place. 
Turkey is a good example that non-forcible intervention can bring a 
desirable humanitarian outcome. The situation of the Kurds in the 80's and 90's is 
totally different from the situation today. Although it is early to assert that Kurds 
enjoy all their fundamental rights in Turkey today, it could be argued that the 
European regional organisations contributed enormously to the protection of their 
rights. What is more, if Turkey joins the European Union of the 25 democratic 
states, it will be obliged to enforce respect of human rights and the rule of law in a 
democratic society. Turkey is the proof and confirmation of effective non-military 
intervention. In Kosovo, six years after the NATO interventions the situation 
remains tense. Had NATO states intervened with peaceful means, the situation 
would be much better. Serbia and Montenegro is on its own way towards 
becoming a member to the European Union. Thus, it could be argued that the same 
intervention that sharply changed the Turkish policy towards the Kurds could have 
worked in the case of Kosovo. This thesis insists that the best way in dealing with 





AFTER KOSOVO, 9/11, AND IRAQ: THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
"Events since the end of the Cold War starkly show that the anti-interventionist regime has fallen 
out of sync with modern notions of justice. The Crisis in Kosovo illustrates this disjunction and 
America's new willingness to do what it thinks right - international law notwithstanding... The new 
system acknowledges something else the UN Charter overlooks: that the major threats to stability 
and well-being now come from internal violence as or more often than they do from cross-border 
fighting - and that to be effective, international law needs to stop the former as well as the latter... 
It is therefore dangerous for NATO to unilaterally rewrite the rules by intervening in domestic 
conflicts on an irregular, case-by-case basis. " 
Michael J. Glennon' 
"It is a mistake to site Article 2(7) of the U. N. Charter as a ban on intervention 'in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, for this restraint does not apply when 
the Security Council decides to impose `enforcement measures' under Chapter VII of the charter. 
Thus Glennon is wrong to argue that the rules bar action to halt intrastate violence: they simply 
require that the intervention first be approved by the Security Council. " 
Thomas M. Franck2 
After the end of World War II and the creation of the UN, the principle of 
non-intervention and respect to state sovereignty became the pivotal norm of the 
world community. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter had banned the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state. The 
Charter had provided for only two exceptions to the above rule: self-defence under 
1 Michael J. Glennon, "The New Interventionism", Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, No. 3,1999, pp. 2-7. 
2 Thomas M. Franck, "Break It, Don't Fake It", Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, No. 4,1999, pp. 116. 
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Article 51, and UN enforcement action when the Council finds a threat to 
international peace and security under Article 42. During the Cold War there are 
many instances that intervention had been justified on humanitarian claims. 
Among the best instances of alleged humanitarian intervention, as regards the 
magnitude of human suffering and violations of human rights, is India's 
intervention in East Pakistan (1971), Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea (1978), 
and Tanzania's intervention in Uganda (1979). However, in all instances 
intervening states had failed to explicitly assert a right to humanitarian 
intervention, but relied primarily on other justifications. There is no alleged 
humanitarian intervention during the Cold War that an intervening state had 
justified its intervention primarily on humanitarian concerns. What is more, 
discussion before the UN Security Council for a matter traditionally considered 
internal was improbable, given the devotion of states in Article 2(7) and respect to 
the internal affairs of states, as well as respect to the principle of non-intervention. 
Nevertheless, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
war, the world community has witnessed an enhanced UN Security Council 
involvement in matters traditionally regarded internal. This practice had signalled 
an era that human rights issues would be on the top of the political agendas and a 
coming boom of alleged humanitarian interventions. Although Brownlie had noted 
that humanitarian intervention is an old-fashioned intervention, state practice in 
3 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 74,78 and 79-80. Also Sean D. Murphy, 
Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, pp. 99,103,104,105. 
` Ian Brownlie, The Principle of Non-Use of Force in Contemporary International Law", in 
William E. Butler (ed), The Non-Use of Force in International Law, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1989, p. 26. 
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the 90's disconfirmed his valuation. On the contrary, there was a boom of alleged 
humanitarian interventions in the end of the 20th century and intervention to protect 
human rights dominated the debates and practice of states in their international 
relations. Some Security Council resolutions had authorised intervention in order 
to halt massive repression and violation of human rights. 
5 Thus, it had been the 
first time that the Security Council had authorised UN "collective humanitarian 
interventions". But the fact that the Council had authorised intervention in places 
where human rights violations have taken place does not mean that humanitarian 
intervention outside the Council's realm is permissible. These developments in 
international affairs did not signal the creation of a "unilateral" right to 
humanitarian intervention. However, these changes had illustrated that a more 
drastic involvement of states in matters previously seen internal (cases of massive 
human suffering). Thus, it could be argued that there were signs of normative 
changes in the concept of state sovereignty and that human rights were no longer 
an internal matter of states, but a concern of the world community. Gross 
violations of fundamental rights might lead the Council to enforcement action to 
restore international peace and security. As a result, the Council's action imposed 
restraints upon state sovereignty and the rule non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of states. 
In Iraq, although no authorisation had been granted, the Council recognised 
for the first time that the transboundary implications of a humanitarian crisis can 
S S/Res/794 (1992), 3 December 1992, S/Res/814 (1993), 26 March 1993, S/Res/929 (1994), 22 
June 1994, S/Res/940 (1994), 31 July 1994, S/Res/1264 (1999), 15 September 1999. 
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pose a threat to international peace and security. 
6 In other words, refugees coming 
from humanitarian crises can threaten international peace and security and the 
Council is competent to intervene. After Iraq, Resolution 770 authorised the all 
measures necessary to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 
7 The next 
significant step had been the adoption of resolution 794 on Somalia. In this 
resolution, the Council acknowledged that the magnitude of the human tragedy in 
Somalia caused a threat to international peace and security and authorised the use 
of force to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in 
Somalia! This was the first time that the Council had authorised the use of force 
for clearly humanitarian reasons, although the use of a special wording diminished 
the prospects for precedent setting and future Security Council action in other 
similar situations. The failure of the UN in Somalia led to inaction in Rwanda, 
where bloody genocide was taking place. Yet, the Council has authorised the use 
of force in order to halt the massacres, but the response was belated. 
9 The third 
case that the Council had authorised the use of force had been Haiti and the 
restoration of democracy in this country. 1° Last but not least, the Council has 
authorised the use of force in East Timor (with the consent of the Indonesian 
government). 11 
However, there are several other cases that the Security Council did not 
authorise the use of force, but it had acted under Chapter VII of the Charter to 
impose arm embargoes, as well as economic and diplomatic sanctions. What is 
6 S/RES/688 (1991), 5 April 1991. 
7 S/RES/770 (1992), 13 August 1992. 
B S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
9 S/RES/929, (1994), 22 June 1994. 
10 S/Res/940 (1994), 31 July 1994. 
11 S/Res/1264 (1999), 15 September 1999. 
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more, it decided the establishment and dispatch of peacekeeping operations and 
security forces. Apart from the above named countries, this category also includes 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and various other countries. In Bosnia, for instance, 
the Council had imposed an arms embargo, 12 established the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 13 called for economic sanctions against Serbia, 14 
called upon states to take all measures necessary to facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, 15 and imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia. 16 In Kosovo, 
the Council had been involved three times before and one after the conflict, but no 
authorisation had been granted to NATO states because of the Russian and Chinese 
strong opposition. There are various other resolutions regarding other states for 
similar humanitarian issues. 
The revocation of the above practice of the UN Security Council in matters 
traditionally seen domestic affairs of states had a sole purpose: the illustration of 
the Council's intensive occupation with humanitarian crises. No doubt, state 
practice, as well as the Council's practice in the 90's has illustrated the will of the 
world community to protect human rights from massive abuses and violations. 
Many times the sovereignty of states had become restricted because of 
humanitarian concerns. The question here is whether these normative changes in 
the world community and the Security Council reflect a new none in international 
law, or not. It could be argued that these developments signify the trend of the 
world community towards a more effective protection of human rights. It would be 
12 S/Resn13 (1991), 25 September 1991. 
13 S/Res/743 (1992), 21 February 1992. 
14 S/Res/757 (1992), 30 May 1992. 
15 S/Res/770 (1992), 13 August 1992. 
16 S/Res/781(1992), 9 October 1992. 
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premature, however, to claim that these changes declare a new era of humanitarian 
intervention. In all these interventions after the end of the Cold War, although they 
verify the world community's willingness to intervene with the purpose of 
protecting human rights from massive violations, there is evident reluctance and 
opposition of many states to accept such a right. This becomes evident from 
various Security Council resolutions, where member states recall Article 2(7) and 
devote their respect to it and where they stress the "extraordinary", "exceptional" 
and "unique" character of such interventions. 
17 What is more, only few states and 
sporadically spoke of a right of humanitarian intervention in international law. 
In Kosovo, where interventionism of the 90's had reached its peak, the 
same intervening states had renounced that the Kosovo intervention be a precedent 
for future interventions. Kosovo had challenged numerous debates regarding 
matters of legality, as well as morality. It had been the first time since the creation 
of the UN that a regional organisation of 16 democratic states intervened militarily, 
bypassing the authority of the Security Council, to halt ethnic cleansing within a 
state. 18 This had been a unique opportunity for the crystallisation of a new right, 
the right of humanitarian intervention. However, the same NATO states not only 
did not invoke this right, but they consistently repeated that NATO intervention 
should be seen as an exceptional one, rather than rule. 19 Further, before the ICJ, 
" S/Res/688 (1991), 5 April 1991, S/Res/794 (1992), 3 December 1992, S/Res/929 (1994), 22 June 
1994, S/Res/940 (1994), 31 July 1994, S/Res/1264 (1999), 15 September 1999. 
1s Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: Emergent Norm, Moral Duty or 
the Coming Anarchy? ", International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1,2001, p. 113. 
19 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 174. Adam 
Roberts, "NATO's `Humanitarian War' over Kosovo", Survival, vol. 41, No. 3,1999, p. 107. 
Catherine Guicherd, "International Law and the War in Kosovo", Survival, vol. 41, No. 2,1999, 
p. 20. Mary Ellen O'Connell, "The UN, NATO and International Law after Kosovo", Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. 22,2000, p. 57. Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for 
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only Belgium raised claims of a right of humanitarian intervention in international 
law. Moreover, there had been many reactions of various states across the world 
against NATO action. 0 The fact that the world community is not ready to accept 
such a right, however, does not mean that interventionism in the 90's is ignored or 
nullified. On the contrary, this practice proves that the Council is competent to 
authorise intervention for humanitarian purposes, when it finds a threat to the 
peace. This is a significant step towards UN collective humanitarian intervention. 
Yet, humanitarian intervention lacking the Council's authorisation remains 
impermissible in international law. This is because there is no provision in 
international law for such a right, nor is there is no sign that from alleged 
humanitarian interventions in the past emerged such a right as a customary law, 
given the lack of opinio juris in these situations. Yet, the fact that the world 
community did not accept this practice as legal does not rule out the possibility of 
accepting it on the future. 
Thus, it is clear from the above that international law bans unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. But what about the oppressed people who are facing 
suffering and expect from the world community to alleviate this suffering? First of 
all, human rights are no longer an internal matter of states, but an international one. 
There are provisions for the promotion and protection of human rights in several 
treaties and conventions and declarations. 21 Thus, it could be said that states are 
Incremental Change, in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert 0. Keohane (eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, 
Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 239. 
Chesterman, op. cit., p. 216. 
20 23d Annual Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77, Ministerial 
Declaration, 24 September 1999. For further details see: http: //www. g77. org/Docs/DecII999. html. 
S/PV. 3988,24 March 1999, S/PV. 4011,10 June 1999. 
21 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR etc. 
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obliged to respect those rights. But the best way in dealing with humanitarian 
crises is to follow non-forcible approaches. Although human rights obligations are 
erga omnes of states, there are no provisions for forcible countermeasures. The 
only legitimate use of force for the protection of human rights is the US Security 
Council enforcement action. But the use of force could only bring a positive 
outcome of a temporary nature. Thus the world community should try to alleviate 
the suffering of people by peaceful means, rather than the use of force. 
Accordingly, education in troubled societies would be a good starting point. 
Further, the work of regional organisations could contribute greatly to respect and 
protection of human rights. 
Yet, it is obvious that state sovereignty in the current legal system does not 
mean that a government can mistreat its people and that human suffering will 
happen and no one has the right to stop it because it could be considered 
intervention in the internal affairs of states. Article 2(7) is not a ban to UN Security 
Council enforcement action. It is clearly stated in this article. Thus, the Security 
Council can legitimately authorise intervention to halt massive violations of human 
rights, if these violations and their transboundary consequences threaten 
international peace and security. This is, at least, what the practice of alleged 
"collective humanitarian intervention" in the 90's indicates. But again, this is not 
what could be considered a "pure" humanitarian intervention. This is because the 
Security Council responds to threats to international peace and security. In other 
words, if a humanitarian crisis does not cause a threat to international peace, it 
would not satisfy the criteria for UN Security Council enforcement action. 
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Let us now consider what the future of humanitarian intervention could be 
after several challenges and changes in the world community. It could be argued 
that humanitarian intervention is in its sunset and its prospects are in question. 
Humanitarian intervention had reached its apogee with the 1999 NATO 
intervention in Kosovo. However, everything that flourishes will face its decline. 
The present chapter has to detect the facts that led to this unexpected decline. 
Before examining the new challenges posed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the 
US and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would be appropriate to seek 
facts within the realm of humanitarian intervention that limited its prospects. First 
and foremost, although there had been an increased Security Council involvement 
in humanitarian crises, the world community did not manage to accept a right of 
humanitarian intervention. Thus, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention lost a 
unique opportunity to become a right in extremely favouring circumstances. 
Nowadays, that the world community is devoted to the war against terrorism and 
the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the emergence of such a right 
becomes much more unlikely. 
Secondly, this kind of interventionism had actually met failure many times. 
This fact had impelled states to consider in depth whether intervention will meet 
success or failure and public reaction and opposition. In Somalia for instance, 
failure is the only word that can describe the outcome of the UN intervention. 22 As 
22 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris, Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the end 
of the Cold War, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds. ), International Society After the Cold War: 
Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, Basingstoke-England, McMillan, 1996, pp. 156-157. Jonathan 
Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia? ", Foreign Policy, Summer 1993, vol. 91, p. 138. Mohamed 
Sahnoun, Mixed Intervention in Somalia and the Great Lakes, Culture, Neutrality, and the Military, 
in Jonathan Moore (ed. ), Hard Choices, Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, Lanham 
Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, p. 98. And Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the 
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long as US troops became vulnerable to domestic reactions, the US president 
announced the withdrawal of the US forces. 
23 The decision to intervene was 
sharply criticised, since intervening states could not attain their humanitarian goals. 
This failure had been reflected in Rwanda, where the world community had been 
reluctant to intervene to halt genocide, given the preceding failure in Somalia. 
4 
Later, in Haiti, the US achieved under the threat of an imminent invasion under the 
auspices of the UN to remove the military junta and restore democratic order. 
25 
However, almost ten years later, there was public unrest and deterioration of the 
humanitarian intervention in Haiti. The OAS immediately condemned the violence 
in Haiti, deplored the loss of life, and expressed its support for constitutional order 
in Haiti, as well as its firm support for the Government of the President of Haiti, 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in its efforts to restore public order by constitutional 
means. 26 Nevertheless, Aristide was forced to resign and leave the country, while a 
transitional government took office. The Security Council decided to support this 
transitional government with the establishment of the United Nations Stabilisation 
Future of Humanitarian Intervention, Centre of International Studies, Monograph Series, No9, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1. 
23 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: 
A Reconceptualisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 212. Also Wheeler, op. cit., p. 198. 
24 Morris and Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 156-157. 
u Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, "Disobedient Generals and the Politics of 
Redemocratisation: The Clinton Administration and Haiti", Political Science Quarterly", vol. 112, 
No3, autumn 1997, p. 380. Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians, US Interventions from 
Northern Iraq to Kosovo, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 93. Fernando R. 
Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2°d edition, New York, 
Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 252. Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, "You, the People": 
Pro-Democratic Intervention in International Law, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth (eds. ), 
Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge, University Press, 2000, p. 286. Also 
Murphy, op. cit., p. 271. 
26 Organisation of American States, Permanent Council Resolution on Haiti, CP/Res. 861 (1400/04). 
For more details see: http: //www. oas. org/consejo/resolutions/res861. asp. 
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Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 27 These developments represent the long-term 
outcome of the brilliant pro-democratic intervention. 
Further, the 1999 intervention in Kosovo did not bear the promising fruits. 
Five years after the end of the conflict the world community did not manage to 
achieve peace in this troubled region. Although ethnic cleansing of Kosovo 
Albanian has halted, another ethnic cleansing commenced: Kosovo Albanians have 
forced the Serbs and Roma to flee the country under the auspices of UNMIK and 
KFOR. The future status of this province is still uncertain and the world 
community will have to deal with another difficult task. Furthermore, worldwide 
criticism of NATO's tactics, reports of NGO's denouncing violations of 
humanitarian laws, and public reaction had shown the vulnerability of 
humanitarian intervention 28 After this promising NATO intervention one would 
expect the continuation of this practice. However, just after the aftermath of the 
Kosovo conflict, the world community manifested its reluctance in intervening in 
another massacre with much more victims of human rights violations and 
casualties, East Timor. The Australian led forces intervened in East Timor only 
after obtaining the consent of the Indonesian government and a Security Council 
authorisation. 29 The belated response in East Timor and the reluctance of the world 
community towards intervention had been the result of post-Kosovo practice. The 
same happened in Rwanda after the failure of the UN authorised force in Somalia. 
27 S/Res/I542 (2004), 30 April 2004. 
'g Amnesty International, "Collateral Damage" or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of 
War by NATO during Operation Allied Force. See: 
http: //web. amnesty. org/library/index/ENGEUR700182000. Also Human Rights Watch, Civilian 
Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, for further details go to the link: 
http: //www. hrw. org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200. htm. 
29 S/Res/1264 (1999), 15 September 1999. 
411 
This reflects the problems and objections associated with humanitarian 
intervention, its questions of legitimacy, its effectiveness and the difficulty in 
attaining the humanitarian goals. 
The above facts represent another vulnerability of humanitarian 
intervention. Most of these interventions in the 90's did not manage to attain a 
long-term goal. Humanitarian interventions should not focus only on the instant 
relief of oppressed populations, but should seek for long-term objectives. Yet, the 
practice after the end of the Cold War disproves the above assertion. A good 
illustration is the recent overthrown of the Haitian president, as well as the 
impotence of the world community to achieve a multi-ethnic and a tolerant society 
in Kosovo. In Iraq, France, UK and US had imposed the no-fly zones, but they 
never urged for a permanent solution to the political problem of the Iraqi Kurds. 
Maybe the 2003 intervention and occupation of Iraq will solve this issue, but it will 
not be the result of the 1993 "collective humanitarian intervention". Moreover, 
intervention in Somalia did not attain its goals of nation building, disarmament of 
factions and capture of uncooperative faction leaders. 30 Although the above goals 
aimed to a long-term solution, they met failure. 31 Thus, it could be said that 
ineffectiveness of humanitarian interventions is one factor that led to its decline. 
Another issue that makes humanitarian intervention problematic is the issue 
of selectivity, as well as the calculation of national interest and power politics. The 
world community had been eager to intervene in Bosnia in 1992, but its belated 
intervention in Somalia and later the total reluctance for intervention in Rwanda 
30 Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, 
The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 172. 
31. Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., pp. 156-157, Abiew, op. cit., p. 172, and Stevenson, op. cit., p. 138. 
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sketch out the above problems. Furthermore, ignorance and indifference in East 
Timor had been the result of the enthusiastic and promising intervention in 
Kosovo. The NATO crusaders that twice felt ethically committed to intervene in 
Yugoslavia in order to protect the Bosnian Muslims and to halt ethnic cleansing of 
the Kosovo Albanians had never felt morally bound to halt ethnic cleansing in 
Krajina and to remove the Croat president Tudjman that was equally criminal to 
Milosevic. 32 On the contrary, the US and its allies assisted the Croatian army's 
Operation Storm. 33 Finally, the US, UK and French forces deemed crucial to 
intervene in northern Iraq with the purpose of protecting its Kurdish population 
from massive violations of human rights, deportation of its population, and 
casualties of a human tragedy. However, the same countries did not intervene in 
southeast Turkey, where the Turkish forces and police had committed equal crimes 
against the Kurdish population. 34 Turkey is a country with very bad human rights 
records. Yet, Turkey is a NATO ally and it is not in the US, UK and French 
interest to invade their valuable ally. This selective intervention of states means 
that either human rights of some people are more worth than others, or that states 
only intervene where there are interests at stake. All people are equal before the 
law. Thus, the selective defence of human rights verifies that humanitarian 
32 Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, Lessons from Kosovo, Monroe ME, Common 
Courage Press, 1999, p. 26. James George Jatras, NATO's Myths and Bogus Justifications for 
Intervention, in Ted Galen, Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's Empty Victory, A Postmortem on the Balkan 
War, Washington D. C., CATO Institute, 2000, p. 26. Marjorie Cohn, "NATO Bombing of Kosovo: 
Humanitarian Intervention or Crime against Humanity? ", International Journal for the Semiotics of 
Law, vol. 15,2002, p. 103. Also Roberts, op. cit., p. 108. 
33 Cohn, op. cit., p. 103 and Jatras, op. cit., p. 27. 
34 Doug Bandow, NATO's Hypocritical Humanitarianism, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed. ), NATO's 
Empty Victory, A Postmortem on the Balkan War, Washington D. C., CATO Institute, 2001, p. 32 
and 36. Eric Herring, From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords: NATO's War against Serbia and 
Its Aftermath, in Ken Booth (eds. ), The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, London, 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 238. Also Cohn, op. cit., p. 103, and Chomsky, op. cit., pp. 8,13 and 
52. 
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intervention is not a right, because it does not apply to all state entities and their 
citizens, but few that are favoured by power politics. 
In addition, many times the means of humanitarian intervention were 
against the humanitarian ends. Accordingly, in the 1999 NATO intervention in 
Kosovo, NATO states had been liable to critics of states, NGO's, lawyers and 
public for their war tactics. Among the critics had been the aerial campaign from 
high altitudes that cannot support the humanitarian objective of halting ethnic 
cleansing. 35 Further, the use of weaponry with highly questionable effect for 
humanitarian purposes had been actually paradoxical. Thus, NATO had been 
criticised for the use of depleted uranium and cluster bombs. 
36 Moreover, the high 
number of civilian casualties also constitutes a black spot in NATO's 
intervention. 37 Humanitarian interventions promise by definition to protect the 
non-combatants. NATO did not only bomb Serb civilians, but also the Kosovo 
Albanians that it had been engaged to protect. The bombing of refugee conveys 
totally collides with the NATO promises. 38 What is more, the bombing of civilian 
infrastructure and public utilities39, hospitals and the bombing of the Yugoslav car 
35 Amnesty International, "Collateral Damage" or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of 
War by NATO during Operation Allied Force. See: 
http: //web. amnesty. org/library/index/ENGEUR700182000 Also Anne Orford, Muscular 
Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism, "European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10,1999, p. 681. Also Christine M. Chinkin, "Kosovo: A Good or a Bad 
War? ", American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 844. 
36 Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, for further details go to the 
link: http: //www. hrw. org/reports/2000/natoNatbm2OO. htm. Also AI Report, supra note 33. 
37 AI Report and HRW Report, supra notes 33 and 34. 
38 Al Report, supra note 33. 
39 Richard A. Falk, "Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law", American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 93, No4, October 1999, p. 85 1. Also Murphy, op. cit., p. 632 and Chinkin, 
op. cit., p. 852. 
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industry (Zastava)40 are very controversial and cannot reconcile with the 
humanitarian objectives of the alliance. But Kosovo is not the only intervention 
that raised such questions. The Recklessness of intervening states in Somalia led to 
a large number of civilian casualties in only one day. 
41 Thus, it is clear from the 
above that many times the means of humanitarian interventions often collide with 
the humanitarian ends. 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AFTER 9/11 
To this extent, most factors that lead to the decline of this practice of 
humanitarian intervention have been stressed out. But new challenges in the world 
community have taken place and they have ruled out any interest for future 
humanitarian interventions. Five years after the Kosovo and the debates about 
humanitarian intervention do not have the same vividness and optimistic 
splendour. Some scholars have argued that after the 9/11 attacks in US 
humanitarian intervention has declined and the fight against terrorism and states 
that foster terrorism had subrogated it 42 Nevertheless, this contention does not 
40 Dino Kritsiotis, "The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Armed Force against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 49,2000, 
p. 355. 
4i Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 195. loan M. Lewis, Making History in Somalia: 
Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless Society, London, Centre for the Study of Global 
Governance, London School of Economics, 1994, p. 13. Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from 
Chaos, Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p. 81. Also 
DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 47 and Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 212. 
42Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 2. Also Tom J. Farer, 
Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy, in J. L. Holzgrefe and 
Robert Keohane(eds. ), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 53. 
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reflect the whole true, but just a part of it. The collapse of the myth of 
humanitarian intervention had occurred much earlier as a result of the oddities, 
failures and ambiguous outcomes of such interventions. The above analysis 
explains this proposition. Long before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the Bush 
administration declared that it was not interested in using the military for 
humanitarian or peace operations and it would not be in the business of state 
building. 43 Therefore, it could be said that other factors led the US administration 
to neglect this doctrine. Thus, it would be misleading to assert that the decay of 
humanitarian intervention is simply the post-9/11 outcome. 
No doubt, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have focused the US administration and 
other states towards the new challenges of the world community. Thus, this 
occupation of the world society with anti-terror had contributed to further 
weakening the practice of humanitarian intervention. War against terrorism had 
dominated the political agendas of states and world organisations. This thesis 
supports that war against terrorism will further reduce the possibilities for future 
humanitarian interventions in the 1999 Kosovo model, because such interventions 
collide with the anti-terror objectives. In other words, in 1999, NATO countries 
had supported the KLA, a guerrilla army heavily committed to terrorist action and 
until 1998 considered "a terrorist organisation" by the US Department of State 
44 
Yet, in 1999 there was an obvious shift in US policy towards the KLA. Since then, 
the US and NATO fell totally bound to assist the KLA "freedom fighters". 
43 Sung-han Kim, "The End of Humanitarian Intervention", Orbis -A Journal of World Affairs, 
vol. 47, No. 4,2003, p. 721. Also DiPrizio, op. cit., p. 169. 
" Edward McWhinney, The United Nations and a New World Order for a New Millennium: Self- 
Determination, State Succession, and Humanitarian Intervention, The Hague, the Netherlands, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 70. Maccgwire, "Why Did We Bomb Belgrade? ", International 
Affairs, vol. 76, No 1, January 2000, p. 7. 
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Five years after the end of the conflict, this NATO-favoured secessionist 
organisation (the ultimate goal of KLA had been Kosovo secession and unification 
with Albania4) had confirmed their extremist nature and they evoked the March 
2004 clashes, which had been condemned by NATO, UNMIK, UN and the world 
community as a whole. 46 Five years after the end of the conflict and the world 
community is inadequate to disarm these people. Now that the US policy focuses 
exclusively on counter-terrorism, US involvement in similar cases is ruled out. 
This is because one cannot simply fight terrorism while abandoning a terrorist 
organisation. Exactly the same thing exists for other interventions in the 90's, such 
as the 1991 intervention in northern Iraq (safe havens) and the 1999 intervention in 
East-Timor. It is now totally difficult, if not impossible, for the US foreign policy 
and its western allies to assist secessionist movements. Humanitarian intervention 
is strongly connected to secessionist struggles47 and most secessionist groups use 
terrorism as the only means for attaining their goals. Such a policy would be 
disastrous for the fight against terrorism, which is the major challenge of the world 
community after the 9/11 attacks. This is why this thesis supports that the 
prospects of humanitarian intervention had been eliminated after the 9/11 attacks. 
Let us now consider the factors that led to the decline of humanitarian 
intervention as a result solely from the 9/11. After 9/11 the Security Council has 
recognised the right of the US to act forcefully in its defence. 48 Although there was 
no explicit Security Council authorisation, the fact that a resolution affirmed the 
45 McWhinney, op. cit., p. 70 and Maccgwire, op. cit., p. 7. 
46 S/PV. 4942,13 April 2004. Also NATO, Press Release 2004 (045) on the Situation in Kosovo, 18 
March 2004, for further details see: http: //www. nato. int/docu/pr/2004/p04-045e. htm. Also UNMIK, 
Press Release UNMIK/PR/1142,18 March 2004, also available on the net: www. unmikonline. org. 
47 Farer, op. cit., p. 58. 
48 S/Res/1373 (2001), 28 September 2001. 
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inherent right of self-defence gave a legal basis to US intervention in Afghanistan. 
However, in September 2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration 
had adopted the doctrine of preemptiveness 
49 This new doctrine of the US agenda 
claims that the US has the right to pre-emptively use force in its defence against an 
imminent threat to its national security-50 This doctrine of pre-emption turns 
against other states associated with terrorism51, especially when there are concerns 
about weapons of mass destruction getting into terrorist hands that would produce 
casualties far greater than those of 9/11.52 Among the various US justifications for 
the use of force in Iraq, had been the preventive war against an imminent threat, in 
relation to UN Security Council resolution relating biochemical, chemical and 
nuclear disarmament. 
53 
It is not proper to examine whether intervention in Iraq or the doctrine of 
pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence is lawful or not. As Stromseth argued, we 
are at a difficult and precarious transitional moment in the international legal 
system governing the use of force. 
54 The consequences, however, of the Iraq 
invasion for international law and order will depend on the future behaviour of the 
49 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, Washington DC, 
2002. 
S0 Miriam Sapiro, "Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defence", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 67, No. 3, July 2003, p. 599. Adam Roberts, "Law and the Use of Force after 
Iraq", Survival, vol. 45, No. 2, summer 2003, p. 45. 
51 Jonathan I. Charney, "The Use of Force against Terrorism and International Law", American 
Journal ofInternational Law, vol. 95, No. 4, October 2001, p. 835. 
52 Richard A. Falk, "What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention? ", American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, p. 592. Jane E. Stromseth, "Law and Force 
after Iraq", American Journal of International Law, vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, p. 634. Also Kim, 
op. cit., p. 721 and 732, Roberts, op. cit., pp. 33,40,46. 
53 S/Res/1441 (2002), 8 November 2002. Falk, op. cit., p. 592, Roberts, op. cit., p. 39, and Sapiro, 
op. cit., p. 599. 
54 Stromseth, op. cit., pp. 629 and 634. 
418 
Bush administration and its successors. 55 Yet, the only thing sure is that this 
doctrine of preemptiveness, as well as the linkage of terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction have dominated the US agenda and curtailed the possibility for 
future concerns of humanitarian intervention 56 It is easier for the US 
administrations to convince its public for intervention when there are concerns of 
internal security, rather than external humanitarian concerns. The new form of 
interventionism and hegemonism in the new millennium is the war on terrorism 
and the fear of weapons of mass destruction falling into terrorist hands. This 
proposition is adequate to persuade the publics for the necessity to recourse to war, 
in order to prevent a future tragedy. The new challenges not only focus upon anti- 
terror, but they also eliminate the possibilities for future humanitarian 
interventions. 
This is because the US will be able to intervene in places such as the 
Middle East and Africa, not for humanitarian purposes, but as a part of its anti- 
terrorism campaign and its anticipatory self-defence. Farer thinks that the post- 
9/11 reading of the Afghan text provides a new non-humanitarian angle for 
visualising the US in places like Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan Congo and 
Liberia. 57 Of course, this list could be expanded in other African countries, as well 
as Middle Eastern, such as Syria or Iran. Thus, it could be argued that the one and 
only superpower has found a reason for intervening in troubled places and failed 
states across the world and restore order. The US can point out the consequences 
55 Tom J Farer, "The Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq", American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, p. 627. 
sb Thomas G. Weiss, "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a 
Unipolar Era", Security Dialogue, vol. 35, No. 2, June 2004, pp. 135-136. Also Kim, op. cit., p. 721. 
57 Tom J Farer, "Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condominium? ", American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 96, No. 2, April 2002, p. 362. 
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of terrorist threats deriving from such states and advance claims of democratic 
society and liberation of the target state. This had been the case of Iraq, where 
claims on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction fell into a lacuna. However, 
the Bush administration had a good reasoning in convincing the American public 
for intervention in Iraq. The fear of future terrorist attacks can persuade a 
"threatened" nation that military intervention is necessary. 
SUDAN: AN EPILOGUE AND EPITAPH TO THE "MILITARY 
HUMANISM" 
A good illustration of this obvious decline of humanitarian intervention is 
Sudan. The war between the Sudanese army and the Sudan people's Liberation 
Army (SPLA) that began in 1983 had cost at least half a million dead and 1.5 
million refugees. 58 The very bad human rights records of Sudan, especially in the 
new millennium, are much worse than the ones in Kosovo and other places that 
western states deemed necessary to intervene in the 90's in order to protect 
fundamental human rights. Accordingly, the war between the government forces 
and the SPLA (a secessionist movement) led to a series of human rights abuses. 
The list includes indiscriminate killings of civilians, torture, abductions, rapes, 
destroyed houses, looting of property, destruction of livestock and crops and 
restricted humanitarian aid 59 What is more, consistent bombing of villages in the 
5g Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics 1945-2000,8t' edition, London, Longman, 2001, p. 664. 
39 Amnesty International, Sudan, 2003 Report, Covering events from January-December 2002, for 
more details see: http: //web. amnesty. org/report2003/Sdn-summary-eng. 
Also Amnesty International, Sudan, 2004 Report, Covering events from January-December 2003, 
see: http: //web. amnesty. org/report2004/sdn-summary-eng. 
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region of Darfur (south Sudan) forced the people to flee their homes and seek 
shelter within the region (internally displaced people), or in the neighbouring state 
of Chad 60 According to some estimates, approximately 200,000 refugees have fled 
to Chad 61 
The climax of the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan led to UN Security 
Council action. In May 2004 the Council expressed in a presidential statement its 
deep concern "of the continuing reports of large-scale violations of human rights 
and of international humanitarian law in Darfur, including indiscriminate attacks 
on civilians, sexual violence, forced displacement and acts of violence, especially 
those of ethnic dimension". 62 In addition, the Council adopted three resolutions, 
where it condemned all acts of violence and violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law by all parties in Sudan. 63 In 2004, two Security 
Council resolutions determined that the situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security and to the stability in the region. 64 Resolution 
1556 imposed an arms embargo on Sudan and endorsed the deployment of 
international monitors, including the protection force envisioned by the AU, to the 
Darfur area of Sudan under the leadership of the AU65 The European Union had 
Amnesty International, Report, Sudan, Arming the perpetrators of grave abuses in Darfur, for 
further details see: http: //web. amnesty. org/library/index/engafr541392004. 
601d 
61 S/RES/1556 (2004), 30 July 2004. 
62 S/PRST/2004/18,26 May 2004. 
63 S/RES/1547 (2004), 11 June 2004, S/RES/1556 (2004), 30 July 2004, S/RES/1564 (2004), 18 
September 2004. 
64 S/RES/1556 (2004), 30 July 2004, S/RES/1564 (2004), 18 September 2004. 
65 S/RES/1556 (2004), 30 July 2004. 
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also reaffirmed and strengthened an ongoing embargo on Sudan, imposed in 
1996.66 
In 2005, the Security Council passed many resolutions on Sudan, in which 
it determined that the situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security. On 24 March 2004, the Council decided to establish the United 
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). 67 Some days later, after deploring the 
situation in Sudan, the Council emphasised that "there can be no military solution 
to the conflict in Darfur' . 6s In this resolution, the Council decided to establish a 
Committee of the Security Council and asked the Secretary-General to appoint for 
a period of six months a Panel of Experts. 9 Last but not least, in another session it 
decided to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court. 70 In 2006 the Council passed a large number of 
resolutions regarding the situation is Sudan, but it did not adopt any other measures 
for attaining a possible humanitarian outcome. 
It is noteworthy that despite this ongoing humanitarian catastrophe, the 
Council did not authorise the use of force in order to halt the massive repression in 
Sudan. Although the situation resembles the ones of 90's that states intervened to 
protect human rights from massive abuses, today the world community does not 
seem willing to use force for humanitarian purposes. Some lawyers and political 
analysts could claim that this inaction has nothing to do with the decline of 
humanitarian intervention, but it is simply a matter of selectivity, which is strongly 
66 European Council, Common Position 2004/31/CFSP, concerning the imposition of an embargo 
on arms, ammunition and military equipment on Sudan, 9 January 2004. 
67 S/RES/1590 (2005), 24 March 2005. 
68 S/RES/1591 (2005), 29 March 2005. 
69 Id 
70 S/RES/1593 (2005), 31 March 2005. 
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connected to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, such an 
argument would be very uncritical. This is because the Council's intensive 
involvement in past crises had led to authorised or unauthorised interventions. But 
in the case of Sudan the only action is negligence. In the interventionism of the 
90's such a wording of a Council's resolution would guarantee intervention. There 
was a refugee flow and a determination of a threat to international peace and 
security, imposition of an arms embargo under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
dispatch of international monitoring team. What is more, there was the 
determination of "humanitarian catastrophe ", a word used quite often in the case 
of Kosovo. 
In addition, there is another element that favours intervention in the first 
place: resolutions 1556 and 1564 express their determination to do everything 
possible to halt a humanitarian catastrophe. " Such a determination was not even 
present in the case of Kosovo. This wording implies the potential authorisation of 
all necessary means under Chapter VII of the Charter. This is what the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General for the Sudan implied in the meeting of 
the Council. He supported that `political agreements may come too late to stop the 
rising violence and human suffering in the towns, villages and settlements in the 
field. I am afraid that the situation in Darfur may become unmanageable unless 
greater efforts are made both at the negotiating table and on the ground. The 
meeting of the Council planned for mid-November in Nairobi provides an excellent 
opportunity to get such robust measures started. Is it necessary? Yes, it is... It is 
duty of the international community to consider further action if the action taken 
71 S/RES/1556 (2004), 30 July 2004, S/RES/1564 (2004), 18 September 2004. 
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so far proves to be insufficient ". 'Z No doubt, his speech advances claims of the 
90's of a duty to intervene. Yet, his claims fell on deaf ears. The 15 members of 
the Council ignored his "hawkish" plans and adopted resolution 1574, which 
provided support for the efforts of the Government of Sudan and the SPLA for a 
political solution to the crisis 73 This resolution did not imply military intervention, 
nor did it evoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In other words, it ended any hopes 
for military intervention in Sudan. 
Western states would not neglect such an opportunity in the past decade, 
but today they are reluctant to use force for humanitarian purposes. The world 
community is preoccupied with the war against terrorism and Iraq. The 
humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan is not crucial for the US National Security 
Strategy, as it emerged after the 9/11 attacks. It is also not in the political agendas 
of other western states. Thus, the only option for Sudan is a non-forcible response. 
Only a political solution can bear long-term and positive outcomes. 
Interventionism of the past decade had confirmed that military intervention could 
only provide a short-lived humanitarian goal. It seems that western governments 
got their lessons from failures of such armed interventions in the 90's. Their choice 
now is to refrain from the use of force for humanitarian purposes. As a result, the 
world community supported political efforts for the resolution of the conflict, 
including ceasefire agreements and plans for a political settlement. Hence, it could 
be argued that Sudan reaffirms and signifies the decline of humanitarian 
intervention and constitutes its epitaph. 
n S/PV. 5071,4 November 2004. 
73 S/RES/1574 (2004), 19 November 2004. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To sum up, the prospects for humanitarian intervention are very doubtful. 
Many reasons have eliminated the possibilities for further expansion of the 
doctrine after its boom in the 90's. This thesis has addressed many problems of this 
doctrine that render its future prosperity highly ambiguous. Among those problems 
are the means of humanitarian intervention that collide with the humanitarian ends, 
instances of failed humanitarian interventions, the inability of such interventions to 
attain long-term goals, the problems of selectivity and interests and the impotence 
to crystallise a right of humanitarian intervention in the favouring circumstances 
after the end of the Cold War. What is more, recent trends and challenges of the 
world community render humanitarian intervention a tertiary issue in the realm of 
the use of force. Nowadays, the major challenges in the world are the war against 
terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the 
combination of which might cause a great tragedy. Expectedly, the publics, as well 
as their governments, do not pay as much attention to humanitarian crises as they 
did in the past, but they are occupied with the issue of terrorism. The US will 
intervene according to its doctrine of preemptiveness to each part of the world it 
deems necessary. Thus, instead of intervening in troubled places and failed states 
across the world, it can find an imminent threat coming out of the anarchy in one 
state, or from its "demonised" leader. 
In the past decade, the Security Council found that humanitarian crises can 
constitute a threat to international peace and security and enforced military 
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intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It could be argued that this is 
the fundamental normative change in the 90s and the only possible emerging norm 
in favour of humanitarian intervention. Yet, this practice of the council is confined 
in only three cases (Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti). The paucity of relevant instances 
and the elimination of this practice after 1999, however, do not support the 
emergence of a new norm in favour of humanitarian intervention. Wheeler and 
Morris think that "today, it is virtually inconceivable that the Security Council 
would oppose armed intervention to end genocide, mass killing and large-scale 
ethnic cleansing on the grounds that this violated a state's sovereign rights " 74 
Yet, the reluctance of the world community to intervene in Sudan disconfirms the 
above assertion. As they asserted, "the much vaunted claim that there is a 
`developing international norm' to protect civilians appears very hollow when 
viewed from the perspective of the millions who perished in the last ten years from 
genocide and war in Rwanda, the Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) " . 
75 
As regards "unauthorised" humanitarian intervention, it is clear from the 
analysis in the previous charters that such an action is illegal under international 
law. The emergence of such a norm seems unlikely to develop in the future. As 
illustrated in Chapter VII, Kosovo was a very bad precedent for humanitarian 
intervention. After a promising decade of enhanced engagement of the world 
community in humanitarian issues, Kosovo has strongly damaged the practice of 
74 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris, Justifying Iraq as a Humanitarian Intervention: The Cure 
is Worse than the Disease, forthcoming in W. P. S. Sidhu and Ramesh Thakur (eds. ), The Iraq Crisis 




humanitarian intervention. NATO intervention violated many of the pivotal 
premises of humanitarian intervention. As a result, its means were against the 
proclaimed humanitarian ends. In addition, peaceful avenues had not been 
exhausted prior the commencement of its aerial campaign against the FRY. Last 
but not least, the positive humanitarian outcome has not yet been attained, nor a 
long-term resolution of the conflict. NATO intervention in Kosovo has manifestly 
shown that force is not the appropriate method to enforce respect for human rights. 
As a result, the world community rejected the proclaimed right of "unilateral" 
humanitarian intervention, as illustrated in Chapter 6.76 This is why this thesis 
considers that moral and political caveats interrupt the emergence of a new legal 
norm. 
Do the above facts reflect the end of humanitarian intervention, or a 
temporary decline? It could be argued that it is premature to claim that the practice 
of humanitarian intervention is witnessing its end in the records of world affairs. 
Nevertheless, an evident and sharp decline is incontestable. Mistakes, omissions, 
incredibility and failure are the main components of this decline. The current 
occupation of the world community, and more specifically the sole superpower, 
the US, with war against terrorism further diminishes any possibility for future 
humanitarian intervention. But again, it is not prudent to say that this commitment 
of the world community and US to war against terrorism will annihilate 
humanitarian intervention. It would be uncritical and venturous to assert such a 
claim. This is not simply because there is no evidence and proof for the definite 
76 For instance the G77 denunciation of humanitarian intervention, as well as the General 
Assembly's resolution. 
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end of humanitarian intervention. There are some factors that might revive this 
doctrine after a period of time. 
If the world community is preoccupied with war against terrorism and the 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it does not mean that this will be 
the eternal challenge for international relations. State practice, as well as 
international law is not static. In the 90's humanitarian intervention had been the 
pivotal challenge of the world community, as regards the use of force. Nowadays, 
the war on terrorism has replaced and annihilated humanitarian intervention. What 
about tomorrow? It could be said that the war against terrorism will last until the 
US and its western allies intervene in "rogue states" in the Middle East and Africa 
and they accomplish their "civilising" mission and "democratisation". After the 
US, the sole superpower, and its allies make their rivals conform to their orders 
and interests, and then they might seek for alternative forms of the use of force to 
intervene in places where war against terrorism cannot be persuasive. For instance, 
after an effective control of the Middle East the US may wish to intervene in China 
that has nothing to do with terrorism, nor does it foster terrorists. Then, the 
prospects for a future humanitarian intervention in Tibet to halt massive violations 
of human rights, ethnic cleansing and mass exodus of refugees can become 
probable. After Kosovo, China is worried that what happened in Yugoslavia could 
occur in the future in Asia, especially in China, whose minority and human rights 
policies are always criticised by the US and its allies. " 
n Zhang Yunling, Whither the World Order after Kosovo?, in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh 
Thakur (eds. ), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, 
Collective Action, and International Citi_enship, New York, United Nations University Press, 2000, 
pp. 117 and 199. Also Franck, op. cit., pp. 117-118. 
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The above argument on a prospective intervention in China for 
humanitarian purposes is not improbable, but it is not certain as well. Nevertheless, 
this paradigm shows that humanitarian intervention may again become an 
imperative, after the US finishes its "civilising" and "liberalisation" mission and its 
war against terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere across the planet. After the 
war against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the 
US, as well as its allies, will find new forms of interventionism, or rely upon 
doctrines of the past, such as humanitarian intervention. Nobody can predict what 
the future form of the US hegemonism and interventionism will be. It will depend 
on future US administrations, as well as the challenges and trends of the world 
community. Hence, it could be argued that future revival of humanitarian 
intervention should not be ruled out. Yet, there is a certain estimate for the fortune 
of humanitarian intervention in the present and the near future. Humanitarian 
interventions in the 90's are still vulnerable to critics such as the instability in 
Kosovo and the problems concerning its future status, and the recent turbulence in 
Haiti. This form of interventionism had met sharp opposition. What is more, the 
war against terrorism has degraded any considerations for future humanitarian 
interventions. Accordingly, humanitarian intervention will decline in the political 
agendas for many years to come. 78 The possibility of an isolated instance of 
alleged humanitarian intervention, however, cannot disconfirm the above 
78 But these conclusions have to do primarily with western practice of humanitarian intervention. 
Thus, this estimate does not include the practice of humanitarian intervention in Africa, given the 
past ECOWAS military involvement in humanitarian crises (Liberia and Sierra Leone). Yet, the 
signs of the world community today indicate that this temporary decline of humanitarian 
intervention is also evident in the African political agendas (Sudan). Accordingly, the existing 
decline of humanitarian intervention relates to the general practice of humanitarian intervention 
(both western and African). 
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